void the marriage contract under the following circumstances. 1. If either of the parties, at the time of the marriage, had not obtained the age of legal consent. 2. If the former husband or wife of the party was living, and the marriage in force. 3. If one of the parties was an idiot or a lunatic. 4. If the consent of one of the parties was obtained by force or fraud. 5. If one of the parties was physically incapable of entering into the mar ried state.

In Massachusetts, marriage between a white person and a negro, Indian, or mulatto, is declared absolutely void, without a de. cree of divorce, or other legal process; and the issue of any such marriage is deemed illegitimate.

It is a remarkable fact, that not a single case of divorce took place in the colony of New York, for more than one hundred years preceding the revolution; and for many years after New York became an independent state, there was no way of dissolv. ing a marriage except by a special act of the Legislature. In the year 1787 the Legislature authorized the Court of Chancery to grant a bill of divorce for adultery, committed by either party, but in three cases only, viz: 1. Where the married persons are inhabitants of the State at the time the offence was committed. 2. Where the marriage took place in the State, and the injured party be an actual resident at the time of the offence, and the filing of the bill. 3. Where the crime was committed in the State, and the injured party, at the time of filing the bill, be an actual inhabitant of the State. In all cases, the fact must be proved by testimony, independent of the confession of the party; for Chancellor Kent remarks, that he "has had occasion to be. lieve, in the exercise of a judicial cognizance over numerous cases of divorce, that the sin of adultery was sometimes committed on the part of the husband, for the very purpose of procuring a divorce.”*

The policy of this state, is well known, to be against granting divorces, except for adultery alone. The laws in the different states, vary on this subject. In Georgia, Mississippi and Alabama, divorces are restrained, even by constitutional provisions, which require to every valid divorce, the assent of two-thirds of each

*Kent's Commentaries, Vol. II. p. 105.

branch of the legislature, founded on a previous judicial investigation and decision. In New Jersey, Maryland, Virginia, South Carolina and Louisiana, no divorce is granted, but by a special act of the legislature, according to the English practice; but in several of these states divorces are very common. In Missouri divorces are granted by the circuit courts, in cases of extreme cruelty, or on conviction of an infamous crime. In Tennessee and North Carolina, the legislature cannot grant divorces, but they may confer the power on the courts of justice. So scrupulous has been the policy of South Carolina, that there is no instance in that state, since the revolution, of a divorce of any kind, either by the sentence of a court of justice, or by act of the legislature. In all the other states, divorces are granted judicially for adultery. In New York and Illinois, the jurisdic. tion of the courts as to absolute divorces, for causes subsequent to the marriage, is confined to this offence alone; but in all the other states, intolerable ill usage, wilful desertion, or unheard of absence, or some of them, will authorize a decree for a divorce, under different modifications and restrictions.

In the year 1814, the legislature of North Carolina, authorized the courts of that state, to use an unlimited discretion, and grant divorces, whenever they should be satisfied that justice required it. But the exercise of this vast power and discretion, is said to have proved exceedingly painful and embarrassing. In that state, and Alabama, parties living in adultery or fornication are indictable. In New Hampshire, joining the religious society of the Shakers, and continuing in that society for three years is a sufficient cause for divorce. In Connecticut the legislature fre quently passes special acts of divorce, although the legal causes are, adultery, fraudulent contract, wilful desertion for three years, or seven years unheard of absence. Habitual drunkenness is also a cause of divorce in some of the states. Chancellor Kent remarks that "the question of divorce involves investigations which are properly of a judicial nature, and the jurisdiction over divorces ought to be confined exclusively to the judicial tribunals, under the limitations to be prescribed by law. It is very questionable whether the facility with which divorces can be procured in some of the states, be not productive of more evil than good. It is doubtful whether even divorces for adultery do

not lead to much fraud and corruption. Some of the jurists are of opinion that the adultery of the husband ought not to be noticed, or made subject to the same animadversion as that of the wife; because it is not evidence of such entire depravity, nor equally injurious in its effects upon the morals, and good order, and happiness of domestic life. Montesquieu, Pothier, and Dr. Taylor, all insist that the cases of husband and wife ought to be distinguished, and that the violation of the marriage vow, on the part of the wife, is the most mischievous, and the prosecution ought to be confined to the offence on her part." It is rather a singular fact, that the puritan fathers, the early settlers of Massachusetts, made this very distinction, and did not allow adultery on the part of the husband to be a sufficient cause of divorce.

The question has never been judicially tried and determined in the courts of the United States, how far a divorce in one state is to be received as valid in another. This question has been most ably discussed by Chancellor Kent in his commentaries on American law, who arrives at the conclusion, that "upon the principles of the English law, a marriage contracted in New York, cannot be dissolved, except for adultery, by any foreign tribunal out of the United States; and if a divorce by a judicial proceding in one of these United States, be entitled to a different consideration in others; it is owing to the force which the national compact, and the laws made in pursuance of it give to the records and judicial proceedings of other States." It is a grave question, and one which ere long must be decided, whether a marriage, for example in New York, may be dissolved by an act of the legislature of another state, passed specially for the purpose, and for a cause not admissible here. If so, then one state may dictate laws to another, and a fearful collision of jurisdiction may follow. Such a construction is considered inadmissible, and yet such occurrences are not unfrequent.

Qualified divorces from "bed and board," are allowed by the statute of New York, which authorizes the court of chancery to grant them on complaint of the wife, of cruel and inhuman treatment, or such conduct as renders it unsafe and improper for her to live with her husband; or for wilful desertion of her, and refusal or neglect to provide for her. The court may decree a separation from bed and board for ever, or for a limited time, in

its discretion, and the decree may be revoked at any time by the same court by which it was pronounced, under such regulations and restrictions, as the court may impose, upon the joint application of the parties, and upon their producing satisfactory evidence of their reconciliation. In such cases, the parties must be 1st. inhabitants of the state: 2d. or the marriage have taken place in the state, and the wife an actual resident at the time of exhibit ing the complaint: 3d. or the parties must have been inhabitants of the state at least one year, and the wife an actual resident at the time of filing the bill.* Qualified divorces of this kind are allowed by the laws of most countries, and throughout the United States generally, in cases of extreme cruelty, though they are unknown in some of the states, as in Connecticut, Ohio, Indiana, and South Carolina. The law decides it to be cruelty if there is reasonable apprehension of bodily hurt; that is, if the wilful conduct of the husband exposes the wife to bodily hazard, or intolerable hardship. It was not long since decided by an English judge, that the law allowed a man to beat his wife with a stick as big as his thumb; whereupon the ladies sent a request that his thumb might be accurately measured. In this country, the causes must be grave and weighty for a separation, and show that the duties of the married life cannot be safely discharged. "Where austerity of temper, petulance of manners, rudeness of language, a want of civil attention, even occasional sallies of passion, if they do not threaten bodily harm, do not amount to that cruelty against which the law can relieve. The wife must disarm such a disposition in the husband by the weapon of kind, ness." (Chan. Kent.)

The law in this state seems to have considered the wife as the only party who stands in need of protection, and accordingly it confines the divorce, for cruelty, desertion, or other improper conduct, to such conduct in the husband; but in England, Mas sachusetts, and some of the other states, divorces from bed and board are allowed for cause of extreme cruelty in either party. Chancellor Kent however remarks, (Com. Vol. II. p. 126,) “ By a statute of New York, of April 10th, 1824, the Court of Chan.

cery was authorized to decree a divorce a mensa, on the complaint of the husband, and that provision is deemed to be in force, notwithstanding the general provision in the Revised Laws confining that remedy to the wife." Again he remarks, "these qualified divorces are regarded as rather hazardous to the morals of the parties. In the language of the English courts, it is throwing the parties back upon society, in the undefined and dangerous characters of a wife without a husband, and a husband without a wife. The ecclesiastical law has manifested great solicitude on this subject, by requiring in every decree of separation, an express monition to the parties, to live chastely and continently, and not, during each other's life, contract matrimony with any other person,' and security was formerly required from the party suing for the divorce to obey the mandate. The statute allows the husband, on such a bill by the wife, for ill conduct, to show, in his defence, and in bar of the suit, a just provocation in the ill behaviour of the wife, and this would have been a good defence, even without the aid of the statute. And on these separations from bed and board, the courts intrusted with the jurisdiction of the subject, will make suitable provision for the support of the wife and children, out of the husband's estate, and enforce the decree by sequestration; and the Chancel. lor, in New York, may exercise his discretion in the disposition of the infant children, and vary or annul the same from time to time as circumstances may require."

EDUCATION OF AMERICAN FEMALES.

So much has been written of late on the subject of female edu. cation, that it is with great reluctance that we venture to offer a few considerations, suggested by considerable observation and an acquaintance with the methods of study pursued in our female boarding schools.

We suppose that it will be admitted, that the object of educa tion is, or ought to be, to prepare for the future duties of life; and making this the standard, if we do not find that our mothers and grandmothers were better educated than females of the present day, we shall at least discover, that our present system is much