night and day." Wolfe disembarked on the Isle of Orleans, four miles below Quebec, on 27th June. His reconnaissance revealed the French dispositions and the way Durell's negligence had enabled them to prepare to meet the attack. A further taste followed, for on the next day they loosed seven fireships, but the coolness of the British seamen, who rowed out and towed them ashore, averted the danger. Wolfe retorted by a prompt stroke, seizing Point Lévis on the south bank of the river opposite Quebec, whence his guns could bombard the city. With an enemy strongly entrenched in a position which commanded the approach to Quebec, Wolfe's problem was to lure him out of his fastness. The only way of doing this was to bait the trap, and to this end Wolfe, who had already despatched Monckton's brigade to Point Lévis, now landed (8th July) the bulk of Townshend's and Murray's brigades on the north shore, just below the Montmorency river. This dispersion of his force has been much criticised, even by Fortescue ; but the objections, while in consonance with abstract theory, seem to overlook the actual circumstances. One is reminded of Foch's favourite anecdote about Verdy du Vernois at the battle of Nachod. Wracking his memory in vain to find a precedent or military axiom which might guide him in the difficult situation with which he was confronted, Verdy du Vernois exclaimed, “To the devil with history and principles! After all, what is the problem? " The first essential in forming or judging any plan is to be clear as to the commander's true object, and the second to know the conditions. Knowing Wolfe's object and the almost impregnable position in which Montcalm was posted, had he any alternative but to take risks in order if possible to provide a bait which would lure the enemy from his entrenchments into the open? And I suggest that the risks were slight. Wolfe's command of the river gave him the power of movement, for reinforcement of either portion if engaged. His distribution gave him the power of surprise, by keeping Montcalm in uncertainty and apprehension as to the direction of Wolfe's real move. He had ample evidence that the French were disinclined to take the offensive, and his confidence in the strong superiority of his own troops in any engagement on their own ground -a confidence which was abundantly justified gave him security that any part that was attacked could hold its own for the time until reinforcements crossed the river. This understanding of Wolfe's object and the conditions sheds light on Townshend's statement, and complaint, that on inspecting his front Wolfe "disapproved of it, saying I had indeed made myself secure, for I had made a fortress." Townshend failed to realise that he was spoiling Wolfe's bait, for if the French would not come out to attack the English in the open, they certainly would not venture against them when visibly in a strongly fortified position. from the main part of the fleet and his base-a far more dangerous dispersion than that which these critics condemn at Point Lévis and Montmorency. His communications would have been stretched like a narrow cord with a knife-Quebecgrazing the middle. So far from Wolfe being in But the weeks were slipping danger, neither this bait nor by, and Wolfe felt bound to the gradual destruction of the try some daring measure to city by bombardment could draw out the French, if he stir the resolute and wary could find one less desperate French commander. The next than a landing above Quebec. move was a naval one. On Below Quebec he was separthe night of 18th July a frigate ated from the French by the and some smaller vessels slipped Montmorency, flowing swift and past the guns of Quebec under deep for many miles until it cover of a heavy British bom- tumbled over the Falls, a two bardment from Point Lévis, hundred and fifty feet drop, and anchored above the city. just before entering the St This at least forced Montcalm Lawrence. He had tried in to detach 600 men to guard vain to discover a practicable the few paths up the cliffs in ford by which he could turn the eight-mile stretch between the gorge-protected front of Quebec and Cap Rouge. Wolfe the French, but below the Falls at once reconnoitred the upper the river ran broad and shallow river for a possible landing on and could be waded near its the north shore, but after mouth. A mile to the west, up restless meditation, decided that the St Lawrence, there was a both the difficulties and the narrow strip of land between risks were too great. As he the river and the heights where wrote to Pitt: "What I feared the French had built redoubts. most was, that if we should Wolfe now planned to land have landed between the town here with all the available and the river of Cap Rouge, grenadiers and part of Monckthe body first landed could ton's brigade from Point Lévis, not be reinforced before they hoping, by the capture of a were attacked by the enemy's detached redoubt, to tempt the whole army." To land still French army down to regain higher up the river, as some it, and so bring on a battle critics have suggested, would in the open. Meanwhile the not only have given Mont- other two brigades were calm time to occupy fresh lines on that side, but have widely separated Wolfe's army to be ready to ford the lower reaches of the Montmorency and join him. 66 On 31st July the attempt was made, covered by the guns of several ships and by the batteries across the Montmorency gorge. But on nearing the shore Wolfe perceived that the redoubt was too much commanded to be kept without very great loss," and drew off. For several hours the boats rowed up and down-stream, both to confuse the enemy and to enable Wolfe to sight another landing point. Late in the afternoon the enemy, marching and counter-marching, seemed in some confusion, and Wolfe gave the signal for a fresh attempt. Unluckily many of the boats grounded on an unseen ledge, causing further delay. Worse was to follow, for when the troops got ashore, the grenadiers rushed impetuously on the enemy's entrenchments without waiting for the main body to form up. As a storm of fire broke in their faces, a storm of rain broke on their heads, and the steep slopes, slippery with blood and rain, became unclimbable, as the muskets became un fireable. Realising that his plans had gone awry, Wolfe broke off the fight and re-embarked the troops. It was a severe setback, and the French were proportionately elated. The Governor wrote, "I have no more anxiety about Quebec." Although neither in his frank despatches to Pitt nor to his troops did Wolfe show any loss of heart, a last letter to his mother reveals his despair, and that he felt himself a ruined man. For he knew that where age can blunder and be forgiven, youth must seal its presumption with success if it is to survive inevitable jealousy. Dejected in mind, he fell ill in body, but saying, “I know perfectly well you cannot cure my complaint," demanded of his surgeon, "Patch me up so that I may be able to do my duty for the next few days, and I shall be content." He had been laid low on 19th August, but before this he had initiated a "starvation campaign against the French, sending detachments to lay waste the country round, although he gave strict orders for the good treatment of women and children. More important still was a move to cut off their main supplies which came downstream from Montreal. For weeks past more and more ships had slipped past the guns of Quebec, and on 5th August, after being joined by Murray with 1200 troops in flat boats, they were sent up-stream to harass the French shipping and shores. The diversion, moreover, forced Montcalm to detach another 1500 men under Bougainville to prevent a landing. Economic pressure, however, is a slow weapon, and Wolfe feared that winter might stop operations before it could achieve its object. From his sick-bed he sent a message asking his brigadiers to consult together on a fresh move, suggesting three possible variations of the Montmorency plan. Murray had now returned, and the three, in reply, proposed a cluster of less than a dozen instead "to carry the opera- tents. Deeming the spot altions above the town" and most inaccessible, the French try to establish ourselves on had posted there only a small the north shore," but without piquet. any detailed suggestions as to how and where it was to be done. Wolfe, as we know, had conceived this idea before, and reluctantly abandoned it, but now the situation was modified both because he had got so many of his ships up-river, and because, after the Montmorency plan had failed, a gamble was more justified and inevitable. On 3rd September Wolfe evacuated the Montmorency camp, and on the 5th, after concentrating his forces on the south shore, marched the bulk, some 3600, overland up the river bank, and embarked them in the ships. Montcalm thereupon reinforced Bougainville, who was at Cap Rouge, with another 1000 men, although feeling confident that it was a ruse of Wolfe's, who "is just the man to double back in the night." Each day the ships drifted up and down with the tide, perplexing the French comcommand, and wearing out their troops with ceaseless marching and counter-marching, while Wolfe reconnoitred the cliffs through a telescope for a possible point of ascent. While his brigadiers were searching elsewhere, he observed a winding path up the cliffs at the Anse du Foulon, only a mile and a half above Quebec, and noticed that it was capped by Wolfe's choice was made, but he kept it secret until the eve of the venture. On the 10th he informed Colonel Burton, of the 48th Regiment, who was to be left in charge of the troops on the south shore, and on the 11th he issued a warning order for the embarkation of the troops next night; on the 12th he issued his orders for the attack, ending on the note, "The officers and men will remember what their country expects of them . resolute in the execution of their duty "-the germ of Nelson's message at Trafalgar. That evening, in his cabin on H.M.S. Sutherland, he sent for his old schoolfellow of Greenwich, John Jervis-later famous as Lord St Vincent, and now commanding a sloop,and gave him his will and a portrait of Miss Lowther to be returned to her in the event of his death. Just before sunset Admiral Saunders with the main fleet drew out along the shore opposite Montcalm's camp below Quebec, and lowering their boats to suggest a landing, opened a violent fire. This ruse admirably fulfilled its purpose of fixing the enemy, for Montcalm concentrated his troops and kept them under arms during the night-miles away from the real danger point. And while they were straining their eyes to detect the threatened landing, a single lantern rose to the maintop of the Sutherland, miles up river, and 1600 troops of the first division noiselessly embarked in their flat-boats. At 2 A.M. as the tide began to ebb, two lanterns rose and flickered, and the whole flotilla dropped silently down-stream, the troops in boats leading. Discovery was narrowly averted when a French-speaking officer twice replied to a sentry's challenge from the shore, his deception helped by the fact, of which two deserters had informed Wolfe, that the enemy were expecting a convoy of provisions. At this crisis of his life, Wolfe, as all know who know nought else of Wolfe, of Wolfe, was reciting the lines of Gray's elegy" The paths of glory lead but to the grave "-and saying to those near him, "I would sooner have written that poem than take Quebec." The landing was safely made at the Foulon cove: a band of picked volunteers swarmed up the steep face of the cliff, and, overpowering the French piquet on the summit, covered the landing of the main body. Before dawn the army, reinforced by another 1200 troops under Colonel Burton direct from the south bank, were moving towards Quebec. Wolfe had found, on the Heights of Abraham, the open battlefield for which he had thirsted. Should he be beaten he was certainly in a desperate posi tion, but he had sure ground for confidence in the quality of his own men to offset the French quantity in open battle. There was a danger that Bougainville might hasten back from Cap Rouge and fall on his rear, but this menace can easily be exaggerated, and the light infantry which Wolfe detached to guard his rear was capable of holding Bougainville in check. A worse danger was that Montcalm might still decline battle, in which case the difficulty of bringing up supplies and artillery might make Wolfe's position precarious. But a military appreciation must consider the moral as well as the material elements, and Wolfe's appearance on the Heights of Abraham was a moral challenge that an enemy could hardly decline. Wolfe disposed his force in a single line-to gain the utmost fire effect, wherein lay his strength-with his left thrown back to guard the inland flank, and one regiment - Webb's (the 48th)-in reserve. Montcalm, warned too late, hurried his troops westwards across the St Charles and through the city. Wolfe's bait this time had succeeded, even beyond expectation, and Montcalm attacked before his whole force was on the spot, probably because the other part were pinned by fear of the threatened landing below Quebec. The clash was preceded by an attempt of the Canadian irregulars and Indians to work |