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edge. “Laws of Belief” must mean data furnishing authority
. for belief: but in what sense it is used, if used with any precision, the beginner in mental philosophy is hardly prepared, at so early a stage, to decide. Of the other two topics, that of General Classification certainly belongs in a General Introduction to Psychology, and that of the Immateriality of the Mind may well enough precede it, though a more searching examination of it requires training of the highest powers of thought.
Our author now uses Understanding, throughout his first Vol., as a synonym for Intellect. He introduces two new titles, “The External or Sensuous Intellect,” “The Internal or Super-Sensuous Intellect," but the latter as well as the former is made a species under the genus Understanding. There is certainly ground enough in usage for this inter-meaning of the last word, but there is need in philosophy of a more exact and specific meaning. We hardly use the verb-to understandin connection with all that the author masses in Part II.intuition, consciousness, judgment, association, memory, reasoning, and imagination—and the uses of the verb and the noun should correspond. Nor do we quite see the propriety of placing such topics as Abstraction and Dreaming along with Reliance on the Senses, Habits of Sensation, and Muscular Habits, under the head of “Sensuous" Intellect. There is a decided advantage in the more recent classification of these with Reasoning and Judgment under the head of the Reflective Power. It would be difficult also to show why Attention should be entitled either Sensuous or Super-Sensuous; some writers omit it altogether, while some set it aside as indicating no distinct power or faculty of mind. Perhaps some day a more analytic arrangement may place it in the Will, as the name for the control or direction given by that faculty to the intellectual powers. Prof. Upham does not bring Memory and Imagination together, as do most writers since Hamilton, under the generic designation “the Re-presentative Power" -which seems the best method, though something could be said in favor of classing them as “Intellectual States of
Internal Origin,” as this prominently recognizes the mind's spontaneous and original action in them. But on this score it is surely quite amiss to class General Abstract Ideas among (products of) States of External Origin. The author adheres everywhere to his classification, his first and only one, of more than thirty years ago.
Among the additions in Vol. I. is the following on Habit, indicating that the author does not use the word “law” in any
“We sometimes speak of Habit as a law, and sometimes as a power. The term law denotes a fixed line or mode of action; but if the action has a beginning, and if it tends to certain fixed results, which would not otherwise bave existed, it implies the existence somewhere of power. But if it should be conceded that it is proper to speak of Habit as a mental power (a view in support of which much might be said), it is pot in any proper sense of the terms a Cognitive power; in other words, it does not directly and by its own action originate or iocrease our knowledge; but it oftentimes very greatly aids the action of the faculties of cognition as well as the emotional and other susceptibilities."
The following remarks on the true philosophical method are a good example of the new matter introduced :
"(1.) First, in order to relieve this department of knowledge from some of the perplexities which have attended its progress, the distinction is to be carefully observed between Mental Philosophy aud Ontology. Mental Philosophy, conceding the existence of the mind and its inherent powers as an admitted fact, deals chiefly with the phenomena which the mind exhibits and the classification of them. Ontology, desirous of knowing what it is which lies back of phenomena, advances with greater boldness, but with less success, and announces itself as the science of existence. The problems of existence, which are hidden in the Infinite or Absolute of things, belong to God, and can never be exhausted by anything short of omniscience. The problems of phenomena, coming within the limits of the finite, can be dealt with by faculties which are adapted to them, and are brought within the reach of human cognitions, so far at least as it is necessary or best for us to know thein.
"(2.) Further, the most satisfactory method, in attempting to learn the history and character of the mind, is that which has been so successful in other departments of science, and which is known from its earliest and ablest expositor as the Baconian. A method which, commencing with the rejection of all prejudices, and having no interests but those of truth, proceeds with the careful observation and the equally careful classification of mental facts, as they are disclosed not only in the sphere of our own consciousness, but as they are revealed in the observation of the thoughts and feelings of others, and in the history of men in all ages. This method, in its application to the mind, includes all the facts and intimations, especially those relating to personality and the foundation of moral distinctions, which are suggested and affirmed by the Intuitional power, as well as the knowledge coming from other sources. The A PRIORI method, therefore, so far as it is legitimately based upon intuitional facts, and is kept true to the laws of our mental nature, is included within the sphere of the Baconian process, when the latter is understood and interpreted in its true spirit.
"3. Again, such is the connection between the mind and the body, that a true philosophy of the mind includes some knowledge of physical conditions. And although it would be an error to accept the extreme view of Cabanais, a well-known French physician and materialistic philosopber, who maintained that all ideas, sentiments, and passions, goodness, and virtue, are derived from physical sensation,' and of other writers of this class, the philosophical method will require the acceptance and study of certain departments of physiology and pathology, as helps in the interpretation of mental action. The distinction first drawn and demonstrated by Sir Charles Bell between the nervous filaments connected with sensation and those connected with motion may serve as an illustration of the importance of the study of the body, as an auxiliary means of understanding the action of the mind. Still more striking illustrations may be found in numerous able treatises on Insauity, which justly make great account, in their attempts to explain the disordered action of the mind, of the physiology and functions of the brain and the nervous system.
“(4.) It comes also within the sphere of mental philosophy to indicate its relation to the many and important departments of science, which, in their principles, if not in their applications, are based upon it, or are closely connected with it. The principles of morals, the laws of evidence, the doctrine of æsthetics, logic, language, axiomatic truths, artistic taste, the philosophy of eloquence, the philosophic relation of the sciences to each other, religion itself, which connects the soul with God—it is difficult to see how these and other great departments, involving thought and feeling, and truth and duty, can be rightly understood, except in the lighi which is communicated through a knowledge of the nature and operations of the human mind."
Hardly any topic in Psychology requires more acuteness or is capable of plainer distinctions than the important subject of Abstraction. The title of Prof. Upham's first section is “ Abstraction implied in the analysis of complex ideas.” It would be more accurate to say, “Analysis implied in abstraction.” So his own later language shows, viz., "our complex notions are susceptible, if one may be allowed so to speak, of being taken to pieces (analyzed), and the elementary parts may be abstracted or separated from each other.” There is lacking in this part of the work, as in many other authors, a definite account of analysis as such, and a distinct characterization of this and of abstraction; as discriminated from one another. The new account which he gives of the latter does not deny it to be a power—as did the original work-indeed claims for it the title of “a power.” And he seems to include analysis, generalization, etc., under abstraction. He says: “Some powers of the mind are simple, others complex; some, like the powers of Sensation and Intuition, securing their results, so far as we can judge, by a single movement; others, Reasoning Power and the Imagination, fulfilling the objects for which they were given us by a complexity of action. It is generally conceded, I believe, that the abstractive or abstractional power aims at and secures the results which it holds under its control, not by a single act, but by a complexity of movement, consisting in a number of distinct mental operations, but all of them regulated and harmonized by appropriate relational adjustments and by unity of purpose.” It is certainly better to analytically distinguish these mental operations, confessedly “distinct” from each other, and to give the name abstraction to that distinct operation to which it properly belongs. Since Prof. Upham first wrote a more analytical use of the terms involved in this “complexity of movement" has been slowly growing up; this is constantly taking place in relation to almost all philosophical and metaphysical terms; and it is the duty of the psychologist not only to favor the analytical, in preference to the complex and popular use of terms, but to lead the way in fixing it. True enough popular usage will never be thoroughly philosophical, for the popular mind will never be thoroughly analytical; but while we resort to popular language for a certain portion of the proof of psychological facts and distinctions it is necessary, for the purposes of philosophy, that so much of this language as is transferred to philosophy should be taken in a definite analytical sense.
We are happy to offset this criticism by saying that the author does better than some late writers in recognizing the distinction between particular abstract ideas” and “general abstract notions," which they obscure or ignore. His example of the former is the mental separation of attributes from the objects to which they belong (and, of course, from each other), and he lays down this statement: “When any quality or attribute of an object, which does not exist by itself, but in a state of combination, is detached by our minds from its customary associates, and is considered separately, the notion we form of it becomes a particularly abstract idea.” This is better than confounding abstraction with generalization and even classification, as was formerly done, and is still done by recent writers who abjure that error, and yet speak of thinking “of the color red in general” as the only true abstraction. If Prof. Upham had also recognized as clearly our abstract complex concepts “particular”—as well as our
. simple ones, i. e., those of genera and species in a word those of classes)—his exposition would have been quite full. He perhaps recognizes the former when he says: “General Abstract notions are not only different, in consequence of embracing a great number of elementary parts, from those which are Particular, but are also susceptible of being distinguished from the great body of our other complex notions." Under this general topic he recognizes general abstract truths* as distinct from general abstract notions, in the same way as he stinguishes intuitive truths from intuitive notions or concepts. There has been of late such a handling of the formation of general concepts as to quite conceal from the learner the equally important subject of the formation of particular ones, and the relation between them.
In his earlier work Dr. Upham gave the name of Original Suggestion to what he now calls the Intuitional or Suggestional Power. A certain fondness for synonyms, or alterna
* Also, Complex Intuitions are recognized, Ch. XV., et seq., or appear to be.