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ed,-no sooner had the charter assumed form, and been reduced to a state fit for carrying its provisions into effeet,- -no sooner had this taken place, ders-or, perhaps, we ought to use a From this rapid review of the blunthan every one of those individuals who were known to enjoy the royal misfortunes-of the Bourbon governmore qualified phrase, and say, the confidence set themselves to vitupe- ment previously to the landing of Narate its provisions, and to compare the poleon from Elba, it will be seen what happy combination of royal preroga- grounds of dissatisfaction prevailed,‐ tive, and civil rights which it displays, how the differences were exasperated aux ordonnances des rois de France by the prodigious follies of the Ultradans les temps de la Feodalite." Ex- Royalists, and how those who sought pressions were foisted into the pream- only repose and security were driven, bles of laws, unfavourable to the stability of the sales of national property Emperor, by the caprice, tyranny, inas it were, into the cause of the Ex-See the preamble of the laws rela solence, and Punic faith of the minitive to the unsold property of emi-stry or government of 1814. It would grants, already referred to,)—and the be difficult to refuse assent to the folprovisions of the liberty of the press lowing admirable observations, though destroyed by the law of censorship. these have the effect to present the errors which we have been contemplating in a still stronger and more vivid point of view.

Against these grievous backslidings the natural good sense of the Kingwho, by all accounts, appears to have had a more accurate perception of his true interest than any of his most zealous adherents-would have provided a remedy, and counteracted their mischievous and most pernicious tendency, had he possessed the necessary. vigour to have given effect to his own better and sounder views. "But the Ultra-Royalists set themselves invariably to protest against the efforts of his wisdom." Were any proof required of the strange infatuation of these men, the following fact would be conclusive:

"When the King engaged M. de Chateaubriand, in order to calm the ferment of men's minds, to publish the necessity of a rigid adherence to the charter, and that he gave it his public and most unqualified approbation, they affectedly professed their dissent, and intimated their disapprobation of the royal conduct." p. 34.

To these public sins were added the exasperation of private insolence. The nobility of the ancien régime regarded the upstart noblesse of Napoleon with the most marked and insufferable contempt, and were at no pains to conceal their sentiments on this subject.

"What pity,' said a duke of the old regime, with an air of commiseration, to one of the most admired of our warriors, rehat pity that you want that which we possess, and which cannot be given! We do not know these females,' said a lady of the Court to Lady Jersey, who had asked the name of a duchess of recent creation, 'these are marshalesses,""—(in French,

"A nation is never willingly turbulent. The majority, in all countries, seek only repose, because that is the condition most favourable to the exercise of their rights In order to create a disposition to disturb and the developement of their industry. public order, oppressions must have been exercised and alarm spread by those invested with authority, or at least by those who consider themselves protected by it. dread of an imaginary evil may, in its consequences, prove no less fatal than the existence of a real one.


For these consequences those vested with public authority are responsible. If such a panic spread, it is because peaceably-disposed citizens have not received sufficient assurance of the loyalty and energy of public functionaries. Whenever we find a people thrown into a state of ferment, we may decide boldly, without even waiting to investigate the catalogue of their grievances, not that the people are in the right, but that the government is in the wrong." p. 44.

M. Lainé, the President of the first Bourbon Chamber of Deputies, and the most enlightened man, perhaps, of all the Royalist party in France, admitted that errors had been committed; but, unluckily, the admission ready appeared on the French soil. came too late, for Buonaparte had alThat, as the President said, was not indeed the time to repair and atone for errors and faults, nor was it prudent to concede to fear what policy had spontaneously withheld; but it was rather unfortunate for the Royalists that men have but little faith in

and are exceedingly sceptical about tardy and compulsory conversions. However, such an admission, from such a quarter, proves the absurdity and folly of many of the measures of the administration of 1814, and leaves little to regret that they met with so merited a fate.

promised and prospective amendment, by the Royal government. Even those who had purchased national property, though they must have seen, with some degree of satisfaction, the return of a man "who represented, under one relation, the interests of the Revolution," yet feared the dangers and the privations to which his system of continual war would necessarily expose the nation. But, what is most remarkable, it was not even in the army, says our author, that Buonaparte found his most devoted and zealous adherents.

The following summary of the errors of the Bourbon government, by which the affections of the mass of the French people were alienated from their legitimate sovereign, and disposed again to submit to the masculine despotism from which they had so lately escaped, is from the pen of our author, and contains the substance of the preceding portion of his work.

"I aver, then, that there can be no manner of doubt as to the faults which the Ultras caused the government of the King to commit, which were the same as they were guilty of in 1815. These were the repeal of all those laws which the Revolution had established; the disturbance of those proprietary changes which it had consecrated; the proscription of all those individuals who, for the last twenty years, had taken any share in its events; in a word, the same system towards which they were hurrying, a second time, without being checked either by prudence, by anterior engagements, by the hazard of throwing France into new convulsions, by the mani. fest disapprobation of Europe, by the efforts of a ministry too long indulgent to their follies, or even by the representations of the King himself, whose authority alone, exerted in the last resort, has been able to oppose a barrier to the torrent which threatened to overwhelm every thing." pp. 57,


In his letter on the species of popularity which Buonaparte enjoyed at the period of his return from Elba, the author presents us with some striking and original views. At the time of his first abdication, Buonaparte was not popular with the enlightened part of the citizens. The weight of his despotism had become intolerable. Those fierce and untractable spirits who had plunged fearlessly into revolutionary excesses felt the power of that restraint which he had imposed. Those, again, who were ignorant of the crimes of the anarchists, on the one side, and of the folly and violence of the counter-revolutionary party, on the other, were equally dissatisfied. These feelings might have been turned to great advantage

"The sufferings which that army had undergone in his distant and gigantic expedi tions had wearied out the most distinguished of the companions in arms of that indefatigable conqueror." p. 77. and covered with honours, looked forThe Marshals, too, loaded with riches ward to enjoy what they had acquir ed, and wished for ease and retirement.

Even as late as after the capture of Grenoble, Marshals Oudinot, Masséna, Jourdan, and Dumouceau, sent in their addresses of loyalty and adherence to Louis XVIII.; ́ and, prior to the 15th March, assurances of fidelity to the constitutional throne had also been sent by Generals Pacthod, Decaen, Rapp, Miolis, Belliard, and Letort, all of whom remained faithful to the King, with the single exception of Letort, who was killed at Fleurus on the 16th June, leaving behind him a declaration, protesting against any other view of his conduct than that he had only taken up arms, when the constitutional monarch had abandoned his country, in order to defend it from the violation of foreign conquest. The conduct of the garrisons of Fere and Cambray is no less remarkable. Buonaparte knew well of the existence of this feeling, and, for some days after his landing, and even as far as Grenoble, avoided the stations of the troops, and advanced forty leagues into the country before he ventured to expose himself to any armed force. His attempt on Antibes was unsuccessful, and the party of assailants made prisoners. Here, then, were two classes, generally believed to have been entirely devoted to Buonaparte,-the holders of national property, and the army,—at least doubtful, and whose inclinations might, with adroit management, have been turned into the right channel.

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A large class, however, among whom Buonaparte was decidedly popular, consisted of those engaged in the manufactures peculiar to the country. How ever hostile to the fundamental principles of political philosophy may have been the Burning Decrees, and the rigorous exclusion from France of British and foreign manufactures and produce, and however vexatious and harassing to those engaged in foreign commerce, they had, nevertheless, the effect to give great encouragement to native industry. What people cannot find among their neighbours, they must endeavour to furnish for themselves. The régime prohibitif of Napoleon gave a new and powerful stimulus to French industry. A greater quantity of capital was attracted to certain employments by an increase of demand. Manufactures were thus extended and improved; fortunes were realized in professions which formerly yielded a bare subsistence; and France saw that she possessed within herself greater resources than her most sanguine friends had divined, and that nothing was wanting but an effectual demand, and a consequent reward for exertion, in order to bring the ingenuity of her people into successful competition with foreigners, and to ensure the extension of national wealth and power. This lesson was taught by the rigorous system of Napoleon. All those, therefore, connected, directly or indirectly, with the manufactures of the country, were enthusiastically devoted to his cause, thus identified with their own interests, and were ready to make very considerable sacrifices in his support; for be it remarked, that, while the return of the Emperor inflicted a mortal blow on distant commercial speculations, it was regarded, and justly, as an index of approaching prosperity to the internal manufactures of France. And, when we recollect that the foreign merchants, even in a country decidedly commercial, like our own, are few in number, in comparison of those who are engaged in the manufacture of raw material, we shall have some notion of the importance of the class of individuals just mentioned, when cast into the scale against the inefficiency of the Bourbon Government.

But, if Buonaparte might calculate on the support of this class, there were others who had still better reason to give

him their countenance, but who, nevertheless, were among the foremost to desert him, and, even when they joined him, were never hearty in his cause. Of these the most remarkable was the ancienne noblesse, at least that portion who had accepted the invitations of Napoleon, and gathered round his person, when his power was at the height, and his throne apparently placed beyond the reach of accident. But we must, on this part of the subject, borrow the words of our author.

"The relations subsisting between the head of the empire and the old nobility had, at all times, been sufficiently awkward. In the author of the 18th Brumaire, the peculiar instinct of this body had led them to discover an enemy of liberty; they accordingly rallied round him; at first applauding every thing, in his measures, which resembled despotism; then lending their full sanction to his power by accepting of those titles, places, and salaries, of which he had the entire disposal. They thus, in a great degree, contributed to the consolidation of his power, by affording him, in France, the benefit of the mode, and, in the eyes of Europe, by surrounding him with that traditional and chivalrous splendour which, for the continental courts, has still so many attractions. They had, so to speak, invested the person who had supplanted the Bourbons with that peculiar quality which they denominate exclusive legitimacy; for, how is it possible to conceive any illegiti macy about a man who was surrounded by those families which had encircled and served sixty-six kings? However, the union between the master sprung from the new régime, and the servants borrowed from the old, had never been complete. Was it that they felt any regrets, which, if they did, they knew marvellously well how to conceal ?-Was it that the creation of another noblesse annoyed them, because the extension of the privilege destroyed the monopoly? From whatever cause it proceeded the fact is certain that the fall of Buonaparte was hailed by the old nobility with the most rapturous acclamations. Remaining in the palace, by birth right, they believed themselves purified; and the contempt which they expressed for past favours, to which they pretended only to have resigned themselves, served to merit and obtain present rewards. The return of the parvenu, whose livery they had so long worn, awakened a painful recollection of that flexibility which they had laboured so hard to consign to oblivion; and as, in attaching them to his triumphal car, Buonaparte, who, in his prosperous days, humbled all, had also humbled them, they cursed his apparition, and were, perhaps, a little puzzled with the secret reflection, that,

should he fix himself firmly on the throne, it would be necessary a second time to discover reasons' pour rentrer ses salons de service." pp. 81-83.


Of the conduct of some of the constitutional party, on the approach of danger, the author speaks with becoming severity. An infatuation pears to have spread amongst them. În this list Soult stands pre-eminent. His conduct was, indeed, absurd and inconsistent beyond all precedent. The erection of a monument to the emigrants who fell in the ill-fated expedition to Quiberon, and the cruel persecution of General Excelmans, affix an indelible stain of inconsistency and cruelty on his character. The author denies that the former of these acts, as the royalists asserted, was done with a view to render the Bourbon government odious. With regard to the latter, founded on the violation of epistolary confidence, and having for its object the destruction of one of the officers in the French service, the most distinguished for bravery, and, for his domestic and social qualities, it would be difficult indeed to find an apology. The truth seems to be,

• When speaking of Marshal Soult, we were surprised to find M. Constant subjoining the following statement: "Je lui saurai gre toujours de cette memorable bataillé de Toulouse, précieuse sur-tout parce qu'elle a montré qu'IL N'ETAIT PAS IMPOSSIBLE de vaincre un général que la fortune avait pris à tâche de favori


Does M. Constant really mean to say, that Marshal Soult beat the Duke of Wellington at Toulouse? Are Frenchmen, indeed, ignorant that, but for the unparalleled humanity of the British hero, who wished to spare the inhabitants of Toulouse the horrors of a bombardment, not a man of Soult's army would have escaped? Is it not known in France that Soult's troops filed off under the very guns of the British army, by whom not a shot was fired? By whom was Soult forced from his lines on the heights which he had been three months in fortifying? Is this "PRECIEUSE BATAILLE "so creditable

to Soult, who is known to have fought it, with a perfect knowledge of the events that had taken place at Paris, and of the abdication of Fountainbleau? National vanity is, indeed, a strong passion. We were simple enough to believe the defeat of Toulouse as complete as that at Orthés, where even Frenchmen did not claim the victory.


however, that the constitutional party would have adhered firmly to the King, and defended him to the last man, had they been convinced of his sincerity, or been admitted to his confidence. Insulted, humiliated, reviled, by those about the royal person, -and finding that, though invested temporarily with office, they had received no portion of the trust which office presupposes,-obnoxious to the violent royalists from revolutionary recollections, and by the rank which they had earned under an usurper, they were necessarily led to look to the party in opposition to the Court, for that support which the Court ought, in common justice, and in good faith, to have afforded them. To this cause may be ascribed much of the mischief and treachery that followed.

The last letter of this first part of our author's performance is devoted to prove that, prior to the 20th March, there existed no conspiracy, having for its object the recall and re-enthronement of the Ex-Emperor. In this part of his book we think our author has been most completely successful; and although this article has already extended to an unconscionable length, we will yet trespass, for a moment, on the patience of our readers, with a brief summary of the facts produced in support of this negative. Many fine theatrical stories have, we are well aware, been coined by ingenious travellers, and circulated in this credulous country, about a sort of free-masonry established in France, as the organ of communication with Napoleon in Elba, and as a test or sign, by which the number and devotion of his partizans might previously be ascertained. The shrewd Buonapartist asked the individual whose faith he wished to put to the testAimez-vous la violette? If the answer was, "Oui," the respondent was put down as a cowie, or a royalist. But if, on the other hand, the answer was, "ELLE REPARAÎTRA AVEC fellowship was instantly extended, LE PRINTEMPS," the right hand of and a communion of knowledge, schemes, hopes, fears, and difficulties, immediately commenced. Can any

thing be more paltry or absurd, not to say impossible, than this? From such pitiful fictions let us turn to plain and stubborn facts.



And here it is not to be denied, that a man who had governed France for fourteen years, who had created so many functionaries and offices,—who had expended such treasures, and to whom so many hopes were attached,must, in spite of his faults and reverses, have preserved a great and power-Of eighty-three prefects in office on ful influence. Nor is it to be doubt the 20th March," says the Moniteur ed that he had many correspondents of Ghent," and whose fidelity had in France, from whom he received not been brought under suspicion, regular information of the state of par- twenty-three only remained in office ties in that country. Nay, our author under the usurper." And yet the asserts, that he derived the most valu- reader will observe, that these officers able information from the ministers had all been appointed by Napoleon. of the great continental powers, whom What answer can be given to this he had formerly corrupted, and who fact? It is singular that not a tittle of had no great disinclination to finger a correspondence between a single prefew more napoleons. But all this fect, or mayor, and Napoleon, was did not amount to a regularly-orga- ever detected. Of all the counsellors nised conspiracy. In fact, such a thing of state, retained in 1814, three only was morally, if not physically, impos- continued to sit under Buonaparte; sible. Among the millions who must and of these three two have, since the have been in the secret, would there 8th of July last, been called to form not have been found one traitor? How part of the present ministry. It is comes it that the conspiracy was not true Labédoyère and Ney were tried so much as breathed till long after it and shot for passing over to Napohad taken effect? How does it happen leon; but what proof of a conspiracy that no fears had been excited, and appeared on their trials? In fact, no precautions taken to ensure safety? neither of these men was accused as a Individuals and small parties of men conspirator. The case of Lavalette may conspire, but there is no example certainly involved the question of in all history of a whole nation con- conspiracy, but the jury did not find spiring. When we look back into that part of the case proved. The acthe records of past events, how few quittal of General Drouet, tried on a conspiracies have succeeded? A man charge of a similar description, is dewho has once become a traitor, has but cisive of this point. In the subselittle way to go, and scarcely deepens quent trials of Generals Bertrand and the enormity of his crime by super- Cambrone, the question of conspiracy adding the guilt of an informer. The was abandoned by the Attorney-Gemachinations of Cataline were no se- neral, and the accusation restricted to cret to Cicero, long before the plot an attack on the government. If the was ripe for execution; and even the proclamations posterior to the landing gunpowder treason, the darkest, most at Frejus, and the occupation of the formidable, and longest concealed con- departments, be held as a proof of conspiracy that ever existed, was never- spiracy, then the greatest of all contheless betrayed. Of all countries spirators must have been the Mayor of Germany, from the peculiar habits of Lyons, who, on the 10th of March, cethe people, is the country most fa- lebrated the arrival of Buonaparte in vourable to secret institutions and terms full of enthusiasm;-yet, strange conspiracies, and yet the celebrated to tell, the "royalistes exagérés" numTugenbund was well known to the bered him in their ranks in 1815;— French to have existed in the Prus- he sat in the "Chambre Introuvasian dominions, notwithstanding their ble;-continued Mayor of Lyons till inability to extirpate it. The small his death;-received his share of resistance made to the progress of merit on account of the events of Buonaparte is no proof of anterior 1817;-and is now generally esteemed conspiracy. Countries have, from to have been "trés bon royaliste." In different causes, been conquered with- fine, we may be allowed, on this head, out the loss of a man, where there to cite no less an authority than that never existed the smallest suspicion of Buonaparte himself, who had no

of treason. In the next place, the prefects, mayors, and other officers of Buonaparte, contributed so little to the success of his enterprise, that even the royalists have admitted that, on his arrival, he was abandoned by nearly the whole of these functionaries.


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