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contrary, is a separate and distinguishable | sons: For, so long as they stuck to the gene act, function, or phenomenon, of the existence ral assertion, that thought might, in some way of which we become aware, not through per- or other, be represented as a quality of matception, or the external senses at all, but ter,-although it was not perceived by the through consciousness or reflection alone: and senses, and bore no analogy to any of its other none of them (with the single exception, per- qualities, and talked about the inherent cahaps, of perception) have any necessary or pacity of substance, to support all sorts of natural reference to any external or material qualities; although their doctrine might elude existence whatever. It is not disputed, how- our comprehension, and revolt all our habits ever, that it is only by perception and the of thinking, still it might be difficult to senses, that we can gain any knowledge of demonstrate its fallacy; and a certain permatter; and, consequently, whatever we come plexing argumentation might be maintained, to know by consciousness only, cannot pos- by a person well acquainted with the use, sibly belong to that category, or be either ma- and abuse, of words: But when they cast terial or external. But we are not aware that away the protection of this most convenient any materialist has ever gone the length of obscurity, and, instead of saying that they directly maintaining that volition for example, do not know what thought is, have the couror memory, or anger, or fear, or any other age to refer it to the known category of Mosuch affection, were proper material qualities tion, they evidently subject their theory to the of our bodily frames, or could be perceived test of rational examination, and furnish us and recognised as such, by the agency of with a criterion by which its truth may be the external senses; in the same way as the easily determined. weight, heat, colour, or elasticity which may belong to these frames. But if they are not each of them capable of being so perceived, as separate physical qualities, it is plain that nothing can be gained in argument, by affecting to disregard their palpable diversity, and seeking to class them all under one vague name, of thought or perception. Even with that advantage, we have seen that the doctrine, of perception or thought being a mere quality of matter, is not only untenable, but truly self-contradictory and unintelligible. But when the number and diversity of the phenomena necessarily covered by that general appellation is considered, along with the fact that most of them have no reference to matter, and do in no way imply its existence, the absurdity of representing them as so many of its distinct perceptible qualities, must be too apparent, we think, to admit of any serious defence.

The sum of the whole then is, that all the knowledge which we gain only by Perception and the use of our external Senses, is knowledge of Matter, and its qualities and attributes alone; and all which we gain only by Consciousness and Reflection on our own inward feelings, is necessarily knowledge of Mind, and its states, attributes, and functions. This in fact is the whole basis, and rationale of the distinction between mind and matter: and, consequently, unless it can be shown that love, anger, and sorrow, as well as memory and volition, are direct objects of sense or external perception, like heat and colour, or figure and solidity, there must be an end, we think, of all question as to their being material qualities.

But, though the very basis and foundation of the argument for Materialism is placed upon the assumption, that thought and perception are qualities of our bodies, it is remarkable that Dr. Priestley, and the other champions of that doctrine, do ultimately give up that point altogether, and maintain, that thought is nothing else than Mction! Now, this, we cannot help thinking, was very impolitic and injudicious in these learned per

We shall not be so rash as to attempt any definition of motion; but we believe we may take it for granted, that our readers know pretty well what it is. At all events, it is not a quality of matter. It is an act, a phenomenon, or a fact:-but it makes no part of the description or conception of matter; though it can only exist with reference to that substance. Let any man ask himself, however, whether the motion of matter bears any sort of resemblance to thought or sensation; or whether it be even conceivable that these should be one and the same thing?-But, it is said, we find sensation always produced by motion; and as we can discover nothing else in conjunction with it, we are justified in ascribing it to motion. But this, we beg leave to say, is not the question. It is not necessary to inquire, whether motion may produce sensation or not, but whether sensation be motion, and nothing else? It seems pretty evident, to be sure, that motion can never produce any thing but motion or impulse; and that it is at least as inconceivable that it should ever produce sensation in matter, as that it should produce a separate substance, called mind. But this, we repeat, is not the question with the materialists. Their proposition is, not that motion produces sensation-which might be as well in the mind as in the body; but, that sensation is motion; and that all the phenomena of thought and perception are intelligibly accounted for by saying, that they are certain little shakings in the pulpy part of the brain.

There are certain propos.tions which it is difficult to confute, only because it is impos sible to comprehend them: and this, the substantive article in the creed of Materialism, really seems to be of this description. To say that thought is motion, is as unintelligible to us, as to say that it is space, or time, or proportion.

There may be little shakings in the brain, for any thing we know, and there may even be shakings of a different kind, accompanying every act of thought or perception;-but, that the shakings themselves are the thought of

perception, we are so far from admitting, that | Berkeleians, it seems quite enough to deter we find it absolutely impossible to compre-mine us to reject it, that it confounds the ac hend what is meant by the assertion. The of perception with the qualities perceived, and shakings are certain throbbings, vibrations, or classes among the objects of perception, the stirrings, in a whitish, half-fluid substance faculty by which these objects are introduced like custard, which we might see perhaps, or to our knowledge, and which faculty must feel, if we had eyes and fingers sufficiently be exercised, before we can attain to any cou small or fine for the office. But what should ception, either of matter or its qualities. we see or feel, upon the supposition that we We do not pretend to have looked through could detect, by our senses, every thing that the whole controversy which Dr. Priestley's actually took place in the brain? We should publications on this subject appears to have see the particles of this substance change their excited: But nothing certainly has struck us place a little, move a little up or down, to the with more astonishment, than the zeal with right or to the left, round about, or zig-zag, or which he maintains that this doctrine, and in some other course or direction. This is that of Necessity, taken together, afford the all that we could see, if Hartley's conjecture greatest support to the cause of religion and were proved by actual observation; because morality! We are a little puzzled, indeed. to this is all that exists in motion,-according to discover what use, or what room, there can be our conception of it; and all that we mean, for a God at all, upon this hypothesis of Mawhen we say that there is motion in any sub- terialism; as well as to imagine what species stance. Is it intelligible, then, to say, that of being the God of the materialist must be. this motion, the whole of which we see and If the mere organisation of matter produces comprehend, is thought and feeling?-and reason, memory, imagination, and all the that thought and feeling will exist wherever other attributes of mind,—and if these differwe can excite a similar motion in a similar ent phenomena be the necessary result of cer substance?-In our humble apprehension, the tain motions impressed upon matter; then proposition is not so much false, as utterly there is no need for any other reason or en unmeaning and incomprehensible. That sen- ergy in the universe: and things may be adsation may follow motion in the brain, or may ministered very comfortably, by the intellect even be produced by it, is conceivable at spontaneously evolved in the different combileast, and may be affirmed with perfect pre-nations of matter. But if Dr. Priestley will cision and consistency; but that the motion is have a superfluous Deity notwithstanding, we itself sensation, and that the proper and com- may ask what sort of a Deity he can expect? plete definition of thought and feeling is, that He denies the existence of mind or spirit althey are certain vibrations in the brain, is a together; so that his Deity must be material; doctrine, we think, that can only be wondered and his wisdom, power, and goodness must at, and that must be comprehended before it be the necessary result of a certain organisa. be answered. tion. But how can a material deity be im. mortal? How could he have been formed? Or why should there not be more,-formed by himself, or by his creator? We will not affirm that Dr. Priestley has not attempted to answer these questions; but we will take it upon us to say, that he cannot have answered them in a satisfactory manner. As to his paradoxical doctrines, with regard to the na tural mortality of man, and the incompre hensible gift of immortality conferred on a material structure which visibly moulders and is dissolved, we shall only say that it exceeds in absurdity any of the dogmas of the Catho lics; and can only be exceeded by his own supposition, that our Saviour, being only a man, and yet destined to live to the day of judgment, is still alive in his original human body upon earth, and is really the Wandering Jew of vulgar superstition!

No advocate for the existence of mind, ever thought it necessary to deny that there was a certain bodily apparatus necessary to thought and sensation in man-and that, on many occasions, the sensation was preceded or introduced by certain impulses and corresponding movements of this material machinery:-we cannot see without eyes and light, nor think without living bodies. All that they maintain is, that these impulses and movements are not feelings or thought, but merely the occasions of feeling and thought; and that it is impossible for them to confound the material motions which precede those sensations, with the sensations themselves, which have no conceivable affinity with matter.

The theory of Materialism, then, appears to us to be altogether unintelligible and absurd; and, without recurring to the reasoning of the

(October, 1805.)

Academical Questions. By the Right Honourable WILLIAM DRUMMOND, K. C., F. R. S., F. R. S. E Author of a Translation of Persius. Vol. I. 4to. pp. 412. Cadell and Davies. London: 1805 We do not know very well what to say of that it is occupied with Metaphysical specu this very learned publication. To some read-lations. To others, it may convey a mon ere it will probably be enough to announce, precise idea of its character, to be told, that

and

Bishop Berkeley, and after him Mr. Drummond, have observed, that by our senses, we can have nothing but sensations; and that sensations, being affections of mind, cannot possibly bear any resemblance to matter, or any of its qualities; and hence they infer, that we cannot possibly have any evidence for the existence of matter; and that what we term our perception of its qualities, is in fact nothing else than a sensation in our own minds. Dr. Reid, on the other hand, distinctly admit ting that the primary functions of our senses is to make us conscious of certain sensations, which can have no sort of resemblance or affinity to the qualities of matter, has asserted it as a fact admitting of no dispute, but recog nised by every human creature, that these sensations necessarily suggest to us the notion of certain external existences, endowed with particular definable qualities; and that these perceptions, by which our sensations are accompanied, are easily and clearly distinguishable from the sensations themselves, and cannot be confounded with them, without the most wilful perversity. Perception, again, he holds, necessarily implies the existence of the object perceived; and the reality of a material world is thus as clearly deduced from the exercise of this faculty, as the reality of our own existence can be from our consciousness, or other sensations. It appears, therefore, that there are two questions to be considered in determining on the merits of this controversy. First, whether there be any room for a distinction between sensation and perception; and, secondly, if we shall allow such a distinction, whether perception does necessarily imply the real and external existence of the objects perceived.

an hour, to the most intrepid logician of our fraternity, he could not help reading on till he came to the end of the volume.*

Mr. Drummond begins with the doctrine of Locke; and exposes, we think, very successfully, the futility of that celebrated author's definition of Substance, as "one knows not what" support of such qualities as are capable of producing simple ideas in us. This notion of substance he then shows to be derived from the old Platonic doctrine of the primary matter, or van, to which the same objections are applicable.

though it gave violent headache, in less than | cipitately, that secondary qualities are universally admitted to have no existence but in the mind of him who perceives them, proceeds, with an air of triumph that is at all events premature, to demonstrate, that there is nothing in the case of primary qualities by which they can be distinguished in this respect from the secondary. The fact unquestionably is, that Dr. Reid and his followers assert the posi tive and independent existence of secondary, as well as of primary qualities in matter; that there is, upon their hypothesis, exactly the same evidence for the one as for the other. The general problem, as to the probable existence of matter-unquestionably the most fundamental and momentous in the whole science of metaphysics-may be fairly and intelligibly stated in a very few words.

Having thus discarded Substance in general from the list of existences, Mr. Drummond proceeds to do as much for the particular substance called Matter, and all its qualities. In this chapter, accordingly, he avows himself to be a determined Idealist; and it is the scope of his whole argument to prove, that what we call qualities in external substances, are in fact nothing more than sensations in our own minds; and that what have been termed primary qualities, are in this respect entirely upon a footing with those which are called secondary. His reasoning upon this subject coincides very nearly with that of Bishop Berkeley; of whom, indeed, he says, that if his arguments be not really conclusive, it is certainly to be lamented that they should have been so imperfectly answered.

To us, we will confess, it does not seem of very great consequence to determine whether there be any room for a distinction between the primary and secondary qualities of matter; for though we are rather inclined to hold that Dr. Reid's observations have established its possibility, we cannot help saying, that it is a distinction which does not touch at all upon the fundamental question, as to the evidence which we have, by our senses, for the existence of a material world. Dr. Reid and his followers contend as strenuously for the real existence of those material qualities which produce in us the sensations of heat, or of colour, as of those which give us intimations of solidity, figure, or extension. We know a little more, indeed, according to them, about the one sort of qualities than the other; but the evidence we have for their existence is exactly the same in both cases; nor is it more a law of our nature, that the sensation of resistance should suggest to us the definable quality of solidity in an external object, than that the sensation of heat should suggest to us, that quality in an external object, which we cannot define otherwise than as the external cause of this sensation.

Mr. Drummond, we think, has not attended sufficiently to this part of his antagonist's position; and after assuming, somewhat too pre

If by perception, indeed, we understand, as Dr. Reid appears to have done, the immediate and positive discovery of external existences, it is evident that the mere assumption of this faculty puts an end to the whole question; since it necessarily takes those existences for For the reasons stated in the note prefixed to granted, and, upon that hypothesis, defines this division of the book, I refrain from reprinting the faculty in question to be that by which the greater part of this review; and give only that we discover their qualities. This, however, part of it which is connected with the speculations it is plain, is not reasoning, but assertion; and in the preceding articles, and bears upon the ques- it is not the mere assertion of a fact, which tion of the existence of an external world, and the in these subjects is the whole perhaps of our faith to be given to the intimations of our senses, and other internal convictions. legitimate philosophy, but of something which

may or may not be inferred from the fact, ac- | asmuch as there is a distinction between on! cording to the views of the inquirer. The feelings of pain, resistance, &c., and our con inquiry is an inquiry into the functions and ception and belief of real external existences: operations of mind; and all that can possibly But they differ merely as one affection of be stated as fact on such an occasion, must re- mind may differ from another; and it is plainly late to the state and affections of mind only: unwarrantable to assume the real existence But to assume the existence of a material of external objects as a part of the statement world, in order afterwards to define one func- of a purely intellectual phenomenon. After tion of mind to be that by which it discovers allowing the reality of this distinction, there material qualities, is evidently blending hy- is still room therefore for considering the pothesis in the statement, and prejudging the second question to which we alluded in the controversy by assumption. The fact itself, outset, viz. Whether perception does neces we really conceive not to be liable to any kind sarily imply the existence of external ob of doubt or dispute; and yet the statement of jects. it, obvious as it is, seems calculated to retrench a good deal from each of the opposite assertions. The fact, if we be not greatly mistaken, is confessedly as follows.

Upon this subject, we entertain an opinion which will not give satisfaction, we are afraid, to either of the contending parties. We think that the existence of external objects is not necessarily implied in the phenomena of perception; but we think that there is no com plete proof of their nonexistence; and that philosophy, instead of being benefited, would be subjected to needless embarrassments, by the absolute assumption of the ideal theory.

We have occasionally certain sensations which we call heat, pain, resistance, &c. These feelings, of course, belong only to the mind, of which they are peculiar affections; and both parties are agreed in asserting, that they have no resemblance, or necessary reference, to any thing external. Dr. Reid has The reality of external existences is not made this indeed the very ground-work of his necessarily implied in the phenomena of perreasonings on the subject of perception; and ception; because we can easily imagine that it will not probably be called in question by our impressions and conceptions might have his antagonists, who go the length of inferring been exactly as they are, although matter had from it, that nothing but mind can be con- never been created. Belief, we familiarly ceived to have an existence in nature. This, know, to be no infallible criterion of actual then, is one fact which we may safely assume existence; and it is impossible to doubt, that as quite certain and indisputable, viz. that we might have been so framed as to receive our sensations are affections of the mind, and all the impressions which we now ascribe to have no necessary reference to any other ex- the agency of external objects, from the meistence. But there is another fact at least as chanism of our own minds, or the particular obvious and indisputable, which the one party volition of the Deity. The phenomena of seems disposed to overlook, and the other to dreaming, and of some species of madness, invest with undue authority, in the discussion. seem to form experimental proofs of the pos This second fact is, that some of the sensations sibility we have now stated; and demonstrate, in question are uniformly and irresistibly ac- in our apprehension, that perception, as we companied by the apprehension and belief of have defined it, (i. e. an apprehension and becertain external existences, distinguished by lief of external existences,) does not necessa peculiar qualities. The fact certainly admits rily imply the independent reality of its obof no dispute; and, accordingly, the philoso-jects. Nor is it less absurd to say that we phers who first attempted to prove that this belief was without foundation, have uniformly claimed the merit of disabusing mankind of a natural and universal illusion. Now this apprehension and belief of external existences, is in itself as much an affection of mind, as the sensations by which it is accompanied; and those who deny the distinction between perception and sensation, might be justified perhaps in asserting, that it is only a sensation of another kind: at the same time, as the essence of it consists in the apprehension of an independent existence, there can be no harm in distinguishing it, by a separate appellation, from those sensations which centre in the sentient being, and suggest to him no idea of any other existence. It is in this sense alone, it appears to us, that perception can be understood in strict philosophical language. It means no more than that affection of the mind which consists in an apprehension and belief in the existence of external objects.

Now in this sense of the word, there can be no doubt that there is a real distinction between mere sensation and perception; in

have the same evidence for the existence of external objects that we have for the exist ence of our own sensations: For it is quite plain, that our belief in the former is founded altogether on our consciousness of the latter; and that the evidence of this belief is consequently of a secondary nature. We cannot doubt of the existence of our sensations, without being guilty of the grossest contradiction; but we may doubt of the existence of the material world, without any contradiction at all. If we annihilate our sensations, we annihilate ourselves; and, of course, leave no being to doubt or to reason. If we annihilate the external world, we still leave entire all those sensations and perceptions which a different hypothesis would refer to its myste rious agency on our minds.

On the other hand, it is certainly going too far to assert, that the nonexistence of matter is proved by such evidence as necessarily to command our assent: Since it evidently im plies no contradiction to suppose, that such a thing as matter may exist, and that an omnip otent being might make us capable of dis

covering its qualities. The instinctive and | This is the legitimate and inevitable ter

insurmountable belief that we have of its existence, certainly is not to be surrendered, merely because it is possible to suppose it erroneous; or difficult to comprehend how a material and immaterial substance can act upon each other. The evidence of this universal and irresistible belief, in short, is not to be altogether disregarded; and, unless it can be shown that it leads to actual contradictions and absurdities, the utmost length that philosophy can warrantably go, is to conclude that it may be delusive; but that it may also be true.

The rigorous maxim, of giving no faith to any thing short of direct and immediate consciousness, seems more calculated, we think, to perplex than to simplify our philosophy, and will run us up, in two vast strides, to the very brink of absolute annihilation. We deny the existence of the material world, because we have not for it the primary evidence of consciousness; and because the clear conception and indestructible belief we have of it, may be fallacious, for any thing we can prove to the contrary. This conclusion annihilates at once all external objects; and, among

mination of that determined scepticism which refuses to believe any thing without the highest of all evidence, and chooses to conclude positively that every thing is not, which may possibly be conceived not to be. The process of reasoning which it implies, is neither long nor intricate; and its conclusion would be undeniably just, if every thing was necessarily true which could be asserted without a contradiction. It is perfectly true, that we are absolutely sure of nothing but what we feel at the present moment; and that it is possible to distinguish between the evidence we have for the existence of the present impression, and the evidence of any other existence. The first alone is complete and unquestionable; we may hesitate about all the rest without any absolute contradiction. But the distinction, we apprehend, is in itself of as little use in philosophy, as in ordinary life; and the absolute and positive denial of all existence, except that of our immediate sensation, altogether rash and unwarranted. The objects of our perception and of our recollection, certainly may exist, although we cannot demon strate that they must; and when in spite of

them, our own bodies, and the bodies and all our abstractions, we find that we must ninds of all other men; for it is quite evident come back, and not only reason with our felthat we can have no evidence of the exist- low creatures as separate existences, but en

ence of other minds, except through the mediation of the matter they are supposed to animate; and if matter be nothing more than an affection of our own minds, there is an end to the existence of every other. This first step, therefore, reduces the whole universe to the mind of the individual reasoner; and leaves no existence in nature, but one mind, with its compliment of sensations and ideas. The second step goes still farther; and no one can hesitate to take it, who has ventured deliberately on the first. If our senses may deceive us, so may our memory:-if we will not believe in the existence of matter, because it is not vouched by internal consciousness, and because it is conceivable that it should not exist, we cannot consistently believe in the reality of any past impression: for which, in like manner, we cannot have the direct evidence of consciousness, and of which our present recollection may possibly be fallacious. Even upon the vulgar hypothesis, we know that memory is much more deceitful than perception; and there is still greater hazard in assuming the reality of any past existence from our present recollection of it, than in relying on the reality of a present existence from our immediate perception. If we discredit our memory, however, and deny all existence of which we have not a present consciousness or sensation, it is evident that we must annihilate our own personal identity, and refuse to believe that we had thought or sensation at any previous moment. There can be no reasoning, therefore, nor knowedge, nor opinion; and we must end by virtually annihilating ourselves, and denying that any thing whatsoever exists in nature, but the present solitary and momentary impression.

gage daily in speculations about the qualities and properties of matter, it must appear, at least, an unprofitable refinement which would lead us to dwell much on the possibility of their nonexistence. There is no sceptic, probably, who would be bold enough to maintain, that this single doctrine of the nonexistence of any thing but our present impressions, would constitute a just or useful system of logic and moral philosophy; and if, after flourishing with it as an unfruitful paradox in the outset, we are obliged to recur to the ordinary course of observation and conjecture as to the nature of our faculties, it may be doubted whether any real benefit has been derived from its promulgation, or whether the hypothesis can be received into any sober system of philosophy. To deny the existence of matter and of mind, indeed, is not to philosophise, but to destroy the materials of philosophy. It requires no extraordinary in. genuity or power of reasoning to perceive the grounds upon which their existence may be doubted; but we acknowledge that we cannot see how it can be said to have been disproved; and think we perceive very clearly, that philosophy will neither be simplified nor abridged by refusing to take it for granted.

Upon the whole, then, we are inclined to think, that the conception and belief which we have of material objects (which is what we mean by the perception of them) does not amount to a complete proof of their existence, but renders it sufficiently probable: : that the superior and complete assurance we have of the existence of our present sensations, does by no means entitle us positively to deny the reality of every other existence; and that as this speculative scepticism neither renders us independent of the ordinary modes of investi

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