trations of this general idea, and have shewn that they do not in the least degree apply to the case, and therefore we are left wholly without ideas, general or particular. Consequently, when you speak "of the soul and body of Jesus being assumed, from the first moment of his existence, into an intimate union with one of these relations or distinctions in the Divine nature," it is in effect to talk of an intimate union with nothing at all. The phrase of a distinction in the Divine nature seems to be growing fashionable with the orthodox divines of the present day; though for no reason that I can imagine, but because, suggesting no ideas at all, it seems to be less open to confutation. It may also seem to preserve the idea of the Divine Unity something better than the term persons, of which the Trinity has been generally said to consist. According to some, this distinction in the Divine nature so little affects the unity of it, that it is held to be only a temporary thing. For, as I am informed, Dr. Hinchliffe, the bishop of Peterborough, in a Charge which he lately delivered at Daventry, thinking proper to give his clergy bis own ideas of a doctrine which is now the subject of public discussion, said, that, in his opinion, "when the time shall come in which the Son shall give up the kingdom to the Father, so that God shall be all in all, the threefold distinction which at present subsists in the Divine nature shall be no more." This, I shall observe, was very nearly the opinion of the ancient Sabellians, or philosophical Unitarians; who supposed that a kind of divine ray, issuing from the Father, the sole fountain of divinity, was attached to the person of Jesus, but only from the time of his baptism; and that when he ceased to appear upon earth, and to work miracles, (to which this communicated divinity was necessary,) it was withdrawn. If a distinction in the Divine nature be any thing more than this, it must imply such a change in the Divine Being as must be incompatible with divinity. Whatever has an end, had, no doubt, a beginning also; and since this wonderful change in the Divine nature, from being simply one, without this mysterious distinction, to this threefold distinction, called the Trinity, was occasioned by the circumstances of this earth of ours, viz. the fall of our first parents, it may not be impossible but that similar dis * Address, p. 14. (P.) tinctions in the Divine nature may take place in consequence of particular events in other habitable worlds; and though a threefold distinction has been sufficient for our purposes, the different circumstances of other worlds may require different arrangements of the same kind, and thus the Divine nature will be a perfect Proteus. If I have been misinformed, and in consequence of this have misrepresented his Lordship's opinion, it will be in his power to set me and the public right about it. But if this representation be just, and such doctrines pass without censure in the Church of England, I shall conclude that the doors of this church are open to all opinions, however discordant; and that the heads of it are perfectly indifferent to every thing but the hierarchy, and the emoluments of it. It will be thought that any member of the church may profess what he pleases, and if he make no farther disturbance, he will not be disturbed. It may even be thought that I myself, an Unitarian, a Necessarian, and a Materialist, as I professedly am; if I could but satisfy myself in getting through the door of subscription, no question would be asked, no recantation required, and I should be permitted to write as I now do, publicly arraigning the doctrine of the Trinity, or any other doctrine of the church that I should see reason to call in question. For, except in degree, there is no difference between my conduct and that of his Lordship; as we both agree in avowing opinions entirely opposite to those of the church. You will find some excellent observations on this doctrine of distinctions in the Deity in Mr. Clark, who particularly observes, that if, as you say, these distinctions have each of them their different attributes and properties, they must be different persons, in the proper sense of the word, which is the same thing as different beings, and then you make three Gods.* These distinctions, therefore, in the Deity are either absolutely nothing at all, or else substantial divine persons, or Gods. For, as he observes, "If they are not strictly and properly personal distinctions, then I contend that they are no distinctions at all to the purpose of the Trinity, and into this vortex must Mr. Hawkins's distinction of properties from the persons in which those properties inhere, ultimately fall."† After I had written the above, a judicious friend recommended to my notice what had been advanced on this • Defence of the Unity, p. 116. (P.) + Ibid. p. 119. (P.) subject of distinctions in the Divine nature by the author of the "Notes to the Life of Dr. Watts by Dr. Johnson;" and it appears to me to be so much to the purpose, that I shall copy the principal part of it. "I can form no idea of a threefold distinction in Deity, but that of three beings, or three component parts, which is equally inconsistent with the unity, and would imply divisibility. I can easily conceive of a distinction between the attributes of God; but are the Son and Spirit only distinct attributes? If so, with what propriety can they be repre sented and addressed as persons; and how can they sustain different offices, and perform different works, or indeed any at all? Besides, if the attributes of God be allowed to be personified, it will follow that there are as many persons in God as there are attributes. If the wisdom of God be called one person, and his power another, his holiness may as justly be styled a third, his goodness a fourth, &c. The attributes of Deity are only the properties of his nature. Neither of these can be properly called God, or be spoken of as equal to God, who is the Being to whom they all belong. Moreover, God himself you must allow to be a being, and God the Father, you will admit, is a person in the proper sense of that term, i. e. an intelligent being. But if the Son and Spirit are only attributes of God, then they are not equal to him, and consequently this notion is contrary to the orthodox faith. If you mean that the one God sustains three characters, or relations, this is intelligible enough; but then it is not orthodox. It is pure Sabellianism. Besides, God sustains more characters and relations than three. Consequently, according to this scheme, there are more distinctions or persons.' If the ingenious author had examined with the same freedom what seems to be his own idea (as he has shewn it to be that of Dr. Watts, and of Dr. Doddridge) of the union of God with the man Christ Jesus, it would have ap peared as untenable a mode of maintaining the doctrine of a Trinity, as this of a distinction in the Godhead. What proper union can there be between God and a creature? It cannot be a necessary union, because it had a beginning, and therefore may cease to be. How, then, is any idea that we can form of such an union at all different from that which we annex to the term presence with; as when we say 1785. See New Ann. Reg. VI. p. [302]. These Notes were attributed, I believe justly, to the late Rev. Samuel Palmer, of Hackney. that God was present with Moses, or any other prophet? And if there be no difference in our ideas, there ought not to be any in our words, if we do not mean to deceive. On this principle of Christ having no other divinity than that which is derived from the union of the Father with him, it ought never to be said that the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost, are each of them God, because this phrase conveys to the hearer the idea of independent divinity, whether originally derived from one source, viz. the divinity of the Father, or not. Because, in fact, there is not, upon this scheme, any other divinity than that of the Father; and the Son and Holy Ghost, as distinguished from the Father, (which is necessarily implied when they are mentioned along with him, as equally God,) have no divinity at all. Besides, our Saviour himself uses this term union with God, as what is equally applicable to his disciples, as to himself; and therefore we have no authority whatever to suppose any other kind of union. The idea, if it can be called an idea, is unscriptural, as well as unintelligible and absurd. I am far from charging such men as Dr. Watts and Dr. Doddridge with wilful prevarication in this business. But they certainly were not aware how much they were influenced by a dread of abandoning the doctrine of the Trinity altogether; and therefore they acquiesced in a scheme which retained it merely in words, when the thing itself was really discarded. But this apology, which may be made for Dr. Watts and Dr. Doddridge, will not apply in the same degree to those who now defend the doctrine of the Trinity on the same principles; because there has been time to reflect upon the subject; and so much has been written upon it, that it cannot but be understood by those who will give proper attention to it. Nothing, indeed, can be more evident than that God merely dwelling in a man, (from which this has obtained the name of the in-dwelling scheme,) cannot make that man to be God, any more than a demon, according to the doctrine of possession, dwelling in a man, can make him to be a demon. If it were possible that two beings of different natures should be united, so as to become one, it would not be either of the former beings, but a being of a different nature, partaking of the properties of both. On this principle, there * On Watts, sce Vol. V. p. 89, Note ‡. fore, of Christ being united to God, he would be a being of a different nature from God, viz. the exact medium between God and man; and this would be far from reaching our idea of Christ being God. It would be far short of the perfection which we ascribe to divinity. But in every view of it, the idea of Christ being God in consequence of his union with God, or of God dwelling in him, is most absurd. If Jesus Christ, or the soul of Jesus Christ, be supposed to have pre-existed, these advocates for the in-dwelling scheme ought to be denominated Arians, if not Socinians or Unitarians. And it is, I fear, the dread of these unpopular names, and the consequences of unpopularity, that is, more than they are aware of, the true reason of their disclaiming them. : After this digression, I must return to the farther consideration of your ideas of the Trinity. You well say, "It is the height of absurdity to affirm that we clearly perceive a contradiction between terms which we confessedly do not apprehend." But then it is equally absurd to say, that there is no contradiction between them, because there is a case in which we are unable to affirm or deny at all. Again, you well say, "Had God required these things to be more explicitly believed, he would have revealed them in a more explicit manner." I, therefore, conclude, that no faith is required in this doctrine of the Trinity, because nothing is revealed about it; and because nothing could have been understood, if it had been revealed in the language that you give us. God would never have tantalized men with the revelation of words, to which they could have affixed no ideas, and then make their eternal salvation depend (according to the doctrine of your Athanasian Creed) upon their assenting to such unmeaning sounds. After giving us this darkness where we expected light, it is curious enough to hear you say, "It may well be questioned whether our ideas of trinity, person, union, divinity of Christ, &c., when stated in general terms, are not, in fact, full as luminous and distinct as those of person, substance or essence, when applied to the Father only-a spiritual being, without form, parts, limitation, or cause."+ For where is the difficulty of understanding what is meant by the term person, substance, or essence, (and you might have added being,) as applied to the Father; when we only • Defence, p. 67. (P.) + Ibid. p. 71. (P.) † Address, p. 9. (P.) |