truded, besides several other thrusts and cuts of less moment. There he lay, wholly deserted and weltering in his blood, it is not known exactly how long. It appears his assassins felt satisfied they had effectually done their work, for they did not follow him up; and as for his brave defenders bearing the Tycoon's arms, they only returned with assistance after a long interval. He survived but an hour or two after his arrival at the Legation-long enough, however, to tell the dismal tale, and state distinctly all that had occurred; fortunately, for the Yaconins had a version of the attack which rivaled Falstaff's. They had been set upon by at least thirty men, and, notwithstanding such terrible odds, kept by their charge to the last— one only, when Mr. Heuskin fell from his horse, being sent on to get assistance to carry him home. But the dying man's testimony was too strong and clear. Even the Government this time, wonderful to say, hesitated to accept the Yaconins' report. Of course two Governors of Foreign Affairs were dispatched immediately with condolences, expressions of sympathy, and assurances of justice, precisely as had been done when my linguist was assassinated in broad daylight under the flagstaff of the British Legation a twelvemonth before, since which nothing had been heard of the assassins except that they could not be discovered. So had it been with eight successive victims-so it followed with this last! Such assured immunity is perhaps the worst feature of the whole, as obviously fatal to all security. And where was the remedy to be sought? This was a question which could not any longer remain without an answer, and the four Representatives of Great Britain, France, Prussia, and Holland resolved a solution should be sought in a determined protest, backed by the striking of their flags and their temporary retirement to Yokohama. Many days were consumed in the necessary preparations for the lodging of the Legations in the dearth of house-room at the settlement of Yokohama, and it was not until the end of the month that either the French Minister or myself could embark, the 'Encounter' and 'Pioneer' fortunately giving us both the means. The Dutch Diplomatic Agent had preceded us, and Count Eulenberg, having obtained the signature of his treaty, prepared to follow in a day or two. Mr. Harris, the American Minister, alone remained, disapproving entirely of the course thus unanimously followed by all his colleagues. He indeed predicted that those who withdrew from the capital would never be able to return; but I had, as the event proved, a tolerably wellfounded conviction to the contrary, while I felt certain that to remain was to invite the very dangers it was the desire of all

to avert. It was a question of means to the end, and with opinions so diametrically opposed, it only remained for each to follow his own course.

CHAPTER XXV.

Second Phase of the Crisis.-Flags of four Treaty Powers struck.-Protest against the Inadequacy of Means taken to protect Life.-Negotiations for Return of British and French Ministers to the Capital.-Conditions stipulated on the part of Foreign Representatives.—Final Acceptance of these on the part of the Japanese Government, and the Return of the former under a Salute to the National Flags of Great Britain and France on their Entrance.

We had now entered upon a second phase of the crisis. The flags of four of the Treaty Powers had been struck, and their respective Representatives had each forwarded a strong protest to the Japanese Government against a total denial of justice, and the absence of all efficient protection or security to life, with what result remained to be seen. It had been made clear to the Japanese Government that, in withdrawing from the capital and striking our flags, we had no intention of breaking off relations with it, and without implying any menace of hostilities if our reasonable demands were not complied with, they must have seen that there was a determination on the part of my colleagues and myself to effect some change for the better in our relations. In a circular to the British Consuls I fully explained our actual position and the objects we contemplated. They were told to explain to the Governors of their respective ports that our object was not to create a rupture, but, if possible, to avert any such calamity (while relieving the Government of Japan from a great danger), and to induce them, without farther delay, to take what steps might be necessary to place their relations with Foreign Powers on a better and safer footing; and, above all, to give that security to life and property which had been greatly in default from the beginning, and latterly wholly wanting.'

6

To the Ministers of Foreign Affairs I wrote in the following unequivocal but conciliatory terms, saying I had to urge upon the Government the importance of putting a speedy end to the present exceptional state of affairs. I am anxious for a peaceable and satisfactory termination, and am ready to return to the Legation, and resume my duties in Yeddo, whenever I can see such material guarantee for redress in respect to past

grievances, and security for the future, as may warrant this step. I have, in the mean time, left all my property undisturbed, under the charge of the officers in my house, and for the safety of which the Government will, of course, be responsible. Whether my return be prompt or tardy, therefore, depends entirely upon the Japanese Government. It is certain, sooner or later, that the representative of Great Britain will return to Yeddo, the place of residence assigned by treaty; but if speedily, there will be the less time for new complications to arise, and affairs may be more easily arranged with mutual benefit (and on a better footing than hitherto, to my regret, has been found possible), if no time be lost.'

Having adopted this decisive step, and taken up a temporary residence at Yokohama, I had leisure to review the position, and meditate on what farther might be necessary to bring this species of interregnum to a speedy conclusion. While it would probably be the policy of the Japanese Government to leavė the protesting Ministers self-exiled from the capital by refusing their terms, and thus giving them a kind of stale-mate quite equivalent in the circumstances to a defeat-the tactics evidently contemplated by our American colleague when he predicted that we should never return-it was my business, and that of the only colleague remaining after the fourth week, Monsieur de Bellecourt, the French Minister, to force them to come to terms, and offer us those guarantees for greater security in the future which we were so fully entitled to demand. It was a struggle, however, in which they had all the advantage of a chance of winning by simply doing nothing, whereas it behooved us to make such moves on the political chess-board as should compel them to act. I speak only of the future, for, as regarded the past, to insist upon any redress for things already done would have been to enter upon a large field of complaints, and debates that might be endless. It was the future position of Foreign nations and their Representatives in Japan which it was most important to regulate and improve. I resolved, therefore, from the beginning, that I would welcome any fair guarantee for this, and trust, after my return to Yeddo, to convert what might be merely promises of improvement into material results. Mr. Harris himself, as I wrote to the Foreign Office at the time, could not be more impressed than I was with the consciousness that if satisfactory relations were ever to be established with the Government and people, we must needs be content with improvement by slow degrees, and put up in the mean time with many shortcomings and not a few wrongs. Nothing, indeed, could be more opposed to the

whole tenor and spirit of my instructions, or less in harmony with my own sentiments and convictions, than a policy founded on coercion and carried out by menaces. I knew, moreover, that any rupture of the relations established by treaty would be regarded by Her Majesty's Government, and by the whole nation, with equal anxiety and regret, as a calamity which no effort should have been spared to prevent, and no future advantage could well compensate. And no one will envy the position of anxious responsibility in which my French colleague and myself were placed during the month following our withdrawal from Yeddo, in which time the question at issue was brought to a final solution in the only sense we desired.

The Japanese Government, exactly as I had anticipated, although manifesting considerable uneasiness and anxiety as to what might be the full import of our withdrawal and its consequences, very soon seemed to accept the status quo without making any effort to change our relations, once assured -as they soon were, and it is needless now to inquire how-that it did not mean war, or the commission of any act of coercion or hostility, present or prospective.

Against such tactics as these I had two resources, which had not entered into their calculation; the one was the possible arrival of Admiral Hope with a squadron on hearing of the critical state of affairs-rather a doubtful one, I confess, and the other a measure strictly within the conditions contemplated by treaties, but which, I could not doubt, would be supremely distasteful to the Government at Yeddo, so much so, indeed, that I could confidently look forward to their making great efforts and almost any sacrifice rather than see it carried out. Strong in this double reserve, one of which was entirely in my own hands fortunately, should the first one fail me, as was but too probable, I sat down in patient expectation, merely suggesting to the Governor at Kanagawa indirectly that if the Government at Yeddo wished to treat, they must send properly authorized agents, mentioning one of whom I had reason to think favorably, Sakai Wookionoske, a member of the Second Council of State, who had frequently taken part in my conferences with the Ministers.

I was not at all surprised to learn that this was considered impossible; and a vain attempt was made to get into communication with us by means of two Governors of Foreign Affairs sent down for that purpose. They were informed, both by my colleague and myself, that we could enter into no communication until a written answer had been received from the Ministers. It was farther intimated through the Japanese Sec

retary of the British Legation, speaking in our joint names, that the present exceptional state of affairs was not without its dangers, and that the first step toward putting an end to it would be the Ministers placing before us distinct propositions as to the measures they were prepared to adopt for the better security of life, and, at the same time, to put an end to the system of alternate assassination and intimidation, which could no longer be tolerated. An official letter from the Ministers only arrived after a week had elapsed, couched in vague and unsatisfactory terms.

In the mean time, during my constrained residence in this infant settlement, I tried to turn it to some good account in the interest of the foreign residents and their location. And, in order to ascertain in the most satisfactory manner in what direction my efforts could most avail, I requested the Consul to call a public meeting of his countrymen, and ask them to furnish a statement of their principal grievances and subjects of complaint in precise terms, more especially as regarded the principal of them, such as the currency, the free exchange of produce, and the occupation of land, with reference to the arbitrary restrictions and official interference on the part of the Japanese authorities, of which many complaints had reached me. These, together with better security of life and property, a better custom-house administration, and certain local improvements in respect to roads, bridges, etc., seemed to exhaust the list of practical grievances in reference to treaty rights or privileges, and the interests of commerce.

And I may state here, that although many practical results were not possible within the month of my residence on the spot, the basis of an agreement with the Japanese authorities were established, from which, in the course of the year, many material changes for the better were finally derived, though not without reiterated efforts, after my return to the capital. What our actual position at the trading port was at this period may be seen by reference to the proceedings of the public meeting to be found in the Appendix.*

The letter of the Ministers bore date February 9, in which they assured me that the neglectful conduct of the Yaconins in Mr. Heuskin's case excited in them impatient sorrow; that it was indispensable measures should be adopted, but this could only be done properly after repeated deliberation, which would require time.

It was now for us to move, since it was obviously the intention of the Japanese Government to leave us fixed in the * See Appendix B.