Friendly admonition is very laudable, and of rare (great) use, but being upon all occasions immoderately used, or in public society, so as to encroach upon modesty, or endanger reputation; or when the person admonished is otherwise employed, and attent (intent) upon his business; or being delivered in an imperiously insulting way, or in harsh and opprobrious language; it became unsavoury (distasteful) and odious, and both in "shew" and effect resembles a froward, malicious exceptiousness (captiousness). "Twere infinite (It would take very long) to compute in how many instances want of due order, measure, and manner, do spoil and incommodate (disarrange) action. "Tis wisdom that applies remedy to these mischiefs. Things must be compared to, and arbitrated by, her standard, or else they will contain something of monstrous enormity; either strutting in unwieldy bulk, or sinking in defective scantness. If she do not fashion and model circumstances, they will sit ugly on the things that wear them, if she do not temper the colours, and describe the lineaments, the draughts of practice1 will be but rude and imperfect, and little resemble the true patterns of duty; but if she interpose and perform her part, all things will appear conformable (harmonious), neat, and delicate. 2. WIT.2 (FROM THE SAME WORK.) FIRST, it may be demanded what the thing we speak of is, or what this facetiousness doth import. To which question I (1) Draughts of practice and patterns of duty. The former are the sketches or drawings made to work by; the latter are the ideal models which ought to be realised in practice. (2) Burnett ("Specimens of English Prose Writers ") considers "the above definition of wit as probably the most wonderful passage to be met with in any language." This definition, or more correctly description, of wit seems to include humour also, and may be compared with Leigh Hunt's definition of both ("Wit and Humour "). "Wit is the arbitrary juxta-position of dissimilar ideas, for some lively purpose of assimilation, or contrast generally of both. Humour is a tendency of the mind to run in particular directions of thought or feeling more amusing than accountable." See note 2, p. 219. Humour formerly meant what we now call temperament, and a man was said to be of sanguine or phlegmatic humour, according as he was warm and lively, or cold in temperament. Thus when the humour was in excess, or when the sanguine temperament ran riot and produced all sorts of wild follies of speech, might reply as Democritus did to him that asked the definition of a man, ""Tis that which we all see and know." Any one better apprehends what it is by acquaintance, "then" I can inform him by description. It is indeed a thing so versatile and multiform, appearing in so many shapes, so many postures, so many garbs, so variously apprehended by several (different) eyes and judgments, that it seemeth no less hard to settle a clear and certain notion thereof, than to make a "pourtraict" 2 of Proteus, or to define the figure of the fleeting air. Sometimes it lieth in pat allusion to a known story, or in seasonable application of a trivial saying, or in forging an apposite tale : sometimes it playeth in words and phrases, taking advantage from the ambiguity of their sense, or the affinity of their sound: sometimes it is wrapped in a dress of humorous expression: sometimes it lurketh under an odd similitude: sometimes it is lodged in a sly question, in a smart answer, in a quirkish reason, in a shrewd intimation, in cunningly diverting or cleverly retorting an objection: sometimes it is couched in a bold scheme of speech, in a tart irony, in a lusty hyperbole, in a startling metaphor, in a plausible reconciling of contradictions, or in acute nonsense: sometimes a scenical representation 3 of persons or things, a counterfeit speech, a mimical look or gesture passeth for it: sometimes an affected simplicity, sometimes a presumptuous bluntness giveth it being: sometimes it riseth only from a lucky hitting upon what is strange, sometimes from a crafty wrestling [of] obvious matter (matter that lies in the way) to the purpose: often it consisteth in one knows not what, and springeth up one can hardly tell how. Its ways are unaccountable and inexplicable, being answerable to the numberless rovings of fancy, and windings of language. It is, in short, a manner of speaking out of the simple and plain way (such as reason teacheth and proveth things by), which by a pretty surprising then the man was called emphatically humorous, and the definition of humour became very nearly what Leigh Hunt describes it to be. Sometimes humorous indicated the prevalence of humour, or bad humour generally, as when Shakspere (in "As you Like It ") says, "the duke is humorous," meaning peevish and self-willed. See Trench's "Select Glossary," sub voce "Humour," and note 4, p. 100. (1) Several. See note 2, p. 149. (2) Pourtraict, fr. Fr. pourtraire, to draw-that which is pourtrait, drawn or delineated; the c preserves the connection with Lat. tractum, fr. wh. it comes. (3) Scenical representation, &c. This, it is obvious, is not wit according to any close definition of it that we can frame, but belongs rather to humour, if not more properly to drollery-which is a lower sort of humour. uncouthness1 (strangeness) in conceit or expression doth affect and amuse the fancy, stirring in it some wonder, and breeding some delight thereto. It raiseth admiration, as signifying a nimble sagacity of apprehension, a special felicity of invention, a vivacity of spirit, and reach of wit more than vulgar (common): it seeming to argue a rare quickness of parts, that one can fetch in remote conceits [which are] applicable; a notable skill, that he can dexterously accommodate them to the purpose before him, together with a lively briskness of humour, not apt to damp those sportful flashes of imagination. It also procureth delight, by gratifying curiosity with its rareness, or semblance of difficulty (as monsters, not for their beauty, but for their rarity; as juggling tricks, not for their use, but their abstruseness, are beheld with pleasure); by diverting the mind from its road of serious thoughts; by instilling gaiety and airiness of spirit; by provoking to such dispositions of spirit in way of emulation or complaisance; and by seasoning matters, otherwise distasteful or insipid, with an unusual, and hence grateful tang (twang, relish). 3. SPEECH. (FROM THE SAME WORK.) SPEECH is commonly judged the truest character 2 of the mind, and the surest test of inward worth; as that which discloseth the hidden man of the heart, which unlocketh the closets of the breast, which draws the soul out of her dark recesses into open light and view, which rendereth our thoughts visible, and our intentions palpable. Hence Loquere, ut te videam, Speak, that I may see you, or know what kind of man you are," is a saying, which all men, at first meeting, do in their hearts direct to one another: neither commonly doth any man require more to ground a judgment upon concerning the worth 66 (1) Uncouthness. Couth is a form of couthe, or cuthe, p.p. of O.E. conne, to know. So Chaucer "To serve halwes (shrines) couthe (known) in sondry londes." Uncouth, then, is unknown, strange, and, therefore, rude and awkward. See note 6, p. 25. (2) Character (fr. Gr. xаpaктýp, that which is cut or marked, applying therefore to the impress or stamp on coins, seals, &c., or to the mark or token impressed on a person or thing, by which he or it is distinguished from others. This is the exact force of the word above. or ability of another, than opportunity of hearing him to discourse for a competent time: yea often, before a man hath spoken ten words, his mind (i.e. the character of his mind) is caught, and a formal sentence is passed upon it; such a strict affinity and connexion do all men suppose between thoughts and words. From hence (from the fact) that the use of speech is itself a great ingredient into our practice, and hath a very general influence upon whatever we do, may be inferred, that whoever governeth it well, cannot also but well order his whole life. The extent of speech must needs be vast, since it is nearly commensurate to (with) thought itself, which it ever closely traceth, widely ranging through all the immense variety of objects; so that men almost as often speak incogitantly (without thinking) as they think silently (without speaking). Speech is indeed the rudder that steereth human affairs, the spring that setteth the wheels of action on going3 (a-going). The hands work, the feet walk, all the members and all the senses act by its direction and impulse; yea, most thoughts are begotten, and most affections stirred up thereby it is itself most of our employment, and what we do beside it is however (in a measure) guided and moved by it. It is the profession and trade of many, it is the practice of all men, to be in a manner continually talking. The chief and most considerable sort of men manage all their concernments (concerns) merely (altogether) by words; by them princes rule their subjects, generals command their armies, senators deliberate and debate about the great matters of state; by them advocates plead causes, and judges decide them; divines perform their offices (i.e. in church) and minister their instructions (ie. preach); merchants strike up their bargains, and drive on all their traffic. Whatever almost (almost everything), great or small, is 4 (1) Ingredient into, a Latinised use of the word, wh. is fr. Lat. ingredior, pres. p. ingrediens, stepping or going into. So Hale speaks of "those various temperaments that have ingredience and influence into him (man)." See note on incident into, p. 103. (2) Speech is indeed, &c. See James iii. 4, 5, where the tongue is compared to a "very small helm," by means of which great and wind-tost ships are turned about. (3) On-going-a-going. One of the last traces of this once common idiom. See note 5, p. 75. (4) Most thoughts begotten. The connection between thought and language here referred to opens up a wide field of speculation. Words which are by theory the slaves of our thoughts, often become in the end their masters; so that, as Barrow suggests, thoughts which, as representing the mind, ought to be the generative cause of language, are in fact produced by it. done in the court or in the hall, in the church or at the exchange, in the school or in the shop, it is the tongue alone that doeth it: 'tis the force of this littis machine that turneth all the human world about. It is indeed the use of this strange organ which rendereth human life, beyond the simple life of other creatures, so exceedingly various and compounded; which creates such a multiplicity of business, and which transacts it; while by it we communicate our secret conceptions, transfusing them into others (i.e. into the conceptions of others); while therewith we instruct and advise one another; while we consult about what is to be done, contest about right, dispute1 about truth; while, the whole business of conversation, of commerce, of government and administration of justice, of learning, and of religion, is managed thereby; yea, while it stoppeth the gaps of time, and filleth up the wide intervals of business, our recreations and divertisements (diversions), (the which do constitute a great portion of our life) mainly consisting therein, so that in comparison thereof, the execution of what we determine, and all other [practical] action, do take up small room; and even all that usually dependeth upon foregoing speech, which persuadeth, or counselleth, or commandeth it. Whence the province of speech being so very large, it being so universally concerned, either immediately as the matter, or by consequence as the source, of our actions, he that constantly governeth it well, may justly be esteemed to live very excellently. The idea of strife is common to these (1) Contest, dispute, combat, conflict. words, but the shades of meaning differ. the three others by both words and blows. "dispute about truth." Since no amount of fighting could settle it, it is equally correct to speak of a "contest about right," because we may settle the claim by appealing (con testari) to an umpire or judge, who will see right done. In a "conflict of opinions or of feelings," the combatants appear to be on equal terms, and the strife incidental, whereas in a "combat" there is something of preparation and set purpose involved, and there may be great disparity of force between the parties. (2) Persuadeth, &c. The gradation is noticeable-an equal may persuade another, a superior in years or wisdom may counsel, but a superior in rank or position has the right to command |