selfish ambition--to diffuse those habits of expense which give corruption her chief hold and purchase, among multitudes who are spectators only of the splendour in which they cannot participate, and are infected with the cravings and aspirations of the objects of their envy, even before they come to be placed in their circumstances. Such needy adventurers are constantly generated by the rapid progress of wealth and luxury; and are sure to seek and court that corruption which is obliged to seek and court, though with too great a probability of success, those whose condition they miscalculate, and labour to attain. Such a state of things, therefore, is far more favourable to the exercise of the corrupt influence of government and wealthy ambition, than a state of greater poverty and moderation; and the same limited means of seduction will go infinitely farther among a people in the one situation than in the other. The same temptations that were repelled by the simple poverty of Fabricius, would, in all probability, have bought half the golden sa traps of the Persian monarch, or swayed the counsels of wealthy and venal Rome, in the splendid days of Catiline and Cæsar. This, therefore, is our first answer; and it is so complete, we think, as not to require any other for the mere purpose of confutation. But the argument is founded upon so strange and so dangerous a misapprehension of the true state of the case, that we think it our duty to unfold the whole fallacy upon which it proceeds; and to show what very opposite consequences are really to be drawn from the circumstances that have been so imperfectly conceived, or so perversely viewed, by those who contend for increasing the patronage of the Government as a balance to the increasing consequence of the People. There is a foundation, in fact, for some part of this proposition; but a foundation that has been strangely misunderstood by those who have sought to build upon it so revolting a conclusion. The people has increased it consequence, in power, and in political importance. Over all Europe, we verily believe, that they are everywhere growing too strong for their governments; and that, if these governments are to be preserved, some measures must be taken to accommodate them to this great change in the condition and interior structure of society. But this increase of consequence is not owing to their having grown richer; and still less is it to be provided against, by increasing the means of corruption in the hands of their rulers. This requires, and really deserves, a little more expla jealous of the honours and emoluments it en joys or distributes, and grudge the expense and submission which it requires, under an apprehension, that the good it accomplishes is not worth so great a sacrifice. And, thirdly and finally, those who may be counted for nothing in all political arrangements-who are ignorant, indifferent, and quiescent-who submit to all things without grumbling or satisfaction-and are contented to consider all existing institutions as a part of the order of nature to which it is their duty to accommodate themselves. In rude and early ages, this last division includes by far the greater part of the people: but, as society advances, and intellect begins to develope itself, a greater and a greater proportion is withdrawn from it, and joined to the two other divisions. These drafts, however, are not made indiscriminately, or in equal numbers, to the two remaining orders; but tend to throw a preponderating weight, either into the scale of the government, or into that of its opponents, according to the character of that government, and the nature of the circumstances by which they have been roused from their neutrality. The di fusion of knowledge, the improvements of education, and the gradual descent and expansion of those maxims of individual or political wisdom that are successively estab lished by reflection and experience, necessa rily raise up more and more of the mass of the population from that state of brutish ac quiescence and incurious ignorance in which they originally slumbered. They begin to feel their relation to the government under which they live; and, guided by those feel ings, and the analogies of their private interests and affections, they begin to form or to borrow, Opinions upon the merit or demerit of the institutions and administration, to the effects of which they are subjected; and to conceive Sentiments either hostile or friendly to such institutions and administration. If the government be mild and equitable-if its undertakings are prosperous, its imposi tions easy, and its patronage just and impar tial-the greater part of those who are thus successively awakened into a state of political capacity will be enrolled among its support ers; and strengthen it against the factions, ambitious, and disappointed persons, who alone will be found in opposition to it. But if, on the other hand, this disclosure of intel lectual and political sensibility occur at a pe riod when the government is capricious or oppressive-when its plans are disastrousits exactions burdensome-its tone repulsive -and its distribution of favours most corrupt and unjust;-it will infallibly happen, that the greater part of those who are thus called into political existence, will take part against it, and be disposed to exert themselves for its correction, or utter subversion. that The last supposition, we think, is that which has been realised in the history of Europe for the last thirty years: and when we say the people has almost every where grown tou strong for their rulers, we mean only to say, hat, in that period, there has been a prodi- not have suggested itself, even to the persons gious development in the understanding and by whom it has been so triumphantly recom intelligence of the great mass of the popula- mended, unless it had been palliated by some tion and that this makes them much less colour of plausibility: And their erter (which willing than formerly to submit to the folly really does not seem very unnatural for men and corruption of most of their ancient gov- of their description) seems to have consisted ernments. The old instinctive feelings of merely in supposing that all those who were loyalty and implicit obedience, have pretty discontented in the country, were disappointed generally given way to shrewd calculations candidates for place and profit; and that the as to their own interests, their own powers, whole clamour which had been raised against and the rights which arise out of these powers. the misgovernment of the modern world, origi They see now, pretty quickly, both the weak-nated in a violent desire to participate in the nesses and the vices of their rulers; and, emoluments of that misgovernment. Upon having learned to refer their own sufferings this supposition, it must no doubt be admitted or privations, with considerable sagacity, to that their remedy was most judiciously detheir blunders and injustice, they begin tacitly vised. All the discontent was among those to inquire, what right they have to a sove- who wished to be bribed-all the clamour reignty, of which they make so bad a use- among those who were impatient for preferand how they could protect themselves, if all ment. Increase the patronage of the Crown who hate and despise them were to unite to therefore-make more sinecures, more jobs, take it from them. Sentiments of this sort, more nominal and real posts of emolument we are well assured, have been prevalent and honour,-and you will allay the discon over all the enlightened parts of Europe for tent, and still the clamour, which are now the last thirty years, and are every day gain-"frighting our isle from her propriety!" ing strength and popularity. Kings and nobles, and ministers and agents of government, are no longer looked upon with veneration and awe, but rather with a mixture of contempt and jealousy. Their errors and vices are canvassed, among all ranks of persons, with extreme freedom and severity. The corruptions by which they seek to fortify themselves, are regarded with indignation and vindictive abhorrence; and the excuses with which they palliate them, with disgust and de-abuse of patronage-a more shameful misaprision. Their deceptions are almost universally seen through; and their incapacity detected and despised, by an unprecedented portion of of the whole population which they govern. This, to be sure, is very plausible and ingenious-as well as highly creditable to the honour of the nation, and the moral experience of its contrivers. But the fact, unfortunately, is not as it is here assumed. There are two sets of persons to be managed and appeased! and the misfortune is, that what might gratify the one would only exasperate the discontents of the other. The one wants unmerited honours, and unearned emoluments—a further plication of the means of the nation. The other wants a correction of abuses-an abridg ment of patronage-a diminution of the public burdens a more just distribution of its trusts, It is in this sense, as we conceive it, that dignities, and rewards. This last party is still, the people throughout civilised Europe have we are happy to think, by far the strongest, grown too strong for their rulers; and that and the most formidable: For it is daily resome alteration in the balance or administra-cruited out of the mass of the population, over tion of their governments, has become neces- which reason is daily extending her dominion; sary for their preservation. They have become and depends, for its ultimate success, upon too strong, not in wealth-but in intellect, nothing less than the irresistible progress of activity, and available numbers; and the tran- intelligence of a true and enlightened sense quillity of their governments has been endan- of interest-and a feeling of inherent right, gered, not from their want of pecuniary in-united to undoubted power. It is difficult, fluence, but from their want of moral respectability and intellectual vigour. then, to doubt of its ultimate triumph; and it must appear to be infinitely foolish to think Such is the true state of the evil; and the of opposing its progress, by measures which cure, according to the English opponents of are so obviously calculated to add to its reform, is to increase the patronage of the strength. By increasing the patronage or inCrown! The remote and original cause of fluence of the Crown, a few more venal the danger, is the improved intelligence and spirits may be attracted, by the precarious tie more perfect intercourse of the people,-a of a dishonest interest, to withstand all at cause which it is not lawful to wish removed, tempts at reform, and to clamour in behalf and which, at any rate, the proposed remedy of all existing practices and institutions. But, has no tendency to remove. The immediate for every worthless auxiliary that is thus re and proximate cause, is the abuse of patron-cruited for the defence of established abuses, age and the corruptions practised by the gov- is it not evident that there will be a thousand ernment and their wealthy supporters:-and new enemies called forth, by the additional the cure that is seriously recommended, is to increase that corruption!—to add to the weight of the burdens under which the people is sinking, and to multiply the examples of partiality, profusion, and profligacy, by which they are revolted! An absurdity so extravagant, howevenld abuse exemplified in the new patronage that is created, and the new scene of corruption that is exhibited, in exchanging this patronage for this dishonourable support?-For a nation to endeavour to strengthen itself against the attempts of reformers by a deliberate augmentation of its corruptions, is not more poli tic, than for a spendthrift to think of relieving himself of his debts, by borrowing at usurious interest to pay what is demanded, and thus increasing the burden which he affects to be throwing off. The only formidable discontent, in short, hat now subsists in the country, is that of those who are reasonably discontented; and the only part of the people whose growing strength really looks menacingly on the government, is that which has been alienated by what it believes to be its corruptions, and enabled, by its own improving intelligence, to unmask its deceptions, and to discover the secret of its selfishness and incapacity. The great object of its jealousy, is the enormous influence of the Crown, and the monstrous abuses of patronage to which that influence gives occasion. It is, therefore, of all infatuations, the wildest and most desperate, to hold out that the progress of this discontent makes it proper to give the Crown more influence, and that it can only be effectually conciliated, by putting more patronage in the way of abuse! and venal, while there is still spirit and vinne enough left, when the measure of provocation is full, to inflict a signal and sanguinary vengeance, and utterly to overthrow the fabrie which has been defiled by this traffic of im quity. And there may be great spirit, and strength, and capacity of heroic resentment in a nation, which will yet allow its institutions to be, for a long time, perverted, its legisla ture to be polluted, and the baser part of its population to be corrupted, before it be roused to that desperate effort, in which its peace and happiness are sure to suffer along with the guilt which brings down the thunder. In such an age of the world as the present, however, it may be looked upon as absolutely certain, that if the guilt be persisted in, the vengeance will follow; and that all reasonable discontent will accumulate and gain strength, as reason and experience advance; till, at the last, it works its own reparation, and sweeps the offence from the earth, with the force and the fury of a whirlwind." all reason, as well as all humanity, urges us to use every effort to avoid the crisis and the shock, by a timely reformation, and an earnest and sincere attempt to conciliate the hostile elements of our society, by mutual concession and indulgence. It is for this reason, chiefly, that we feel such extreme solicitude for a legislative reform of our system of representa tion,-in some degree as a pledge of the wil lingness of the government to admit of reform where it is requisite; but chiefly, no doubt, as in itself most likely to stay the flood of ve nality and corruption,-to reclaim a part of those who had begun to yield to its seductions, and to reconcile those to the govern In such a view of the moral destiny of naIn stating the evils and dangers of corruptions, there is something elevating as well as tion and profligacy in a government, we must terrible. Yet, the terror preponderates, for always keep it in view, that such a system those who are to witness the catastrophe: and can never be universally palatable, even among the basest and most depraved people of which history has preserved any memorial. If this were otherwise indeed-if a whole nation were utterly and entirely venal and corrupt, and each willing to wait his time of dishonourable promotion, things might go on with sufficient smoothness at least; and as such a nation would not be worth mending, on the one hand, so there would, in fact, be much less need, on the other, for that untoward operation. The supposition, however, is obviously impossible; and, in such a country at least as England, it may perhaps be truly stated, as the most alarming consequence of corruption, that, if allowed to go on without any effectualment and constitution of their country, who check, it will infallibly generate such a spirit of discontent, as necessarily to bring on some dreadful convulsion, and overturn the very foundations of the constitution. It is thus fraught with a double evil to a country enjoying a free government. In the first place, it gradually corrodes and destroys much that is truly valuable in its constitution; and, secondly, it insures its ultimate subversion by the tremendous crash of an insurrection or revolution. It first makes the government oppressive and intolerable; and then it oversets it altogether by a necessary, but dreadful calamity. These two evils may appear to be opposite to each other; and it is certain, that, though brought on by the same course of conduct, they cannot be inflicted by the same set of persons. Those who are the slaves and the ministers of corruption, assuredly are not those who are minded to crush it, with a visiting vengeance, under the ruins of the social order; and it is in forgetting that there are two sets of persons to be conciliated in all such questions, that the portentous fallacy which we are considering mainly consists. The government may be very corrupt, and a very considerable part of the nation may be debased had begun to look upon it with a mingled qualifications, the body of electors in general will be invested with a more respectable character, and feel a greater jealousy of every thing that may tend to degrade or dishonour them: but, above all, a rigid system of economy, and a farther exclusion of placemen from the legislature, by cutting off a great part of the minister's most profitable harvest of corruption, will force his party also to have recourse to more honourable means of popularity and to appeal to principles that must ultimately promote the cause of independ ence. By the introduction, in short, of a system of reform, even more moderate and cautious han that which we have ventured to indicate, we think that a wholesome and legitimate play will be given to those principles of opposition to corruption, monopoly, and abuse, which, by the denial of all reform, are in danger of being fomented into a decided spirit of hostility to the government and the institutions of the country. Instead of brooding, in sullen and helpless silence, over the vices and errors which are ripening into intolerable evil, and seeing, with a stern and vindictive joy, wrong accumulated to wrong, and corruption heaped up to corruption, the Spirit of reform will be continually interfering, with active and successful zeal, to correct, restrain, and deter. Instead of being the avenger of our murdered liberties, it will be their living protector; and the censor, not the executioner, of the constitution. It will not descend, only at long intervals, like the Avatar of the Indian mythology, to expiate, with terrible vengeance, a series of consummated crimes; but, like the Providence of a better faith, will keep watch perpetually over the actions of corrigible men, and bring them back from their aberrations, by merciful chastisement, timely admonition, and the blessed experience of purer principles of action. Such, according to our conviction of the fact, is the true state of the case as to the increasing weight and consequence of the people; and such the nature of the policy which we think this change in the structure of our society calls upon us to adopt. The people are grown strong, in intellect, resolution, ari mutual reliance, quick in the detection of the abuses by which they are wronged, and confident in the powers by which they may be compelled ultimately to seek their redress. Against this strength, it is something more wild than madness, and more contemptible than folly, to think of arraying an additional phalanx of abuses, and drawing out a wider range of corruptions In that contest, the issue cannot be doubtful, nor the conflict long; and, deplorable as the victory will be, which is gained over order, as well as over guilt, the blame will rest heaviest upon those whose offences first provoked, what may very probably turn out a sanguinary and an unjustifiable vengeance. The conclusions, then, which we would draw from the facts that have been relied on by the enemies of reform, are indeed of a rery opposite description from theirs; and the course which is pointed out by these new circumstances in our situation, appears to us no less obvious, than it is safe and promising.— If the people have risen into greater conse quence, let them have greater power. If a greater proportion of our population be now capable and desirous of exercising the func tions of free citizens, let a greater number be admitted to the exercise of these functions. If the quantity of mind and of will, that must now be represented in our legisla ture, be prodigiously increased since the frame of that legislature was adjusted, let its basis be widened, so as to rest on all that intellect and will. If there be a new power and energy generated in the nation, for the due application of which, there is no contrivance in the original plan of the constitution, let it flow into those channels through which all similar powers were ordained to act by the principles of that plan. The power itself you can neither repress nor annihilate; and, if it be not assimilated to the system of the constitution, you seem to be aware that it will ultimately overwhelm and destroy it. To set up against it the power of influence and corruption, is to set up that by which its strength is recruited, and its safe application rendered infinitely more difficult: it is to defend your establishments, by loading them with a weight which of itself makes them totter under under its pressure, and, at the same time, affords a safe and inviting approach to the assailant. In our own case, too, nothing fortunately is easier, than to reduce this growing power of the people within the legitimate bounds and cantonments of the constitution; and nothing more obvious, than that, when so legalised and provided for, it can tend only to the exaltation and improvement of our condition, and must add strength and stability to the Throne, as well as to the other branches of the legis lature. It seems a strange doctrine, to be held by any one in this land, and, above all, by the chief votaries and advocates of royal power, that its legal security consists in its means of corruption, or can be endangered by the utmost freedom and intelligence in the body of the people, and the utmost purity and popularity of our elections. Under an arbitrary government, where the powers of the monarch are confessedly unjust and oppres sive, and are claimed, and openly asserted, not as the instruments of public benefit, but as the means of individual gratification, such a jealousy of popular independence is sufficiently intelligible: but, in a government like ours, where all the powers of the Crown are universally acknowledged to exist for the good of the people, it is evidently quite extravagant to fear, that any increase of union and intelligence. -any growing love of freedom and justice in the people should endanger, or should fail to confirm, all those powers and prerogatives. We have not left ourselves room to ente: more at large into this interesting question; but we feel perfectly assured, and ready to maintain, that, as the institution of a limited, hereditary monarchy, must always appear the wisest and most reasonable of all human institutions, and that to which increasing reflection and experience will infallibly attach men more and more as the world advances; so, the prerogatives of such a monarch will always be safer and more inviolate, the more the sentiment of liberty, and the love of their political rights, is diffused and encouraged among his people. A legitimate sovereign, in short, who reig..s by the fair exercise o his prerogative, can have no enemies among the lovers of regt.ated freedom; and the hos tility of such men-by far the most tembie of all internal hostility can only be directed towards him, when his throne is enveloped, by treacherous advisers, with the hosts of corruption; and disguised, for their ends, in the borrowed colours of tyranny. (January, 1810.) Short Remarks on the State of Parties at the Close of the Year 1899. 8vo. pp. 30. London: 1809.* THE parties of which we now wish to speak, are not the parties in the Cabinet,- -nor even the parties in Parliament, but the Parties in the Nation;—that nation, whose opinions and whose spirit ought to admonish and control both Cabinet and Parliament, but which now seems to us to be itself breaking rapidly into two furious and irreconcileable parties; by whose collision, if it be not prevented, our constitution and independence must be ultimately destroyed. We have said before, that the root of all our misfortunes was in the state of the People, and not in the constitution of the legislature; and the more we see and reflect, the more we are satisfied of this truth. It is in vain to cleanse the conduits and reservoirs, if the fountain itself be tainted and impure. If the body of the people be infatuated, or corrupt or depraved, it is vain to talk of improving their representation. The dangers, and the corruptions, and the prodigies of the times, have very nearly put an end to all neutrality and moderation in politics; and the great body of the nation appears to us to be divided into two violent and most pernicious factions;-the courtiers, who are almost for arbitrary power,-and the democrats, who are almost for revolution and republicanism. Between these stand a small, but most respectable band-the friends of liberty and of order-the Old Constitutional Whigs of England-with the best talents and the best intentions, but without present power or popularity, calumniated and suspected by *This, I fear, is too much in the style of a sage and solemn Rebuke to the madness of contending factions. Yet it is not all rhetorical or assuming And the observations on the vast importance and high and difficult duties of a middle party, in all great national contentions, seem to me as univerBally true, and as applicable to the present position of our affairs, as most of the other things I have ventured, for this reason, now to produce. It may be right to mention, that it was written at a time when the recent failure of that wretched expedition to Walcheren, and certain antipopular declarations in Parliament, had excited a deeper feeling of discontent in the country, and a greater apprehension for its consequences, than had been witnessed since the first great panic and excitement of the French revolution. The spirit of such a time may, perhaps, be detected in some of the following pages. both parties, and looking on both with toc visi. ble a resentment, aversion, and alarm. The two great divisions, in the mean time, are daily provoking each other to greater excesses and recruiting their hostile ranks, as they ad ||vance, from the diminishing mass of the calm and the neutral. Every hour the rising tides are eating away the narrow isthmus upon which the adherents of the Constitution now appear to be stationed; and every hour it be comes more necessary for them to oppose some barrier to their encroachments. If the two extreme parties are once per mitted to shock together in open conflict, there is an end to the freedom, and almost to the existence of the nation,—whatever be the re sult,—although that is not doubtful: And the only human means of preventing a consum mation to which things seem so obviously tending, is for the remaining friends of the constitution to unbend from their cold and repulsive neutrality, and to join themselves to the more respectable members of the party to which they have the greatest affinity; and thus, by the weight of their character, and the force of their talents, to temper its violence and moderate its excesses, till it can be guided in safety to the defence, and not to the destruction, of our liberties. In the present crisis, we have no hesitation in saying, that it is to the popular side that the friends of the constitution must turn themselves; and that, if the Whig leaders do not first conciliate, and then restrain the people,-if they do not save them from the leaders they are already choos ing in their own body, and become themselves their leaders, by becoming their patrons, and their cordial, though authoritative, advisers, they will in no long time sweep away the Constitution itself, the Monarchy of England. and the Whig aristrocracy, by which that Monarchy is controlled and confirmed, and exalted above all other forms of polity. This is the sum of our doctrine; though we are aware that, to most readers, it will require more development than we can now afford, and be exposed to more objections than we have left ourselves room to answer. To many, we are sensible, our fears will appear altogether chimerical and fantastic. We have |