gation, nor assists us materially in the use of | them, it is inexpedient to dwell long upon it in the course of our philosophical inquiries, and much more advisable to proceed upon the supposition that the real condition of things is conformable to our natural apprehensions. The little sketch we have now ventured to offer of the abstract, or thorough-going philosophy of scepticism, will render it unnecessary for us to follow our author minutely through the different branches of this inquiry. Overlooking, or at least undervaluing the indisputable fact, that our sensations are uniformly accompanied with a distinct apprehension, and firm belief in the existence of real external objects, he endeavours to prove, that the qualities which we ascribe to them are in reality nothing more than names for our peculiar sensations; and maintains accordingly, that because men differ in their opinions of the same object, it is impossible to suppose that they actually perceive any real object at all; as a real existence must always appear the same to those who actually perceive it.

Now, nothing, we conceive, is more obviors than the fallacy of this reasoning. The l king, or disliking, of men to a particular object, has nothing to do with the perception of its external qualities; and they may differ entirely as to their opinion of its agreeableness, though they concur perfectly as to the description of all its properties. One man may admire a tall woman, and another a short one; but it would be rather rash to infer, that they did not agree in recognising a difference in stature, or that they had no uniform ideas of magnitude in general. In the same way, one person may have an antipathy to salt, and another a liking for it; but they both perceive it to be salt, and both agree in describing it by that appellation. To give any degree of plausibility to Mr. Drummond's inferences, it would be necessary for him to show that some men thought brandy and Cayenne pepper in sipid and tasteless, and objected at the same time to milk and spring water as excessively acrid and pungent.

In the concluding part of his book, Mr. His illustrations are of this nature. Water, Drummond undertakes nothing less than a which feels tepid to a Laplander, would appear defence of the theory of Ideas, against the cold to a native of Sumatra: But the same arguments of Dr. Reid. This is a bold atwater cannot be both hot and cold: therefore tempt; but, we are inclined to think, not a it is to be inferred that neither of them is successful one. Mr. Drummond begins with affected by any real quality in the external the old axiom, that nothing can act but where body, but that each describes merely his it is; and infers, that as real material objects own sensations. Now, the conclusion here is cannot penetrate to the seat of the soul, that plainly altogether unwarranted by the fact; sentient principle can only perceive certain since it is quite certain that both the persons images or ideas of them; against the assumpin question perceive the same quality in the tion of which he conceives there can be no water, though they are affected by it in a dif- considerable obstacle. Now, it is needless, ferent manner. The solution of the whole we think, to investigate the legitimacy of this puzzle is, that heat and cold are not different reasoning very narrowly, because the foundaqualities; but different degrees of the same tion, we are persuaded, is unsound. The quality, and probably exist only relatively to axiom, we believe, is now admitted to be each other. If the water is of a higher tem- fallacious (in the sense at least here assigned perature than the air, or the body of the to it) by all who have recently paid any attenperson who touches it, he will call it warm; tion to the subject. But what does Mr. Drumif of a lower temperature, he will call it cold. mond understand exactly by ideas? Does he But this does not prove by any means, that mean certain films, shadows, or simulacra, the difference between two distinct tempera- proceeding from real external existences, and tures is ideal, or that it is not always perceived passing through real external organs to the by all individuals in the very same way. If local habitation of the soul? If he means Mr. Drummond could find out a person who this, then he admits the existence of a manot only thought the water cold which other terial world, as clearly as Dr. Reid does; people called warm, but also thought that and subjects himself to all the ridicule which warm which they perceived to be cold, he he has himself so justly bestowed upon the might have some foundation for his inference; hypothesis of animal spirits, or any other but while all mankind agree that ice is cold, supposition, which explains the intercourse and steam hot, and concur indeed most exactly between mind and matter, by imagining some in their judgments of the comparative heat of matter, of so fine a nature as almost to graall external bodies, it is plainly a mere quib-duate into mind! If, on the other hand, by ble on the convertible nature of these qualities, to call in question the identity of their perceptions, because they make the variable standard of their own temperature the rule for denominating other bodies hot or cold.

ideas, Mr. Drummond really means nothing but sensations and perceptions (as we have already explained that word), it is quite obvious that Dr. Reid has never called their existence in question; and the whole debate comes back to the presumptions for the exist ence of an external world; or the reasonable

In the same way, Mr. Drummond goes on to say, one man calls the flavour of assafoetida nauseous, and another thinks it agreeable;-ness of trusting to that indestructible belief one nation delights in a species of food which to its neighbours appears disgusting. How, then, can we suppose that they perceive the same real qualities, when their judgments in regard to them are so diametrically opposite?

which certainly accompanies those sensations, as evidence of their having certain external causes. We cannot help doubting, whether Mr. Drummond has clearly stated to himself, in which of these two senses he proposes to

defend the doctrine of ideas. The doctrine | guished by its colur, from the other portions of IMAGES proceeding from actual external that were perceived at the same time. I existences, is the only one in behalf of which seems equally impossible to dispute, however, he can claim the support of the ancient philosophers; and it is to it he seems to allude, in several of the remarks which he makes on the illusions of sight. On the other supposition, however, he has no occasion to dispute with Dr. Reid about the existence of ideas; for the Doctor assuredly did not deny that we had sensations and perceptions, notions, recollections, and all the other affections of mind to which the word idea may be applied, in that other sense of it. There can be no question upon that supposition, but about the origin of these ideas-which belongs to another chapter.

Mr. Drummond seems to lay the whole stress of his argument upon a position of Hume's, which he applies himself to vindicate from the objections which Dr. Reid has urged against it. "The table which I see," says Dr. Hume, "diminishes as I remove from it; but the real table suffers no alteration:-it could be nothing but its image, therefore, which was present to my mind." Now this statement, we think, admits pretty explicitly, that there is a real table, the image of which is presented to the mind: but, at all events, we conceive that the phenomenon may be easily reconciled with the supposition of its real existence. Dr. Reid's error, if there be one, seems to consist in his having asserted positively, and without any qualification, that it is the real table which we perceive, when our eyes are turned towards it. When the matter however is considered very strictly, it will be found that by the sense of seeing we can perceive nothing but light, variously arranged and diversified; and that, when we look towards a table, we do not actually see the table itself, but only the rays of light which are reflected from it to the eye. Independently of the co-operation of our other senses, it seems generally to be admitted, that we should perceive nothing by seeing but an assemblage of colours, divided by different lines; and our only visual notion of the table (however real it might be) would, therefore, be that of a definite portion of light, distin

that we should receive from this impression the belief and conception of an external existence, and that we should have the very same evidence for its reality, as for that of the objects of our other senses. But if the external existence of light be admitted, a very slight attention to its laws and properties, will show its appearances must vary, according to our distance from the solid objects which emit it. We perceive the form of bodies by sight, in short, very nearly as a blind man perceives them, by tracing their extremities with his stick: It is only the light in one case, and the stick in the other, that is properly felt or perceived; but the real form of the object is indicated, in both cases, by the state and disposition of the medium which connects it with our sensations. It is by intimations formerly received from the sense of Touch, no doubt, that we ultimately discover that the rays of light which strike our eyes with the impressions of form and colour, proceed from distant objects, which are solid and extended in three dimensions; and it is only by recollecting what we have learned from this sense, that we are enabled to conceive them as endued with these qualities. By the eye itself we do not perceive these qualities: nor, in strictness of speech, do we perceive, by this sense, any qualities whatever of the reflecting ob ject; we perceive merely the light which it reflects; distinguished by its colour from the other light that falls on the eye along with it, and assuming a new form and extension, according as the distance or position of the body is varied in regard to us. These variations are clearly explained by the known properties of light, as ascertained by experiment; and evidently afford no ground for supposing any alteration in the object which emits it, or for throwing any doubts upon the real existence of such an object. Because the divergence of the rays of light varies with the distance between their origin and the eye, is there the slightest reason for pretending, that the mag nitude of the object from which they proceed must be held to have varied also?

(April, 1807.)

An account of the Life and Writings of James Beattie, LL. D. late Professor Moral Philoso phy and Logic in the Marischal College and University of Aberdeen including many of his original Letters. By Sir W. FORBES of Pitsligo, Baronet, one of the Executors of Dr. Beattie. 2 vols. 4to. pp. 840. Edinburgh and London: 1806.

DR. BEATTIE's great work, and that which was undoubtedly the first foundation of his celebrity, is the "Essay on the Nature and Immutability of Truth;" on which such unThe greater part of this article also is withheld from the present reprint, for the reasons formerly stated; and only those parts given which bear upon points of metaphysics.

measured praises are bestowed, both by his present biographer, and by all the author's male and female correspondents, that it is with difficulty we can believe that they are speaking of the performance which we have just been wearying ourselves with looking over. That the author's intentions were good, and his convictions sincere, we entertain not

we agree with him: But he thought it very consequences are perfectly harmless. Theil wicked and very despicably silly; and there reasonings are about as ingenious and as inno we cannot agree with him at all. It is a very cent as some of those which have been empretty and ingenious puzzle,-affords a very ployed to establish certain strange paradoxes useful mortification to human reason, and as to the nature of motion, or the infinite divis leads us to that state of philosophical wonder ibility of matter. The argument is perfectly and perplexity in which we feel our own logical and unanswerable; and yet no man in helplessness, and in which we ought to feel his senses can practically admit the concluthe impropriety of all dogmatism or arrogance sion. Thus, it may be strictly demonstrated, in reasoning upon such subjects. This is the that the swiftest moving body can never overonly use and the only meaning of such scep- take the slowest which is before it at the comtical speculations. It is altogether unfair, mencement of the motion; or, in the words and indeed absurd, to suppose that their of the original problem, that the swift-footed authors could ever mean positively to main- Achilles could never overtake a snail that had tain that we should try to get the better of a few yards the start of him. The reasoning any reliance on our memories, or that they upon which this valuable proposition is foundthemselves really doubted more than other ed, does not admit, we believe, of any direct people as to the past reality of the things confutation; and yet there are few, we supthey remembered. The very arguments they pose, who, upon the faith of it, would take a bet use, indeed, to show that the evidence of as to the result of such a race. The sceptical memory may be fallacious, prove, completely, reasonings as to the mind lead to no other that, in point of fact, they relied as implicitly practical conclusion; and may be answered as their antagonists on the accuracy of that or acquiesced in with the same good nature. faculty. If they were not sure that they recollected the premises of their own reasonings, it is evidently impossible that they should ever have come to any conclusion. If they did not believe that they had seen the books they answered, it is impossible they should have set about answering them.

Such, however, are the chief topics which Dr. Beattie has discussed in this Essay, with a vehemence of temper, and an impotence of reasoning, equally surprising and humiliating to the cause of philosophy. The subjects we have mentioned occupy the greater part of the work, and are indeed almost the only The truth is, however, that all men have a ones to which its title at all applies. Yet we practical and irresistible belief both in the think it must be already apparent, that there existence of matter, and in the accuracy of is nothing whatever in the doctrines he opmemory; and that no sceptical writer ever poses, to call down his indignation, or to jus meant or expected to destroy this practical tify his abuse. That there are other doctrines belief in other persons. All that they aimed in some of the books which he has aimed at at was to show their own ingenuity, and the confuting, which would justify the most zealnarrow limits of the human understanding;- ous opposition of every friend to religion, we to point out a curious distinction between the readily admit; but these have no necessary evidence of immediate consciousness, and dependence on the general speculative scepthat of perception of memory, and to show ticism to which we have now been alluding, that there was a kind of logical or argumen- and will be best refuted by those who lay all tative possibility, that the objects of the latter that general reasoning entirely out of confaculties might have no existence. There sideration. Mr. Hume's theory of morals, aever was any danger of their persuading which, when rightly understood, we conceive men to distrust their senses or their memory; to be both salutary and true, certainly has no nor can they be rationally suspected of such connection with his doctrine of ideas and iman intention. On the contrary, they neces-pressions; and the great question of liberty sarily took for granted the instinctive and in- and necessity, which Dr. Beattie has settled, destructible belief for which they found it so by mistaking, throughout, the power of doing difficult to account. Their whole reasonings what we will, for the power of willing withconsist of an attempt to explain that admitted out motives, evidently depends upon considerfact, and to ascertain the grounds upon which ations altogether apart from the nature and that belief depends. In the end, they agree immutability of truth. It has always appeared with their adversaries that those grounds can- to us, indeed, that too much importance has not be ascertained: and the only difference been attached to Theories of morals, and to between them is, that the adversary main-speculations on the sources of approbation. tains that they need no explanation; while the sceptic insists that the want of it still leaves a possibility that the belief may be fallacious; and at any rate establishes a distinction, in degree, between the primary evidence of consciousness, which it is impossible to distrust without a contradiction, and the secondary evidence of perception and memory, which may be clearly conceived to be erroneous.

To this extent, we are clearly of opinion that the sceptics are right; and though the value of the discovery certainly is as small as possible, we are just as well satisfied that its

Our feelings of approbation and disapprobation, and the moral distinctions which are raised upon them, are Facts which no theory can alter, although it may fail to explain. While these facts remain, they must regulate the conduct, and affect the happiness of mankind, whether they are well or ill accounted for by the theories of philosophers. It is the same nearly with regard to the controversy about cause and effect. It does not appear to us, however, that Mr. Hume ever meant to deny the existence of such a relation, or cf the relative idea of power. He has merely

given a new theory as to its genealogy or descent; and detected some very gross inaccuracies in the opinions and reasonings which were formerly prevalent on the subject.

scholars of the south, who knew little of meta physics themselves, to get a Scotch professor of philosophy to take up the gauntlet in their behalf. The contempt with which he chose If Dr. Beattie had been able to refute these to speak of his antagonists was the very tone doctrines, we cannot help thinking that he which they wished to be adopted; and, some would have done it with more temper and of them, imposed on by the confidence of his moderation; and disdained to court popularity manner, and some resolved to give it all by so much fulsome cant about common sense, chances of imposing on others, they joined in virtue, and religion, and his contempt and one clamour of approbation, and proclaimed a abhorrence for infidels, sophists, and meta- triumph for a mere rash skirmisher, while the physicians; by such babyish interjections, as leader of the battle was still doubtful of the "fy on it! fy on it!"-such triumphant ex- victory. The book, thus dandled into popuclamations, as, "say, ye candid and intelli-larity by bishops and good ladies, contained gent!" or such terrific addresses, as, "ye traitors to human kind! ye murderers of the human soul!”—"vain hypocrites! perfidious profligates!" and a variety of other embellishments, as dignified as original in a philosophical and argumentative treatise. The truth is, that the Essay acquired its popularity, partly from the indifference and dislike which has long prevailed in England, as to the metaphysical inquiries which were there made the subject of abuse; partly from the perpetual appeal which it affects to make from philosophical subtlety to common sense; and partly from the accidental circumstances of the author. It was a great matter for the orthodox

many pieces of nursery eloquence, and much innocent pleasantry: it was not fatiguing to the understanding; and read less heavily, on the whole, than most of the Sunday library. In consequence of all these recommendations, it ran through various editions, and found its way into most well-regulated families; and, though made up of such stuff, as we really believe no grown man who had ever thought 'of the subject could possibly go through with out nausea and compassion, still retains its place among the meritorious performances, by which youthful minds are to be purified and invigorated. We shall hear no more of it, however, among those who have left college.

(November, 1810.)

Philosophical Essays. By DUGALD STEWART, Esq., F. R. S. En urgh, Emeritus Professor of Moral Philosophy in the University of Edinburgh, &c. &c. 4to. pp. 590. Edinburgh: 1810

THE studies to which Mr. Stewart has devoted himself, have lately fallen out of favour with the English public; and the nation which once placed the name of Locke immediately under those of Shakespeare and of Newton, and has since repaid the metaphysical labours of Berkeley and of Hume with such just celebrity, seems now to be almost without zeal or curiosity as to the progress of the Philosophy of Mind.

The causes of this distaste it would be curious, and probably not uninstructive, to investigate: but the inquiry would be laborious, and perhaps not very satisfactory. It is easy, indeed, to say, that the age has become frivolous and impatient of labour; and has abandoned this, along with all other good learning, and every pursuit that requires concentration of thought, and does not lead to immediate distinction. This is satire, and not reasoning; and, were it even a fair statement of the fact, such a revolution in the intellectual habits and character of a nation, is itself a phenomenon to be accounted for,—and not to be accounted for upon light or shallow considerations. To us, the phenomenon, in so far as we are inclined to admit its existence, has always appeared to arise from the great multiplication of the branches of liberal study, and from the more extensive diffusion of knowledge among the body of the people,

and to constitute, in this way, a signal ex ample of that compensation, by which the good and evil in our lot is constantly equalised, or reduced at least to no very variable standard.

The progress of knowledge has given birth, of late years, to so many arts and sciences, that a man of liberal curiosity finds both sufficient occupation for his time, and sufficient exercise to his understanding, in acquiring a superficial knowledge of such as are most inviting and most popular; and, consequently, has much less leisure, and less inducement than formerly, to dedicate himself to those abstract studies which call for more patient and persevering attention. In older times, a man had nothing for it, but either to be absolutely ignorant and idle, or to take seriously to theology and the school logic. When things grew a little better, the classics and mathematics filled up the measure of general education and private study; and, in the most splendid periods of English philosophy, had received little addition, but from these investigations into our intellectual and moral nature. Some few individuals might attend to other things; but a knowledge of these was all that was required of men of good education; and was held accomplishment enough to entitle them to the rank of scholars and philosophers. Nowa. days, however, the necessary qualification is prodigiously raised, at least in denomina.