arsenals was also adopted. Lord Clarendon pointed out that the maintenance of an arsenal of the first class at Nicolaieff, though not on the shores of the Black Sea, would justify public opinion in attributing to Russia intentions which she cannot entertain." Upon this the first plenipotentiary of Russia replied "that the Emperor, his august master, on acceding with sincerity to the propositions of peace, firmly resolved strictly to carry out all the engagements resulting from them; . . . that in order at once to provide for his engagements and for the requirements of the naval service, the Emperor intends only to authorize the construction at Nicolaieff of the vessels of war mentioned in the bases of the negotiation." Further, Count Orloff agreed to the insertion of his declaration in the Protocol, adding that, to prove his sincerity, the Emperor requested a free passage through the Bosphorus and Dardanelles for the two ships of the line which alone were then at Nicolaieff, and which would have to proceed to the Baltic as soon as peace was concluded.

Thus, the Black Sea, which washes the southern coasts of Russia, was neutralized, and no ships of war beyond the number of six, and these of a small size, were permitted to appear in the waters of the Euxine.

No doubt, this was a humiliation to Russia. All other Powers were free to have what navy they pleased within their own waters. For fourteen years Russia was made an exception, and, until recently, had quietly submitted to the restraint imposed upon her. She took advantage, however, of the supposed annihilation of the French power by the capitulation of Metz to announce her intention no longer to abide by the Treaty of 1856, so far as it related to the neutralization of the Black Sea, and henceforth to treat the provisions of it which had that end in view as of no force. Europe was struck with astonishment at the effrontery of this declaration. There was no indisposition any where to reconsider the stipulations of the treaty in the interest of Russia, nor to relieve her from the pressure of such of them as were penal in their nature, on the understanding that all the parties to the treaty should be properly invoked to give their consent to that release. But Earl Granville, on the part of this country, led the way in protesting against the assumed right of any one signatory to set aside at his own will an international agreement made between several Powers, and dealt with the announcement of Russia as of no effect.

In assuming a right to abolish her own treaty engagements, there can be no doubt that Russia counted upon some general understanding she had arrived at with Prussia, that the latter Power would assist her in effecting her wishes. She deprived herself, however, of the benefit which it might have given her, by her own impatient and premature action. Count Bismarck, no less than the leading statesmen of other European Powers, was taken by surprise. Prussia had enough upon her hands to task all her energies to the utmost, without precipitating another war, in which

Count Bismarck, moderate, and pro

she would have been held bound to take part. therefore, counselled Russia to be patient and posed the convening of a Conference as the likeliest means of achieving without offence, and with the full concurrence of all the signatory Powers, the object upon which she had set her heart. Finding herself alone as to the method she had adopted for gaining her ends, she listened to reason, and consented to ask as a boon what she had previously declared her intention of taking as a right. Invitations were thereupon issued by Earl Granville to the other signatory Powers, all of which consented to attend, on the full understanding that they should enter the Conference wholly unpledged.

Some delay arose in the assembling of the Conference in consequence of the anomalous position of France. The provisional nature of the existing Government had not, it is true, prevented France from being represented at this gathering of Plenipotentiaries, inasmuch as a formal invitation was sent to the Government of Defence, and accepted by that Government: but M. Jules Favre, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, whom his colleagues requested to appear for France on the occasion, felt himself unable to quit the side of General Trochu at the moment when Paris was undergoing actual bombardment. No one could blame him for the reluctance he expressed to quit the spot on which the primary duties and responsibilities of his office called for his continued presence. Hence the adjournment of the Conference, at first without any attempt to enter upon the business for which it was convened. The French Ministry at first demanded that the question of the war and the position of France should be brought before the Conference. To this Lord Granville was unable to assent. Dreading the delay, which, in the best of cases, must ensue in the despatch of a Plenipotentiary from France, he suggested the appointment of M. Tissot, the Chargé d'Affaires in London. All the other Powers had appointed as their Plenipotentiaries their representatives at the English Court. A most unpleasant delay, and the lamentable absence of a representative of France from a great European Council would have been spared had Lord Granville's advice been accepted. On the 18th of December, 1870, Lord Granville received a formal intimation that a French Plenipotentiary would present himself at the Conference. On the 23rd the official invitations were sent out from the Foreign Office, among others to M. Tissot as the substitute for the French Plenipotentiary. The day of meeting was fixed for the 3rd of January, 1871.

The French Plenipotentiary chosen was M. Jules Favre, and M. de Chaudordy, in announcing his name to the English Government, begged that it would obtain a pass out of Paris for M. Favre from the Prussian head-quarters, and that the Prussians should communicate for this purpose with the besieged city. Lord Granville replied that the Prussians had determined to send no more flags of truce, in consequence of some recent alleged acts of treachery on the

part of the French, and that the application for a safe conduct must come from M. Favre. A weary game of cross purposes followed. Count Bismarck was not very obliging, and M. Favre was irritated and wayward. It finally became clear that M. Favre did not mean to attend, and Lord Granville on the 6th of January recapitulated in a despatch to Lord Lyons the efforts he had made to secure the presence of a French representative at the Conference. As the best means of supplying this void Lord Granville affirmed that, whatever the decision of the Conference, it should be ultimately left open for the adhesion of France, and that before and after each sitting the course of business should be communicated to the French Chargé d'Affaires.

The Conference was postponed to the 17th of January, in the hope of obtaining the presence of M. Favre. Lord Granville was desirous to postpone the meeting longer, but the Austrian and Turkish Ministers deprecated delay. At the first sitting only the general question of international law was debated, and all the Powers represented signed a note expressly repudiating the right of any single Power to retreat from a Treaty without the previous consent of its co-signataries, or a majority of them. The discussion of the Treaty was adjourned to the 26th, by which time it was hoped M. Favre might arrive. But the emergency at Paris had now become so terrible that M. Favre no longer desired to leave the city, and the result was that the other European Powers were compelled to meet and discuss the Eastern Question without the assent or co-operation of France.

The correspondenee which led to the Conference was laid before Parliament soon after its meeting. It was on the 9th of November that Baron Brunnow communicated to Lord Granville a Circular Note, sent at nearly the same time to the other Powers who signed and guaranteed the Treaty of Paris, and also a despatch addressing its arguments more particularly to the English Government. The purpose of the Note was to declare that the Czar felt himself no longer bound by the provisions of the Treaty of Paris signed by himself and the Sultan, and that he withdrew from the joint Convention appended to the Treaty, which prescribes the size and number of war vessels to be maintained by the two Powers within the Straits. It is worth while to cite Article XIV. of the Treaty itself:— "Their Majesties the Emperor of all the Russias and the Sultan having concluded a Convention for the purpose of settling the force and the number of light vessels necessary for the service of their coasts which they reserve to themselves to maintain in the Black Sea, that Convention is annexed to the present Treaty, and shall have the same force and validity as if it formed an integral part thereof. It cannot be either annulled or modified without the assent of the Powers signing the present Treaty."

Prince Gortschakoff's Circular, dated "Tsarskoé-Sélo, October 19-31, 1870," distinctly intimated the intention of the Czar to violate the last-cited clause. It began by insisting that recent

changes in the settlement on which the European balance of power rested had compelled Russia to review her political position. The part of that settlement which most directly affected her was the Treaty of 1856; a Convention appended to it limited the naval power of Russia in the Black Sea, and the Treaty, in return, neutralized that Sea. But while the former portion of the arrangement effectually weakened Russia, the latter was plainly powerless to protect her. Turkey was not restricted in her navy in the Archipelago or the Straits, nor England and France in the Mediterranean. As the Straits were only closed, by Treaty, in time of peace, Russia was always exposed on a declaration of war to be attacked on her coast-line even by a weaker State at a disadvantage—a disadvantage rendered the more oppressive by the introduction of ironclad vessels of war since 1856, and the consequent increased difficulty of improvising defence. Urging so far the unequal operation of the neutralization policy, Prince Gortschakoff went on farther to point out that the Treaty of 1856 had been violated in important particulars. Moldavia and Wallachia, the position of which had been fixed and guaranteed by the Treaty, had been permitted to pass through revolution into union, and to elect a foreign prince. "The representative of Russia," added the Prince, "was the only one who raised his voice to remind the Cabinets that by this tolerance they would be departing from the distinct stipulations of the Treaty." Furthermore, on several occasions the neutrality of the Black Sea had been violated under various pretexts by the admission of warvessels and even "whole squadrons," within the Straits. The Czar, in view of these facts, "could not admit, de jure, that Treaties violated in several of their essential and general clauses should remain binding in other clauses" directly affecting the "interests of his empire," nor could he "admit, de facto, that the security of Russia should depend on a fiction which has not stood the test of time." His Imperial Majesty therefore declined to recognize any longer the neutralization of the Black Sea, and withdrew from the Naval Convention, restoring, at the same time, to the Sultan the full exercise of his rights, and "loyally informing" the other Powers of his action. He added an assurance that "he" had no wish to revive the Eastern Question, that he adhered to the principles of the Treaty of 1856 as fixing the position of Turkey, and was ready to enter into any understanding to this effect with the other Powers.

A despatch designed to justify the Circular to the English Government was handed at the same time to Lord Granville by Baron Brunnow. It referred to the negotiations for a Conference in 1866, when it was urged on the part of Russia that the occurrence of certain eventualities modifying the status quo in the East must lead to a revision of the Treaty. Lord Russell at the time admitted that any such change in the situation must be followed by a change in the obligations imposed on the Powers. These eventualities had not occurred; but it will not be disputed, the Prince affirmed, that

the manner in which Roumania has become independent has been an infringement of the Treaty, which casts doubt on its binding force. The Emperor's decision implied no change in his Eastern policy, or in his perfect accord with England," the best guarantee for the preservation of peace and the balance of power in Europe." On the same day that these despatches were received by him, Lord Granville hastened to inform Sir A. Buchanan, our Ambassador at St. Petersburg, of the fact, adding that, considering the importance and suddenness of the communication, he had declined to make any reply without consulting his colleagues. The Government were determined, he said, "to measure their words on all questions involving international difficulties, so that there might not be the slightest chance of their going beyond that to which they intended strictly to adhere." On the following day the Foreign Secretary was able to make a longer and more weighty communication. Recapitulating Prince Gortschakoff's complaints and final declaration, Lord Granville said :

"An allegation is made that certain facts have occurred which, in the judgment of Russia, are at variance with certain stipulations of the Treaty, and the assumption is made that Russia-upon the strength of her own judgment as to the character of those facts-is entitled to release herself from certain other stipulations of that instrument."

If a Power bound by Treaty can renounce a part of its obligations, he argued, it may renounce the whole. In the present case the question was not whether the claims of Russia to be released are reasonable, but whether one party to a Treaty may, of its own accord and without discussion, announce its immunity from some or all of its provisions. The right of releasing any party has ever been held to belong, not to one, but to all the parties; and Prince Gortschakoff's doctrine would lead to "the entire destruction of Treaties in their essence." Treaties are agreements made binding by a partial surrender of the free will of each party, but if each may at pleasure bring back the subject into his own control, the surrender and binding force of the arrangement clearly becomes illusory. The expressed intention of Russia to abide by the rest of the Treaty was, in this point of view, as objectionable as her renunciation of the obnoxious clauses for it was merely an intimation of her individual free will, which she may at any time alter. The Powers, then, had nothing to do with the desire of Russia to be released from her former engagements; they had to consider "whether they are to accept from her the announcement that, by her own act, without any consent from them she has released herself from a solemn covenant." Lord Granville expressed "deep regret" at the opening of a discussion which "might unsettle the cordial understanding" between England and Russia, but he firmly refused "to give any sanction to the course announced by Prince Gortschakoff." If Russia had made complaint of the alleged infractions of the Treaty, or had protested against the severity of its pressure in altered circumstances, the