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memory, or in the mind, whenever it is suggefted by the memory, appears not to be new, but the mind finds it in itself, and knows it was there before. By this it may be tried, whether there be any innate ideas in the mind, before impression from sensation or reflection. I would fain meet with the man, who, when he came to the use of reason, or at any other time, remembered any of them; and to whom, after he was born, they were never new. If any one will say, there are ideas in the mind that are not in the memory, I desire him to explain himself, and make what he says intelligible. ý 21. Principles not Innate, because of little. Use or little
Certainty. Besides what' I have already faid, there is another reason why I doubt, that neither these, nor any other principles, are innate. I that am fully persuaded, that the infinitely wise God made all things in perfect wildom, cannot satisfy myself why he should be supposed to print upon the minds of men some universal principles, whereof those that are pretended innate, and concern speculation, are of no great use; and those that concern practice not self-evident; and neither of them distinguisoable from some other truths, not allowed to be innate. For to what purpose should characters be graven on the mind by the finger of God, which are not clearer there than those which are afterwards introduced, or cannot be distinguished from them? If any one thinks there are such innate ideas and propositions, which, by their clearness, and usefulness, are distinguishable from all that is adventitious in the mind and acquired, it will not be a hard matter for him to tell us which they are, and then every one will be a fit judge, whether they be so or no, since, if there be such innate ideas and impressions, plainly different from all other perceptions and knowledge, every one will find it true in himself. Of the evidence of these supposed innate maxims, I have spoken already; of their usefulness, I shall have occafion to speak more hereafter.
felf when some univate, and control
$ 22. Difference of Mens Discoveries depends upon the
different application of their Faculties. To conclude ; fome ideas forwardly offer themselves to all mens understandings; some sorts of truths result from any ideas, as soon as the mind puts them into propositions; other truths require a train of ideas placed in order, a due comparing of them, and deductions made with attention before they can be discovered and assented to. Some of the first fort, because of their general and easy reception, have been mistaken for innate; but the truth is, ideas and notion's are no more born with us than arts and sciences, though some of them indeed offer themselves to our faculties more readily than others, and therefore are more generally received, though that too be according as the organs of our bodies and powers of our minds happen to be employed; God having fitted men with faculties and means to discover, receive and retain truths, according as they are employed. The great difference that is to be found in the notions of mankind, is from the different use they put their faculties to, whilst some (and those the most) taking things upon trust, misemploy their power of asfent, by lazily enslaving their minds to the dictates and dominion of others, in doctrines which it is their duty carefully to examine, and not blindly, with an implicit faith, to swallow. Others, employing their thoughts only about some few things, grow acquainted sufficiently with them, attain great degrees of knowledge in them, and are ignorant of all other, having never let their thoughts loose in the search of other inquiries. Thus, that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right ones, is a truth as certain as any thing can be, and I think more evident than many of those propositions that go for principles; and yet there are millions, however expert in other things, who know not this at all, because they never set their thoughts on work about such angles ; and he that certainly knows this propositjon, may yet be utterly ignorant of the truth of other proportions, in mathematics itself, which are as clear and evident as this, because in his search of those ma
thematical truths, he stopped his thoughts short, and went not so far. The same may happen concerning the notions we have of the being of a Deity; for though there be no truth which a man may more evidently make out to himself than the existence of a God, yet he that shall content himself with things, as he finds them in this world, as they minister to his pleasures and paffions, and not make inquiry a little farther into their causes, ends, and admirable contrivances, and pursue the thoughts thereof with diligence and attention, may live long without any notion of such a Being. And if any person hath by talk put such a notion into his head, he may perhaps believe it; but if he hath never examined it, his knowledge of it will be no perfecter than his, who having been told that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right ones, takes it upon trust, without examining the demonstration, and may yield his affent as a probable opinion, but hath no knowledge of the truth of it, which yet his faculties, if carefully employed, were able to make clear and evi. dent to him. But this only by the by, to show how much our knowledge depends upon the right use of those powers nature bath bestowed upon us, and how little upon such innate principles, as are in vain supposed to be in all mankind for their direction, which all men could not but know if they were there, or else they would be there to no purpose ; and which, since all men do not know, nor can distinguish from other adventitious truths, we may well conclude there are no such.
Ø 23. Men must think and know for themselves. WHAT censure, doubting thus of innate principles, may deserve from men who will be apt to call it pulling up the old foundations of knowledge and certainty, I cannot tell; I persuade myself at leait, that the way I have pursued, being conformable to truth, lays those foundations surer. This I am certain, I have not made it my business either to quit or follow any authority in the ensuing discourse ; truth has been my only aim, and wherever that has appeared to lead, my thoughts have impartially followed, without minding whether the footsteps of any other lay that way or no. Not that I want a due respect to other mens opinions; but, after all, the greatest reverence is due to truth; and I hope it will not be thought arrogance to say, that perhaps we should make greater progress in the discovery of rational and contemplative knowledge, if we fought it in the fountain, in the consideration of things ther-felves, and made use rather of our own thoughts than other mens, to find it; for I think we may as rationally hope to see with other mens eyes, as to know by other mens understandings. So much as we ourselves consider and comprehend of truth and reason, so much we possess of real and true knowledge. The floating of other mens opinions in our brains, makes us not one jot the more knowing, though they happen to be true. What in them was science, is in us but opiniatry; whilst we give up our affent only to reverend names, and do not, as they did, employ our own reason to understand those truths which gave them reputation. Aristotle was certainly a knowing man, but nobody ever thought him so, because he blindly embraced, and confidently vented the opinions of another. And if the taking up of another's principles, without examining them, made not him a philosopher, I suppose it will hardly make any body elie so. In the sciences every one has so much as he really knows and comprehends; what he believes only, and takes upon truít, are but shreds, which, however, will in the whole piece make no considerable addition to his stock who gathers them. Such borrowed wealth, like fairy-money, though it were gold in the hand from which he received it, will be but leaves and dust when it comes to use.
$ 24. Whence the Opinion of Innate Principles. WHEN men have found some general propositions, that could not be doubted of as foon as understood, it was, I know, a short and easy way to conclude them innate. This being once received, it eased the lazy from the pains of fearch, and stopped the inquiry of the doubtful concerning all that was once styled innate. And it was of no small advantage to those who affected to be maf
ters and teachers, to make this the principle of principles, that principles must not be questioned; for having once established this tenet, that there are innate principles, it put their followers upon a necessity of receiving some doctrines as such, which was to take them off from the use of their own reason and judgment, and put them on believing and taking them upon trust, without farther examination; in which posture of blind credulity, they might be more easily governed by, and made useful to some sort of men, who had the skill and office to principle and guide them. Nor is it a small power it gives one man over another, to have the authority to be the dictator of principles, and teacher of unquestionable truths, and to make a man swallow that for an innate principle, which may serve to his purpose who teaches them; whereas, had they examined the ways whereby men came to the knowledge of many universal truths, they would have found them to result in the minds of men from the being of things themselves, when duly considered, and that they were discovered by the application of those faculties that were fitted by nature to receive and judge of them, when duly employed about them.
Ø 25. Conclusioni. To bow how the understanding proceeds herein, is the defogn of the following discourse, which I shall proceed to, when I have first premised, that hitherto, to clear my way to those foundations which I conceive are the only true ones whereon to establish those notions we can have of our own knowledge, it hath been necessary for me to give an account of the reasons I had to doubt of innate principles. And since the arguments which are against them do some of them rise from common received opinions, I have been forced to take several things for granted, which is hardly avoidable to any one whole talk it is to show the falsehood or improbability of any tenet; it happening in controversial discourses, as it does in the assaulting of towns, where, if the ground be but firm whereon the batteries are erected, there is no far