war in December last did not seriously alarm us. Men enough, we doubt not, the Americans could have got together. Indeed, there was a rumour in circulation, to which, however, we gave little credence, that they had collected as many as 20,000 close to the frontier. But to collect men and to move them are two different things, and to feed and provide for them, after they are fairly launched into a campaign, is a third matter, which inexperienced persons will find it easier to talk about than to settle. Still, if the Federals should by chance succeed, either in conquering the Confederates or in separating from them amicably, then we have every reason to expect that the Washington Cabinet will find it necessary to seek employment for its enormous army somewhere away from home. Nor is it difficult, if we may judge from the tone of the American newspapers, to guess in what direction General M'Lellan and his troops will be turned. Assume then, that a new quarrel is likely to be fastened upon England, and that the long-cherished idea of annexing Canada is resumed. How is it probable that the attack will be made, and by what means may we, while time and opportunity are afforded, best provide against the emergency? We take it for granted that the Federal Government will for many reasons direct against Canada the largest amount of its disposable force which it can command. Less than 200,000 men would not suffice for so grave an undertaking; and if there really be, when hostilities begin, half a million under arms, there is no reason why 300,000 should not enter on the campaign.* The probabilities are likewise, that as far as the altered condition of both countries may allow, the assailants will advance by the same lines as in 1813. They will push forward three, perhaps four columns,

one from Washington to Detroit, at the top of Lake Erie; another from New York to Buffalo, at the bottom of the same lake; possibly a third to Sacketts Harbour, with a view to the reduction of Kingston; and a fourth from Boston to Rouse's Point, at the bottom of Lake Champlain. This last we may safely put down at not less than 100,000 men, while the other three may number 25,000 respectively. Previously to all this, strenuous exertions will have been made to build and launch such a number of war vessels as shall give them the command of Lake Ontario -an object which, unless we be beforehand with them, there is nothing to prevent them from effecting. Grant all this to be done, and well done, what follows? While Amherstburg and Niagara are both invaded, and Kingston invested, the larger army at Rouse's Point separates into two masses, one of which will threaten, and, if the opportunity serve, attack Montreal in front; while the other crosses the St Lawrence opposite to Cornwall, and takes the city in reverse.

We assume that the officer who shall direct these operations has acquired in his contests with the Confederates some knowledge of the art of war. He will have learned, for example, that it is necessary, in conducting offensive operations, to keep open the communications of his own army with its rear, and having 25,000 men to spare, he will doubtless employ them on this service. They will watch Nova Scotia and New Brunswick from their own portion of the valley of St John, and be ready, as occasion shall arise, either to repel an aggressive movement, or to make one. All this may not come to pass, nor even a portion of it, but all is undoubtedly upon the cards. What is England required to do in anticipation of it?

There may be both justice and wisdom in the theory, that colonies,

as soon as they acquire the rights of self-government, should be called upon to provide for their own defence in war. Like other general rules, however, this admits of exceptions, and the case of British North America must to a certain extent be regarded as exceptional. Perhaps England should not be taxed to keep soldiers continually at the Cape of Good Hope, in the Australasian group, or even in the West India Islands. Every one of these colonies is rich enough to maintain such armed force as it requires in time of peace, because they are all sufficiently guarded by distance, or by the naval supremacy of the mother country, from the sudden attacks of regular armies. But British North America is differently circumstanced. It stands face to face with a power which, in the appliances of modern science and in the courage and endurace of its people, is a match for the most military of European nations. An American army, when it first takes the field, may be little better than a rabble; but give it the experience of a year or two, and it becomes able to hold its own against the best troops in the world. So our people found half a century ago, and so, if the storm which we are now contemplating do not burst till 1863, our people may find again. Under these circumstances, it appears to us that the Imperial Government is bound to garrison British North America in time of peace, and to render it all the support which can be spared when war arises. The Imperial Government may likewise, in our opinion, be expected to share in the expense of constructing such permanent works as prudence may suggest, and for this reason, that there are ten chances to one that war with the Federal States, when it occurs, will arise not out of colonial but out of Imperial questions. On the other hand, British North America cannot expect we are sure that she does not expect-to be defended altogether by the mother country. She must out of her own resources sup

plement the regular garrison, which the mother country supplies, with a numerous, stout, and well-disciplined militia. She has all the machi nery ready, though for lack of use it has got out of gear and she must restore it to working order, no matter what inconvenience the effort may occasion. We believe that a militia in Canada alone could be raised to the amount of 150,000 men, without any serious drain upon the industry of the country. Of this mass, 50,000 might easily be called out at a time, and kept under arms for three months. At the end of three months a second batch, to the like extent, should take their places, and thus in the course of a single summer we should be able to show a force of 100,000 disciplined soldiers in case of need. In winter all might drill, as our own Volunteers drill at home, at odd hours, in halls and under sheds, by squads and companies. With 150,000 provincials thus prepared, and 10,000 or 15,000 British troops behind them, Canada might safely, according to our view of the subject, defy the world in arms.

The same rule which we apply to Canada we should apply to New Brunswick and Nova Scotia. It is not exacting too much from these provinces to require that they shall each supply 10,000 or 15,000 effective militia, which, supported by 5000 regular troops, will render them competent to play their parts in any game to which they may be called.

The American colonies will naturally look to the mother country for arms and stores. We do not think that they ought to accept these things as free gifts. They are rich enough to purchase their own matériel, as well as to clothe, pay, and feed their own troops when embodied. But if unable to bear the heavy expense of a first equipment, it seems to us that they cannot scruple to share it with the mother country, or at all events to take upon themselves the burden of keeping up the stock when it has once been supplied. In like man

ner they will be expected, if not to defray, certainly to share the cost of all such public works as shall serve the double purpose of commercial and military communication. The railway from Quebec to Montreal, for example, is on the wrong side of the river. In time of peace it may be convenient enough; in the event of war it would become useless. If a second line on the left bank be considered indispensable, the Canadian Government should be required to provide a fair proportion of the funds necessary to make it. And still more, should competent authorities arrive at the conclusion that England's readiest mode of obtaining and keeping command of the lakes is to construct a new canal, which, embracing and enlarging the first of those now in use, shall pass thence into the Ottawa Canal, and from the Ottawa Canal to Kingston harbour, then must Canada, as well as the mother country, be taxed for the completion of it, though possibly the heavier portion of the expense may fall upon England. Such a work, executed sufficiently in rear of the St Lawrence to prevent the possibility of molestation from the other side, would for all military as well as commercial purposes throw the inland waters of America and the Atlantic into one. It would then be easy for Great Britain to crowd into Lake Ontario such a fleet as must render competition on the part of the United States hopeless. For, in spite of all their skill, the Americans could never build as fast as our gunboats and frigates could ascend from the seaboard, while the door would always be open to them to return for the blockade of the enemy's coasts, as soon as they should have destroyed the enemy's harbours and captured their flotilla on the lakes. It is obvious that the sort of canal of which we are now speaking, must be rendered more capacious in every respect than the most convenient of those now in use; though for an unreasonable depth there can be no need, because stores and guns can be floated on rafts or barges in rear of

the larger frigates when they come into smooth water.

It has been suggested to add to these a line of railway, which shall connect Halifax and St John with Quebec. For reasons elsewhere assigned, we consider this project as of doubtful value. Not that we are disposed to make much of the physical obstacles presented elsewhere than through the valley of the St John by the face of the country in New Brunswick. Of whatever nature these may be, skill, industry, and capital can overcome them; but your railway, when constructed, must either end at Riviere du Loups, whence it will run for thirty miles within ten miles of the frontier, or it will carry you to some point lower down the St Lawrence, where the river is wide, and in winter generally impassable. Moreover, in reaching the opposite bank, you will find no railway to take you up, but the prospect of a march of two hundred miles over a country intersected with torrents, and otherwise difficult. On the whole, we incline to think that, till our line of frontier is rectified, the construction of a railway between the St John and the St Lawrence would, so far as military operations are concerned, be money thrown away. We must be content, therefore, for a while, to consider New Brunswick and Nova Scotia as a flanking bastion or ravelin thrown out from Canada, which, though it be cut off from ready communication with the body of the place, is not therefore useless.

We come now to another point, which is equally worthy of attention. Should any new fortifications be thrown up in Canada? and if thrown up, where shall we place them? We confess ourselves little friendly to a system of defence which depends to any great extent upon fortified places. Here and there, as in the Austrian Quadrilateral, these may be of the utmost importance; but a country like Canada will never be defended at all, unless it be defended by armies in the field. Indeed, the attempt to cover the frontier, or even the most

exposed points in it, by forts, or other enclosed works, must lead only to discomfiture. You could not garrison a dozen or two of such places except by weakening too much your field force, while each, as the enemy passed it by, would be lost to you. The best army in the world, however, if it is to act in separate corps, and over an extended area, requires here and there a place d'armes, round which its levies may gather, and on which, in case of disaster, its fragments may retire. This rule, which holds good everywhere, is especially applicable to the state of a country with a frontier so extensive and exposed as that of Canada.

If it be the use of history to read the future in the past, then the plan of campaign which we sketched out for the Americans in 1863 is that which they will probably follow. Canada will be invaded again, as she has been repeatedly invaded before, by Amherstburg, Niagara, Kingston, and Montreal: we must provide, therefore, for every possible contingency in each of these directions. Possibly Quebec itself may be threatened, even at the commencement of the war; but we certainly do not consider the contingency probable. For though it be indisputable that the power which holds Quebec holds the gate of Canada against all comers, no Federal leader, even if he could command the passage of the river, would throw himself in these days upon Quebec, till he should have barred out the population of Canada West from coming to its relief. For our present purpose, therefore, it will suffice to look to the old lines of attack, and see if we can render them safe to ourselves and difficult of emprise to the enemy.

It may well appear at first sight impossible to provide effectually for the defence of Montreal. We admit the difficulty of the scheme, but deny its impossibility. Montreal is too extensive, and lies too much in a hollow, to be enclosed within walls and ditches; but you may render the approaches to it ex

tremely difficult by detached works judiciously placed, especially by the construction of a strong tête-de-pont on the right bank of the river, and by planting on the hill which overlooks the town on the left a redoubt or citadel. But you must do more than this. On the first tidings of war, an attempt must be made to take possession of the fort at Rouse's Point. The occupation of this, and of the forts at Isle aux Noix, St John, and Chambly, would block the way long enough to try the patience of the assailants; and when these places fall, if fall they must, you have still your tête-depont to maintain, with the broad and rapid St Lawrence behind it. It is possible that, even by these means, you will not be able to save Montreal from bombardment; but, assuming your military canal to have been completed, or that you have ships enough on Lake Ontario to hinder the descent of bateaux from Sacketts Harbour, we really do not see how the enemy are to cross the St Lawrence in the face of a few batteries judiciously planted. Everything will of course depend upon your power to prevent the laying of a bridge. Should the canals be still where they now are, and Lake Ontario in the enemy's possession, Montreal can hardly be saved, unless you be in force enough to fight a general action, and defeat the enemy under its walls.

With respect again to Kingston, as the approaches to the harbour are already fortified, nothing more seems necessary than to strengthen the existing works, and, perhaps, to enlarge them. We are aware of the obstacles presented to this by the surrender, some time ago, of all crown lands to the local government, and by the encroachments subsequently made upon the line of fire by private dwellings. But if it be considered too expensive to remove thesedwellings, their owners must be prepared, on an emergency, to destroy them; while fresh batteries are erected wherever their action seems to be required. Beyond this, however, it seems un

necessary to go. Kingston cannot be attacked, except by water, till Upper Canada shall have fallen; and if you so distribute its defences as to render a landing difficult and dangerous, you have done all in this quarter which circumstances admit of. The case is different both in Amherstburg and Niagara. There such places as Sandwich and Fort Dalhousie would simply be in the way. They might tempt a general to throw a few men into them whom he would certainly lose. But in the rear both of Amherstburg and the Niagara there are positions which, if taken up and rendered as strong as the skill of man can make them, would render the subjugation of these districts, if not impossible, at all events very tedious and very difficult.

Looking first to the Amherstburg territory, we find that the only retreat left open to Colonel Proctor in the last war was up the valley of the Thames. The same line would certainly be chosen now by an army worsted on the frontier; for the Grand Trunk Railway runs from Amherstburg to London, and from London by Hamilton to Toronto and Kingston. London itself thus becomes an important strategical point, being at once sufficiently removed from the border to serve as a place of muster for the militia of the district, and sufficiently near to afford security to the corps which might have engaged and been overcome by an invading army in Essex county. It is important, likewise, as holding the key to the only door of rapid communication between the extreme west of what may be called the settled portions of Canada and the Atlantic. It appears to us, therefore, that the Imperial Government will do well to take possession of as much land in this quarter as may enable our engineers to construct, without delay, an intrenched camp capable of being defended by 5000

ever venture more than a few miles from its place of landing.

For the same reasons, and because the material facilities of the ground are even more striking, we would suggest the construction of a second intrenched camp of similar dimensions on Burlington Heights. These heights, it will be remembered, constituted the point d'appui on which, during the war of 1812, 1813, and 1814, the troops told off for the protection of the Niagara district always rallied after some temporary reverse. The town of Hamilton is now connected with them, and they command both its harbour, which is good, and the Grand Trunk Railway. Five thousand men thrown into an intrenched camp in this position would hold at bay any number of invaders, till time should have been afforded to call out the whole strength of the province.

We have alluded elsewhere to the possibility of an attempt by coupde-main on Quebec. Not that we consider such an occurrence at all likely to happen. An American general would scarcely venture, with New Brunswick on his flank, to march by the uncleared portions of Maine, only that he might fight his way up to a broad river, through a district so well peopled and so warlike as St Francis. But in war even possibilities must be guarded against. Quebec is strong already; its strength will be increased by surrounding the detached towers which now crown the Heights of Abraham with solid earthworks; and by looking to that exposed corner of the lower town, by which, during the war of the Revolution, Arnold had wellnigh entered. This being done, and care taken to have the magazines and arsenals well filled, we need not entertain the smallest apprehension for Quebec; and so long as Quebec remains in possession of British troops, the permanent conquest of Canada by the Americans will remain to be effected.

Having thus provided points at which the local militia may collect, and places of strength to which corps, worsted in a first encounter,