Thus then during my first administration I took care of the power of the ftate, by raifing credit to its highest pitch; and I took care of its happiness, by faving the people from contributions that would have been unavoidable, if credit had not been restored; and from annual taxes which the interefts of the loans would have ́demanded, had no melioration taken place at the fame time in the finances. I afk, what was it poffible to do more?'

What was it poffible to do more? It was poffible to have examined whether the expected order and economy were likely to be realized; whether the violent and rapid exertions of the nation while they raised its fpirit, might not injure its vigour; whether the accumulated burthens of many years might not contribute ultimately to fink it. They were rather the cordials, which fupport the worn-out debauchee, detracting from the little ftrength which they apparently feem to cherish.

The prefent revolution was, he allows, in fome degree affifted by various arrangements of that period. The eftablishment of provincial affemblies in 1779, tended to affociate the whole nation in the direction of its interefts, the publication of the ftate of the finances laid the measures of the minister open to a fair difcuffion. The declaration for abolishing the rights of mortmain, and limiting the taille, were meafures of a fimilar kind. For thefe the French nation is greatly indebted to M. Necker. They in part emancipated the people; taught them to feel their dignity and power, and perhaps gave the firft fpur to their exertions.

The fecond administration of M. Necker commenced in Auguft 1788: it was in the period of distress, diftruft, and clamour. The moderate talents of the minister, added to his known integrity, were conciliating and advantageous. He again affumed the helm; and, with a policy dictated by his late defeat, owns that he temporifed with difficulties and kept the finances from the public view. His great object was the convocation of the ftates-general. It was indeed an important one; and every step of the minifter, in purfuit of it, fhould be examined with the most anxious care. 'The national wish and the improvement of the age' prevented the model of the states affembled at Paris in 1614, from being adopted. The form was referred to the notables; and the king, who serioufly wifhed to put an end to the difficulties, was cager to render the meeting an effectual, that it might be an ufeful one. The notables, as might be expected, coincided with the opinion of the parliament, in preferving the original number of the reprefentatives of the commons. M. Necker oppofed it; and in his famous report, recommended the plan afterwards adopt

ed of making the number of commons equal to that of both the other orders. If in this, he fincerely hoped that the bufinefs would be executed more effectually, he was a weak man; if he forefaw the fubfequent revolution, in calling the tiers etat into action, and at the fame time giving it the power as well as the will to rife fupreme, his future conduct was very inconfiftent, and he deserves what he has experienced. If we combine both ideas, he will appear to have acted with little wisdom, for he increased the number and the power of the commons, and then fided with the king. It was the firft decifive ftep in the revolution; it was the main fpring which put the other wheels in motion.

• Either the three chambers ought to deliberate feparately, and then the number of deputies of the tiers etat would be a point of indifference to the two first orders; or the three chambers ought to deliberate in common, and then, notwithstanding the ancient ufages of the realm, which are liable to dispute, and will admit of various constructions, it would have been a fingular phenomenon, in this æra of intellectual progress and improvement in all sorts of ideas, in this æra when the oppreffion of the commons was on the point of being extirpated, if they had not been allowed the fame number of defenders as the two other orders, who were in poffeffion of every favour and every privilege.

It would have been ftrange, unjuft, and impolitic, to have rejected the reasonable demand of ninety-eight men in a hundred of the nation, and the equitable wish of that numerous class of citizens whose labour, knowledge, and industry, conftitute the wealth and fplendour of France. It is a flagrant wrong to pretend to combat maxims already obfolete against all the vigour of the natural principles of juftice, when thefe principles blaze forth and are feconded by the general with of the nation. It is from not having obferved fufficiently early the progrefs of opinions, and their invincible power, that the two firft orders fixed their eyes on the past, and exerted their combined strength to maintain it in exiftence, inftead of imitating the wifdom of government, which yielded in fome respects to prevailing opinion. The mafter-stroke of policy in human affairs, is to act with forefight, and to obtain the merit of facrifice, before the moment arrives when facrifice will be regarded as duty, and will be inadequate to the exigency of the fituation.'

These seem to have been really the ideas of the moment: that they are weak and injudicious is obvious from the event; but they would have appeared fo a priori, if the bias, the eager enthusiasm of the nation, was confidered. M. Necker efembles the mechanic, who confiders only the force of gravity

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vity in a falling body, without taking into the account the velocity acquired by falling from a height. The effect, in the percuffion, would be very different. Yet adds M. Necker

I have pointed out more forcibly than any perfon, in my different works, the empire of public opinion, and its increafing ftrength. Foreigners can scarcely form an idea of fuch a power, and cannot comprehend how it can be put in a balance against military force. But no country fo completely as France unites to an immense population all that can rouse men to freedom of sentiment and freedom of thinking; an abundance of wealth, an immense national debt which attaches to the land a multitude of independent men, the activity of commerce, the cultivation of the arts, the eclat of letters, the progrefs of fcience, the love of novelty, the focial fpirit, the vehement de fire of praife, the fascinating practice of every kind of oftentation; and in the midst of this combination of circumstances, which gave a direction to the national genius, there has started up in these latter days a new philofophy, which, carrying all before it, destroying our fortreffes, our banks, our barriers, has fo levelled the moral world, as to render it favourable to, and incline it to establish, every political theory, and every fyftem of legislation.

In the mean time, as long as public opinion divided its forces royal authority had little to fear, and frequently derived from it effential advantage; this opinion conftituting a principal reward for courage and military virtue. Public opinion, attentive at that time to different objects, and diffused over a large space, did not and could not create any alarm; but the diforder and ruin of the finances, by collecting its fcattered rays into one focus, have increased to such a degree its action and energy, that it is become indifpenfably neceffary either to yield to, or at beft to compound with it.'

Nothing appears more evident, than that thefe are opinions of two different æras. The one was that of the time; the other formed on a view of events, for this plain reason, that they are totally incompatible but on one foundation, that the author confidered his reputation fufficient to counterba lance every irregularity. There never was but one man who could wield an engine confifting of the harfheft and most dif cordant materials with fafety, and that was Oliver Cromwell. A better apology follows.

The party who oppose the admiffion of too great a number of deputies of the commons into the states general, and who accuse me of a breach of duty towards the monarch, feem to have loft fight of various circumftances. They forget, for example, that at the time I refumed the reins of administration, the king conceived

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ceived that he had reafon to complain of the conduct of the nobleffe in the late political diffenfions; whereas the tiers etat had in various provinces fhewn a confiderable deference to the views of government. They forget alfo that they have frequently afcribed the violence of the affembly to the afcendency of the popular leaders, and their fecret plots; but enumerate these leaders, and it will be found that the majority of them were not deputed by the order of the commons. In short, the party whofe objections I am refuting, cannot confider themselves as having no share in the measures adopted by the court the 11th of July; measures which excited all the kingdom to arms, and eventually occafioned the desertion of the troops.. In the mean time, the balance of ftrength being once fubverted, and that in so striking a manner, the defence of the existing powers, and the support of public order, vefted no longer in the hands of government; and the language of reafon, that last resource, loft at the fame time a confiderable share of its energy and influence.'

The fubfequent remarks will be found lefs applicable; for M. Necker's error confifts in not taking into the account the enthusiasm of the nation, and the probable effects of giving enthufiafts uncontrouled power: in such a state it was rather to be expected, that the nobles to become popular would join with the commons, than that the latter would court unpopularity to fupport their former oppreffors.

The objection which might arife from the number of undignified clergy, M. Necker has answered more fatisfactorily; but these answers appear to have been the suggestions of afterreflections. The number of deputies our author attempts alfo to defend, as well as the place of their fitting; but thefe are objections, or not, according to the opinion formed of the future conduct of the affembly..

The affembly met: M. Necker and the king, for it is almoft Ego et Rex meus, harangued them; but these fplendid morfels of eloquence have been long fince before the public. In the conduct of the affembly, and in the conduct of the minifter, the greatest errors occur. Whatever was the confequence of the former mistakes, much mischief might have been prevented by fubfequent addrefs. The errors at this time might be reduced to three. ft. The early affront given by the minister of the finances to the affembly, by telling them that, fo far as his department was concerned, their meeting was unneceffary.-2dly. Introducing the influence of the king in determining difputed queftions, refpecting the verification of powers.-3dly. The union of the different orders in one chamber. Thefe difgufted the members, by raising the minifter and the king above the affembly; putting the conduct

and

and exiftence of the affembly into the hands of the monarch; and giving undefined and uncontrolable ftrength to the commons. Above all, it showed that their darling minion, in cafes of difficulty, would join with the king rather than the people; and it fhows us that a new power was established, without a regulator, without a guide, and without a check. If this outline be compared with M. Necker's obfervations, no farther clue will be wanted to fhow how this minifter became unpopular, nor how the kingly power was loft. It must be remembered, that we are now tracing events from their causes, without attempting to offer any opinion refpecting these

events.

M. Necker was foon' difmiffed, and he complied without a murmur, and without tears: he was recalled, and he obeyed implicitly. Fatal obedience! It has been the grave of his character, and in the opinion of many, of his integrity. The first ftep after his return did credit to his heart, though little to his judgment. In the moment of popular acclamation, a general forgiveness was proposed and adopted. This was at least humane, and it was judicious if the acclamations of the people were folid. M. Necker knew nothing, or thought not, of the changes in a popular state: he forgot, that his having in part adopted the cause of the king and of the nobility was a crime ftill not expiated; and that, in this general amnesty, the most obnoxious of the nobility were included. He faw every thing feemingly fincere, and he walked with unconcern to the edge of this precipice, which was already prepared for him by a fecret enemy. It was the laft fatal wound, for after this ftep his proposals were received with doubt, with fufpicion, fcarcely concealed, or with oppofition. M. Necker went on apparently with courage. He propofed a loan, a contribution. Each was received with coolness and modified fo as to render it useless, or rejected. The affembly had already began to feel their confequence, and it was not their defign to leffen their popularity by harth impofitions. They endeavoured to avail themselves of the popular enthufiafm, and dexterously managed that weapon which the minifter had neglected or confidered as ufelefs.

The emission of affignats, and the fcizing of the property of the church, our author allows to be excellent expedients, if the question of morality is kept out of fight. The flowness of the fubftitution has added to the tranquillity, and the exemption from taxes is connected, in the people's mind, with the new government. Taxes, M. Necker thinks, may be cautioufly introduced without murmur: it is perhaps more probably the moment of danger to the affembly: it is ftriking the centre of the arch, which will put the ftability of the work to

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the