255 acquainted with that fubject, and know it by that name. So, to make a country man understand what fueillemorte colour fignifies, it may fuffice to tell him, it is the colour of withered leaves falling in autumn. Secondly, But the only fure way of making known the fignifica tion of the name of any fimple idea, is by presenting to his fenfes that fubject which may produce it in his mind, and make hini actually have the idea that word stands for. 15. 2. In mixed Modes, by Definition.

SECONDLY, Mixed modes, especially thofe belonging to morality, being most of them fuch combinations of ideas as the mind puts together of its own choice, and whereof there are not always ftanding patterns to be found exifting, the fignification of their names cannot be made known, as those of fimple ideas, by any showing; but in recompence thereof, may be perfectly and exactly defined. For they being combinations of feveral ideas, that the mind of man has arbitrarily put together, without reference to any archetypes, men may, if they pleafe, exactly know the ideas that go to each compofition, and fo both use these words in a certain and undoubted fignification, and perfectly declare, when there is occafion, what they ftand for. This, if well confidered, would lay great blame on thofe, who make not their difcourfes about moral things very clear and diftinct; for fince the precife fignification of the names of mixed modes, or, which is all one, the real effence of each fpecies, is to be known, they being not of nature's but man's making, it is a great negligence and perverfenefs to difcourfe of moral things with uncertainty and obfcurity; which is more pardonable in treating of natural substances, where doubtful terms are hardly to be avoided, for a quite contrary reafon, as we fhall fee by and by.

§ 16. Morality capable of Demonflration. UPON this ground it is, that I am bold to think that morality is capable of demonftration, as well as mathematics, fince the precife real eflence of the things moral words ftand for, may be perfectly known, and to the congruity or incongruity of the things themfelves be certainly difcovered, in which confifts perfect knowledge. Nor

let any one object, that the names of fubftances are often to be made ufe of in morality, as well as thofe of modes, from which will arife obfcurity. For as to fubstances, when concerned in moral difcourfes, their divers natures are not fo much inquired into, as fuppofed; v. g. when we say, that man is fubject to law, we mean nothing by man, but a corporeal rational creature; what the real effence or other qualities of that creature are, in this cafe, is no way confidered; and therefore, whether a child or changeling be a man in a phyfical sense, may amongst the naturalifts be as difputable as it will, it concerns not at all the moral man, as I may call him, which is this immoveable unchangeable idea, a corporeal rational being ; for were there a monkey, or any other creature, to be found, that had the use of reason to such a degree as to be able to understand general signs, and to deduce confequences about general ideas, he would no doubt be fubject to law, and in that fenfe be a man, how much foever he differed in fhape from others of that name.. The names of fubftances, if they be used in them as they fhould, can no more disturb moral than they do mathematical difcourfes; where, if the mathematician fpeaks of a cube or globe of gold, or any other body, he has his clear fettled idea which varies not, though it may by mistake be applied to a particular body to which it be longs not.

17. Definition can make moral Difcourfes clear.. THIS I have here mentioned by the by, to fhow of what confequence it is for men, in their names of mixed modes, and confequently in all their moral difcourfes, to define their words when there is occafion, fince thereby moral. knowledge may be brought to fo great clearnefs and certainty. And it must be great want of ingenuity (to fay no worse of it) to refuse to do it, fince a definition is the only way whereby the precife meaning of moral words can be known, and yet a way whereby their meaning may be known certainly, and without leaving any room for any contest about it; and therefore the negligence or perverfenefs of mankind cannot be excufed, if their dif courses in morality be not much more clear than thofe

in natural philofophy, fince they are about ideas in the mind, which are none of them falfe or difproportionate, they having no external beings for the archetypes which they are referred to, and much correfpond with. It is far easier for men to frame in their minds an idea which fhall be the ftandard to which they will give the name juftice, with which pattern so made, all actions that agree fhall pafs under that denomination, than, having feen Ariftides, to frame an idea that fhall in all things be exactly like him, who is as he is, let men make what idea they please of him: For the one, they need but know the combination of ideas that are put together within in their own minds; for the other they muft inquire into the whole nature, and abftrufe hidden conftitution, and various qualities of a thing existing without them.

§ 18. And is the only way.

ANOTHER reason that makes the defining of mixed modes fo neceflary, especially of moral words, is what I mentioned a little before, viz. That it is the only way whereby the fignification of the most of them can be known with certainty For the ideas they ftand for, being for the moft part fuch whofe component parts no where exist together, but scattered and mingled with others, it is the mind alone that collects them, and gives them the union of one idea; and it is only by words, enumerating the feveral fimple ideas which the mind has united, that we can make known to others what their names ftand for; the affiftance of the fenfes in this cafe not helping us, by the proposal of fenfible objects, to fhow the ideas which our names of this kind stand for, as it does often in the names of fenfible fimple ideas, and also to fome degree in thofe of fubftances.

§ 19. 3. In Subftances, by showing and defining. THIRDLY, For the explaining the fignification of the names of fubftances, as they ftand for the ideas we have of their diftinct fpecies, both the fore-mentioned ways. viz. of showing and defining, are requifite in many cafes to be made use of; for there being ordinarily in each fort fome leading qualities, to which we fuppofe the other ideas, which make up our complex idea of that fpe

cies, annexed, we forwardly give the fpecific name to that thing, wherein that characteristical mark is found, which we take to be the moft diftinguishing idea of that fpecies. Thefe leading or characteristical (as I may fo call them) ideas, in the forts of animals and vegetables, is (as has been before remarked, Ch. VI. § 29. and Ch. IX. § 15.) moftly figure, and in inanimate bodies colour, and in fome both together. Now,

$ 20. Ideas of the leading qualities of Subflances are beft got by showing.

THESE leading fenfible qualities are those which make the chief ingredients of our specific ideas, and confequently the moft obfervable and unvariable part in the definitions of our specific names, as attributed to forts of fubftances coming under our knowledge: For though the found man, in its own nature, be as apt to fignify a complex idea made up of animality and rationality, united in the fame fubject, as to fignify any other combination, yet ufed as a mark to ftand for a fort of creatures we count of our own kind, perhaps the outward fhape is as neceffary to be taken into our complex idea, fignified by the word man, as any other we find in it; and therefore why Plato's animal implume bipes latis unguibus, fhould not be as good a definition of the name man, ftanding for that fort of creatures, will not be easy to show; for it is the fhape, as the leading quality, that feems more to determine that fpecies, than a faculty of reasoning, which appears not at first, and in fome never. And if this be not allowed to be fo, I do not know how they can be excufed from murder, who kill monstrous births (as we call them), because of an unordinary fhape, without knowing whether they have a rational foul or no; which can be no more difcerned in a well-formed, than ill-shaped infant, as foon as born. And who is it has informed us, that a rational foul can inhabit no tenement, unless it has juft fuch a fort of frontispiece, or can join itself to, and inform no fort of body but one that is juft of fuch an outward ftructure?

§ 21. Ideas of the leading qualities of Subftances are beft got by showing.

Now thefe leading qualities are beft made known by showing, and can hardly be made known otherwife; for the fhape of an horfe or caffuary, will be but rudely and imperfectly imprinted on the mind by words, the fight of the animals doth it a thousand times better; and the idea of the particular colour of gold is not to be got by any defcription of it, but only by the frequent exercife of the eyes about it, as is evident in thofe who are used to this metal, who will frequently diftinguish true from counterfeit, pure from adulterate, by the fight, where others (who have as good eyes, but yet by ufe have not got the precife nice idea of that peculiar yellow) fhall not perceive any difference. The like may be faid of thofe other fimple ideas, peculiar in their kind to any fubftance, for which precife ideas there are no peculiar names. The particular ringing found there is in gold, distinct from the found of other bodies, has no particu lar name annexed to it, no more than the particular yellow that belongs to that metal.

22. The Ideas of their Powers beft by Definition. BUT becaufe many of the fimple ideas that make up our fpecific ideas of fubftances, are powers which lie not obvious to our fenfes in the things as they ordinarily appear; therefore in the fignification of our names of fubflances, fome part of the fignification will be better made know by enumerating thofe fimple ideas, than in showing the fubftance itself; for he that, to the yellow fhining colour of geld got by fight, fhall, from my enumerating them, have the ideas of great ductility, fufibility, fixednefs, and folubility in aq. regia, will have a perfecter idea of gold than he can have by feeing a piece of gold, and thereby imprinting in his mind only its obvious qualities. But if the formal conftitution of this fhining, heavy ductile thing (from whence all thefe its properties flow) lay open to our fenfes, as the formal conftitu tion or effence of a triangle does, the fignification of the word gold might as eafily be afcertained as that of tri