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5. Revelation cannot be admitted against the clear Evi
derice of Reason. 6. Traditional Revelation much less. ing. Things above Reason. 8. Or not contrary to Reason, if revealed, are Matter of
Faith. 9. Revelation, in Matters where Reason cannot judge, or
but probably, ought to be hearkened to. 10. In Matters where Reason can afford certain Knowledge,
that is to be hearkened to... 11. If the Boundaries be not set between Faith and Reason,
no Enthusiasm, or Extravagancy in Religion, can be contradicted. it .. .'
Of Enthuhafm. Sect.
1. Love of Truth necessary. 2. A Forwardness to dictate, whence. 3. Force of Enthusiasm. 4. Reason and Revelation. . . 5. Rise of Enthusiasm. 6, 7. Enthusiasm. 8, 9. Enthusiasm mistaken for seeing and feeling 10. Enthusiasm, how to be discovered. 11. Enthusiasm fails of Evidence, that the Proposition is
from God. 12. Firmness of Persuasion, no Proof that any Proposition
is from God. 13. Light in the Mind, what. 14. Revelation must be judged by Reason. is. Belief no Proof of Revelation.
Of wrong Asent, or Error. Sect. 1. Causes of Error. 2. First, Want of Proofs. 3. Obj. What shall become of those who want them, an
swered. 4. People hindered from Inquiry.
OF THE CONDUCT OF THE UNDERSTANDING,
OF HUMAN UNDERSTANDING.
BOOK IV.-CHAP. I.
OF KNOWLEDGE IN GENERAL.
$1. Our Knowledge conversant about our Ideas. CINCE the mind, in all its thoughts and reason.
ings, hath no other immediate object but its own ideas, which it alone does or can contemplate, it is evident, that our knowledge is only conversant about them, § 2. Knowledge is the Perception of the Agreement
or Disagreement of two Ideas. KNOWLEDGE then seems to me to be nothing but the perception of the connection and agreement, or disagrecment and repugnancy of any of our Ideas. In this alone it consists. Where this perception is, there is knowledge ; and where it is not, there, though we may fancy, guess, or believe, yet we always come short of knowledge. For when we know that white is not black, what do we else but perceive that these two ideas do not agree? when we possess ourselves with the utmost security of the demonstracion, that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right ones, what do we more but perceive, that equality to two right ones, does necessarily agree to, and is inseparable from the three angles of a triangle?
$ 3. This Agreement fourfold. But to understand a little more distinály, wherein this agreement or disagreement consists, I think we may reduce it all to these four forts : VOL. III.
1. Identity', or diversity.
§ 4. 1. Of Identity or Diverhty. FIRST, As to the first fort of agreement or disagreement, vix. identity or diversty, It is the first act of the mind, when it has any sentiments or ideas at all, to perceive its ideas; and so far as it perceives them, to know each what it is, and thereby also to perceive Their difference, and that one is not another. This is fo absolutely necessary, that without it there could be no knowledge, no reasoning, no imagination, no distinet thoughts at all. By this the mind clearly and infallibly perceives each idea to agree with itself, and to be what it is ; and all distinct ideas to disagree,
. e. the one not to be the other : and this it does without pains, labour or deduction, but at first view, by its natural power of perception and distinction. And though men of art have reduced this into those general rules, What is, is; and it is imposible for the fume thing to be, and not to be; for ready application in all cases, wherein there may be occasion to reflect on it ; yet it is certain, that the first exercise of this faculty is about particular ideas. A man infallibly knows, as soon as ever he has them in his mind, that the ideas he calls white and round, are the very ideas they are, and that they are not other ideas which he calls red or square : Nor can any maxim or propofition in the world make him know it clearer or furer than he did before, and without any such general rule. This then is the first agreement or disagreement, which the inind perceives in its ideas; which it always perceives at first sight: and if there ever happen any doubt about it, it will always be found to be about the names, and not the ideas themselves, whose identity and diversity will always be perceived, as soon and as clearly as the ideas themselves are, nor can it poliibly be otherwise.
Ś s. 2. Relative. SECONDLY, The next sort of agreement, or disagreement, the inind perceives in any of its ideas, may, 1 think, be called relative, and is nothing but the percetion of the relation between any two ideas, of what kind soever, whether substances, modes, or any other. For fince all distinct ideas must eternally be known not to be the same, and so be universally and conitantly denied one of another, there could be no room for any positive knowledge at all, if we could not perceive any relation between our ideas, and find out the agreement or disagreement they have one with another, in several ways the mind takes of comparing them.
$ 6. 3. Of Co-existence. THIRDLY, The third sort of agreement, or disagree. ment, to be found in our ideas, which the perception of the mind is employed about, is co-existence, or nonco-exijlence in the same subje&t; and this belongs particularly to substances. Thus, when we pronounce concerning gold that it is fixed, our knowledge of this truth amounts to no more but this, that fixedness, or a power to remain in the fire unconsumed, is an idea that always accompanies and is joined with that parricular sort of yellowness, weight, fusibility, malleableness, and folubility in aqua rogia, which make our complex idea, signified by the word gold.
$ 7. 4. Of real Existence. FOURTHLY, The fourth and last fort is that of actual real existence agreeing to any idea. Within these four sorts of agreement or disagreement, is, I suppose, contained all the knowledge we have, or are capable of: For all the inquiries that we can make concerning any of our ideas, all that we know or can affirm concerning any of them, is, that it is, or is not, the same with some other; that it does, or does not, always co-exist with some other idea in the same subject ; that it has this or that relation to some other idea; or that it has a real ex. istence without the mind. Thus blue is not yellow, is of identity: Two triangles upon equal bases between