Imágenes de página
PDF
ePub

ehild certainly knows that a ftranger is not its mother; that its fucking-bottle is not the rod, long before he knows that it is impoffible for the fame thing to be, and not to be? And how many truths are there about numbers, which it is obvious to obferve that the mind is perfectly acquainted with, and fully convinced of, before it ever thought on thefe general maxims, to which mathematicians, in their arguings, do fometimes refer them? Whereof the reafon is very plain: For that which makes the mind affent to fuch propofitions, being nothing else but the perception it has of the agreement or difagreement of its ideas, according as it finds them affirmed or denied one of another in words it understands, and every idea being known to be what it is, and every two distinct ideas being known not to be the fame; it muft neceffarily follow, that fuch felf-evident truths must be firft known, which confift of ideas that are first in the mind and the ideas first in the mind, it is evident, are thofe of particular things, from whence, by flow degrees, the understanding proceeds to fome few general ones; which being taken from the ordinary and familiar objects of fenfe, are fettled in the mind, with general names to them. Thus, particular ideas are first received and diftinguished, and fo knowledge got about them; and next to them, the lefs general or fpecific, which are next to particular; for abstract ideas are not fo obvious or eafy to children, or the yet unexercifed mind, as particular ones. If they feem fo to grown men, it is only becaufe by conftant and familiar use they are made fo; for when we nicely reflect upon them, we fhall find, that general ideas are fictions and contrivances of the mind, that carry difficulty with them, and do not fo eafily offer themselves, as we are apt to imagine. For example, does it not require fome pains and fkill to form the general idea of a triangle? (which is yet none of the most abftract, comprehenfive, and difficult), for it muût be neither oblique, nor rectangle, neither equilateral, equicrural, nor fcalenon; but all and none of these at once. In effect, it

is fomething imperfect, that cannot exi; an idea wherein fome parts of feveral different and inconfiftent ideas are put together. It is true, the mind, in this imperfect ftate, has need of fuch ideas, and makes all the hafte to them it can, for the conveniency of communication and enlargement of knowledge; to both which it is naturally very much inclined. But yet one has reason to fufpect fuch ideas are marks of our imperfection; at least this is enough to fhow, that the most abstract and general ideas are not thofe that the mind is first and most eafily acquainted with, nor fuch as its earliest knowledge is converfant about.

10. Because on them the other Parts of our Knowledge do not depend.

SECONDLY, From what has been faid, it plainly follows, that these magnified maxims are not the principles and foundations of all our other knowledge; for if there be a great many other truths, which have as much felf-evidence as they, and a great many that we know before them, it is impoffible they fhould be the principles from which we deduce all other truths. Is it impoffible to know that one and two are equal to three, but by virtue of this, or fome fuch axiom, viz. the whole is equal to all its parts taken together? Many a one knows that one and two are equal to three, without having heard or thought on that or any other axiom by which it might be proved; and knows it as certainly, as any other man knows, that the whole is equal to all its parts, or any other maxim, and all from the fame reafon of felf-evidence; the equality of those ideas being as visible and certain to him without that, or any other axiom, as with it, it needing no proof to make it perceived; nor after the knowledge, that the whole is equal to all its parts, does he know that one and two are equal to three, better or more certainly, than he did before; for if there be any odds in those ideas, the whole and parts are more obfcure, or at least more difficult to be fettled in the mind, than those of one, two, and three. And indeed, I think, I may afk these men, who will needs have all know

Book IV. ledge, befides thofe general principles themselves, to depend on general, innate, and felf-evident principles, what principle is requifite to prove, that one and one are two, that two and two are four, that three times two are fix? Which being known without any proof, do evince, that either all knowledge does not depend on certain præcognita, or general maxims, called principles, or elfe that these are principles; and if thefe are to be counted principles, a great part of numeration will be fo. To which if we add all the felf-evident propofitions, which may be made about all our diftinct ideas, principles will be almost infinite, at least innumerable, which men arrive to the knowledge of, at different ages; and a great many of these innate principles they never come to know all their lives. But whether they come in view of the mind, earlier or later, this is true of them, that they are all known by their native evidence, are wholly independent, receive no light, nor are capable of any proof one from another; much lefs the more particular from the more general, or the more fimple from the more compounded; the more fimple, and lefs abstract, being the most familiar, and the easier and earlier apprehended. But whichever be the clearest ideas, the evidence and certainty of all fuch propofitions is in this, that a man fees the fame idea to be the fame idea, and infallibly perceives two different ideas to be different ideas: For when a man has in his understanding the ideas of one and of two, the idea of yellow and the idea of blue, he cannot but certainly know, that the idea of one is the idea of one, and not the idea of two; and that the idea of yellow is the idea of yellow, and not the idea of blue; for a man cannot confound the ideas in his mind, which he has diftinct; that would be to have them confufed and diftinct at the fame time, which is a contradiction; and to have none distinct, is to have no ufe of our faculties, to have no knowledge at all. And therefore, what idea foever is affirmed of itself, or whatsoever two entire diftinct ideas are denied one of another, the mind can

not but affent to fuch a propofition as infallibly true, as foon as it understands the terms without hesitation or need of proof, or regarding those made in more general terms, and called maxims.

§ 11. What ufe thefe general Maxims have. WHAT fhall we then fay? Are these general maxims of no use? By no means; though perhaps their use is not that which it is commonly taken to be. But fince doubting in the leaft of what hath been by fome men afcribed to these maxims, may be apt to be cried out againft, as overturning the foundations of all the fciences, it may be worth while to confider them, with respect to other parts of our knowledge, and examine more particularly to what purposes they serve, and to what not.

1. It is evident from what has been already said, that they are of no ufe to prove or confirm lefs general felf-evident propofitions.

2. It is as plain that they are not, nor have been the foundations whereon any fcience hath been built. There is, I know, a great deal of talk, propagated from fcholaftic men, of sciences and the maxims on which they are built; but it has been my ill luck never to meet with any fuch fciences, much lefs any one built upon these two maxims, what is, is, and it is impoffible for the fame thing to be, and not to be: And I would be glad to be fhown where any fuch fcience, erected upon thefe or any other general axioms, is to be found; and should be obliged to any one, who would lay before me the frame and fyftem of any fcience fo built on thefe or any fuch like maxims, that could not be shown to ftand as firm without any confideration of them. I afk, whether thefe general maxims have not the fame ufe in the ftudy of divinity, and in theological questions, that they have in the other friences? They ferve here too to filence wranglers, and put an end to dispute. But I think that nobody will therefore fay, that the Chriftian religion is built upon thefe maxims, or that the knowledge we have of it is derived from thefe principles: It is from

Book IV. revelation we have received it, and without revelation thefe maxims had never been able to help us to it. When we find out an idea, by whofe intervention we difcover the connection of two others, this is a revelation from God to us, by the voice of reason; for we then come to know a truth that we did not know before. When God declares any truth to us, is is a revelation to us by the voice of his fpirit, and we are advanced in our knowledge; but in neither of thefe do we receive our light or knowledge from max ims; but in the one, the things themselves afford it, and we fee the truth in them by perceiving their agreement or difagreement; in the other, God himfelf affords it immediately to us, and we fee the truth of what he fays in his unerring veracity.

3. They are not of ufe to help men forward in the advancement of sciences, or new difcoveries of yet unknown truths. Mr. Newton, in his never enough to be admired book, has demonftrated feveral propo fitions, which are fo many new truths, before unknown to the world, and are farther advances in mathematical knowledge; but for the discovery of thefe, it was not the general maxims, what is, is, or, the whole is bigger than a part, or the like, that helped him; thefe were not the clues that led him into the discovery of the truth and certainty of those propofitions, nor was it by them that he got the knowledge of thofe demonftrations; but by finding out intermediate ideas, that thowed the agreement or difagreement of the ideas, as expreffed in the propofi. tions he demonftrated. This is the great exercife and improvement of human underflanding in the enlarging of knowledge, and advancing the fciences, wherein they are far enough from receiving any help from the contemplation of thefe, or the like magnified maxims. Would thofe who have this traditional admiration of thefe propofitions, that they think no ftep can be made in knowledge without the fupport of an axiom, no ftone laid in the building of the fciences without a general maxim, but diftinguish between the me

« AnteriorContinuar »