XXII.

The Reply to the Bishops' Disputants, which was not answered.'-Reliquiæ Baxterianæ, by Sylvester, pp. 350—6.

WHETHER it be our arguing or your answering that is “lax, declamatory, pedantic," (as you call it,) and whether your confident insulting arise from your advantages, or infirmity of mind, and want of matter for more pertinent answers, are questions that we shall leave to impartial judges. And we shall crave pardon if we rather seem to neglect your words, than to follow you in these strange vagaries, any further than mere necessity for saving your readers from the error into which they are fitted to mislead them doth require.

To prove the consequence of an hypothetical argument by an enthymeme hath not been used to be accounted culpable. The proof you shall not want.

That we removed your Answer, by showing your distinction frivolous, deserved not to be called "a popular insinuation, superfluous," &c. We had two things here to do: the first was, if we had been at hand with you, to have called on you for the necessary explanation of your distinction, whether by "commanded by lawful power," you mean commanded under no penalty, or commanded under a penalty, consistent with the receiving and forbearing mentioned in the text, or commanding under a penalty inconsistent with this receiving and forbearance. And whether you mean by "lawful power," that which is indeed lawful power ad hoc or only ad aliud? As far as we can find in these your papers, you still forbear to explain your distinction. But this we must yet insist upon, and desire of you, notwithstanding all your exclamations.

This paper was drawn up by Baxter, and given in on the last day of the king's commission.-Reliquiæ Baxterianæ, p. 356.

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And then our next work must be to show you that, indeed your distinction is useless as to the shaking of our argument. The latter branch of your distinction, "if we speak of things lawful and commanded," you apply to the denial of our antecedent or minor, which we prove stands good, notwithstanding this your Answer. Indeed we speak of things lawful as such, abstracting from command: but we speak of things which materially were partly not commanded, and partly commanded. It was not commanded to eat or not eat the meats in question, to keep the days or not keep them in these they went against no law. But to be weak in the faith, and erroneously to take things lawful to be unlawful, and things indifferent to be necessary, and to offend a brother by the use of liberty on the other side, were against the commands of God. Now the scope of our argument was to shew that, if you speak of a command upon the penalty of the question, your distinction helps you not to shake our argument; because as it is true that the text speaketh not of things so commanded, so the thing that we are proving is, that it is the sense of the text to forbid all such commands. If it be the sense of the text to forbid such commands, then your distinction is frivolous, and the use of it here prevented, and our argument stands good. But it is the sense of the text to forbid all such commands-ergo, the minor we are to prove hereafter, when we are further called to it by your answers. But if by "command" you mean any other "command without penalty," or without the penalty forbidden, we argue-If it be all one, as to our case, whether it be so commanded or not, then your distinction is frivolous, and our argument stands good but it is all one to our case, whether it be so commanded or not: ergo, this was the sum of our rejection of your Answer, which we cannot prosecute till you will be persuaded, as we have required, to explain your distinction; and then we shall know what to speak to.

But perhaps you take your very refusal to explain it, to be an explanation; and your words may seem to allow us to understand you of any command, with this penalty or with

out, where you say, "That text which speaks of things under no command at all, is brought nothing to the purpose of the things which we debate of, being under some command of lawful authority." But still that text which forbiddeth any such command, and so taketh away the authority of so commanding, is something to the purpose, as proving that no human authority should so command. But this text forbiddeth any such command, and so taketh away the authority of so commanding: ergo, and as it is a command consistent with "receiving, forbearing," &c., that you may be understood to speak of-1. If you speak de facto et de jure, and suppose that there be, and ought to be, no other command, then you grant us the cause that there should be no command, upon penalty of being "not received, not forborne," &c. 2. If your supposition be de facto only, then that commanding which consisteth with God's command "to receive and forbear, &c.," altereth not the case. But such is the commanding that now you are supposed to speak of: ergo, so still your distinguishing toucheth not our argument, no more than if you had distinguished of the instructed and uninstructed, and said Paul speaketh of those that were uninstructed only; ergo, he is not alleged to the purpose.

Whereas you say "That this penalty, that the minister be enjoined not to administer the communion to those that disobey such command, is no ways inconsistent with the receiving and all the indulgences of that truth," we shall prove the contrary anon in due place.

For appellation to indifferent persons, we also are willing such shall judge whether, if your distinction speak of no commanding but such as is consistent with this "receiving, forbearing," &c., it leave us not in possession of the force of our argument? And if it speak, de jure, that there should be no other, whether it yield not up the cause?

It seems our very phrase of "begging the question," being misunderstood by you, hath been taken as your greatest occasion of insulting. But if we used an unusual phrase, if that occasioned your mistake, we can beg your pardon, and

explain it, with less wrong to our cause or ourselves than you can make such use of it as to yours. We did not dream of

charging you with that begging of the question which is the fallacy and fault of the opponent, as it is the begging of a principle undertaken to be proved: we know this is not incident to the respondent, nor to be imputed to him. We charged you with no such thing, though we confess our phrase was liable to your misinterpretation. But we crave your willingness to understand that we were proving that such things may not be by rulers enjoined or commanded under the penalty of exclusion from communion; and that the latter branch of your distinction hath the nature of a reason of your denial of the proposition denied, viz., because the things are commanded; and that by our telling you of begging the question, we mean but this much:-1. That you give us a reason implied in a distinction, which is but equal to a simple negation, and is not (we say not the giving a sufficient reason, but) the giving of a reason indeed at all. 2. That it is but equal to an unsavory denial of the mere conclusion. 3. Yea, that it is a preposterous reduction of the rule to the action, and of the former to the latter. Suppose we had thus phrased our proposition. "Rulers themselves are here forbidden to enjoin or command the rejecting of such as are only weak in the faith, &c. ;" and you should distinguish and say-"either rulers have comhave, manded the rejecting them for such things, or not; if they then we deny the proposition," that is, "if they have done it, they may do it, and the text that forbids it, is to be understood of such rulers as have not already forbidden it:" tell us how you will call such distinguishing yourselves, and you may understand our meaning. It is all one if you put your exception into the description of the fault: and when we say God here forbiddeth governors themselves to make any commands or injunctions for rejecting such as are only weak in the faith, and mistake about indifferent things; and you distinguish thus-" either the weak offend against such commands or not; if they do sin against such commands, then the text

forbiddeth not the making of such commands:" give this kind of distinguishing and answering a proper name yourselves. Or if to our proposition you say, "the indifferent things are commanded by the governors, or not; if they be, then God forbiddeth not the governor to command the rejection of the persons from communion;" that is, "though God forbid governors to make laws for rejecting such as err about indifferent things only, yet that is on supposition that the said governors do not first command those indifferent things; for if once they command them, they may then command the rejection of those that break them: " but, on the contrary, he that forbiddeth the rejection of such, simply and antecedently to the laws of men, forbiddeth the rejecting of them, mediately or immediately, and forbiddeth the framing of such commands as shall be means of the prohibited rejection. But God in the text forbiddeth the rejection of such, simply and antecedently to the laws of men: ergo, he forbiddeth the rejecting of them, mediately or immediately, and forbiddeth the framing of such commands as shall be means of the prohibited rejection.

Though we have thus taken off your Answer, we shall give you fuller proof in the end of what you can reasonably expect.

You next answer this argument of ours.- "If there be no power that may command such things, any further than may stand with the reception and other indulgences of the text, then must you not suppose that any power may otherwise command them. But the antecedent is true: ergoHere you deny the minor, which I prove thus :

If none have power to break the laws of God, then there is no power that may command such things, any further than may stand with the reception, and other indulgences, of the text. But none have power to break the laws of God: ergo, there is no power that may command such things, any further than may stand with the reception, and other indulgences of the text.

We had used before another argument to prove the minor,