10

the fame thing to be, and not to be, are by nature imprinted, children cannot be ignorant of them; infants, and all that have fouls, muft neceflarily have them in their understandings, know the truth of them, and affent to

it.

§ 6.

To avoid this, it is ufually answered, that all men know and affent to them when they come to the use of reafon, and this is enough to prove them innate. F answer,

§ 7. That Men know them when they come to the ufe of Reafon, anfwered.

DOUBTFUL. expreffions, that have fcarce any fignification, go for clear reafons to thofe whe, being prepoffeffed, take not the pains to examine even what they themfelves fay. For to apply this anfwer with any tolerable fenfe to our prefent purpose, it must fignify one of these two things, either that as foon as men come to the use of reafon, thefe fuppofed native infcriptions come to be known and obferved by them, or else that the use and exercite of mens reafons affists them in the difcovery of thefe principles, and certainly makes them known to them.

8. If Reafon difcovered them, that would not prove

them Innate.

IF they mean, that by the ufe of reafon men may difcover the fe principles, and that this is fufficient to prove them innate, their way of arguing will ftand thus, viz. that whatever truths reafon can certainly discover to us, and make us firmly affent to, thofe are all naturally imprinted on the mind, fince that univerfal affent, which is made the mark of them, amounts to no more but this, that by the use of reason we are capable to come to a certain knowledge of, and affent to them; and by this means there will be no difference between the maxims of the mathematicians and theorems they deduce from them; all must be equally allowed innate, they being all difcoveries made by the ufe of reafon, and truths if that a rational creature may certainly come to know, he apply his thoughts rightly that way.

9. It is falfe that Reafon difcovers them. BUT how can thefe men think the use of reafon neceffary to discover principles that are fuppofed innate, when reafon (if we may believe them) is nothing else but the faculty of deducing unknown truths from principles or propofitions that are already known? That certainly can never be thought innate which we have need of reason to discover, unlefs, as I have faid, we will have all the certain truths that reafon ever teaches us to be innate. We may as well think the ufe of reafon neceflary to make our eyes difcover vifible objects, as that there should be need of reafon, or the exercife thereof, to make the understanding fee what is originally engraven in it, and cannot be in the underftanding before it be perceived by it: So that to make reafon difcover thofe truths thus imprinted, is to fay, that the use of reafon discovers to a man what he knew before; and if men have those innate impreffed truths originally, and before the use of reafon, and yet are always ignorant of them till they come to the use of reafon, it is in effect to say, that men know and know them not at the fame time.

§ 10.

IT will here perhaps be faid, that mathematical demonfirations, and other truths that are not innate, are not affented to as foon as propofed, wherein they are diftinguished from thefe maxims and other innate truths. I fhall have occafion to speak of aflent upon the first propofing more particularly by and by. I fhall here only, and that very readily, allow that thefe maxims and mathematical demonftrations are in this different, that the one has need of reafon, ufing of proofs, to make them out, and to gain our affent; but the other, as foon as understood, are, without any the least reafoning, embraced and aflented to. But I withal beg leave to obferve, that it lays open the weaknefs of this fubterfuge, which requires the use of reafon for the difcovery of thefe general truths, fince it must be confeffed, that in their difcovery there is no ufe made of reafoning at all: And I think thofe who give this anfwer will

not be forward to affirm, that the knowledge of this maxim, That it is impoffible for the fame thing to be, and not to be, is a deduction of our reafon; for this would be to deftroy that bounty of Nature they feem fo fond of, whilft they make the knowledge of those principles to depend on the labour of our thoughts; for all reafoning is fearch, and cafting about, and requires pains and application. And how can it with any tolerable fense be fuppofed, that what was imprinted by Nature as the foundation and guide of our reason, fhould need the use of reafon to discover it?

THOSE who will take the pains to reflect with a little attention on the operations of the understanding, will find, that this ready affent of the mind to fome truths depends not either on native infcription or the use of reafon, but on a faculty of the mind quite diftinct from both of them, as we fhall fee hereafter. Reafon, therefore, having nothing to do in procuring our affent to thefe maxims, if by faying, that men know and affent to them when they come to the use of reafon, be meant, that the use of reafon aflifts us in the knowledge of these maxims, it is utterly falfe, and were it true, would prove them not to be innate.

§ 12. The coming to the Ufe of Reafon, not the Time we come to know thefe Maxims.

IF by knowing and affenting to them when we come to the use of reafon, be meant, that this is the time when they come to be taken notice of by the mind, and that as foon as children come to the ufe of reafon they come allo to know and affent to these maxims, this alfo is falfe and frivolous. First, It is falfe, because it is evident thefe maxims are not in the mind fo early as the use of reason, and therefore the coming to the use of reafon is falfely affigned as the time of their difcovery. How many inftances of the ufe of reafon may we obferve in children long time before they have any knowledge of this maxim, That it is impoffible for the fame thing to be, and not to be? And a great part of illiterate people and favages pafs many years, even of their ra

tional age, without ever thinking on this, and the like general propofitions. I grant, men come not to the knowledge of these general and more abstract truths, which are thought innate, till they come to the use of reason; and I add, nor then neither: Which is fo, because, till after they come to the use of reason, those general abstract ideas are not framed in the mind, about which those general maxims are, which are mistaken for innate principles; but are indeed discoveries made, and verities introduced, and brought into the mind by the fame way, and discovered by the fame fteps, as feveral other propofitions, which nobody was ever fo extravagant as to fuppofe innate. This I hope to make plain in the sequel of this difcourfe. I allow, therefore, a neceffity, that men fhould come to the use of reason, before they get the knowledge of those general truths; but deny that mens coming to the use of reafon is the time of their difcovery.

13. By this they are not diftinguished from other

knowable Truths.

In the mean time it is obfervable, that this faying, that men know, and affent to these maxims, when they come to the use of reafon, amounts, in reality of fact, to no more but this, that they are never known, nor taken notice of, before the ufe of reafon, but may poffibly be affented to fome time after, during a man's life, but when, is uncertain; and fo may all other knowable truths, as well as these which therefore have no advantage, nor diftinction from others, by this note of being known when we come to the ufe of reafon; nor are thereby proved to be innate, but quite the contrary.

14. If coming to the Ufe of Reafon were the Time of their Difcovery, it would not prove them Innate. BUT, Secondly, Were it true that the precife time of their being known and affented to, were, when men come to the use of reafon, neither would that prove them innate. This way of arguing is fo frivolous, as the fuppofition of itself is falfe. For by what kind of logic will it appear, that any notion is originally by nature imprinted in the mind in its first constitution, because

it comes first to be observed and affented to, when a faculty of the mind, which has quite a diftinct province, begins to exert itself? And therefore, the coming to the ufe of fpeech, if it were fuppofed the time that thefe maxims are firft affented to (which it may be with as much truth, as the time when men come to the use of reafon), would be as good a proof that they were innate, as to fay, they are innate because men affent to them, when they come to the use of reafon. I agree then with thefe men of innate principles, that there is no knowledge of thefe general and felf-evident maxims in the mind, till it comes to the exercise of reason : But I deny that the coming to the ufe of reafon is the precife time when they are firft taken notice of; and if that were the precife time, I deny that it would prove them imate. All that can with any truth be meant by this propofition, that men offent to them when they come to the ufe of reafon, is no more but this, that the making of general abftract ideas, and the understanding of general names, being a concomitant of the rational faculty, and growing up with it, children commonly get not thofe general ideas, nor learn the names that itand for them, till having for a good while exercised their reafon about familiar and more particular ideas, they are, by their ordinary difcourfe and actions with others, acknowledged to be capable of rational converfation. If affenting to these maxims, when men come to the use of reafon, can be true in any other fenfe, I defire it may be fhown; or, at leaft, how in this, or any other fenfe, it proves them innate.

$15. The Steps by which the Mind attains feveral

Truths.

THE fenfes at first let in particular ideas and furnish the yet empty cabinet; and the mind by degrees growing familiar with fome of them, they are lodged in the me-mory, and names got to them. Afterwards the mind proceeding farther, abftracts them, and by degrees learns the use of general names. In this manner the. mind comes to be furnished with ideas and language, the materials about which to exercife its difcurfive fa