the power of thinking well or ill, approving or difapproving of the actions of those whom they live amongit, and converfe with: And by this approbation and diflike, they eftablifh among themfelves what they will call Virtue and Vice.

THAT this is the common measure of virtue and vice, will appear to any one who confiders, that though that paffes for vice in one country, which is counted a virtue, or at leaft not vice in another, yet every where virtue and praife, vice and blame go together. Virtue is every where that which is thought praife-worthy; and nothing elfe but that which has the allowance of public esteem, is called Virtue*. Virtue and praise are fo united, that they

Our author, in his preface to the fourth edition, taking notice how apt men bave been to mifluke him, added what bere follows: Of this the ingenious author of the Difcourfe concerning the Nature of Man has given me a late inftance, to mention no other: For the civility of his expreffions, and the candour that belongs to his order, forbid me to think, that he would have clofed his preface with an infinuation, as if in what I had faid, Book II. Chap. 28. concerning the third rule which men refer their actions to, I went about to make virtue vice, and vice virtue, unless he had mistaken my meaning, which he could not have done, if he had but given himself the trouble to confider what the argument was I was then upon, and what was the chief defign of that chapter, plainly enough fet down in the fourth fection, and thofe following: For I was there not laying down moral rules, but fhowing the original and nature of moral ideas, and enumerating the rules men make use of in moral relations, whether thofe rules were true or false; and pursuant thereunto, I tell what has every where that denomination, which in the language of that place anfwers to virtue and vice in ours, which alters not the nature of things, though men do generally judge of, and denominate their actions according to the esteem and fashion of the place, or fect they are of.

If he had been at the pains to reflect on what I had faid, B. I. c. 3. $18. and in this prefent chapter, § 13, 14, 15, and 20. he would have known what I think of the eternal and unalterable nature of right and wrong, and what I call virtue and vice; and if he had obferved, that in the place he quotes, I only report, as matter of fact, what others call virtue and vice, he would not have found it liable to any great exception: For I think I am not much out in faying, that one of the rules made use of in the world for a ground or measure of a moral relation, is that efteem and reputation which feveral forts of actions find varioufly in the feveral focieties of men, according to which they are called virtues or vices; and whatever authority the learned Mr. Lorde places in his Old English Dictionary, I dare fay it no where tells him (if I should

are called often by the fame name. Sunt fua præmia laudi, fays Virgil; and so Cicero, Nihil babet natura præftantius, quam honeflatem, quam laudem, quam dignitatem,

appeal to it) that the fame action is not in credit, called and counted a virtue in one place, which being in difrepute, paffes for and under the name of vice in another. The taking notice that men beflow the names of virtue and vice according to this rule of reputation, is all I have done, or can be laid to my charge to have done, towards making vice virtue, and virtue vice: But the good man does well, and as becomes his calling, to be watchful in fuch points, and to take the alarm, even at expreffions, which standing alone by themfelves might found ill, and be fufpected.

It is to this zeal, allowable in his function, that I forgive his citing, as he does thefe words of mine, in § 11. of this chapter: The exbortations of infpired teachers have not feared to appeal to common repute; whatsoever things are lovely, whatfoever things are of good report, if there be any virtue, if there be any praife, &c. Phil. iv. 8. without taking notice of thofe immediately preceding, which introduce them, run thus: Whereby in the corruption of manners, the true boundaries of the law of nature, which ought to be the rule of virtue and vice, were pretty well preferved; fo that even the exbortations of infpired teachers, &c. By which words, and the rest of that fection, it is plain that I brought that passage of St. Paul, not to prove that the general measure of what men call virtue and vice, throughout the world, was the reputation and fashion of each particular fociety within itself; but to fhow, that though it were fo, yet, for reasons I there give, men, in that way of denominating their actions, did not for the most part much vary from the law of nature; which is that ftanding and unalterable rule, by which they ought to judge of the moral rectitude and pravity of their actions, and accordingly denominate them virtues or vices: Had Mr. Lorde confidered this, he would have found it little to his purpose, to have quoted that paffage in a fenfe I used it not; and would, I imagine, have fpared the explication he fubjoins to it, as not very neceffary: But I hope this fecond edition will give him fatisfaction in the point, and that this matter is now so expreffed, as to fhow him there was no caufe of fcruple.

Though I am forced to differ from him in thofe apprchenfions he has expreffed in the latter end of his preface, concerning what I had faid about virtue and vice, yet we are better agreed than he thinks, in what he fays in his third chapter, p. 78. concerning natural infeription and innate notions. I fhall not deny him the privilege he claims, p. 52. to ftate the queftion as he pleases, especially when he ftates it fo as to leave nothing in it contrary to what I have faid: For, according to him, innate notions being conditional things, depending upon the concurrence of feveral other circumftances, in order to the foul's exerting them; all that he fays for innate, imprinted, impressed notions (for of innate ideas he fays nothing at all) amounts at laft only to this; that there are certain propofitions, which though the foul from the beginning, or when a man is born, does not know, yet by affiflance from the outward fenfes, and the belp of fome previous cultivation, it may afterwards come certainly to know the truth of; which is no more than what I have affirmed in my first book: For I suppose, by the soul's exerting them, he means its bc

quam decus; which, he tells you, are all names for the fame thing, Tufc. 1. 2. This is the language of the heathen philofophers, who well understood wherein their notions of virtue and vice confifted. And though perhaps, by the different temper, education, fashion, maxims, or intereft of different forts of men, it fell out that what was thought praife-worthy in one place, escaped not cenfure in another; and fo in different focieties, virtues and vices were changed; yet, as to the main, they for the most part kept the fame every where: For fince nothing can be more natural, than to encourage with esteem and reputation that wherein every one finds his advantage, and to blame and discountenance the contrary; it is no wonder, that esteem and difcredit, virtue and vice, fhould in a great measure every where correfpond with the unchangeable rule of right or wrong, which the law of God hath established; there being nothing that fo directly and visibly fecures and advances the general good of mankind, in this world, as obedience to the laws he has fet them; and nothing that breeds fuch mifchiefs and confufion, as the neglect of them: And therefore men, without renouncing all ginning to know them, or elfe the foul's exerting of notions will be to me a very unintelligible expreffion, and I think at beft is a very unfit one in this cafe, it mifleading mens thoughts by an infinuation, as if these notions were in the mind before the foul exerts them, i. e. before they are known; whereas truly before they are known, there is nothing of them in the mind but a capacity.to know them, when the concurrence of thofe circumftances, which this ingenious author thinks neceffary in order to the foul's exerting then, brings them into our knowledge.

P. 52. I find him exprefs it thus: Thefe natural notions are not fo imprinted upon the foul, as that they naturally and neceffarily exert themselves (even in children and idiots) without any affiftance from the outward fenfes, or without the help of fome previous cultivation. Here he fays they exert themfelves, as p. 78. that the foul exerts them. When he has explained to himfelf or others, what he means by the foul's exerting innate notions, or their exerting themselves, and what that previous cultivation, and circumftances, in order to their being exerted, are, he will, I fuppofe, find there is fo little of controverfy between him and me in the point, bating that he calls that exerting of notions, which I in a more vulgar ftyle call knorving, that I have reafon to think he brought in my name upon this occafion, only out of the pleasure he has to fpeak civilly of me; which I muft gratefully acknowledge he has done every where he mentions me, not without conferring on me, as fome others have done, a title L have no right to.

fenfe and reason, and their own intereft, which they are fo conftantly true to, could not generally mistake in placing their commendation and blame on that fide that really deferved it not: Nay, even thofe men, whose practice was otherwife, failed not to give their approbation right; few being depraved to that degree, as not to condemn, at least in others, the faults they themfelves were guilty of; whereby, even in the corruption of manners, the true boundaries of the law of nature, which ought to be the rule of virtue and vice, were pretty well preferved: So that even the exhortations of inspired teachers have not feared to appeal to common repute: Whatsoever is lovely, whatsoever is of good report, if there be any virtue, if there be any praife, &c. Phil. iv. 8. § 12. Its Inforcements, Commendation, and Difcredit. IF any one fhall imagine that I have forgot my own notion of a law, when I make the law, whereby men judge of virtue and vice, to be nothing elfe but the confent of private men, who have not authority enough to make a law; efpecially wanting that which is fo neceffary and effential to a law, a power to inforce it; I think I may fay, that he who imagines commendation and difgrace not to be ftrong motives on men, to accommodate themselves to the opinions and rules of thofe with whom they converse, seems little skilled in the nature or history of mankind, the greatest part whereof he fhall find to govern themselves chiefly, if not folely, by this law of fashion; and fo they do that which keeps them in reputation with their company, little regarding the laws of God, or the magiftrate. The penalties that attend the breach of God's laws, fome, nay perhaps moft men, dom feriously reflect on; and amongst thofe that do, many, whilft they break that law, entertain thoughts of future reconciliation, and making their peace for fuch breaches: And as to the punishments due from the laws of the commonwealth, they frequently flatter themselves with the hopes of impunity; but no man efcapes the punishment of their cenfure and dislike, who offends against the fafhion and opinion of the company he keeps, and would recommend himfelf to; nor is there

fel

one of ten thoufand, who is ftiff and infenfible enough to bear up under the conftant diflike and condemnation of his own club. He must be of a ftrange and unufual constitution who can content himself to live in conftant disgrace and difrepute with his own particular fociety. Solitude many men have fought, and been reconciled to; but nobody, that has the leaft thought or fenfe of a man about him, can live in fociety under the conftant diflike and ill opinion of his familiars, and thofe he converfes with: This is a burden too heavy for human fufferance: And he must be made up of irreconcileable contradictions, who can take pleasure in company, and yet be infenfible of contempt and difgrace from his companions.

13. These three Laws the Rules of Moral Good and Evil. THESE three then, First, the law of God; Secondly, The law of politic focieties; Thirdly, the law of fashion or private cenfure, are thofe to which men variously compare their actions: And it is by their conformity to one of thefe laws, that they take their measures, when they would judge of their moral rectitude, and denominate their actions good or bad.

14. Morality is the Relation of Actions to thefe Rules. WHETHER the rule, to which, as to a touchstone, we bring our voluntary actions to examine them by, and try their goodness, and accordingly to name them, which is, as it were, the mark of the value we fet upon them; whether, I fay, we take that rule from the fashion of the country, or the will of a law-maker, the mind is eafily able to obferve the relation any action hath to it, and to judge whether the action agrees or difagrees with the rule; and fo hath a notion of moral goodness or evil, which is either conformity or not conformity of any action to that rule; and therefore is often called moral rectitude. This rule being nothing but a collection of feveral fimple ideas, the conformity thereto is but fo ordering the action, that the fimple ideas belonging to it may correfpond to thofe which the law requires: And thus we fee how moral beings and notions are founded on, and terminated in these fimple ideas we have receive