defign they fhall ftand for, there will be little reafon left to doubt, that those words I write do really exist without me, when they cause a long feries of regular founds to affect my ears, which could not be the effect of my imagination, nor could my memory retain them in that order. § 8. This Certainty is as great as our Condition needs. BUT yet, if after all this, any one will be fo fceptical as to diftruft his fenfes, and to affirm that all we fee and hear, feel and tafte, think and do, during our whole Leng, is but the feries and deluding appearanoes of a long dream, whereof there is no reality, and therefore will queftion the existence of all things, or our knowledge of any thing; I must defire him to confider, that if all be a dream, then he doth but dream that he makes the question; and fo it is not much inatter that a waking man fhould answer him. But yet, if he pleafes, he may dream that I make him this aufwer, that the certainty of things exifting in rerum natura, when we have the teftimony of our fenfes for it, is not only as great as our frame can attain to, but as our condition needs; for our faculties being fuited not to the full extent of being, nor to a perfect, clear, comprehenfive knowledge of things, free from all doubt and scruple, but to the prefervation of us in whom they are, and accommodated to the use of life; they ferve to our purpose well enough, if they will but give us certain notice of those things which are convenient or inconvenient to us; for he that fees a candle burning, and hath experimented the force of its flame, by putting his finger in it, will little doubt that this is fomething exifting without him, which does him harm, and puts him to great pain;. which is affurance enough, when no man requires greater certainty to govern his actions by, than what is as certain as his actions themselves. And if our dreamer pleases to try, whether the glowing heat of a glass furnace be barely a wandering imagination in a drowsy man's fancy, by putting his hand into it. he may perhaps be wakened into a certainty greater than he could wish, that it is fomething more than bare imagination; fo that this evidence is as great as we can defire, being as certain to us as our pleafure or pain, i. e. happiness or mifery, beyond which we have no concernment, either of knowing or being. Such an affurance of the existence of things without us, is fufficient to direct us in the attaining the good, and avoiding the evil, which is caufed by them; which is the important concernment we have of being made acquainted with them. $9. But reaches no farther than actual Senfation. IN fine then, when our fenfes do actually convey into our understandings any idea, we cannot but be fatiffied that there doth fomething at that time really exift without us, which doth affect our fenfes, and by them give notice of itfelf to our apprehenfive faculties, and actually produce that idea which we then perceive; and we cannot fo far diftruft their teftimony as to doubt, that fuch collections of fimple ideas, as we have obferved by our fenfes to be united together, do really exift together. But this knowledge extends as far as the prefent teftimony of our fenfes, employed about particular objects that do then affect them, and no farther; for if I faw fuch a collection of fimple ideas, as is wont to be called man, existing together one minute fince, and am now alone, I cannot be certain that the fame man exifts now, fince there is no neceflary connection of his existence a minute fince, with his exiftence now; by a thousand ways he may ceafe to be, fince I had the teftimony of my fenfes for his existence; and if I cannot be certain, that the man I faw laft to-day is now in being, I can lefs be certain that he is fo, who hath been longer removed from my fenfes, and I have not feen fince yesterday, or fince the last year; and much lefs can I be certain of the existence of men that I never faw. And, therefore, though it be highly probable, that millions of men do now exift, yet whilst I am alone writing this, I have not that certainty of it which we ftrictly call knowledge; though the great likelihood of it puts me paft doubt, and it be reasonable for me to do feveral things upon the confidence that there are men (and men also of my acquaintance, with whom I have to do) now in the world; but this is but probability, not knowledge. 10. Folly to expect Demonftration in every Thing. WHEREBY yet we may obferve, how foolish and vain a thing it is, for a man of a narrow knowledge, who having reafon given him to judge of the different evidence and probability of things, and to be swayed accordingly; how vain, I say, it is to expect demonstration and certainty in things not capable of it, and refufe affent to very rational propofitions, and act contrary to very plain and clear truths, because they cannot be made out fo evident, as to furmount every the leaft (I will not fay reafon, but) pretence of doubting. He that in the ordinary affairs of life would admit of nothing but direct plain demonftration, would be fure of nothing in this world, but of perithing quickly; the wholesomeness of his meat or drink would not give him reafon to venture on it; and I would fain know, what it is he could do upon fuch grounds as are capable of no doubt, no objection. 11. Paft Existence is known by Memory. As when our fenfes are actually employed about any object, we do know that it does exift; fo by our memory we may be affured, that heretofore things that affected our fenfes have exifted: And thus we have knowledge of the past existence of several things, whereof our fenfes having informed us, our memories ftill retain the ideas; and of this we are paft all doubt, fo long as we remember well; but this knowledge alfo reaches no farther than our senses have formerly affured us. Thus, feeing water at this inftant, it is an unquestionable truth to me, that water doth exift; and remembering that I faw it yesterday, it will also be always true; and as long as my memory retains it, always an undoubted propofition to me, that water did exift the 10th of July 1688, as it will alfo be Book IV. equally true, that a certain number of very fine colours did exift, which at the fame time I faw upon a bubble of that water; but being now quite out of the fight both of the water and bubbles too, it is no more certainly known to me that the water doth now exist, than that the bubbles or colours therein do fo; it being no more neceflary that water fhould exift to-day, because it exifted yesterday, than that the colours or bubbles exist to-day, because they exifted yesterday; though it be exceedingly much more probable, because water hath been obferved to continue long in exiftence, but bubbles and the colours on them quickly cease to be. $12. The Existence of Spirits not knowable. WHAT ideas we have of fpirits, and how we come by them, I have already shown. But though we have thofe ideas in our minds, and know we have them there, the having the ideas of fpirits does not make us know, that any fuch things do exift without us, or that there are any finite fpirits, or any other spiritual beings but the Eternal God. We have ground from revelation, and feveral other reasons, to believe with affurance, that there are fuch creatures; but our fenfes not being able to discover them, we want the means of knowing their particular existences; for we can no more know that there are finite spirits really exifting, by the idea we have of fuch beings in our minds, than by the ideas any one has of fairies, or centaurs, he can come to know that things answering those ideas do really exist. And therefore, concerning the existence of finite fpirits, as well as feveral other things, we must content ourfelves with the evidence of faith; but univerfal certain propofitions concerning this matter, are beyond our reach; for however true it may be, v. g. that all the intelligent fpirits that God ever created, do ftill exift, yet it can never make a part of our certain knowledge. Thefe and the like propofitions we may affent to as highly probable, but are not, I fear, in this ftate capable of knowing. We are not then to put others upon demonftrating, nor ourselves upon fearch of universal certainty in all those matters, wherein we are not capable of any other knowledge, but what our fenfes give us in this or that particular. 13. Particular Propofitions concerning Existences are knowable. By which it appears, that there are two forts of propofitions. 1. There is one fort of propofitions concerning the existence of any thing anfwerable to fuch an idea; as, having the idea of an elephant, phænix, mo-· tion, or an angle, in my mind, the fift and natural inquiry is, whether fuch a thing does any where exift? And this knowledge is only of particulars. No existence of any thing without us, but only of God, can certainly be known farther than our fenfes inform us. 2. There is another fort of propofitions, wherein is expreffed the agreement or difagreement of our abfiract ideas, and their dependence one on another. Such propofitions may be univerfal and certain. So, having the idea of God and myself, of fear and obedience, I cannot but be fure that God is to be feared and obeyed by me; and this propofition will be certain, concerning man in general, if I have made an abstract idea of fuch a fpecies, whereof I am one particular. But yet this propofition, how certain foever, that men ought to fear and obey God, proves not to me the existence of men in the world, but will be true of all fuch creatures whenever they do exift; which certainty of fuch general propofitions, depends on the agreement or disagreement, is to be difcovered in those abstract ideas. §14. And general Propofitions concerning abstract Ideas. In the former cafe, our knowledge is the confequence of the existence of things producing ideas in our minds by our fenfes; in the latter, knowledge is the confequence of the ideas (be they what they will), that are in our minds producing there general certain propoli -tions. Many of thefe are called æternæ veritates, æd all of them indeed are fo; not from being written ali |