Opinion of Dana. Opinion of framed, appear to apply to ships of war by whomsoever they may be supplied to the belligerent; but from the note to section 764 and the reference to section 765, hereinbefore cited as to the sale of arms and munitions of war in the country of the neutral, I gather that the Professor means to draw a distinction between ships made over to a belligerent, whether by sale or otherwise, for the purpose of assisting his cause, and ships of war sold to a belligerent by neutral subjects in the way of trade. This is the view taken by Mr. Dana in a note to his edition of "Wheaton's Elements of International Law," which has been reprinted in the documents appended to the American Case : An "Our rules do not interfere with bond file commercial dealings in contraband of war. American merchant may build and fully arm a vessel, and provide her with stores, and offer her for sale in our own market. If he does any acts as an agent or servant of a belligerent, or in pursuance of an arrangement or understanding with a belligerent, that she shall be employed in hostilities when sold, he is guilty. He may, without violating our law, send out such a vessel, so equipped, under the flag and papers of his own country, with no more force of crew than is suitable for navigation, with no right to resist search or seizure, and to take the chances of capture as contraband merchandize, of blockade, and of a market in a belligerent port. In such case, the extent and character of the equipments is as immaterial as in the other class of cases. The intent is all. The act is open to great suspicions and abuse, and the line may often be scarcely traceable; yet the principle is clear enough. Is the intent one to prepare an article of contraband merchandize, to be sent to the market of a belligerent, subject to the chances of capture and of the market? Or, on the other hand, is it to fit out a vessel which shall leave our port to cruise, immediately or ultimately, against the commerce of a friendly nation? The latter we are bound to prevent; the former the belligerent must prevent."* Professor Gola, of Parma, in a recent work, observes : "Lo stesso dicasi ove si trattasse di costruzioni di navi: l'atto lede la neutralità, ove l'impresa si eseguisca dal governo, è invece un'opera d'industria ove si compia da privati imprenditori nei loro cantieri."+ M. Ortolan, who had made no such distinction in the former edition of his work, "Sur la Diplomatie de la Mer,” in the last edition of that work has, with reference to this subject, the following, I cannot help thinking somewhat extraordinary doctrine :— "Si l'on suppose un navire construit sur le territoire neutre, non pas sur commande d'un belligérant ou par suite d'un traité ostensible ou dissimulé avec ce belligérant, mais en vue d'un dessein quelconque, soit de navigation commerciale, soit tout autre, et que ce navire, déjà par lui-même propre à la guerre ou de nature à être converti à cet usage, une fois sorti des ports de la nation neutre, soit vendu, dans le cours de sa navigation, occasionnellement, à l'un des belligérants, et se mette à naviguer en destination directe pour ce belligérant; un tel navire dans de telles circonstances tombe uniquement sous le coup des règles relatives à la contrebande de guerre. Il est sujet à être arrêté et confisqué par l'ennemi qui pourra s'en emparer, mais sans qu'aucun grief de violation des devoirs de la neutralité puisse sortir de ce fait contre l'Etat neutre pour n'avoir pas défendu à ses nationaux de telles ventes ou ne les avoir pas réprimées. C'est une opération de trafic qui a eu lieu, trafic de contrebande de guerre, dont aucune circonstance particulière n'est venue changer le caractère. "Tel fut, en l'année 1800, le cas du navire Américain le Brutus, capturé par les Anglais et jugé de bonne prise par le Cour d'Amirauté d'Halifax. "Mais la situation change, la contrebande de guerre n'est plus la question principale, d'autres règles du droit des gens interviennent et modifient profondément la solution, si l'on suppose qu'il s'agisse de bâtiments de guerre construits, armés ou équipés sur un territoire neutre pour le compte d'un belligérant, par suite d'arrangement pris à l'avance avec lui, sous la forme d'un contrat commercial quelconque-vente, commission, louage d'industrie ou de travail; que les arrangements aient été pris ostensiblement, ou qu'ils le soient d'une manière secrète ou déguisée; car la loyauté est une condition essentielle dans la solution des difficultés internationales, et sous le couvert des fausses apparences il faut toujours aller au fond des choses. Il y a ici, incontestablement, une seconde hypothèse qu'il importe de distinguer soigneusement de la précédente. "Nous nous rattacherons, pour résoudre en droit des gens les difficultés que présente cette nouvelle situation, à un principe universellement établi, qui se formule en ce peu des mots: 'Inviolabilité du territoire neutre.' Cette inviolabilité est un droit pour l'Etat neutre, dont le territoire ne doit pas être atteint par les faits de guerre, mais elle impose aussi à ce même Etat neutre une étroite obligation, celle de ne pas permettre, celle d'empêcher, activement au besoin, l'emploi de ce territoire par l'une des parties ou au profit de l'une des parties belligérantes, dans un but hostile à l'autre partie. "Les publicistes en crédit ne font aucun doute pour ce qui concerne l'armement et l'équipement dans un port neutre de bâtiments de guerre destinés à accroître les forces des belligérants. Ils s'accordent pour reconnaître l'illégalité de ces armements ou équipements, comme une infraction de la part de l'Etat neutre qui les tolérerait aux devoirs de la neutralité. 'N'est-il pas évident qu'il en doit être de même a fortiori de la construction de pareils bâtiments, lorsque cette construction a lieu dans les conditions prévues en notre seconde hypothèse ?" * United States' Documents, vol. vii, p. 36. So that, according to M. Ortolan, if a ship happens to be ready made and armed, she may be lawfully sold to a foreign belligerent, though with a full knowledge on the part of the seller of the purpose to which she is to be applied; but, if she is made to order, the transaction assumes the opposite character, and is a breach of neutrality. With all respect for the authority of this distinguished writer, I must decline to adopt a doctrine which rests on so shadowy a distinction. Professor Bluntschli, undertaking to pronounce a judgment on the subject matter Opinion of Proof this dispute, as it were ex cathedrá, in an article in the "Revue de Droit Interna- fessor Bluntschli. tional" of 1870, lays down the following doctrine :— "L'Etat neutre qui veut garantir sa neutralité doit s'abstenir d'aider aucune des parties belligérantes dans ses opérations de guerre. Il ne peut prêter son territoire pour permettre à l'une des parties d'organiser en lieu sûr des entreprises militaires. Il est obligé de veiller fidèlement à ce que des particuliers n'arment point sur son territoire des vaisseaux de guerre, destinés à être livrés à une des parties belligérantes. (Bluntschli, Modernes Volkerrecht, section 763.) "Ce devoir est proclamé par la science, et il dérive tant de l'idée de neutralité que des égards auxquels tout Etat est nécessairement tenu envers les autres Etats avec lesquels il vit en paix et amitié. "La neutralité est la non-participation à la guerre. Lorsque l'Etat neutre soutient un des belligérants, il prend part à la guerre en faveur de celui qu'il soutient, et dès lors il cesse d'être neutre. L'adversaire est autorisé à voir dans cette participation un acte d'hostilité. Et cela n'est pas seulement vrai quand l'état neutre livre lui-même des troupes ou des vaisseaux de guerre, mais aussi lorsqu'il prête à un des belligérants un appui médiat en permettant, tandis qu'il pourrait l'empêcher, que, de son territoire neutre, on envoie des troupes ou des navires de guerre. "Partout où le droit de neutralité étend le cercle de son application, il restreint les limites de la guerre et de ses désastreuses conséquences, et il garantit les bienfaits de la paix. Les devoirs de l'Etat neutre envers les belligérants sont en substance les mêmes que ceux de l'Etat ami, en temps de paix, vis-à-vis des autres Etats. Aucun Etat ne peut non plus, en temps de paix, permettre que l'on organise sur son territoire des agressions contre un état ami. Tous sont obligés de veiller à ce que leur sol ne devienne pas le point de départ d'entreprises militaires, dirigées contre des Etats avec lesquels ils sont en paix." I entirely agree in all that is thus said by this able jurist-that is, if I properly apprehend his language, and am right in understanding it to apply not to the sale of ships of war, simpliciter, but to the sending out of troops and armed ships for the purpose of what the learned Professor terms "military enterprises," and to the "organizing of aggressions against a friendly State." Another eminent jurist, who has espoused the cause of the United States, in a very able review of the work of Professor Mountague Bernard, and whose opinion is referred to by the United States as an authority in their favour, M. Rolin Jacquemyns, does not, as far as I collect, deny the legality of the sale of ships of war, but rests his M. Rolin Jacqueopinion on the general circumstances connected with the construction and escape of the Alabama. But the spirit in which this author writes will be seen from the following passage: "Il eût dans tous les cas été digne d'un jurisconsulte de la valeur de M. Bernard de ne pas se borner à examiner cette grave question des devoirs de la neutralité au point de vue du droit positif existant. C'est par l'opinion hautement émise de savants comme lui, que les idées générales en matière de droit sont appelées à se rectifier et à se compléter. Or, s'il y a une chose que chaque guerre nouvelle démontre, c'est le caractère non-seulement insuffisant, mais fallacieux de la vieille définition : neutrarum partium. Si au début de cette dernière et épouvantable guerre de 1870, l'Angleterre au lieu d'être obstinément neutrarum partium, avait clairement désapprouvé l'offensive inique de la France, est-ce que les intérêts de la justice et de la paix n'auraient pas été mieux servis? L'idéal du personnage neutrarum partium, c'est le juge qui, dans l'apologue de l'huitre et des plaideurs, avale le contenu du mollusque et adjuge les écailles aux deux belligérants. Il n'est d'aucun parti, mais il s'engraisse scrupuleusement aux dépens de tous deux. Une telle conduite de la part d'un grand peuple peut être aussi conforme aux précédents que celle du vénérable magistrat dont parle la fable. Mais quand elle se fonde sur une loi positive, sur une règle admise, c'est une preuve que cette loi ou cette règle est mauvaise, comme contraire à la science, à la dignité, et à la solidarité humaine. This reasoning may be very well deserving of attention for the future; but, for the present purpose, when the authority of M. Rolin Jacquemyns as to the culpability of Great Britain is cited, I must protest against the question being determined not according to "existing positive law," but to the opinion of "savants" as to what the law should have been, or should now be made. The Tribunal cannot, I apprehend, adopt such a principle in forming its judgment. Its functions are not to make the law, but to decide according to the rules of the Treaty, with the light Opinion of myns. No. 23900. "Revue de Droit International et de Législation comparée," 1871, p. 125. Opinion of the Case of the Santissima Trinidad. Judgment of Case of the 4 which the acknowledged principles of international jurisprudence and the established usages of nations may afford for its assistance. The occasion may be a tempting one for giving effect to speculative opinions or individual theories. But a decision founded on such a principle would not ensure the approbation of wise and judicious minds, or command the respect of those who might suffer from a judgment which would be at variance with the first principles of equity and justice. Let us see what has been the practical view taken of the subject in England or America. As far back as the year 1721, ships of war having been built in England, and sold to the Czar of Russia, then at war with Sweden, and complaint having been made by the Swedish Minister, the Judges were summoned to the House of Lords, and their opinion was asked whether by law the King of England had the power to prohibit the building of ships of war, or of great force, for foreigners, in any of His Majesty's dominions. And the judges, with the exception of one, who had formed no opinion, answered that the King had no such power. It is plain that, if the sale of such vessels. had been an offence against international law, the King would have had power to prevent it by the prosecution of the parties building and selling such ships, as offenders against the municipal law, as the offence would have been a misdemeanour at the common law. It appears that Chief Justice Trevor, and Parker, afterwards Lord Chancellor, had given the like opinion seven years before.* The judgment of Judge Story, in the well-known case of the Santissima Trinidad,† shows that the sale of armed ships of war has never been held to be contrary to law in America. In that case a vessel, called the Independencia, equipped for war and armed with twelve guns, had been sent out from the American port of Baltimore, upon a pretended voyage to the North-West Coast, but in reality to Buenos Ayres, then at war with Spain, with instructions to the supercargo to sell her to the Buenos Ayres Government if he could obtain a certain price. She was sold to that Government accordingly, and, having been commissioned, was sent to sea and made prizes. She afterwards put into an American port, and having there received an augmentation of her force, again put to sea and captured a prize. The validity of this prize was questioned in the suit, on two grounds 1st. That the sale of the vessel to a foreign Government by American citizens, for the purpose of being used in war against a belligerent with whom the United States were at peace, was a violation of neutrality and illegal; 2ndly. Because the capture had been made after an augmentation of the force of the vessel in a port of the United States. The capture was held invalid on the latter ground. Upon the first, the Judge delivered judgment as follows:-- "The question as to the original illegal armament and outfit of the Independencia may be dismissed in a few words. It is apparent, that though equipped as a vessel of war, she was sent to Buenos Ayres on a commercial adventure, contraband, indeed, but in no shape violating our laws or our national neutrality. If captured by a Spanish ship of war during the voyage, she would have been justly condemned as good prize for being engaged in a traffic prohibited by the law of nations. But there is nothing in our laws, or in the law of nations, that forbids our citizens from sending armed vessels, as well as munitions of war, to foreign ports for sale. It is a commercial adventure which no nation is bound to prohibit, and which only exposes the person engaged in it to the penalty of confiscation. Supposing, therefore, the voyage to have been for commercial purposes, and the sale at Buenos Ayres to have been a bona fide sale (and there is nothing in the evidence before us to contradict it), there is no pretence to say that the original outfit on the voyage was illegal, or that a capture made after the sale was, for that cause alone, invalid." It is now sought to shake the authority of this judgment, by saying that it was unnecessary to the decision of the cause, as the prize was held to be invalid on the other ground; but it was, nevertheless, a solemn judgment upon a point properly arising in the cause, and, so far as I am aware, it has never been questioned. It is indeed alleged (but for the first time) in the American Case that the authority of this decision is to be looked upon as overruled or controlled by a judgment given by the same Court in the case of the Gran Para. Now, the latter judgment was a judgment of the same Court (of which, therefore, Mr. Justice Story was himself a member), and was pronounced on the very next day. We are told in the Case of the United States, that the cases were argued, the one on the 20th, the other on the 28th of February, 1822; that the judgment in the case of the Santissima Trinidad was pronounced on the 12th of March, that in the case of the Gran Para on the ensuing day, the 13th. It is said, and truly, that "there can be no doubt they were considered together in the consultation room," and lawyers are gravely asked to believe that it was intended by the second judgment to overrule or qualify the doctrine involved in the first. No English or American lawyer could entertain the notion for a moment that, if the same Court had intended to overrule, or even to qualify, the judgment given immediately before, it would not have referred to it in terms and given its reasons for so sudden a change in its views of the law. But the truth is,--and I am at a loss to understand how the American Counsel can have failed to overlook this, or to call attention to it when citing the decision,-that, so far from overruling or affecting the judgment in the Santissima Trinidad, the case of the Gran Para had nothing in common with it beyond that of being a suit for the restitution of prize. It was not the case of the sale of a ship to a foreign Government at all. It was simply the case of an American privateer armed in defiance of American law, and cruizing under a fictitious commission, the property in her still remaining unchanged in the American citizen by whom she had been fitted out! The great importance of this distinction will be seen in another part of this case. In a learned and able article in the well-known publication the "American Law American Review. Review" of January 1871, the writer, after referring to the case of the Santissima Trinidad as “a famous and leading case," states the law as follows: "It may be declared as indubitable that the pure unalloyed bargain and sale of a ship, even a ship of war, to a belligerent is legal by the rules of international law; that such a ship is, however, contraband of war, and if captured after sale on her way towards delivery, or before sale on her way toward a market where she is intended to be sold to a belligerent, she will be properly condemned. Neutrality Acts have not been intended to change this state of the law, but only to furnish sufficient means for preventing its abuse. Our original proposition that the doctrine of contraband of war does not operate as a restriction upon trade, upon dealings which are purely commercial, remains correct, even in this -matter of war vessels." In this view of the law I am glad to have the concurrence of our distinguished Opinion of colleague Mr. Adams, who, writing to Earl Russell on the 6th of April, 1863, states, Mr. Adams. Iwith reference to certain American authorities which Lord Russell had appealed to : “The sale and transfer, by a neutral, of arms, of munitions of war, and even of vessels of war, to a belligerent country, not subject to blockade at the time, as a purely commercial transaction, is decided by these authorities not to be unlawful. They go not a step further; and precisely to that extent I have myself taken no exception to the doctrine."* This being the present state of international law on this subject, if it is desirable Question as to to introduce new rules, it must be done by the common consent of nations, not by the prohibition of sale speculative doctrines of theorists, however distinguished. But is it desirable that it should be altered, and that obstacles to the industry and trade of neutral nations should be created? Azuni observes: "Une grande partie du commerce de quelques nations Européennes, telles que les Suédois, Norvégiens, et les Russes, consiste en marchandises nécessaires pour la guerre maritime, pour la construction et pour l'équipement d'une flotte; elles vendent en temps de paix, à quiconque en a besoin, de fer, du cuivre, des mâts, des bois, du goudron, de la poix, et des canons, enfin des navires de guerre entiers. Quelles raisons pourrait-il y avoir de priver ces nations de leur commerce et de leur manière de subsister, à l'occasion d'une guerre à laquelle ils ne prennent aucune part? Il n'y a dans le code de la justice et de l'équité rien en faveur d'une telle protection. Il est donc nécessaire d'établir, comme maxime fondementale de tout droit, que les peuples neutres devant et pouvant licitement. continuer le commerce qu'ils font en temps de paix, on ne doit faire aucune distinction de denrées, de marchandises, et de manufactures, quoique propres à la guerre, et que, par cette raison, la vente et le transport aux parties belligérantes en sont permis, si le commerce actif et passif était établi en temps de paix, sans qu'on puisse prendre, en aucune manière, que la neutralité soit violée, pourvu que cela se fasse sans animosité, sans préférence, et sans partialité." I cannot but feel the force and justice of these observations. I ask in like manner, “Why—unless, indeed, on account of reasons of State affecting the interests of the neutral State itself, in which case private interests must give way to those of the public-are the armourers of Birmingham or Liege, or the shipbuilders, of London or Liverpool, to have their business put a stop to because one of their customers happens to be engaged in war with another State ?" It is not enough to say that but for the war the demand for the articles in question would not have arisen. From whatever cause it may proceed, of articles contraband of war. * United States' Documents, vol. ii, p. 591. Ship of war sent out for immediate service. Armament and crew sent out in different ships. increased demand is the legitimate advantage of the producer or the merchant, and it is by the advantage which periods of increased and more active demand bring with them that the loss arising from occasional periods of stagnation is balanced and made good. The authors who desire to put further restraints on the free commerce of neutrals than international law has hitherto done, appear to me to think too much of the interests of belligerents, who are the disturbers of the world's peace, and to be too unmindful of the interests of neutral nations, who are simply seeking occupation for their industry and commerce indifferent by whom they are employed. They seem to think that the belligerent is granting an indulgence or conferring a favour on the neutral in allowing him to remain a stranger to the war, which the grateful neutral should be too glad to purchase by the sacrifice of all rights at all incompatible with the convenience of the belligerent. M. Hautefeuille, indeed, invokes humanity, and would prohibit the sale of articles of warlike use in order to prevent and put an end to war. But if considerations of humanity are to be taken into account, it is obvious that the sale of such things should be prohibited in time of peace, as well as of war. They are not the less available in time of war because bought in time of peace. The armourer or the shipbuilder, who is thus required to close his establishment to the belligerents when war arises, may continue to manufacture and sell, undisturbed, his instruments of destruction down to the very hour when war is proclaimed. Had Prussia, for instance, anticipated the attack of France as likely to occur so soon, and had desired to procure a fleet, she might have resorted to the shipwrights' yards of England till she possessed ships enough to cope with her formidable adversary on the seas. But, let war but be proclaimed, and according to these views, the work becomes at once criminal, the workman's hammer must be arrested, the shipwright's yard closed. There may be reasons of state in certain instances-as according to British and American views in the case of ships-for putting a restraint on the freedom of trade, but it seems idle to base it on the score of humanity. The effect would simply be that a Government meditating the invasion of another country would have to provide itself in time. The neighbour upon whom it thus brings war on the sudden, and who may be comparatively unprepared, is not to be at liberty to seek the materials of war elsewhere, but is to be left at the mercy of the invader. Peaceful nations would thus be at the mercy of others more ambitious and warlike and better prepared than themselves. The weak would be sacrificed to the strong. Let me suppose a people rising in a just and righteous cause. I will not offend the patriotic susceptibility of my honourable and esteemed colleague by suggesting, for a single instant, even hypothetically, the possibility that the cause of the Insurgents might have been such a one-I will take what he will readily admit to have been so, the separation of the United States from the mother country. Let me suppose that, while Great Britain had her fleets prepared, her troops armed, her arsenals well stored, America had neither ships nor arms, nor munitions of war, with which to resist the superior forces of her adversary. Would it have been in the interest of humanity that she should be shut out from the markets of the world? An appeal to considerations of humanity has no doubt something very captivating about it; but I question very much whether humanity would not lose more than it would gain by the proposed restraint on the commercial freedom of nations. The case, however, becomes essentially different when a ship thus equipped and armed is not sent out to be taken to the port of the belligerent purchaser, but is sent to sea with officers and a fighting crew for the purpose of immediate warfare. Under such circumstances the transaction ceases to be one of mere commerce, and assumes the form of a hostile expedition sent forth from the territory of the neutral. Such an expedition is plainly a violation of neutrality, according to international law, and one which the neutral Government is bound to do its best to prevent. But what if, in order the better to avoid observation and detection, the vessel is sent forth, without its armament, without its war crew, and these, sent to it by another or different vessels, are put on board of it in some place or water beyond the jurisdiction of the neutral? In my opinion, except so far as the question of diligence is concerned, as to which it may form a very material element, this makes no difference. The ship, the armament, the crew, though sent out separately, form each of them part of one and the same enterprise or undertaking. Taken together, they constitute a hostile expedition and must be treated as such. It is as though a hostile force were sent by sea to invade an enemy's territory, and each arm of the force so |