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the mind constantly to them, forward to take notice of new, and apt to be delighted with the variety of changing objects. Thus, the first years are usually employed and diverted in looking abroad. Mens business in them is to acquaint themselves with what is to be found without, and so, growing up in a constant attention to outward sensations, seldom make any considerable reflection on what passes within them, till they come to be of riper years, and some scarce ever at all. Ø 9. The Soul begins to have Ideas, when it begins to .
perceive. To ask at what time a man has first any ideas, is to ask when he begins to perceive, having ideas, and perception, being the same thing. I know it is an opinion, that the soul always thinks, and that it has the actual perception of ideas in itself constantly as long as it exifts, and that actual thinking is as inseparable from the soul as actual extension is from the body; which, if true, to inquire after the beginning of a man's ideas, is the same as to inquire after the beginning of his soul ; for, by this account, soul and its ideas, as body and its extension, will begin to exist both at the same time. § 10. The Soul thinks not always, for this wants
Proofs. . But whether the soul be supposed to exist antecedent to, or coeval with, or some time after, the first rudiments or organization, or the beginnings of life in the body, I leave to be disputed by those who have better thought of that matter. I confess myself to have one of those dull souls, that doth not perceive itself always to contemplate ideas, nor can conceive it any more neceflary for the soul always to think, than for the body always to move, the perception of ideas being (as I conceive) to the soul, what motion is to the body, not its ellence, but one of its operations. And therefore, though thinking be supposed ever so much the proper action of the soul, yet it is not necessary to suppose that it should be always thinking, always in action ; that, perhaps, is the privilege of the infinite Author and Preserver of things, quho never slumbers nor peeps, but
propos: be a felf: hearing, he all laftet, it is beter as the
is not competent to any finite being, at least not to the foul of man. We know certainly by experience, that we sometimes think, and thence draw this infallible consequence, that there is something in us that has a power to think; but whether that substance perpetually thinks or no, we can be no farther assured than experience informs us; for to say that actual thinking is essential to the soul, and inseparable from it, is to beg what is in question, and not to prove it by reason; which is necessary to be done, if it be not a self-evident proposition. But whether this, that the soul always thinks, be a self-evident proposition that every body alfents to at first hearing, I appeal to mankind. It is doubted, whether I thought all last night or no; the question being about a matter of fact, it is begging it, to bring as a proof for it, an hypothesis, which is the very thing in dispute, by which way one may prove any thing ; and it is but supposing that all watches, whilst the balance beats, think, and it is sufficiently proved, and past doubt, that my watch thought all last night. But he that would not deceive himself, ought to build his hypothesis on matter of fact, and make it out by sensible experience, and not presume on matter of fact, because of his hypothesis, that is, because he supposes it to be so ; which way of proving amounts to this, that I must necessarily think all last night, because another supposes I always think, though I myself cannot perceive that I always do 1o.
But men, in love with their opinions, inay not only suppose what is in question, but allege wrong matter of fact. How else could any one make it an inference of mine, that a thing is not, because w? are not sensible of it in our sleep? I do not say there is no soul in a man, because he is not sensible of it in his sleep; but I do say, he cannot think at any time, waking or fleeping, without being sensible of it. Our being sensible of it, is not necessary to any thing, but to our thoughts, and to them it is, and to them it will always be necellary, till we can think without being conscious of it.
us. It is not always conscious of it. I GRANT that the soul in a waking man is never without thought, because it is the condition of being awake; but whether sleeping, without dreaming, be not an af. fection of the whole man, mind as well as body, may be worth a waking man's consideration ; it being hard to conceive, that any thing should think, and not be conscious of it. If the foul doth think in a sleeping man, without being conscious of it, I ask, whether, during such thinking, it has any pleasure or pain, or be capable of happiness or misery? I am sure the man is not, no more than the bed or earth he lies on; for to be happy or miserable, without being conscious of it, feems to me utterly inconsistent and impossible. Or if it be possible that the soul can, whilst the body is sleeping, have its thinking, enjoyments and concerns, its pleasure or pain apart, which the man is not conscious of, or partakes in; it is certain that Socrates alleep and Socrates awake is not the same person ; but his foul when he sleeps, and Socrates the man, consisting of body and soul when he is waking, are two persons, since waking Socrates has no knowledge of, or con cernment for that happiness or misery of his soul which it enjoys alone by itself whilft he sleeps, without perceiving any thing of it, no more than he has for the happiness or misery of a man in the Indies, whom he knows not. For if we take wholly away all conscioufa ness of our actions and sensations, especially of pleasure and pain, and the concernment that accompanies it, it will be hard to know wherein to place personal identity. ý 12: If a sleeping Man thinks without knowing it, the
Neeping and waking Man are two Perfons. The foul, during sound sleep, thinks, say these men.. Whilst it thinks and perceives, it is capable certainly of those of delight or trouble, as well as any other perceptions; and it must necesarily be conscious of its own perceptions. But it has all this apart; the sleeping man, it is plain, is conscious of nothing of all this. Let us suppose then the soul of Castor, while he is sleeping,
perception body. Let used during his
retired from his body, which is no impossible supposition for the men I have here to do with, who so liberally allow life, without a thinking foul, to all other animals : These men cannot then judge it impossible, or a contradiction, that the body should live without the soul, nor that the soul should subsist and think, or have perception, even perception of happiness or misery, without the body. Let us then, as I say, fuppose the foul of Castor separated, during his sleep, from his body, to think apart ; let us suppose too, that it chooses for its scene of thinking, the body of another man, v. g. Pollux, who is sleeping without a soul; for if Caitor's soul can think, whilst Callor is aileep, what Caftor is never conscious of, it is no matier what place it chooses to think in. We have here then the bodies of two men with only one foul between them, which we will suppose to fleep and wake by turns, and the soul still thinking in the waking man, whereof the sleeping man is never conscious, has never the least perception. I ask then, Whether Castor and Pollux, thus with only one foul between them, which thinks and perceives in one what the other is never conscious of, nor is concerned for, are not two as distinct persons as Castor and Hercules, or as Socrates and Plato were ? And whether one of them might not be very happy, and the other very miserable ? Just by the same reason they make the soul and the man two pero fons, who make the soul think apart what the man is not conscious of. For I suppose nobody will make identity of persons to consist in the soul's being united to the very same numerical particles of matter; for if that be necessary to identity, it will be impossible in that constant flux of the particles of our bodies, that any man should be the same person two days or two moments together. $ 13. Impolible to convince those that seep without dream
ing, that they think. Thus, methinks, every drowsy nod shakes their doctrine, who teach, that the soul is always thinking. Those at least who do at any time seep without dreaming, can never be convinced that their thoughts are sometimes for four hours busy without their knowing of it, and if they are taken in the very act, waked in the middle of that fleeping contemplation, can give no manner of account of it. Ø 14. That men dream without remembering it, in vain
urged. It will perhaps be said, that the foul thinks even in the foundelt sleep, but the memory retains it not. That the foul in a sleeping man should be this moment busy athinking, and the next moment, in a waking man, not remember nor be able to recollect one jot of all those thoughts, is very hard to be conceived, and would need some better proof than bare affertion to make it be believed. For who can without any more ado, but being barely told so, imagine, that the greatest part of men do, during all their lives, for several hours every day, think of something, which if they were asked, even in the middle of these thoughts, they could remember nothing at all of ? Most men, I think, pass a great part of their fleep without dreaming. I once knew a man that was bred a scholar, and had no bad memory, who told me, he had never dreamed in his life till he had that fever he was then newly recovered of, which was about the five or fix-and-twentieth year of his age. I suppose the world affords more such instances; at least every one's acquaintance will furnish him with examples enough of such as pass most of their nights without dreaming. ♡ 15. Upon this hypothesis the Thoughts of a seeping
Man ought to be most rational. To think often, and never to retain it f much as one moment, is a very useless fort of thinking; and the soul, in such a state of thinking, does very little, if at all, excel that of a looking-glais, which constantly receives variety of images, or ideas, but retains none; they disappear and vanish, and there remain no footsteps of them; the looking-glass is never the better for such ideas, nor the soul for such thoughts. Perhaps it will be said, that in a waking man the naterials of the body are employed, and made use of, in thinking, and that the memory of thoughts is retained by the impreslions