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ther inquiry of whom it is borrowed, nor whom it belongs to, so it affords but a fit rise for the prefent purpose. But in the future part of this discourse, deligning to raise an edifice uniform and consistent with itself, as far as my own experience and observation will assist me, I hope to erect it on such a basis, that I shall not need to shore it up with props and buttreffes, leaning on borrowed or begged foundations; or at least, if. mine prove a caftle in the air, I will endeavour it shall be all of a piece, and hang together. Wherein I warn the reader not to expect undeniable cogent demonstrations, unless I may be allowed the privilege, not feldom assumed by others, to take my principles for granted, and then I doubt not but I can demonstrate too. All that I shall say for the principles 1 proceed on is, that I can only appeal to mens own unprejudised experience and observation, whether they be true or no; and this is enough for a man who profeffes no more than to lay down candidly and freely his own conjectures concerning a subject lying somewhat in the dark, without any other delign than an unbiassed inquiry af. ter truth.
BOOK II.--CHAP. I.
OF IDEAS IN GENERAL, AND THEIR ORIGINAL.
$ 1. Idea is the Object of thinking. T VERY man being conscious to himself that he
t thinks, and that which his mind is applied about whilst thinking, being the ideas that are there, it is part doubt, that men have in their minds several ideas, such as are those expressed by the words whiteniesi, kard. nefs, sweetness, thinking, motion, man, elephant, ariny, drunkenness, and others. It is, in the first place then,
to be inquired, how he comes by them? I know it is a received doctrine, that men have native ideas and original characters stamped upon their minds in their very first being. This opinion I have at large examined already; and, I suppose, what I have said in the foregoing book will be much more easily admitted, when I have shown whence the understanding may get all the ideas it has, and by what ways and degrees they may come into the mind, for which I shall appeal to every one's own observation and experience.
Ý 2. All Ideas come from Sensation or Refletion. Let us then suppose the mind to be, as we say, white paper, void of all characters, without any ideas, how comes it to be furnished ? Whence comes it by that vast store which the busy and boundless fancy of man has painted on it, with an almoft endless variety? Whence has it all the materials of reason and knowledge? To this I answer, in one word, from experience; in that all our knowledge is founded, and from that it ultimately derives itself. Our obfervation employed either about external fenhble obje&s, or about the internal operations of our minds, perceived and refleEted on by curselves, is thert which supplies our underfiandings with materials of thinking. These two are the fountains of knowledge, from whence all the ideas we have, or can naturally have, do spring.
Ý 3. The Objects of Sensation cne Source of Ideas. FIRST, Our senses, conversant about particular sensible objects, do convey into the mind several distinct perceptims of things, according to those various ways wherein those objects do affect them; and thus we come by those ideas we have of yellow, white, heat, cold, fofi, bard, bitter, sweet, and all those which we call fenlible qualities, which when I say the senses convey into the mind, I mean, they from external objects convey into the mind wliat produces there. those perceptions. This great source of most of the ideas we have, depending wholly upon our senses, and derived by them to the understanding, I call SENSATION.
94. The Operations of our Minds the other Source of
them. ' Secondly, The other fountain from which experience furnisheth the understanding with ideas, is the perception of the operations of our own mind within us, as it is employed about the ideas it has got; which operations, when the soul comes to reflect on and consider, do furnish the understanding with another set of ideas, which could not be had from things without, and such are perception, thinking, doubting, believing, reasoning, knowing, willing, and all the different actings of our own minds, which we being conscious of and observing in ourselves, do from these receive into our understandings as distinct ideas, as we do from bodies affecting our senses. This source of ideas every man has wholly in himself; and though it be not fenfe as having nothing to do with external objects, yet it is very like it, and might properly enough be called internal sense. But as I call the other Sensation, so I call this REFLECTION, the ideas it affords being such only as the mind gets by reflecting on its own operations within itself. By REFLECTION, then, in the following part of this discourse, I would be understood to mean, that notice which the mind takes of its own operations, and the manner of them ; by reason whereof there come to be ideas of these operations in the understanding. These two, I say, viz. external material things, as the objects of SENSATION, and the operations of our minds within, as the objects of REFLECTION, are to me the only originals from whence all our ideas take their beginnings. The term operations here I use in a large fense, as comprehending not barely the actions of the mind about its ideas, but some fort of passions arising sometimes from them ; such as is the satisfaction or uneasiness arising from any thought.
§ 5. All our Ideas are of the one or other of these. The understanding seems to me not to have the least glimmering of any ideas, which it doth not receive from one of these two. External abjects furnish the mind with the ideas of sensible qualities, which are all those different perceptions they produce in us; and the mind furnishes the understanding with ideas of its own opera. tions.
These, when we have taken a full survey of them, and their several modes, combinations, and relations, we thall find to contain all our whole stock of ideas, and that we have nothing in our minds which did not come in one of these two ways. Let any one examine his own thoughts, and thoroughly search into his under: standing, and then let him tell me whether all the ori. ginal ideas he has there are any other than of the objects of his senses, or of the operations of his mind, considered as objects of his reflection; and how great a mass of knowledge foever he imagines to be lodged there, he will, upon taking a strict view, see that he has not any idea in his mind, but what one of these two have imprinted, though perhaps with infinite variety compounded and enlarged by the understanding, as we shall see hereafter.
$ 6. Observable in Children. He that attentively considers the state of a child, at his fæst coming into the world, will have little reason to think him tored with plenty of ideas, that are to be the matter of his future knowledge ; it is by degrees he comes to be furnished with them. And though the ideas of obvious and familiar qualities imprint themselves before the memory begins to keep a register of time and order, yet it is often so late before some unusual qualities come in the way, that there are few men that cannot recollect the beginning of their acquaintance with them; and if it were worth while, no doubt a child might be so ordered, as to have but a very few even of the ordinary ideas, till he were grown up to a man. But all that are born into the world being surrounded with bodies that perpetually and diversely affect them; variety of ideas, whether care be taken about it or no, are imprinted on the minds of children. Light and colours are busy at hand every where, when the eye is but open: Sounds, and some tangible qualities, fail not to folicit their proper senses, and force an entrance to the VOL. I.
mind; but yet, I think, it will be granted easily, that if a child were kept in a place where he never saw any other but black and white, till he were a man, he would have no more ideas of scarlet or green, than he that from his childhood never tasted an oyster or a pine-apple, has of those particular relishes.
07. Men are differently furnished with these, according 3 to the different Objects they converse with. Men then come to be furnished with fewer or more simple ideas from without, according as the objects they converse with afford greater or less variety, and from the operations of their minds within, according as they more or less reflect on them. For though he that contemplates the operations of his mind cannot but have plain and clear ideas of them, yet, unless he turn his thoughts that way, and considers them attentively, he will no more have clear and distinct ideas of all the operations of his mind, and all that may be observed therein, than he will have all the particular ideas of any landscape, or of the parts and motions of a clock, who will not turn his eyes to it, and with attention heed all the parts of it. The picture or clock may be so placed, that they may come in his way every day; but yet he' will have but a confused idea of all the parts they are made up of, till he applies himself with attention to consider them each in particular. § 8. Ideas of Reflection later, because they need At
terition. And hence we see the reason why it is pretty late before most children get ideas of the operations of their own minds, and some have not any very clear or perfect ideas of the greatest part of them all their lives; because, though they pass there continually, yet, like floating visions, they make not deep impressions enough to leave in the mind clear, distinct, lasting ideas, till the understanding turns inwards upon itself, reflects on its own operations, and makes them the object of its own contemplation. Children, when they come first into it, are surrounded with a world of new things, which, by a constant solicitation of their senses, drais