or any of them in the minds of all men, or that they were any of them propofitions in any one's mind, till he, having got the abstract ideas, joined or separated them by affirmation or negation. But wherefoever we can fuppofe fuch a creature as man is, endowed with fuch faculties, and thereby furnished with fuch ideas as we have, we must conclude he muft needs, when he applies his thoughts to the confideration of his ideas, know the truth of certain propofitions that will arife from the agreement or disagreement which he will perceive in his own ideas. Such propofitions are therefore called eternal truths, not because they are eternal propofitions actually formed, and antecedent to the understanding that any time makes them; nor because they are imprinted on the mind from any patterns that are any where of them out of the mind, and existed before; but becaufe being once made about abstract ideas fo as to be true, they will, whenever they can be fuppofed to be made again at any time. paft or to come, by a mind having those ideas, always actually be true; for names being fuppofed to ftand perpetually for the fame ideas, and the fame ideas having immutably the fame habitudes one to another, propofitions concerning any abftract ideas that are once true, muft needs be eternal verities.

CHAP. XII.

OF THE IMPROVEMENT OF OUR KNOWLEDGE.

§ 1. Knowledge is not from Maxims. T having been the

common received opinion

I among men of letters, that maxims were the

foundation of all knowledge; and that the fciences were each of them built upon certain præcognita, from whence the understanding was to take its rife, and by which it was to conduct itself, in its inquiries into the matters belonging to that fcience; the beaten road of the schools has been, to lay down in the beginning one or more general propofitions, as foundations where

on to build the knowledge that was to be had of that fubject. Thefe doctrines thus laid down for foundations of any science, were called principles, as the beginnings from which we must set out, and look no farther backwards in our inquiries, as we have already obferved.

§ 2. The occafionof that Opinion.

ONE thing which might probably give an occafion to this way of proceeding in other fciences, was (as I fuppofe) the good fuccefs it seemed to have in mathematics, wherein men, being obferved to attain a great certainty of knowledge, these sciences came by preeminence to be called Matuata and Manors, learning, or things learned, thoroughly learned, as having of all others the greatest certainty, clearness and evidence in them.

3. But from the comparing clear and diftin&t Ideas. Bur if any one will confider, he will (I guess) find that the great advancement and certainty of real knowledge, which men arrived to in these fciences, was not owing to the influence of thefe principles, nor derived from any peculiar advantage they received from two or three general maxims, laid down in the begin. ning, but from the clear, diftinct, complete ideas their thoughts were employed about, and the relation of equality and excefs fo clear between fome of them, that they had an intuitive knowledge, and by that a way to discover it in others, and this without the help of those maxims. For I ask, is it not poffible for a young lad to know, that his whole body is bigger than his little finger, but by virtue of this axiom, that the whole is bigger than a part, nor be affured of it till he has learned that muxim? Or cannot a countrywench know, that having received a fhilling from one that owes her three, and a fhilling alfo from another that owes her three, that the remaining debts in each of their hands are equal? Cannot the know this, I fay, without fhe fetch the certainty of it from this maxim, that if you take equals from equals, the remainder will be equals, a maxim which poffibly the

never heard or thought of? I defire any one to confider, from what has been elsewhere faid, which is known first and cleareft by most people, the particular instance, or the general rule, and which it is that gives life and birth to the other. Thefe general rules are but the comparing our more general and abstract ideas, which are the workmanship of the mind made, and names given to them, for the eafier difpatch in its reafonings, and drawing into comprehenfive terms, and short rules, its various and multiplied obfervations; but knowledge began in the mind, and was founded on particulars, though afterwards perhaps no notice be taken thereof; it being natural for the mind (forward ftill to enlarge its knowledge) moft attentively to lay up thofe general notions, and make the proper use of them, which is to difburden the memory of the cumbersome load of particulars. For I defire it may be confidered what more certainty there is to a child, or any one, that his body, little finger and all, is bigger than his little finger alone, after you have given to his body the name whole, and to his little finger the name part, than he could have had before; or what new knowledge concerning his body, can these two relative terms give him, which he could not have without them? Could he not know that his body was bigger than his little finger, if his language were yet fo imperfect, that he had no fuch relative terms as whole and part? I ask farther, when he has got these names, how is he more certain that his body is a whole, and his little finger a part, than he was or might be certain, before he learned these terms, that his body was bigger than his little finger? Any one may as reasonably doubt or deny that his little finger is a part of his body, as that it is less than his body; and he that can doubt whether it be less, will as certainly doubt whether it be a part; fo that the maxim, the whole is bigger than a part, can never be made use of to prove the little finger lefs than the body, but when it is useless, by being brought to convince one of a truth which he knows already; for he that does

not know that any parcel of matter, with another par cel of matter joined to it, is bigger than either of them alone, will never be able to know it by the help of these two relative terms, whole and part, make of them what maxim you please.

§ 4. Dangerous to build upon precarious Principles. Bur be it in the mathematics as it will, whether it be clearer, that taking an inch from a black line of two inches, and an inch from a red line of two inches, the remaining parts of the two lines will be equal, or that if you take equals from equals, the remainder will be equals; which, I fay, of thefe two is the clearer and first known, I leave to any one to determine, it not being material to my prefent occafion. That which I have here to do is to inquire, whether, if it be the readiest way to knowledge to begin with general maxims, and build upon them, it be yet a fafe way to take the principles which are laid down in any other fcience as unquestionable truths, and fo receive them without examination, and adhere to them, without fuffering to be doubted of, becaufe mathematicians have been fo happy, or fo fair, to ufe none but selfevident and undeniable. If this be fo, I know not what may not pafs for truth in morality, what may not be introduced and proved in natural philofophy.

Let that principle of fome of the philofophers, that all is matter, and that there is nothing elfe, be received for certain and indubitable, and it will be easy to be feen by the writings of fome that have revived it again in our days, what confequences it will lead us into. Let any one, with Polemo, take the world, or with the ftoics, the ether or the fun, or with Anaximenes, the air, to be God; and what a divinity, religion and worship muft we needs have! Nothing can be fo dangerous as principles thus taken up without queftioning or examination, especially if they be such as concern morality, which influence mens lives, and give a bias to all their actions. Who might not juftly expect another kind of life in Ariftippus, who placed happiness in bodily pleasure, and in Antifibenes, who

Book IV. made virtue fufficient to felicity? And he who, with Plato, fhall place beatitude in the knowledge of God, will have his thoughts raised to other contemplations than those who looked not beyond this spot of earth, aud thofe perishing things which are to be had in it. He that with Archelaus fhall lay it down as a principle, that right and wrong, honest and difhonest, are defined only by laws, and not by nature, will have other measures of moral rectitude and pravity than those who take it for granted that we are under obligations antecedent to all human conftitutions.

§ 5. This is no certain way to Truth.

IF, therefore, thofe that pafs for principles, are not certain (which we must have some way to know, that we may be able to diftinguish them from thofe that are doubtful), but are only made fo to us by our blind affent, we are liable to be misled by them, and instead of being guided into truth, we fhall by principles be only confirmed in mistake and error.

§ 6. But to compare clear complete Ideas under Ready Names.

BUT fince the knowledge of the certainty of principles, as well as of all other truths, depends only upon the perception we have of the agreement or difagreement of our ideas, the way to improve our knowledge is not, I am fure, blindly, and with an implicit faith, to receive and swallow principles; but is, I think, to get and fix in our minds clear, diftinct and complete ideas, as far as they are to be had, and annex to them proper and conftant names; and thus, perhaps, without any other principles, but barely confidering thofe ideas, and by comparing them one with another, finding their agreement and difagreement, and their feveral relations and habitudes, we shall get more true and clear knowledge, by the conduct of this one rule, than by taking up principles, and thereby putting our minds into the difpofal of others.