hand, and leffen it in the other, and fo caufe the different fenfations of heat and cold that depend thereon. $ 22.

a

I HAVE, in what just goes before, been engaged in phyfical inquiries a little farther than perhaps I intended. But it being neceffary to make the nature of fenfation little understood, and to make the difference between the qualities in bodies, in the ideas produced by them in the mind, to be diftinctly conceived, without which it were impoffible to difcourfe intelligibly of them; I hope I shall be pardoned this little excurfion into natural philosophy, it being neceffary in our prefent inquiry to diftinguish the primary and real qualities of bodies, which are always in them (viz. folidity, extension, figure, number, and motion, or reft, and are sometimes perceived by us, viz. when the bodies they are in are big enough fingly to be difcerned), from thofe fecondary and im puted qualities, which are but the powers of feveral combinations of thofe primary ones, when they operate, without being diftinctly difcerned, whereby we also may come to know what ideas are, and what are not refemblances of fomething really exifting in the bodies we denominate from them.

§ 23. Three forts of Qualities in Bodies. THE qualities then that are in bodies, rightly confidered, are of three forts.

Firft, The bulk, figure, number, fituation, and motion, or reft of their folid parts; those are in them, whether we perceive them or no; and when they are of that fize that we can discover them, we have by these an idea of the thing as it is in itself, as is plain in artificial things. Thefe I call primary qualities.

Secondly, The power that is in any body, by reafon of its infenfible primary qualities, to operate after a peculiar manner on any of our senses, and thereby produce in us the different ideas of feveral colours, founds, fmells, tastes, &c. These are ufually called fenfible qualities.

Thirdly, The power that is in any body, by reason of the particular conftitution of its primary qualities, to

make fuch a change in the bulk, figure, texture, and motion of another body, as to make it operate on our fenfes differently from what it did before. Thus the fun has a power to make wax white, and fire to make lead fluid. These are ufually called powers.

The first of these, as has been faid, I think may be properly called real, original, or primary qualities, becaufe they are in the things themselves, whether they are perceived or no; and upon their different modifications it is that the fecondary qualities depend.

The other two are only powers to act differently upon other things, which powers refult from the different modifications of those primary qualities.

24. The first are Refemblances; the fecond thought Refemblances, but are not; the third neither are, nor are thought fo.

BUT though these two latter forts of qualities are powers barely, and nothing but powers relating to several other bodies, and refulting from the different modifications of the original qualities, yet they are generally otherwise thought of; for the fecond fort, viz. the powers to produce feveral ideas in us by our fenfes, are looked upon as real qualities in the things thus affecting us; but the third fort are called, and esteemed barely powers, v. g. the idea of heat or light, which we receive by our eyes or touch from the fun, are commonly thought real qualities, exifting in the fun, and fomething more than mere powers in it. But when we confider the sun, in reference to wax, which it melts or blanches, we look on the whitenefs and foftnefs produced in the wax, not as qualities in the fun, but effects produced by powers in it; whereas, if rightly confidered, thefe qualities of light and warmth, which are perceptions in me when I am warmed, or enlightened by the fun, are no otherwife in the fun, than the changes made in the wax, when it is blanched or melted, are in the fun. They are all of them equally powers in the fun, depending on its primary qualities, whereby it is able in the one cafe, fo to alter the bulk, figure, texture, or motion of fome of the infenfible parts of my eyes or hands,

as thereby to produce in me the idea of light or heat; and in the other it is able fo to alter the bulk, figure, texture, or motion of the infenfible parts of the wax, as to make them fit to produce in me the diftinct ideas of white and fluid.

25.

THE reason why the one are ordinarily taken for real qua-lities, and the other only for bare powers, feems to be, becaufe the ideas we have of diftinct colours, founds, &c. containing nothing at all in them of bulk, figure, or motion, we are not apt to think them the effects of these primary qualities, which appear not to our fenses to operate in their production, and with which they have not any apparent congruity, or conceivable connection. Hence it is that we are fo forward to imagine, that thofe ideas are the refemblances of fomething really exifting in the objects themselves; fince fenfation difcovers nothing of bulk, figure, or motion of parts in their production, nor can reafon fhow how bodies, by their bulk, figure, and motion, should produce in the mind the ideas of blue or yellow, &c. But in the other. cafe, in the operations of bodies, changing the qualities one of another, we plainly discover, that the quality produced hath commonly no refemblance with any thing in the thing producing it, wherefore we look on it as a bare effect of power. For though receiving the idea of heat or light from the fun, we are apt to think it is a perception and resemblance of fuch a quality in the fun, yet when we fee wax, or a fair face, receive change of colour from the fun, we cannot imagine that to be the perception or resemblance of any thing in the fun, because we find not those different colours in the fun itself. For our fenfes being able to obferve a likeness or unlikeness of fenfible qualities in two different external objects, we forwardly enough conclude the production of any fenfible quality in any fubject, to be an effect of bare. power, and not the communication of any quality, which was really in the efficient, when we find no fuch fenfible quality in the thing that produced it. But our fenfes, not being able to discover any unlikeness between:

the idea produced in us, and the quality of the object producing it, we are apt to imagine, that our ideas are refemblances of fomething in the objects, and not the effects of certain powers placed in the modification of their primary qualities, with which primary qualities the ideas produced in us have no resemblance.

§ 26. Secondary Qualities twofold; First, immediately perceivable; Secondly, mediately perceivable. To conclude, befides thofe before-mentioned primary qualities in bodies, viz. bulk, figure, extenfion, number, and motion of their folid parts; all the reft, whereby we take notice of bodies, and diftinguish them one from another, are nothing else but feveral powers in them depending on those primary qualities, whereby they are fitted, either by immediately operating on our bodies, to produce feveral different ideas in us, or else by operating on other bodies, fo to change their primary qualities, as to render them capable of producing ideas in us different from what before they did. The former of these, I think, may be called fecondary qualities, immediately perceivable; the latter, fecondary qualities, mediately perceivable.

CHAP. IX.

OF PERCEPTION.

§ 1. Perception the firft fimple Idea of Reflection. PERCEPTION, as it is the first faculty of the mind,

exercised about our ideas, so it is the first and fimpleft idea we have from reflection, and is by fome called thinking in general; though thinking, in the propriety of the English tongue, fignifies that fort of operation of the mind about its ideas, wherein the mind is active, where it, with fome degree of voluntary attention, confiders any thing: For in bare naked perception, the mind is, for the most part, only passive; and what it perceives, it cannot avoid perceiving.

§ 2. Is only when the Mind receives the impreffion. WHAT perception is, every one will know better by reflecting on what he does himself, when he fees, hears,

feels, &c. or thinks, than by any difcourfe of mine. Whoever reflects on what paffes in his own mind, cannot miss it; and if he does not reflect, all the words in the world cannot make him have any notion of it.

§3.

THIS is certain, that whatever alterations are made in the body, if they reach not the mind; whatever impreffions are made on the outward parts, if they are not taken notice of within, there is no perception. Fire may burn our bodies, with no other effect than it does a billet, unless the motion be continued to the brain, and there the fenfe of heat, or idea of pain, be produced in the mind, wherein confifts actual percep

tion.

§ 4.

How often may a man obferve in himself, that whilst his mind is intently employed in the contemplation of fome objects, and curiously surveying fome ideas that are there, it takes no notice of impreffions of founding bodies made upon the organ of hearing, with the fame alteration that ufes to be for the producing the idea of found? A fufficient impulfe there may be on the organ, but it not reaching the obfervation of the mind, there follows no perception; and though the motion that ufes to produce the idea of found, be made in the ear, yet no found is heard. Want of fenfation in this cafe, is not through any defect in the organ, or that the man's ears are lefs affected than at other times when he does hear; but that which uses to produce the idea, though conveyed in by the ufual organ, not being taken notice of in the understanding, and fo imprinting no idea on the mind, there follows no fenfation: So that wherever there is fenfe, or perception, there fome idea is actually produced, and prefent in the understanding.

§ 5. Children, though they have Ideas in the Womb, have none Innate.

THEREFORE I doubt not but children, by the exercise of their fenfes about objects that affect them in the womb, receive fome few ideas before they are born, as the unavoidable effects, either of the bodies that environ them,