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9 6. Confusion of Ideas, is in reference to their Names. To remove this difficulty, and to help us to conceive aright what it is that makes the confusion ideas are at any time chargeable with, we must congder that things ranked under distinct names, are supposed different enough to be distinguished, that so each fort by its peculiar nime may be marked and discoursed of apart upon any occafion; and there is nothing more evident, than that the greatest part of different names are supposed to stand for different things. Now, every idea a man has, being visibly what it is, and distinêt from all other ideas but it. self, that which makes it confused is, when it is fuch, that it may as well be called by anot'er name, as that which it is expressed by: the difference which keeps the things (to be ranked under those two different names) distinct, and makes some of them belong rather to the one, and some of them to the other of those names, being left out; and so the distindion, which was inten:!ed to be kept up by those different names, is quite loft.
§ 3. Defaults qvhich make Confusion." The defaults which usually o:casion this confission, I think, are chiefy these following: - Firt, complex Ideas made up of too foru fimple ones. FIRST, When any complex idea (for it is complex idens that are most liable to confufion) is made up of too finall a number of simple ideas, and such only as are common to cther things, whereby the differences that make it deserve a different name, are left out. Thus he that has an idea made up of barely the simple ones of a beast with spots, has but a confused idea of a leopard; it not being there. by fufficiently distinguished from a lynx, and several oother forts of beasts that are spotted : So that such an idea, though it hath the peculiar name leopard, is not distinguishable from those designed by the names lynx or panther, and may as well come under the name lynx as leopard. How much the custom of defining of words by general terms, contributes to make the ideas we would express by them confused and undetermined, I leave others to confider: This is evident, that confused ideas are such as render the use of words uncertain, and
take away the benefit of distinct names ; when the ideas, for which we use different terms, have not a difference answerable to their distinct names, and so cannot be distinguished by them, there it is that they are truly confused. ỹ 8. Secondly, or its fimple ones jumbled disorderly tia
geiher. SECONDLY, Another default which makes our ideas confused, is, when though the particulars that make up any idea are in number enough, yet they are fo jumbled together, that it is not easily discernible, whether it more belongs to the name that is given it, than to any other. There is nothing properer to make us conceive this confusion, than a sort of pictures usually shown as surprising pieces of art, wherein the colours, as they are laid by the pencil on the table itself, mark out very odd and unusual figures, and have no discernible order in their pofition. This draught, thus made up of parts wherein no symmetry nor order appears, is in itself no more a confused thing, than the picture of a cloudy sky, wherein though there be as little order of colours or figures to be found, yet nobody thinks it a confused picture. What is it then that makes it be thought confused, since the want of symmetry does not ? as it is plain it does net; for another draught made, barely in imitation of this could not be called confused. I answer, That which makes it be thought confused, is, the applying it to fome name, to which it does no more discernibly be. long, than to some other : v.g. When it is said to be the picture of a man, or Cafar, then any one with reafon counts it confused; because it is not discernible, in that itate, to belong more to the name man, or Celar, than to the name baboon, or Pompey, which are supposed to stand for different ideas from those signified by man or Cæfar: But when a cylindrical mirror placed right, hath reduced those irregular lines on the table into their due order and proportion, then the confusion ceases, and the eye presently sees that it is a man, or C:far, i. e. that it belongs to those names, and that it is suficiently distinguishable from a baboon, or Pompey, i. e.. from the ideas fignified by those names. Just thus it is with our ideas, which are as it were the pictures of things. No one of these mental draughts, however the parts are put together, can be called confused (for they are plainly discernible as they are) till it be ranked under fome ordinary name, to which it cannot be discerned to belong, any more than it does to some other name of an allowed different signification.
Ø 9. Thirdly, or are mutable and undetermined. THIRDLY, A third defect that frequently gives the name of confused to our ideas, is, when any one of them is uncertain and undetermined. Thus we may observe men, who not forbearing to use the ordinary words of their language, till they have learned their precise signification, change the idea they make this or that term stand for, almost as often as they use it : He that does this out of uncertainty of what he should leave out, or put into his idea of church or idolatry, every time he thinks of either, and holds not steady to any one precise combination of ideas that makes it up, is said to have a confused idea of idolatry or the church; though this be still for the same reason that the former, viz. because a mutable idea (if we will allow it to be one idea) cannot belong to one name rather than another, and so loses the distinction that distinct names are designed for. ♡ 10. Confufon without reference to Names, hardly con
ceivable. By what has been said, we may observe how much names, as supposed steady signs of things, and by their difference to stand for and keep things distinct that in themselves are different, are the occasion of denominating ideas distinct or confused, by a secret and unobserved reference the mind makes of irs ideas to such names. This perhaps will be fuller understood, after what I say of words, in the third book, has been read and considered: But without taking notice of such a reference of ideas, to distinct names as the signs of distinct things, it will be hard to say what a confused idea is ; and therefore when a man designs, by any name, a sort of things, or any oue particular thing, distinct from all others, the complex idea he annexes to that name, is the more diftinct, the nore particular the ideas are, and the greater and more determinate the number and order of them is, whereof it is made up; for the more it has of these, the more has it still of the perceivable differences, whereby it is kept separate and distinct from all ideas belonging to other names, even those that approach nearest to it, and thereby all confusion with them is avoided.
$11Confusion concerns always two Ideas. CONFUSION, making it a difficulty to separate two things that should be separated, concerns always two ideas; and those most, which most approach one another : Wheoever therefore, we suspect any idea to be confused, we muft examine what other it is in danger to be confound. ed with, or which it cannot easily be separated from ; and that will always be found an idea belonging to ano. ther name, and so should be a different thing; from which yet it is not sufficiently diftinct, being either the same with it, or making a part of it, or at least as properly called by that name, as the other it is ranked under; and so keeps not that difference from that other idea which the different names import.
Ø 12. Causes of Confufon. This, I think, is the confusion proper to ideas, which Nill carries with it a secret reference to names : At least if there be any other confusion of ideas, this is that which most of all disorders mens thoughts and discourses, ideas as ranked under names, being those that for the most part men rcaļon of within then selves, and always those which they commune about with o. thers; and therefore where there are supposed two dif. ferent ideas marked by two different names, which are not as distinguishable as the sounds that stand for them, there never fails to be confusion : And where any ideas are distinct, as the ideas of those two founds they are marked by, there can be between them no confu|10".
The way to prevent it, is to collect and unite into our complex idea, as precisely as is possible, all those ingredients whereby it is differenced from others; and to them so united in a determinate number and order, ap
ply steadily the same name ; but this neither accommodating mens ease or vanity, or serving any design but that of naked truth, which is not always the thing aimed at, such exactness is rather to be wished than hoped for. And since the loose application of names to undetermined, variable, and almost no ideas, serve both to cover our own ignorance, as well as to perplex and confound others, which goes for learning and superiority in knowledge, it is no wonder that most men should use it themselves, whilst they complain of it in others. Though, I think, no small part of the confufion to be found in the notions of men, might by care and inge. nuity be avoided, yet I am far from concluding it every where wilful. Some ideas are so complex, and made up of so many parts, that the memory does not easily retain the very same precise combination of simple ideas under one name ; much less are we able constantly to divine for what precise complex idea such a name stands in another man's use of it. From the first of these follows confufon in a man's own reasonings and opinions within himself; from the latter, frequent confufon in discoursing and arguing with others. But haying more at large treated of words, their defects and abuses in the following book, I shall here say no more of it. $ 13. Complex Ideas may be distinel in one part, and cone
fused in another. Our complex ideas being made up of collections, and so variety of simple oncs, mzy accordingly be very clear and distinct in one part, and query obscure and confused in another. In a man who speaks of a chiliaedron, or a body of a thousand sides, the idea of the figure may be very confused, though that of the number be very diftinét; so that he being able to discourse and demonstrate concerning that part of his complex idea which depends upon the number of a thousand, he is api to think he has a distinct idea of a chiliaedron ; though it be plain he has no precise idea of its figure, so as to distinguish it by that, from one that has but 999 fides ; the