the roughness of sailors, the pedantry of schoolmasters, and the frivolousness of beauties, we should learn to regard, with something of the same feelings, the selfishness and the cunning of kings. In the second place, we presume to think that the general adoption of these opinions as to the personal defects that are likely to result from the possession of sovereign power, may be of use to the sovereigns themselves, from whom the knowledge of their prevalence cannot be very long concealed. Such knowledge, it is evident, will naturally stimulate the better sort of them to counteract the causes which tend to their personal degradation, and enable them more generally to surmount their pernicious operation, by such efforts and reflections as have every now and then rescued some powerful spirits from their dominion, under all the disadvantages of the delusions with which they were surrounded. Finally, if the general prevalence of these sentiments as to the private manners and dispositions of sovereigns should have the effect of rendering the bulk of their subjects less prone to blind admiration, and what may be called personal attachment to them, we do not imagine that any great harm will be done. The less the public knows or cares about the private wishes of their monarch, and the more his individual will is actually consubstantiated with the deliberate sanctions of his responsible counsellors, the more perfectly will the practice of government correspond with its admitted theory, the more wisely will affairs be administered for the public, and the more harmoniously and securely both for the sovereign and the people. An adventurous warrior may indeed derive signal advantages from the personal devotedness and enthusiastic attachment of his followers; but in the civil offices of monarchy, as it exists in modern times, the only safe attachment is to the office, and to the measures which it sanctions. The personal popularity of princes, in so far as we know, has never done any thing but harm and indeed it seems abundantly evident, that whatever is done merely for the personal gratification of the reigning monarch, that would not have been done at any rate on grounds of public expediency, must be an injury to the community, and a sacrifice of duty to an unreturned affection; and whatever is forborne out of regard to his pleasure, which the interest of the country would otherwise have required, is in like manner an act of base and unworthy adulation. We do not speak, it will be understood, of trifles or things of little moment; but of public acts of the government that involve the honour or the interest of the nation. : 304 [We earnestly recommend the following article to the particular attention of the reader, as containing a mass of authentic information with respect to a subject at this time most peculiarly interesting. Let him not be deterred by its length from giving it a serious and wary perusal. It is evidently the production of a man who has had access to the best sources of knowledge, and cannot fail of throwing much light into the present state of many things, with which we in this country have been hitherto entirely unacquainted.] [From the Quarterly Review, for September, 1812.] A Brief Inquiry into the Causes of premature decay in our Wooden Bulwarks, with an Examination of the Means best calculated to prolong their Duration. By Richard Pering, Esq. of his Majesty's Yard at Plymouth Dock. 1812. Observations on the Expediency of Ship-building at Bombay for the service of his Majesty and of the East-India Company. By William Taylor Money, Esq. late Superintendant of the Marine at Bombay. 1811. THE interests of the British navy are closely entwined round the heart of every lover of his country, and not without reason; for in this invincible arm of his strength he sees the bulwark of his independence, his prosperity, and his glory. In the whole history of its transcendent exploits, brilliant as they always have been, never was its career more eminently distinguished by a rapid succession of victories than in the present war; never were its services more important and indispensable than when nothing was left for it to conquer-when it had driven from the ocean every ship of every foe, and rode triumphant and alone. At that moment Europe seemed to be irretrievably lost, when a British army, transported under the protection of British ships of war, was destined to arrest the march of tyranny, and stop the progress of desolation. Discussions on naval concerns are not, therefore, merely interesting as matters of amusement and speculation: to us, as Englishmen, they are of vital importance; nor can they be indifferent to the world at large. The two pamphlets before us are calculated to excite the most painful sensations. The discouraging view, taken by the one, of the alarming diminution of oak timber of native growth, and by the other, of the premature decay of our ships of war, is, however, somewhat relieved by the confidence with which the writers both speak of the remedies for the respective diseases which they describe. We may also derive some satisfaction from the persuasion that, like most professors of the healing art, they have exaggerated the danger of the symptoms, in order to enhance the value of the cure. This is, at least, worth ascertaining; and we shall therefore enter pretty fully into the examination of the two cases, with the modes of treatment; giving the preference to that stated by Mr. Péring, as it is the more complicated in its symptoms, and the effect of the remedy which he proposes is somewhat more equivocal. "Richard Pering, Esq. of his Majesty's Yard at Plymouth Dock," is not, it seems, a professional man, nor in any shape concerned with ship-building. He is any thing but a learned man, and has no pretensions whatever to abstract science: but he has been nearly thirty years, he tells us, in his majesty's service, and is one of the longest standing, as a principal officer, (clerk of the check, we believe,) of any in the dock. yards. He has, therefore, seen ships of war, and it is sufficiently obvious that he has looked at them too, with the eyes of one who knows something about their construction. He tells us, indeed, that he has considered the subject long and attentively; that it has been his study and delight; and on these grounds he presumes to consider his opinions as entitled to some weight. We have no objections to listen to the opinions of a man on any particular branch of the arts, because he happens not to be an artist; he is likely, at least, to possess one advantage that of being free from technical prejudices; from' such we fully absolve Mr. Pering. The general result of Mr. Pering's observations on ships and ship-building is stated to be "a thorough conviction that many and most essential improvements may be adopted, not only in the models of our ships, but in their preservation." Of the two subjects, the latter is, beyond all comparison, the most important. It has never, we confess, given us much uneasiness to hear encomiums on the beautiful curves and lines of the bottom of a French ship of war; nor are we jealous of the superior science which has produced them; being fully persuaded that, in all the essential qualities-in stability, stowage, and birthing the men, our ships of war are invariably preferable; while it is by no means a settled point, that French ships generally outsail ours. If the theory of naval architecture has been carried farther by the French than by us, we have at least the advantage in point of practice; if they have more science, we have more solidity; if they have more skill in drawing the lines, we have better workmanship in putting the materials together-though, if Mr. Pering be correct, our shipwrights are still miserably deficient, even in that part of their profession. In France, it must be observed, the science of ship-building has invariably VOL. I. New Series. ૨. ૧ been kept separate from the art: the builder there has no science; he merely follows the plan, which he can neither draw nor describe; whereas, with us, the men who handle the addice, furnish the designs, and are, consequently, far superior in a general knowledge of the machine to be constructed to the French builders. Our own opinion is, that very little of science or skill is exhibited, either by us or the French, in the present mode of constructing a ship. We profess ourselves to be "no great clerks," but we cannot avoid thinking that, of all the arts, this has made the least progress in improvement, and that the best constructed ship is pretty nearly the same rude machine which it was at the earliest periods of its invention. It has grown in magnitude, it is true, and its defects have probably grown in the same proportion. We see, in the finest constructed ship, little more than congregated logs of heavy timber, inartificially placed beside each other, each pulling by its own weight a different way; the beams thrusting out the sides, the sides bolted to the beams to prevent their tumbling in, the overhanging stern tearing itself from the body of the ship, and the body struggling to fall in pieces, in spite of the distorted plank which binds it together:-no two parts, in short, giving mutual support :-still, however, it may be suited to the element in which it is intended to move; the equal pressure of this fluid binds all together, and the fragility of the machine is only put to the test when in contact with the ground; then, indeed, the whole fabric resolves itself into its constituent parts, scarcely any two of them remaining in adhesion. The act of launching seldom fails to break a shipthat is, to alter the line which was straight before launching, to a curve of six or seven inches when floating in the water. This strain loosens, to a certain degree, every fastening in the machine; yet, according to the present practice of putting a ship together, her existence almost wholly depends upon the fastenings;--but this is a subject to which we shall hereafter have occasion to advert. We cannot omit the present opportunity of noticing the able and judicious remarks of the commissioners for revising the civil affairs of the navy, on the theory and practice of shipbuilding. In speaking of that mixture of theory and practice which enables us to build better than the French, at the same time that it may lead to other effects that are hurtful, they observe, "Where we have built exactly after the form of the best of the French ships that we have taken, thus adding our dexterity in building to their knowledge in theory, the ships, it is generally allowed, have proved the best in our navy; but whenever our builders have been so far misled by their little attainments in the science of naval architecture, as to depart from the model before them in any material degree, and attempt improvements, the true principles on which ships ought to be constructed (being imperfectly known to them) have been mistaken or counteracted, and the alterations, according to the information given to us, have in many cases done harm. "From the same cause there has been infinite variety in the alterations made, and in the forms which have been adopted. The alterations being founded on no certain principles, no similarity in the form of the ships could be expected, and they have the appearance of having been constructed on the chance that, in the multitude of trials made, some one might be found of superior excellence. While, therefore, our rivals in naval power were employing men of the greatest talents, and most extensive acquirements, to call in the aid of science for improving the construction of ships, we have contented ourselves with groping on in the dark, in quest of such discoveries as chance might bring in our way. "Nothing, certainly, can be more surprising than that, in a nation so enlightened as this is, and whose power, importance, and even safety, depend on its naval superiority, matters so essential to the preservation of that superiority should so long have been neglected. "As a remedy for this great evil, it has been proposed, that the ships of each class or rate should be constructed in every particular, according to the form of the best ship in the same class in our navy; of the same length, breadth, and depth, the masts of the same dimensions, and placed in the same parts of the ship, with the same form and size of the sails."* The commissioners farther observe, that the French have been so completely convinced of the disadvantages arising from this variety, that they have, from time to time, ascertained by ordinances, the forms on which the ships of each class or rate must be constructed. We do not understand, however, that either the example of the French, or the intelligent observations of the commissioners of revision, have yet had the effect of changing the old system founded on no fixed principles. With the exception of a lot of seventy-four gun ships recently built in merchants' yards, and which, as far as we can learn, have not turned out well, the plans of all our ships of war continue, as heretofore, to be determined by the predilection of some professional lord of the admiralty for some ship which he may have commanded; or by the prejudices of the surveyors of the navy in favour of some chance draught which may have succeeded; or by the encomiums lavished on some prize ship by the officer who may have captured her, &c. All this is perfectly natural, and, if it stopped * Third Report of the Commissioners for revising the Civil Affairs of the Navy. Page 194. |