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beings that are considered as at rest, and, finding that fpirits, as well as bodies, cannot operate but where they are, and that spirits do operate at several times in feveral places, I cannot but attribute change of place to all finite fpirits ; (for of the infinite fpirit I speak not here). For my foul, being a real being as well as my body, is certainly as capable of changing distance with any other body or being, as body itself; and so is capable of motion. And if a mathematician can con. sider a certain distance, or a change of that distance between two points, one may certainly conceive a dif. tance, and a change of distance between two spirits ; and so conceive their motion, their approach, or removal one from another.
$ 20. Every one finds in himself, that his soul can think, will, and operate on his body in the place where that is, but cannot operate on a body, or in a place an hundred miles distant from it. Nobody can imagine that his soul can think, or move a body at Oxford, whilst he is at London ; and cannot but know, that being united to his body, it constantly changes place all the whole journey between Oxford and London, as the coach or horse does that carries him, and, I think, may be faid to be truly all that while in motion; or, if that will not be allowed to afford us a clear idea enough of its motion, its being separated from the body in death, I think, will: For to consider it as going out of the body, or leaving it, and yet to have no idea of its motion, seems to me imposible.
§ 21. If it be said by any one, that it cannot change place, because it hath none ; for spirits are not in loco, but ubi ; I suppose that way of talking will not now be of much weight to many, in an age that is not much disposed to admire, or suffer themselves to be deceived by such unintelligible ways of speaking. But if any one thinks there is any sense in that distinction, and that it is applicable to our present purpose, I defire him to put it into intelligible English ; and then from thence draw a reason
to show, that immaterial spirits are not capable of mo. tion. Indeed motion cannot be attributed to God, not because he is an immaterial, but because he is an infinite Spirit.
$ 22. Idea of Soul and Body compared. Let us compare then our complex idea of an immaterial spirit with our complex idea of body, and see whether there be any more obscurity in one than in the other, and in which most. Our idea of body, as I thirik, is an extended folic fubstance, capable of communicating motion by impulfe: And our idea of soul, as an in material spirit, is of a substance that thinks, and has a power of exciting motion in body, by willing or thought. These, I think, are our complex ideas of foul and body, as contra-diftinguished; and now let us examine which has most obscurity in it, and difficultly to be apprehended. I know, that people, whole thoughts are immersed in matter, and have so subjected their minds to their senses, that they feldom reflect on any thing beyond them, are apt to fay, they cannot comprehend a thinking 'thing; which perhaps is true : But I affirm, when they consider it well, they can no more comprehend an extended thing. $ 23. Coheson of solid Parts in Body, as hard to be
conceived as Thinking in a Soul. If any one say, he knows not what it is thinks in him ; he means, he knows not what the substance is of that thinking thing: No more, say I, knows he what the fubftance is of that folid thing. Farther, if he says he knows not how he thinks, I answer, Neither knows he how he is extended ; how the solid parts of body are united, or cohere together, to make extension. For though the pressure of particles of air may account for the cohepon of several parts of matter, that are groffer than the particles of air, and have pores less than the corpuscles of air ; yet the weight or pressure of the air will not explain, nor can be a cause of the coherence of the particles of air themselves. And, if the preffure of the ether, or any subtiler matter than the air, may unite, and hold fast together the parts of a particle of air, as well as other bodies, yet it cannot make bonds for itself, and hold together the parts that make up every the least corpuscle of that materia subtilis. So that that hypothesis, how ingeniously foever explain. ed, by showing that the parts of sensible bodies are held together by the pressure of other external insensible bodies, reaches not the parts of the ether itself: And by how much the more evident it proves, that the parts of other bodies are held together by the external pressure of the ether, and can have no other conceivable cause of their cohesion and union, by so much the more it leaves us in the dark concerning the cohesion of the parts of the corpuscles of the ether itself; which we can neither conceive without parts, they being bodies, and divisible ; nor yet how their parts cohere, they wanting that cause of cohesion which is given of the cohesion of all other bodies.
- § 24. But in truth, the pressure of any ambient fuid, how great loever, can be no intelligible cause of the cohefion of the solid parts of matter. For though such a pressure may hinder the avulsion of two polished superficies one from another, in a line perpendicular to them, as in the experiment of two polished marbles; yet it can never, in the least, hinder the separation by a mo. rion, in a line parallel to those surfaces; because the ambient fluid, having a full liberty to succeed in each point of space, deserted by a lateral motion, resists such a motion of bodies so joined, no more than it would resist the motion of that body, were it on all sides en. vironed by that fluid, and touched no other body: And therefore, if there were no other cause of cohesion, all parts of bodies must be easily separable by such a lateral sliding motion : For if the pressure of the ether be the adequate cause of cohesion, wherever that cause operates not, there can be no cohesion. And since it cannot operate against such a lateral separation (as has been thown), therefore, in every imaginary plain, intersecting any mass of matter, there could be no more cohesion, than of two polished surfaces, which will always, note withstanding any imaginable preffure of a fluid, easily slide one from another. So that perhaps, how clear an idea foever we think we have of the extension of body, which is nothing but the cohesion of solid parts, he that shall well consider it in his mind, may have reason to conclude, that it is as easy for him to have a clear idea, how the foul thinks, as how body is extended. For since body is no farther, nor otherwise extended, than by the union and cohesion of its solid parts, we shall very ill comprehend the extension of body, without understanding wherein consists the union and cohesion of its parts; which seems to me as incomprehensible, as the manner of thinking, and how it is performed.
§ 25. I ALLow it is usual for most people to wonder, how any one should find a difficulty in what they think they every day observe. “Do we not see (will they be ready to fay) the parts of bodies stick firmly together? Is there any thing more common ? And what doubt can there be made of it? And the like I say concerning thinking and voluntary motion. Do we not every moment experiment it in ourselves; and therefore can it be doubted? The matter of fact is clear, I confess; but when we would a little nearer look into it, and consider how it is done, there I think we are at a loss, both in the one and the other; and can as little understand how the parts of body cohere, as how we ourselves perceive, or move. I would have any one intelligibly explain to me, how the parts of gold, or brass (that but now in fusion were as loose from one another, as the particles of water, or the sands of an hour-glass), come in a few moments to be so united, and adhere so strongly one to another, that the utmost force of mens arms cannot feparate them: A considering man will, I suppose, be here at a loss to satisfy his own or another man's understanding.
§ 26. The little bodies that compose that fluid we call water, are so extremely small, that I have never heard of any one, who, by a microscope, (and yet I have heard of some that have magnified to 10,000, nay, to much above
100,000 times) pretended to perceive their distinct bulk, figure or motion : And the particles of water are also so perfectly loose one from another, that the least force sen bly separates them. Nay, if we consider their perpetual motion, we must allow them to have no cohesion one with another; and yet, let but a tharp cold come, and they unite, they consolidate, these little atoms cohere, and are not, without great force, separable. He that could find the bonds that tie these heaps of loose little bodies together so firmly; he that could make known the cement that makes them stick so fast one to another, would discover a great, and yet unknown fecret; and yet when that was done, would he be far enough from making the extension of body (which is the cohesion of its solid parts) intelligible, till he could show wherein confifted the union, or consolidation of the parts of those bonds, or of that cement, or of the least particle of matter that exists. Whereby it appears, that this primary and supposed obvious quality of body, will be found, when examined, to be as incomprehensible as any thing belonging to our minds, and a solid extended substance as hard to be conceived as a thinking immaterial one, whatever difficulties some would raise against it.
op Ý 27. For, to extend our thoughts a little farther, that prelsure which is brought to explain the cohesion of bodies, is as unintelligible as the cohesion itself. For if matter be considered, as no doubt it is, finite, let any one fend his contemplation to the extremities of the universe, and there see what conceivable hoops, what bond he can imagine to hold this mass of matter in so close a prefiure together; from whence steel has its firmness, and the parts of a diamond their hardness and indiffolubility. If matter be finite, it must have its extremes, and there must be something to hinder it from scattering asunder. If, to avoid this difficulty, any one will throw himself into the supposition and abyss of infinite matter, let him consider what light he thereby brings to the cohesion of body, and whether he bs ever the nearer making it intelligible, by resolving it into a supposition, the most absurd and most incomprehensible of all other :