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of them, with names given to them; and those have been these three : Thinking and motion (which are the two ideas which comprehend in them all action) and power, from whence these actions are conceived to flow. These simple ideas, I say, of thinking, motion, and power, have been those which have been most modified, and out of whose modification have been made most complex modes, with names to them. For action being the great business of mankind, and the whole matter about which all laws are converfant, it is no wonder that the several modes of thinking and motion should be taken notice of, the ideas of them observed, and laid up in the memory, and have yames assigned to them, without which laws could be but ill made, or vice and disorder reprefled, Nor could any communication be well had amongst men, without such complex ideas, with names to them; and therea fore men have settled names, and supposed settled ideas, in their minds, of modes of actions distinguished by their causes, means, objects, ends, instruments, time, place, and other circumstances; and also of their powers Gitted for those actions, y. g. boldness is the power to speak or do what we intend before others, without fear or disorder; and the Greeks call the confidence of speaking by a peculiar name, wapnoia, which power or ability in man, of doing any thing, when it has been acquired by frequent doing the same thing, is that idea. we name habit; when it is forward, and ready upon every occasion to break into action, we call it difpofition. Thus teftinefs is a disposition or aptness to be angry.
To conclude, let us examine any mode of action, v. g. confideration and assent, which are actions of the mind; running and speaking, which are actions of the body; revenge and murder, which are actions of both together; and we shall find them but so many collections of fimple ideas, which together make up the complex onės signified by those names. § 11. Several Words seeming to fignify action, signi
fy but the Efect. Power being the source from whence all action proceeds, the substances wherein these powers are, when
they exert this power into act, are called causes ; and the substances which thereupon are produced, or the simple ideas which are introduced into any subject by the exerting of that power, are called effeéts. The efficary whereby the new substance or idea is produced, is called, in the subject exerting that power, action ; but in the subject wherein any simple idea is changed or produced, it is called paflion; which efficacy, however various, and the effects almost infinite, yet we can, I think, conceive it, in intellectual agents, to be nothing else but modes of thinking and willing ; in corporeal agents, nothing else but modifications of motion. I fay, I think we cannot conceive it to be any other but these two : For whatever sort of action, besides these, produces any effects, I confess myself to have no norion nor idea of, and so it is quite remote from my thoughts, apprehensions, and knowledge, and as much in the dark to me as five other senses, or as the ideas of colours to a blind man; and therefore many words, which seem to express "Some action, fignify nothing of the action or modus operandi at all, but barely the effect, with fome circumstances of the subject wrought on, or cause operating ; v. g. creation, annihilation, contain in them no idea of the action or manner whereby they are produced, but barely of the cause, and the thing done. And, when a country man says the cold freezes water, though the word freezing seems to import fome action, yet truly it fignifies nothing but the effect, viz. that water that was before fluid, is become hard and consistent, without containing any idea of the action whereby it is done.
$ 12. Mixed Modes made alfo of other Ideas. I THINK I shall not need to remark here, that though power and action make the greatest part of mixed modes, marked by names, and familiar in the minds and mouths of men ; yet other simple ideas, and their several combinations, are not excluded; much less, I think, will it be necesary for me to enumerate all the mixed modes which have been settled, with names to them. That would be to make a dictionary of the
greatest part of the words made use of in divinity, ethics, law, and politics, and several other sciences. All that is requisite to my present design, is to fhow what sort of ideas those are which I call mixed modes, how the mind comes by them, and that they are compositions made up of simple ideas got from sensation and reflection, which, I suppose, I have done.
OF OUR COMPLEX IDEAS OF SUBSTANCES,
5 1. Ideas of Subliances, how made. THE mind being, as I have declared, furnished with
1 a great number of the simple ideas, conveyed in by the senses, as they are found in exterior things, or by reflection on its own operations, takes notice also, that a certain number of these simple ideas go constantly together; which being presumed to belong to one thing, and words being suited to common apprehensions, and made use of for quick dispatch, are called, so united in one subject, by one name; which, by inadvertency, we are apt afterwards to talk of, and consider, as one simple idea, which indeed is a complication of many ideas together : Because, as I have said, not imagining how: these simple ideas can sublift by themselves, we accus. tom ourselves to suppose some fubftratum wherein they do subfift, and from which they do result; which there fore we call substance.
$ . Our Idea of Substance in general. So that if any one will examine himself concerning his notion of pure substance in general, he will find lie has no other idea of it at all, but only a supposition of he knows not what support of such qualities, which are capable of producing simple ideas in us; which qualities are commonly called accidents. If any one should be asked, What is the subject wherein colour or weight inheres ? he would have nothing to fay, but the folid ex. tended parts : And if he were demanded, What is it that solidity and extension inhere in ? he would not be
in a much better cafe than the Indian before mentioned, who, saying that the world was supported by a great elephant, was asked what the elephant rested on; to which his answer was, A great tortoise. But being again pressed to know what gave support to the broadbacked tortoise, replied, Something, he knew not what. And thus here, as in all other cases where we use words without having clear and distinct ideas, we talk like children, who being questioned what such a thing is, which they know not, readily give this fatisfactory answer, That it is something : which, in truth, signifies no more, when so used either by children or men, but that they know not what; and that the thing they pretend to know and talk of, is what they have no distinet idea of at all, and fo are perfectly ignorant of it, and in the dark. The idea, then, we have, to which we give the general name Substance, being nothing but the suppored, but unknown, fupport of those qualities we find exifting, which we imagine cannot sublift fine re substante, without something to support them, we call that support fubßantia, which, according to the true import of the word, is, in plain English, standing under, or upholding.
3. Of the forts of Substarices. An obscure and relative idea of fubstance in general being thus made, we come to have the ideas of particklar sorts of substances, by collecting such combinations of fimple ideas, as are, by experience and observation of mens senses, taken notice of to exist together, and are therefore supposed to flow from the particular internal constitution, or unknown eflence of that substance. Thus we come to have the ideas of a inan, horse, gold, water, &c. of which substances, whether any one has any other clear idlea, farther than of certain simple ideas co-existing together, I appeal to every one's own expe. ricuce. It is the ordinary qualities observable in iron, or a diamond, put together, that make the true complex idea of those substances, which a fmith or a jeweller commonly knows better than a philosopher, who, whatever substantial forms he may talk of, has no other idea of those substances than what is framed by a colo lection of those fimple ideas which are to be found in them : only we muit take notice, that our complex ideas of substances, besides all those simple ideas they are made up of, have always the confused idea of something to which they belong, and in which they subfit. And therefore, when we speak of any sort of substance, we fay, it is a thing having such or such qualities; as body is a thing that is extended, figured, and capable of mocion ; spirit, a thing capable of thinking; and so hardness, friability, and power to draw iron, we say, are qualities to be found in a loadstone. There, and the like fashions of speaking, intimate, that the substance is supposed always something besides the extension, figure, folidity, motion, thinking, or other observable ideas, though we know not what it is. ,
ý 4. No clear Idea of Substance in general: HENCE, when we talk or think of any particular fort of corporeal substances, as korle, ftone, &c. though the idea we have of either of them be but the complication or collection of those several simple ideas of sensible qualities, which we ule to find united in the thing called horse or stone; yet because we cannot conceive how they should fubáft alone, nor one in another, we suppose them existing in and supported by some common subject ; which support we denote by the name Subfiance, though it be certain we have no clear or distinct idea of that thing we suppose a support.
$ 5. As clear an Idea of Spirit as Body. The fame happens concerning the operations of the mind, viz. thinking, reasoning, fearing, &c. which we concluding not to subfiftof themselves, nor apprehending how they can belong to body, or be produced by it, we are apt to think these the actions of some other subItance, which we call spirit: whereby yet it is evident, that having no other idea or no:ion of matter, but fomething wherein those many sensible qualities which affect our senses, do fubfift; by supposing a substance, wherein thinking, knowing, doubting, and a power of moving, &c. do subäst, we have as clear a notion of the substance of spirit, as we have of body; the one being supposed