of reverend antiquity, it comes to me with the paffport of former ages, and therefore I am fecure in the recep tion I give it; other men have been, and are of the fame opinion (for that is all is faid), and therefore it is reafonable for me to embrace it. A man may more justifiably throw up cross and pile for his opinions, than take them up by fuch measures. All men are liable to error, and most men are in many points, by paffion or intereft, under temptation to it. If we could but fee the fecret motives that influenced the men of name and learning in the world, and the leaders of parties, we should not always find that it was the embracing of truth for its own fake, that made them efpoufe the doctrines they owned and maintained. This at leaft is certain, there is not an opinion fo abfurd, which a man may not receive upon this ground; there is no error to be named, which has not had its profeflors; and a man fhall never want crooked paths to walk in, if he thinks that he is in the right way, wherever he has the footsteps of others to follow.

18. Men not in fo many Errors as is imagined. BUT notwithstanding the great noife is made in the world about errors and opinions, I must do mankind that right as to fay, there are not fo many men in errors and wrong opinions as is commonly fuppofed. Not that I think they embrace the truth, but indeed, becaufe concerning those doctrines they keep such a stir about, they have no thought, no opinion at all; for if any one fhould a little catechife the greatest part of the partifans of most of the fects in the world, he would not find, concerning those matters they are fo zealous for, that they have any opinions of their own; much lefs would he have reafon to think, that they took them upon the examination of arguments, and appearance of probabi lity. They are refolved to ftick to a party, that education or intereft has engaged them in; and there, like the common foldiers of an army, fhow their courage and warmth as their leaders direct, without ever examining or fo much as knowing the caufe they contend for. If a man's life fhows that he has no ferious regard for religion, for what reafon fhould we think that he beats

his head about the opinions of his church, and troubles himself to examine the grounds of this or that doctrine? It is enough for him to obey his leaders, to have his hand and his tongue ready for the support of the common caufe, and thereby approve himself to those who can give him credit, preferment or protection in that fociety. Thus men become profeffors of, and combatants for those opinions, they were never convinced of, nor profelytes to, no, nor ever had fo much as floating in their heads; and though one cannot fay, there are fewer improbable or erroneous opinions in the world than there are, yet this is certain, there are fewer that actually affent to them, and mistake them for truths, than is imagined.

A

CHAP. XXI.

OF THE DIVISION OF THE SCIENCES.

1. Three Sorts.

LL that can fall within the compafs of human understanding, being either, First, The nature of things as they are in themselves, their relations, and their manner of operation; or, Secondly, That which man himself ought to do, as a rational and voluntary agent, for the attainment of any end, especially happinefs; or, Thirdly, The ways and means whereby the knowledge of both the one and the other of these are attained and communicated; I think science may be divided properly into these three forts.

§ 2. 1. Phyfica.

FIRST, The knowledge of things, as they are in their own proper beings, their conititutions, properties, and operations; whereby I mean not only matter and body, but fpirits alfo, which have their proper natures, conftitutions, and operations, as well as bodies. This in a little more enlarged fenfe of the word, I call us, or natural philofophy. The end of this is bare fpeculative truth; and waatfoever can afford the mind of man any fuch, falls under this branch, whether it be God himself,

angels, fpirits, bodies, or any of their affections, as number and figure, &c.

§3. 2. Practica.

SECONDLY, ПaxTixh, The fkill of right applying our own powers and actions, for the attainment of things good and ufeful. The most confiderable under this head is ethics, which is the feeking out thofe rules and mea fures of human actions, which lead to happiness, and the means to practife them. The end of this is not bare fpeculation, and the knowledge of truth, but right, and a conduct fuitable to it.

$4. 3. Σημιωτική.

THIRDLY, The third branch may be called

or the doctrine of figns, the most ufual whereof being words, it is aptly enough termed also Aoyıxù, logic; the bufinefs whereof, is to confider the nature of figns the mind makes ufe of for the understanding of things, or conveying its knowledge to others; for fince the things the mind contemplates are none of them, befides itfelf, prefent to the understanding, it is neceffary that fomnething elfe, as a fign or reprefentation of the thing it confiders, fhould be prefent to it; and thefe are ideas. And because the fcene of ideas, that makes one man's thoughts, cannot be laid open to the immediate view of another, nor laid up any where but in the memory, a no very fure repofitory; therefore to communicate our thoughts to one another, as well as record them for our own ufe, figns of our ideas are alfo neceffary. Thofe which men have found moft convenient, and therefore generally make ufe of, are articulate founds. The con fideration then of ideas and words, as the great inftruments of knowledge, makes no defpicable part of their contemplation, who would take a view of human knowledge in the whole extent of it; and perhaps f they were diftinctly weighed, and duly confidered, they would afford us another fort of logic and critique than what we have been hitherto acquainted with.

§ 5. This is the first Division of the Objects of Know

ledge.

THIS feems to me the first and most general, as well as na

tural divifion of the objects of our understanding; for a man can employ his thoughts about nothing, but either the contemplation of things themselves for the discovery of truth, or about the things in his own power, which are his own actions, for the attainment of his own ends; or the figns the mind makes use of, both in the one and the other, and the right ordering of them for its clearer information. All which three, viz. things as they are in themselves knowable, actions as they depend on us in order to happiness, and the right ufe of figns in order to knowledge, being toto cœlo different, they feemed to me to be the three great provinces of the intellectual world, wholly feparate and diftinct one from another.