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per of its owm nature or natural value, is not worth so much as a loaf ofbread ; but by the institution of the prince is worth so much." And in this manner ** we* may say," saith he, ** that our works are worthy of life everlasting by grace, and not by the substance of the act. For God hath ordained, that he that worketh well in grace should have life everlasting: and therefore by the law and grace of Christ our prince we merit condignly everlasting life." Whereby we may see, how rightly it hath been observed by Vasquez ; that* divers of those whom he accounteth Catholics, do differ from us only in words, but agree in deed. Of which number he nameth Willielmus Parisiensis*, Scotus', Ockam*, Gregorius Ariminensis', Gabriel Biels, with his supplement", the Canons of Culleyn in their Antididagma', and Enchiridion*, Johannes Bunderius', Alphonsus de Castro", and Andreas Vega" who was present at the handling of these matters in the last Tridentine council. All these and sundry others beside them, hold that the dignity of the good works done by God's children doth not proceed from the value of the works themselves but only from the gracious promise and acceptation of God. Yea Gregorius Ariminensis, that" most able and careful defender of St. Augustine (as Vega stileth him) concludeth peremptorily, “that” no act of man, though issuing from never so great charity, meriteth of condignity from God, either eternal life, or yet any other reward whether eternal or temporal.” The same conclusion is by Durand the most resolute doctor (as Gerson" termeth him) thus confirmed : “That which is conferred rather out of the liberality of the giver than out of the due of the work, doth not fall within the compass of the merit of condignity, strictly and properly taken. But whatsoever we receive of God, whether it be grace or whether it be glory, whether temporal or spiritual good, whatsoever good work we have before done for it, yet we receive the same rather and more principally out of God's liberality, than out of the due of the work. Therefore nothing at all falleth within the compass of the merit of condignity, so taken.” And “the"
tum, sicut unus panis; sed ex institutione principis tantum valet. Rob. Holcot. in lib. sapient. cap. 3. lect. 36. • Possumus dicere, quod opera nostra sunt condigna vitæ æternæ ex gratia, non ex substantia actus. Statuit enim Deus quod bene operans in gratia habebit vitam æternam. Et ergo per legem et gratiam Principis nostri Christi meremur de comdigno vitam æternam. Ibid. ° Contingere enim potest, ut si veram causam et rationem meriti non assignemus; verbis solum ab hæreticis dissidentes reipsa cum eis conveniamus, atque in eorum sententiam, velimus nolimus, consentire cogamur: quod sane aliquibus catholicis in hac controversia accidisse, non obscure inferius patebit. Gabr. Vasquez, in primam 2ae. quaest. 114. disput. 214. cap. 1. • Guilielm. Parisiens. tract. de meritis. ° Scotus in 1. sent. dist. 17. quaest. 3. sect. Hic potest dici. Id. in 4. distinct. 49. quæst. 6. Loquendo de stricta justitia, Deus nulli nostrum propter quæcunque merita est debitor perfectionis reddendae, tam intense ; propter immoderatum excessum illius perfectionis ultra illa merita. • Guilielm. Ockam, in 1. sent. distinct. 17. quaest. 2. sect. Ideo dico aliter. ' Gregor. in 1. sent. distinct. 17. quaest. 1. artic. 2. in confirmationibus secundae conclusionis, et solutione quarti argumenti contra eandem. 5 Gabriel. in 1. sent. dist. 17. quæst. 3. artic. 3. dub. 2. et in 2. dist. 27. quæst. 3. artic. 3. dub. 2. * Supplement. Gabriel. in 4. dist. 49. qu. 4. artic. 2. conclus. 3. ' Antididagm. Coloniens. cap. 12. de praemio et retribut. bonorum operum. * Enchirid. addit. concilio Coloniensi, tit. de Justific. sect. Et ut semel hunc articulum. 1 Jo. Bundem. compend. concertationis, tit. 6. artic. 5. m Alphons. contr. haeres. lib. 10. tit. meritum ; et lib. 7. tit. Gratia.
" Vega in opusc. de justif. quaest. 5. ad 1. et 3. * Valens ille Gregorius Ariminensis, maximus et studiosissimus Divi Augustini propugnator. Id. ibid. quaest. 6. P Ex hoc ulterius infero; quod nedum vitae aeternae sed nec alicujus alterius praemii aeterni vel temporalis, aliquis actus hominis ex quacunque charitate elicitus, est de condigno meritorius apud Deum. Greg. in 1. sent. dist. 17. quaest. 1. artic. 2. * Durandus utique resolutissimus. Jo. Gerson. epist, ad studentes collegis Navarrae. * Quod redditur potius ex liberalitate dantis quam ex debito operis, non cadit sub merito de condigno stricte et proprie accepto, ut expositum est. Sed quicquid a Deo accipimus, sive sit gratia sive sit gloria, sive bonum temporale vel spirituale, praecedente in nobis propter hoc quocunque bono opere; potius et principalius accipimus ex liberalitate Dei, quam reddatur ex debito operis. Ergo nihil penitus cadit sub merito de condigno sic accepto. Durand. in 2. sent. dist. 27. quaest. 2, sect. 12. * Causa autem hujus est, quia et illud quod sumus, et quod habemus, sive
cause hereof is" saith he, “ because both that which we are and that which we have, whether they be good acts or good habits, or the use of them, is wholly in us by God's liberality freely giving and preserving the same. Now because none is bound by his own free gift to give more, but the receiver rather is more bound to him that giveth : therefore by the good habits, and by the good acts or uses which God hath given us, God is not bound to us by any debt of justice to give any thing more, so as if he did not give it he should be unjust; but we are rather bound to God. And to think or say the contrary, is rashness or blasphemy.” Of the same judgment with Durand, was Jacobus de I'verbaco, as Marsilius witnesseth who delivereth his own opinion touching this matter in these three conclusions. I. “If we consider our works in themselves, or as they proceed also from cooperating grace, they are not such works as deserve eternal life of condignity.” For proof whereof he bringeth in many reasons; and that of Durand's for one : “If" for the works wrought by grace and free-will although never so great, eternal life should be due unto any by condignity : then God should do him injury, if he did not give eternal life unto him ; and so God by those great good things which he had given, should be constrained in way of justice to add more great thereunto : which reason doth not comprehend.” II. “Such" works as these may be said to merit eternal life of condignity, by divine acceptation, originally proceeding from the merit of the passion of Christ.” III. “Works" done by grace do merit eternal life by way of congruity; in respect of God's liberal disposition, who hath so purposed to reward them.” Afterwards he proveth out of the apostley, that “eternal' life is given out of God's grace, not out of our righteousness:” and that God in thus rewarding us, doth neither exercise commutative justice, “because" in our good works we give nothing unto God, for which by way of commutation the reward should be due unto us; nor yet distributive, because" no man by working well, in regard of himself and in regard of the state wherein he is, doth merit any thing of condignity, but is bound to God rather by a greater obligation, because he hath received greater good things” from him. And thereupon at last concludeth", that God “ is just in rewarding, because by his just disposition he hath ordained by the grace of acceptation to crown the lesser merit with the greater reward; not by the justice of debt, but by the grace and disposition of the divine good pleasure.” But the sentence of the chancellor and the theological faculty of Paris in the year MCCCLIV. against one Guido an Austin friar, that then defended the merit of condignity, is not to be overpassed. For by their order, this form of
sunt boni actus, sive boni habitus seu usus ; totum est in nobis ex liberalitate divina gratis dante et conservante. Et quia ex dono gratuito nullus obligatur ad dandum amplius, sed potius recipiens magis obligatur danti: ideo ex bonis habitibus, et ex bonis actibus sive usibus nobis a Deo datis, Deus non obligatur nobis ex aliquo debito justitiae ad aliquid amplius dandum, ita quod si non dederit sit injustus; sed potius nos sumus Deo obligati. Et sentire, seu dicere oppositum, est temerarium seu blasphemum. Durand. sect. 13, 14. * Considerando opera nostra secundum se, vel etiam prout sunt ex gratia cooperante ; non sunt opera meritoria vitae aeternae de condigno. Marsil. de Inghen, in 2. sent. quaest. 18. art. 4. "Si de condigno ex operibus gratia et libero arbitrio etiam quantumlibet magnis operatis deberetur vita aeterna: tunc Deus illi injuriam faceret, si sibi vitam aeternam non tribueret, et sic Deus ex magnis datisbonis cogeretur sub justitia addere ampliora: quod ratio non capit. Ibid.
WOL. III. P P
"Hujusmodi opera possunt dici vitae aeternae meritoria de condigno; ex acceptatione divina originaliter procedente ex merito passionis Christi. Marsil. de Inghen, iu 2. sec. quaest. 18. art. 4. * Opera facta ex gratia merentur vitam aeternam de congruo ex liberali Dei dispositione, qua disposuit ea sic praemiare. Ibid. y Rom. chap. 6. ver. 23. * Non ex nostra justitia, sed ex Dei gratia datur vita aeterna: juxta illud ad Rom. cap. 6. gratia Dei vita aeterna. Ibid. * Cum in operibus nostris bonis nihil Deo demus, pro quo per commutationem debeatur nobis praemium. Ibid. * Cum nullus bene operando secundum se et secundum statum aliquid de condigno mereatur, sed potius Deo majori obligatione astringitur, quia majora bona recepit. Ibid. * Ex quibus concluditur, qmod justus sit in remunerando: quiajusta dispositione sua disposuit ex gratia acceptationis minus meritum majori praemio coronare ; non justtia debiti, sed gratia et dispositione beneplaciti divini. Ibid.
recantation was prescribed unto him: “I” said against a bachelor of the order of the friars preachers in conference with him, that a man doth merit everlasting life of condignity, that is to say, that in case it were not given, there should injury be done unto him. I wrote likewise, that God should do him injury: and approved it. This I revoke as FALSE, HERETICAL, and BLASPHEMoUs.” Yet now the times are so changed, and men in them, that our new divines of Rhemes stick not to tell us, that it “is" most clear to all not blinded in pride and contention, that good works be meritorious, and the very cause of salva tion, so far that God should be unjust, if he rendered not heaven for the same.” Where to the judgment of the indifferent reader I refer it, whether side in this case is more likely to have been blinded in pride: (we who abase ourselves before God's footstool, and utterly disclaim all our own merits; or they who have so high a conceit of them, that they dare in this presumptuous manner to challenge God of injustice, if he should judge them to deserve a lesser reward than heaven itself:) and whether that sentence of our Saviour Christ be not fulfilled in them, as well as in the proud and blind Pharisees their predecessors: “Fort judgment I am come into this world, that they which see not might see, and that they which see might be made blind.” And so leaving these blind leaders of the blind, who say they sees (by that means making their sin to remain) and say they “are" rich and increased with goods, not knowing that they are wretched, and miserable, and poor, and blind, and naked:” I proceed, and out of the fifteenth century or hundred of years after Christ, produce other two witnesses of this truth. The one is
* Dixi contra bacchalarium praedicatorum conferendo cum ipso, quod homo meretur vitam aeternam de condigno; id est, quod si non daretur, ei fieret injuria. Et scripsi quod Deus faceret sibi injuriam: et hanc probavi. Istam revoco tanquam falsam, haereticam, et blaspheman. Guid. revocat, errorum, fact. Paris. ann. 1354. tom. 14. bibliothec. patr. edit. Colon, pag, 347.
* Rhem. annotat. in Hebr. cap. 6. ver. 10.
John, chap. 9. ver. 39. g Ibid. ver. 41.
* Revel, chap. 3. ver, 17.