THE proposals contained in the Dutch Defences Bill on the subject of the fortification of Flushing have attracted attention all over Europe. Much diversity of opinion with regard to the question has made itself apparent in this country, and somewhat extreme views have found expression in certain quarters as to the effect which the scheme, supposing that it is carried out, may exert upon the strategical position of the United Kingdom in conceivable contingencies. By some, the contemplated action of the Netherlands with regard to the Scheldt is regarded as a grave menace to our national interests; by others, the project is attributed to a legitimate anxiety on the part of the responsible Ministers of The Hague to ensure that the neutrality of Holland shall not be infringed were a European war to break out in which the central and the western Powers found themselves in conflict. Some see the sinister influence of the diplomats of Berlin in the proposed step; others are satisfied that the plan merely stands for a wise measure of self-protection about to be undertaken by a small State which foresees that its territory may be made the battle- ground of formidable neighbours if the opportunity be afforded them. There is much to be said in favour of either point of view. But, whatever differences of

opinion with regard to the fortifying of Flushing may divide us, all of us who have studied the strategical situation under existing political conditions are at one in holding that the independence of Holland is a matter of vital importance to the United Kingdom.

It was a universally accepted principle of British statesmanship for more than a century, that our national security would be put to hazard were those portions of the Low Countries which are now included in the kingdom of Belgium to be incorporated in the territory of a great Power; and it was generally considered that the situation would be especially dangerous to this country were that region to be added to the French dominions. It was in obedience to this theory of defence policy that the Walcheren enterprise was undertaken in 1809, that an expedition was despatched to reduce Antwerp in 1814, and that the Cabinet of St James's took so prominent a part in bringing about the international settlement under which Belgium in 1839 was finally transformed into a perpetually neutral State under the guarantee of the five Great Powers. That principle, no doubt, still holds good up to a certain point; but the rise of Germany as a military, a naval, and a commercial empire has brought it about that to-day the main

tenance of the neutrality and of the independence of Holland are of even greater moment to the United Kingdom than the maintenance of the neutrality and of the independence of Belgium. The generation which has passed away rightly regarded an Antwerp in French hands as a pistol pointed at the heart of England. But we are coming to realise that a Rotterdam in the hands of Germany would be as grave a menace to our national existence in the future as a French fortified arsenal and dockyard on the Scheldt would have been during the half-century between Waterloo and Sedan, Treaty obligations of the most solemn kind pledge this country to defend Belgium from aggression. We have undertaken no such responsibility with regard to Holland, but the independence of that northern half of the Low Countries is, if possible, of even greater concern to us.

It is no secret that numbers of Germans look upon it almost as a matter of course that the Netherlands shall in due season become part and parcel of the Fatherland. Nor can it be denied that their ambition to swallow up the little State is a natural one. The control of the mouths of the Rhine, of the Meuse, and of the Scheldt, coupled with the acquisition of Dutch colonial possessions in many portions of the globe, which would accompany the annexation of Holland, would benefit German sea power almost incalculably, both in its commercial and its strategical sense, and would provide means

of expansion that are sorely needed in a land where the population is ever increasing by leaps and bounds. There is no secret about this. The Dutch are well aware that their independence is placed to a certain extent in jeopardy by the aspirations of their powerful neighbours; but they are justified in hoping that their independence may not be wrested from them unless they provide foreign nations with an excuse for intervening in Dutch concerns. Their statesmen perceive that an exouse for such interference might easily arise were the country to become involved in the quarrels of adjacent Powers. They realise that the maintenance of a strict neutrality in the event of a European war is imperative. They see the interests of the German Empire clashing in various directions with the interests of Great Britain and of France, and they cannot disguise from themselves the fact that this state of things may some day produce a conflagration against which it is their duty to take precautions in time. They are entitled to ask themselves by which side their neutrality is the more likely to be infringed, supposing such a conflagration were to break out.

The development of a system of railways in the Rhenish Provinces, which are evidently designed for strategical purposes, and the construction of elaborate sidings at a number of localities, which are of little importance except from the military point of view, on the

eastern side of the Belgian and Luxemburg frontiers, show unmistakably that Germany, in the event of war with France, proposes under certain circumstances to move at least a portion of her fighting forces through those neutralised States. Apart from questions of right and wrong, and leaving guarantees and pledges entirely out of consideration, there is no doubt some justification to be found for such a course of military action. Unless those defences can be avoided by making a movement through neutral territory, the chain of fortresses and barrier forts fringing the western side of the Franco- German frontier will render it almost impossible for the German armies to assume at once that vigorous offensive in which their leaders trust. But were the campaign to take this form, the United Kingdom would be involved in the struggle, and the violation of Belgian neutrality would be met by the despatch of British troops to the Continent, in addition to resolute action at sea by the British Navy. Antwerp is one of the greatest seaports in the world. It possesses quays of vast extent, which are furnished with every convenience for the rapid disembarkation of troops and for the discharging of military stores. The city is, moreover, the focus of a diverging system of railways, and its environs are very strongly fortified. It furthermore is so situated geographically, that an army coming from over-sea and using it as a base,

would of necessity threaten the flank of military forces from Germany which were traversing the south-eastern districts of Belgium en route to the French frontier. This great emporium of modern commerce suggests itself, in fact, as in some respects an excellent startingpoint for our expeditionary force were the case of a violation of Belgian neutrality at the hands of German troops to arise. And of this the Dutch are well aware.

Now it so happens that the approaches to Antwerp from the open sea traverse Dutch territory. In consequence of this, the passage of our troops and warships through the lower Scheldt in time of war would be just as much an infringement of the neutrality of the Netherlands as a march of German German armies through the Ardennes would be an infringement of the neutrality of Belgium and of Luxemburg. The appearance of a British armada in this waterway under such circumstances would, in fact, place Holland in a position of extreme perplexity. It is not suggested that anything of the kind is contemplated by the experts who are responsible for drawing up our plans of naval and military action under various circumstances: a project of defending the neutrality of one country by violating the neutrality of another is on the face of it absurd. But we have no right to complain if the Dutch Government desires to make its country safe from the possibility of such outrages. It must be remembered that,

if the Netherlands were, under the supposed circumstances, to assent to our using the Soheldt, such assent would constitute an act of hostility against Germany, and would justify reprisals on the part of that Power; and even if the Dutch declined to sanction the arrangement, but failed to prevent it by force of arms, this might well afford Germany an excuse for sending troops into Holland to sustain that country in defending its rights. On the other hand, were assent to be refused, the refusal might involve the Dutch in difficulties with the United Kingdom, France, and Belgium.

It is obviously for the interest of a weak State, such as Holland is, to avoid becoming embroiled in the quarrels of its stronger neighbours, and the Dutch have every reason to wish that this awkward problem of the Scheldt shall not be raised at all in times of crisis. A fortress dominating the entrance into the channel practically puts an end to any projects which other Powers may be supposed to entertain with regard to using the estuary of the river for warlike purposes, and it of necessity obliges British naval and military authorities to give up any plans they may have had in mind-if they ever had such plans in mind-for using Antwerp as & military base, except with the full concurrence of the Netherlands. To assume that the Flushing project is an act of hostility towards this country, is to admit that this country pro

poses in certain eventualities to violate Dutch neutrality; for it must be remembered that batteries and mine-fields at the mouth of the Scheldt would not prevent our using the waterway if the nation to which it belongs sanctioned such action.

But it is not only in the Scheldt that the Dutch may foresee possibilities of the United Kingdom, or of the United Kingdom acting in concert with France, infringing the neutrality of their country. Assuming the present naval preponderance of the British Empire over Germany to be maintained, then our warships, or our warships in conjunction with the French fleet, ought to be able to drive the German marine off the high seas. But the maritime situation would in all likelihood be such that the allies would stand in need of an advanced naval base, within short steaming range of the estuaries of the Ems, the Weser, and the Elbe, for the use of their smaller fighting craft; and it may have occurred to the expert advisers of Queen Wilhelmina's Government that there are Dutch ports which provide localities well situated for this purpose. It is not suggested that we or the French have any intention of acting in this highhanded manner. But when statesmen in the Netherlands read writings on military subjects emanating from the United Kingdom which assume that Dutoh rights in the Scheldt can be ignored in time of war, they may conceive that those

rights might perhaps also be trampled upon at other points of the littoral. It will not be denied that Holland is seriously concerned in this matter, and it is therefore expedient to examine it from the Dutch point of view as well as from

our own.

It will perhaps be urged that Germany has & far greater temptation to violate the neutrality of the Netherlands than the United Kingdom has. But is that the case? This is not a question of the absorption of Holland into the German Empire, nor of strategical situations which might arise were Holland a province of that empire. It is a question of the position of Holland as an independent State at a time when Germany is engaged in hostilities with France and the United Kingdom. Now, it may be suggested that if German armies marched through Luxemburg, the Netherlands, as one of the Powers guaranteeing the neutrality of that duchy, would be bound to take up arms. But a country of such limited military military and naval resources as Holland could hardly be expected to take action in such an event unless vital national interests were involved-which is not the case. Then, again, it may be suggested that if Germany found it necessary to send her troops through Belgium and Luxemburg, she might also find it expedient to send them through Dutch territory, and this aspect of the question deserves a brief examination.

VOL. CLXXXIX.-NO. MCXLV.

On the eastern bank of the Meuse a tongue of Holland extends southwards to near Aix-la-Chapelle, and a glance at a small scale-map will convey the impression that it might be convenient for German troops to oross this tongue on their way to Belgium. Such a course of action would seemingly permit them to advance on a somewhat broader front, although nothing obviously would be gained unless the troops thus violating Dutch neutrality crossed the Meuse below Liége. Liége and Namur are, however, formidable fortresses, which the invaders could not hope to gain possession of by assault; so that a German contingent

thus traversing Dutch territory and crossing the Meuse, would find itself separated from the rest of the army by a formidable line of permanent Belgian defences. The wisdom of a divided advance of this character would be very much open to question in any case; but it has the additional drawback that it might range the Dutch on the side of Germany's enemies, and that it would certainly raise very very inconvenient questions with regard to the status of the Netherlands as a neutral Power.

Then there is a very important point which is sometimes overlooked in this country. As long as Holland remains independent, it will be for the interests of the German Empire, when opposed to a stronger maritime coalition, that the Dutch should remain strictly

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