thod of acquiring knowledge, and of communicating; between the method of raising any science, and that of teaching it to others as far as it is advanced; they would fee that thofe general maxims were not the foundations on which the first discoverers raised their admirable structures, nor the keys that unlocked and opened thofe fecrets of knowledge; though afterwards, when schools were erected, and fciences had their profeffors to teach what others had found out, they often made use of maxims, i. e. laid down certain propofitions which were felf-evident, or to be received for true; which being fettled in the minds of their fcholars as unquestionable verities, they on occafion made ufe of, to convince them of truths in particular inftances that were not fo familiar to their minds as thofe general axioms which had before been inculcated to them, and carefully fettled in their minds; though thefe particular inftances, when well reflected on, are no lefs felf-evident to the understanding, than the general maxims brought to confirm them; and it was in those particular inftances that the firft discoverer found the truth, without the help of the general maxims : And fo may any one elfe do, who with attention confiders them.

To come, therefore, to the ufe that is made of maxims,

1. They are of ufe, as has been obferved, in the ordinary methods of teaching fciences as far as they are advanced, but of little or none in advancing them farther.

2. They are of ufe in difputes, for the filencing of obtinate wranglers, and bringing thofe contefts to fome conclufion. Whether a need of them to that end came not in, in the manner following, I crave leave to inquire. The fchools having made difputation the touchstone of mens abilities, and the criterion of knowledge, adjudged victory to him that kept the field; and he that had the laft word, was concluded to have the better of the argument, if not of the caufe; but becaufe by this means there was like to be no decifion be

Book IV. tween skilful combatants, whilft one never failed of a medius terminus to prove any propofition, and the other could as conftantly, without or with a distinction, deny the major or minor; to prevent, as much as could be, the running out of difputes into an endlefs train of fyllogifms, certain general propofitions, most of them indeed felf-evident, were introduced into the schools, which being fuch as all men allowed and agreed in, were looked on as general measures of truth, and ferved inftead of principles (where the difputants had not laid down any other between them), beyond which there was no goiug, and which must not be receded from by either fide. And thus these maxims getting the name of principles, beyond which men in difpute could not retreat, were by mistake taken to be the originals and fources from whence all knowledge began, and the foundations whereon the fciences were built; because, when in their difputes they came to any of thefe, they stopped there, and went no farther, the matter was determined. But how much this is a mistake hath been already shown.

This method of the fchools, which have been thought the fountains of knowledge, introduced, as I fuppofe, the like ufe of thefe maxims into a great part of converfation out of the schools, to stop the mouths of cavillers, whom any one is excufed from arguing any longer with, when they deny these general felf-evident principles received by all reafonable men who have once thought of them; but yet their ufe herein is but to put an end to wrangling. They in truth, when urged in fuch cafes, teach nothing; that is already done by the intermediate ideas made ufe of in the debate, whofe connection may be feen without the help of thofe maxims, and fo the truth is known before the maxim is produced, and the argument brought to a first principle. Men would give off a wrong argument before it came to that, if in their difputes they propofed to themfelves the finding and embracing of truth, and not a conteft for victory;

and thus maxims have their use to put a stop to their perverfenels, whofe ingenuity fhould have yielded Looner; but the method of the schools having allowed and encouraged men to oppofe and refift evident truth till they are baffled, i. e. till they are reduced to contradict themselves or fome established principle, it is no wonder that they should not in civil converfation be ashamed of that which in the schools is counted a virtue and a glory, viz. obstinately to maintain that fide of the queftion they have chofen, whether true or falfe, to the laft extremity, even after conviction; a strange way to attain truth and knowledge; and that which I think the rational part of mankind, not corrupted by education, could fcarce believe fhould ever be admitted amongst the lovers of truth, and ftudents of religion or nature, or introduced into the feminaries of those who are to propagate the truths of religion or philofophy amongst the ignorant and unconvinced. How much fuch a way of learning is likely to turn young mens minds from the fincere fearch and love of truth, nay, and to make them doubt whether there is any fuch thing, or at least worth the adhering to, I fhall not now inquire. This I think, that bating thofe places which brought the peripatetic philofophy into their fchools, where it continued many ages, without teaching the world any thing but the art of wrangling, these maxims were nowhere thought the foundations on which the fciences were built, nor the great helps to the ad vancement of knowledge.

What use thefe general Maxims have.

As to thele general maxims, therefore, they are, as I have faid, of great ufe in difputes, to flop the mouths of wranglers, but not of much ufe to the difcovery of unknown truths, or to help the mind forwards in its fearch after knowledge; for who ever began to build his knowledge on this general propofition, what is, is, or, it is impoffible for the fame thing to be, and not to be; and from either of thefe, as from a principle of science, deduced a system of useful knowledge?

Wrong opinions often involving contradictions, one of these maxims, as a touchstone, may ferve well to fhow whither they lead; but yet, however fit to lay open the abfurdity or mistake of a man's reafoning or opinion, they are of very little ufe for enlightening the understanding; and it will not be found that the mind receives much help from them in its progress in knowledge, which would be neither lefs, nor lefs certain, were these two general propofitions never thought on. It is true, as I have said, they fometimes ferve in argumentation to stop a wrangler's mouth, by thowing the abfurdity of what he faith, and by expofing him to the shame of contradicting what all the world knows, and he himself cannot but own to be true. But it is one thing to fhow a man that he is in an error, and another to put him in poffeffion of truth; and I would fain know what truths these two propofitions are able to teach, and by their influence make us know, which we did not know before, or could not know without them. Let us reafon from them as well as we can, they are only about identical predications, and influence, if any at all, none but fuch. Each particular propofition concerning identity or diverfity is as clearly and certainly known in itself, if attended to, as either of thefe general ones; only thefe general ones, as ferving in all cafes, are therefore more incul cated and infifted on. As to other lefs general maxims, many of them are no more than bare verbal propofi tions, and teach us nothing but the refpect and import of names one to another. The whole is equal to all its parts; what real truth, I befeech you, does it teach us? What more is contained in that maxim than what the fignification of the word totum, or the whole, does of itfelf import? and he that knows that the word whole ftands for what is made up of all its parts, knows very little lefs than that the whole is equal to all its parts: And upon the fame ground, I think that this propofition, a bill is higher than a valley, and feveral the like, may alfo pafs for maxims; but yet mafters of mathematics, when they would, as teachers of what

they know, initiate others in that science, do not without reafon place this, and fome other fuch maxims, at the entrance of their fyftems; that their scholars, having in the beginning perfectly acquainted their thoughts with thefe propofitions made in fuch general terms, may be used to make fuch reflections, and have these more general propofitions, as formed rules and fayings, ready to apply to all particular cafes ; not that if they be equally weighed, they are more clear and evident than the particular inftances they are brought to confirm, but that, being more familiar to the mind, the very naming them is enough to fatisfy the understanding. But this, I fay, is more from our custom of ufing them, and the establishment they have got in our minds by our often thinking of them, than from the different evidence of the things; but before custom has fettled methods of thinking and reafoning in our minds, I am apt to imagine it is quite otherwife; and that the child, when a part of his apple is taken away, knows it better in that particular inftance, than by this general propofition, the whole is equal to all its parts; and that if one of thefe have need to be confirmed to him by the other, the general has more need to be let into his mind by the particular, than the particular by the general; for in particulars our knowledge begins, and fo fpreads itself by degrees to generals; though afterwards the mind takes the quite contrary courfe, and having drawn his knowledge into as general propofitions as it can, makes thofe familiar to its thoughts, and accuftoms itfelf to have recourse to them, as to the ftandards of truth and falfehood: By which familiar ufe of them, as rules to meafure the truth of other propofitions, it comes in time to be thought, that more particular propofitions have their truth and evidence from their conformity to these more general ones, which in difcourfe and argumentation, are fo frequently urged, and conftantly admitted; and this I think to be the reafon why amongft fo many felf-evident propofitions, the most general only have had the title of maxims.