are yet to learn, that the commissioners of lunacy have given general dissatisfaction to the public, otherwise than by the costliness of their operations, which, it is but fair to add, is not within their controul. Of the argument connected with the Welsh judges, we have already disposed.

'Observer' thinks, that the new appointments will be mere jobs. We think that if they be, the system will fail at once, and that for such failure no person can be more responsible than the Lord Chancellor, the very parent of the measure. This will, indeed, be a marvellous inconsistency.

The expence of the new plan is much insisted upon, both by Observer' and Mr. Raines. Let us take it at the outside of the amount, with all its exaggeration, calculated by the latter, that is to say at 220,000l. per annum. The question is, whether the country will pay that sum by way of public tax, for the purpose of bringing home justice to every man's door, or whether it will consent to the permanence of a system, fraught with the evils so forcibly depicted in the Chancellor's speech? Would it not be better for each tax payer to add a shilling or two, though it could not possibly be so much, to his present contributions to the State, and thus secure an efficient and economical administration of justice, rather than be exposed to the danger of losing hundreds and thousands of pounds in the year, by the continuance of abuses which directly, or indirectly, affect and injure all classes of real and personal property? If any doubt be entertained upon this subject, let the question be put to the country, through its representative, the house of commons, and let them answer for the result. We may, however, observe, that the expence of the new courts could not possibly exceed 150,000l. per annum, and that of this sum at least 50,000l. per annum would be saved to the country, or rather, indeed, transferred to the new courts, by the extinction of the courts of request and conscience.

Another objection in which the two writers coincide is, that the Bill uniformly lays the venue in the district in which the defendant resides,-in other words, that a creditor must follow his debtor, wherever he dwells, which, in many cases, would be inconvenient, as well as expensive and unreasonable. The Bill certainly does propose this, although it gives to the parties the power of agreeing otherwise. But it also says, that actions may be brought in the district wherein the cause of action, or some part thereof, hath arisen. At present, local actions must be brought in the county in which the cause of action has arisen; and transitory actions may be brought in that county, or any other, at the option of the plaintiff. But the defendant, if he pleases, may, in transitory actions, compel the plaintiff to fix the venue in the county wherein the cause of action arose; so that the Bill proposes nothing materially different, in this respect, from the existing practice. There must be some criterion to determine the jurisdiction, and to afford a

rational safeguard against caprice or vindictiveness, on either side.

Both Observer,' and Mr. Raines, make several objections of detail, most of which are equally applicable to the present system, with all its additional expence and delay. These objections we shall not notice, as they merely shew, that at best, the new courts cannot be wholly free from imperfection. They would not be human if they were. All that can be done by the wisest legislators, is to compromise, as well as they can, between good and evil -to retain in their institutions, as much of the former, and as little of the latter, as the agency of men, which cannot be dispensed with, will permit.

There is a striking coincidence between Observer,' and Mr. Raines, as to the remedy for redressing some of the grievances which they acknowledge to exist. Both recommend the extension of the jurisdiction of the county courts, generally, to 107., apparently flattering themselves, that such a change as this, would be sufficient to meet all the real evils of the established system. Upon this point, we shall only observe, that Lord Althorpe's Bill, founded upon a plan nearly similar to theirs, failed to carry with it the feeling of the country; and that it was, for that reason, abandoned. Every body saw that it did not go far enough—that it did not even scotch the snake, much less kill it. The proposition is now renewed, merely for the purpose of creating a diversion from the only reformation that can be effectual.

The two writers coincide in another objection, which is of some weight. The Bill gives power to the parties, and, in certain cases, to the judge, to dispense with the assistance of a jury; and hence we have a great deal of good declamation, upon the constitutional nature of that famed tribunal, and its connection with liberty. We hold this institution in the greatest reverence, as we see in it a bulwark, without which the sovereignty of the people would be but an empty sound. At the same time, we can very well understand, that the assistance of a jury is not always necessary, to say that A. owes 201. to B. Among the transactions which take place between man and man, there are, every day, thousands of such a nature, that one head could decide upon their justice, or injustice, quite as well as twelve. If parties sometimes consent to have their disputes tried by the judge, without the intervention of a jury, as in all cases they must do, either expressly, or by implication, in order to authorise him to adjudicate alone, we do not see that the constitution is thereby exposed to any real peril. It is to be remarked, that the power is given, in no instance, to the judge alone, by his own arbitrary decree, to dispense with the jury. Such a power as this, would, undoubtedly, be dangerous, and highly improper. But it is neither dangerous, nor improper, that parties should have, and exercise, an option upon this point, as the insti

tution, being a popular one, it is not likely that the people will ever wantonly and mischievously abridge its functions.

;

The remarks of Mr. Raines, but particularly those of 'Observer,' upon the arbitration and reconcilement functions proposed to be given to the new judges, betray rather too earnest a disposition to find faults in every part of the Chancellor's plan. The first says, that Lord Tenterden's Bill sufficiently provides for references to arbitrators, chosen by the court or the parties. Perhaps it does but that Bill only applies to the superior courts. He says, that the principle of reconcilement has failed in France, in Holland, the Netherlands, Sweden, and Switzerland. We have already seen, upon Mr. Rey's authority, that the principle has not altogether failed to be of utility in France, and we have learned, from that lawyer, why it has not been more generally successful. With respect to Switzerland, Mr. Raines is at issue with the Edinburgh reviewer. We own that, upon this subject, we should prefer being guided by the experiment,-for it is no more than an experiment, which the Bill proposes to make in England, rather than by the assertions of any individuals, however respectable. It is clear that 'Observer' had not seen the Bill when he wrote his pamphlet ; for, if he had, he could never have fallen into the mistake of supposing, that, after the judge had been invested by the parties with the character of mediator, it would be competent to him to try the same cause of dispute in his judicial capacity. There is an express provision in the Bill to the contrary, which directs, that in case the parties do not wish to abide by the opinion of the judge before whom they appear in reconcilement, the matter is to be transferred to the judge of some adjoining district.

We do not find that any solid objection is made to the functions proposed to be given to the judges in ordinary, with respect to legacies not exceeding 100/. Mr. Raines thinks, that such functions might very well be exercised by the courts at Westminster. We think so too; but, within the limits stated, there can be no reason why the courts in ordinary should not have a concurrent jurisdiction, the object being to afford the middling and poorer classes every possible facility in recovering small bequests which may be made in their favour. The criticisms of Observer' upon this part of the plan resolve themselves into difficulties which, he supposes, will sometimes embarrass the judge in ordinary, in deciding upon particular classes of claims. The Bill clearly intends that those cases only, and they are of every day occurrence, which admit of being disposed of almost in a summary manner, shall be brought before the tribunal in question. Whenever they assume a complicated form, and involve matters not within his usual jurisdiction, the district judge may, with the consent of parties, direct a case to be stated for the opinion of the superior courts.

With respect to the power given to the new judge, to hear any

case in private, with the consent of parties, we apprehend that it will be universally approved of. He is not bound to act upon the agreement of the parties, if he think it essential to justice that the matter shall be heard in open court. We assume, that the power will be discreetly exercised; and that it will be directed in a safe course, between the sanctuary of private life and the constitutional vigilance of the community, removing the chance of publicity where it may be injurious to morality, and made a mere instrument of scandal, but never retiring from the public eye without the sternest necessity. The people, as a general rule, have a right to know every thing that passses in our courts of justice: concealment should never be resorted to, unless interests higher even than those of liberty should render it imperative, and then the general rule not only warrants, but demands the exception.

A good deal is said, and more is insinuated, in both the pamphlets under review, respecting the injurious effect which the reversal by a superior court of any decisions emanating from the judge in ordinary, is likely to have upon his character. Events of this kind have occurred, and will occur again, under the system at present established. The directions of judges of assize are sometimes overruled in Westminster-hall, and yet we do not find that the character of the individual, thus convicted of a mistake, suffers in public estimation. Those classes of the community, who are sufficiently enlightened to influence and mould public opinion in this country, are well aware that occasional error is inseparable from all human tribunals; they clearly understand that an incident of this kind cannot affect the reputation of any judge, unless it be of such frequent recurrence, as to fix upon his brow the stamp of utter ignorance and incapacity. In that case, he must fall from the bench upon which he has been so unworthily placed; but it does not follow that the bench should partake of his ruin. For our parts, we apprehend, that the cases likely to come before the judges in ordinary, will not require more penetration, learning, and good sense, than may be found in hundreds of barristers, who are not even of the standing required in the Bill. Many gentlemen belong to that profession, whose days, and nights too, are wholly spent in chambers, who are unknown beyond the limited sphere of college friends and acquaintances, but who, perhaps, if called into the public arena, would be found equal to any task requiring the vigour, the integrity, the comprehensiveness, and knowledge, of great and highly-polished minds. Mr. Raines, who, we believe, is a special pleader, knows this as well as we do; indeed, he speaks of the bar in language which it would not become us to use, though it is, certainly, not less accurate than eloquent. He says, that, the bar, in its present state, is justly celebrated for high honour, superior learning, and extended knowledge, forming a society of persons, such as no other country in the world can present, and whose influence on the community, both as private individuals, and as a public

body, is greater, perhaps, than that of any other class in it.' If this be true, the chances of appeals, disastrous in their result to the professional reputation of the new judges, must necessarily be of very rare occurrence. Nay, we should go farther, and say, that appeals from the ordinary to the superior courts will be few, in proportion to the number of cases which may be brought before them. In Scotland, it is ascertained, that the appeals from the courts of the sheriff's depute (in many respects analogous to those of which we speak) to the court of session, do not much exceed the average of one out of fifty-three; out of 22,000 cases which are annually disposed of by the local tribunals in that country, no more than about 400 are brought to the court of session. This number of appeals does not seem to have any effect upon the feelings of satisfaction, with which their economical administration of justice is contemplated by the people of Scotland, although the sheriff depute is, we believe, generally a barrister, who need be of only half the standing required in the Chancellor's Bill.

Mr. Raines appears to labour under an impression, that although the bar, in its present state, cannot be deteriorated by the establishment of the proposed courts, yet, in the course of time, they will cause its degradation, and degeneracy, from the high position which it now maintains. We cannot sympathise with him, upon this topic, because we think his apprehensions groundless. The new courts will, undoubtedly, form around them provincial, or rather, district bars, composed of gentlemen, most of whom will, probably, be eventually induced to reside, exclusively, in the country. But their education must be the same as it now is, or rather, it must be more liberal than it has hitherto been. At present a barrister, who aspires to eminence in his profession, must, for three or four years, at least, lose all recollection of those studies which enlarge and embellish the mind, in order to imbibe the technicalities of our mechanical system of special pleading. For many years after he is called to the bar, he may be in active business, without having an opportunity of even once addressing a jury. In Ireland, the practice is different; the junior for the plaintiff there, being uniformly charged with the duty of replying to evidence. But before a junior, in England, can expect to be placed in a similar situation, he must have dispossessed himself of the spirit of eloquence, if ever it visited his intellect, and have forgotten not only the graces of elocution, but even the common proprieties of diction. Experience may, afterwards, provide him with the common places which we daily hear in our courts of justice; but, unless his be a bold, as well as a gifted mind, beyond a tame mediocrity he never can ascend. The new courts, on the contrary, are, in no respect, calculated to stupify and degrade the intelligence that has orce frequented the haunts of the academy, and drank of the sacred fountains of ancient poetry and eloquence. We do not mean to say, or to express any wish, that those courts