tent that France should under- concerned before France creates take the "dirty work" in the a leverage for herself in the opening up of Morocco to Euro- capital that may upset future pean enterprise, and however deliberations. The fait acmuch it may hope to profit compli, as the Germans sarby the bitterness that French donically enough realised when action has engendered in the they made their official anMoorish mind, Germany is not nouncement of the Agadir unmindful of what has resulted project, always presents forcein Egypt from the vague and ful difficulties in the council indefinite mission that British chambers. The presence of the diplomacy then undertook. German warship at the mouth Germany has no intention of the Sus is a definite earnest that France's mission shall be that Germany intends the either indefinite or intermin- future of Morocco to be a able. The presence of the matter of International discusBerlin off Agadir is the first sion and arrangement. Also it earnest of this. The writer will serve the double purpose of is not sure that in the abstract providing a very accurate test of it is not really a kindly act. the value of the Anglo-French This may be a bizarre view entente, upon which pointneither to take, but it is probable Germany, nor yet France herthat the hot-headed Frenchmen self, nor ourselves, seem to be at the head of the Fez mission very certain. As to the matter are travelling too fast with of justification, unfortunately their pliable Sultan, and that France herself has furnished this is a reminder that there some justification. It has alare "wait-a-bit" thorns in this ready been stated in this paper Morocco question that are that upon the day that the worthy of consideration, and investment of Fez was raised, also that, though the occu- Dr Vassal, the German Consul pation of Fez by a French at Fez, had Colonel Mangin, army has given to France head of the French Military many of the responsibilities Mission, "stone dead." of conquest, yet it has con- this it was meant that Mangin, ferred upon her none of the with his head inflated by the rights. personal adulation that the In simple language, Germany Parisian Press had poured considers that the ascendancy upon him, permitted the which the French have now French-trained, French - offigained at the capital has reached the limit which German interests can afford. The first period indicated by the Algeciras Act expires this winter. It is expedient, therefore, to German ambitions that the question of Morocco be reopened by the Powers chiefly By cered troops of the Maghzen to descend upon the peaceful homesteads of the Uled Jamma tribesmen, and to burn, ravish, loot, and destroy as to them seemed sufficient. As the result of this atrocious licence, much property of British and German protected Moors was destroyed, and children of tender years were torn from their homes, and, after being ravished, were sold in the streets of Fez into lifelong slavery for a few silver coins. When officially remonstrated with by the representatives of friendly European Powers, the leader of the French Mission is said to have replied, "There are no rights of private life and property in a rebel country." There are There are other excesses upon the slate that have been permitted during the French control of Mulai Hafid's action. Reference need not be made to these. It will be sufficient for German diplomacy to say, which it can unfortunately say with truth, "But what guarantee have we that this self-imposed French régime is for the ultimate benefit of the people of the country? Here are the undisputed facts of what the French representatives have countenanced in the past-have supported, since those responsible have not been removed from their posts. Apart from equality of treatment in the matter of commercial interests, we must have international guarantees on humanitarian grounds." German diplomacy rarely makes a mistake, and it can be brutally frank when brutal frankness serves a purpose. It is almost certain that France is face to face with a situation when it will please German diplomacy to be frank, It knows what the effect of a humanitarian screech, if properly pitched, can have in this country. The presence of the German ship at Agadir, there fore, must be looked upon as a roughly-handled plug to join the circuit between the expiring Algeciras Agreement and the present French ascendancy with the Sultan at Fez. The impression that Germany has seized upon Agadir with the intention of claiming it in & subsequent partition of Morocco, is hardly a rational view to take of the incident at present. Those who lightheartedly talk of converting these open Moroccan bar-ports on the Atlantic seaboard, are recommended to study the Admiralty charts and sailing directions before they are carried away by their fears. It would not matter how many millions sterling Germany was prepared to spend on Agadir in converting it into a naval base; it would still be, to the intents and purposes of naval gunnery, an open port. It was Admiral Shamimura of the Japanese navy who said of naval bases, "Their strength is commensurate with their distance from the sea,"-an axiom which landsmen who discuss naval matters should inscribe well within their hearts. But even if Agadir could be converted into an inland haven,which all the wealth of the Indies could not effect, the value of such a detached coaling-station would be doubtful, since it connects with no line of supporting bases. Naval strategists tell us that detached havens, such as Wei-hai-wei, are a strategical weakness unless they are to be evacuated at the outbreak of war. The idea of the Germans dreaming of converting Agadir into a protected coaling-station from which the converted liners may emulate in the next great war the historical corsairs of Salee, and prey upon the world's shipping, seems to the writer fantastical, when anything that lay within a sea-wall, that it would take years and millions to build, could be comfortably shelled from below the horizon. It must not be thought that the writer is antagonistic to the supremacy of French interests in Morocco. Such is far from being the case. The question of Morocco, however, is not going to rest upon sentiment. The matter of any individual European Power having a supremacy in Morocco is a matter about which there can be no sentiment. It will only be settled in the hardest school of international bargaining. This will be rendered the more difficult by the fact that at least one Power is prepared to fight for the principles or selfish motives, if the phrase be more aptthat it is her intention to impose. Herein lies the gravity and delicate character of the situation, Moreover, the impression that rests with the one Power prepared to fight, is that the other two Powers chiefly concerned are not prepared to accept the gauntlet given in earnest. It is for this reason that one must regret that France has been so badly served by the members of the French Mission at Fez. These actions will enable German diplomacy to state a case against France's individual claims that one with a clear conscience cannot contravene. Such a knowledge weakens the convictions of a weak. backed ally, and German diplomacy is astute enough to know this. For the other part, we must have every admiration for the admirable way the relief force was commanded by General Moinier. The campaign was no easy one. It was replete with transport difficulties from the moment that the transports dropped anchor at Casablanca, Rabat, or Mehidya. These open anchorages, exposing the ships to the swell of the Atlantic, often delayed the discharge of cargo and troops for days. It is true that the fighting was not severe, since the Moor has been much overrated as an enemy. The difficulties of carrying sufficient food by camel transport, and the delicate handling of the unrebellious populace, were all operations that called for not only considerable military administrative efficiency, but a full quota of march discipline and political forbearance. All these qualities General Moinier and his staff possessed to the full; and if the whole of French policy in Morocco could be judged by the conduct of the relief operations, France could face German obstructions with equanimity. As to the troops of France's Colonial Army, they have called forth universal eulogiums from disinterested European observers. The Algerian Spahis and Tirailleurs are soldiers that France might well pit against 11 the best trained troops in as will be found in the Frontier Europe. The European Col- Army Corps. This, however, onial Troops, Artillery and is counterbalanced by experiInfantry, are, if anything, ence in war. The majority of better in moral than the simi- the officers have seen service. lar units of the line with their What is bad with the French shorter service. The Sene- Army is its sanitary-discipline galese, several battalions of on the march. This may be which were employed, are said to be practically nontroops which, if held in reserve existent. Although the army throughout a long day, could was reinforced and fed by a be employed for a close-combat single line of communication, issue at nightfall with wonder- no thought was ever taken ful effect. Like the Japanese for the poor unfortunates who Infantry at the beginning of might require the same camptheir war, they have a lust ing-ground for the morrow. for killing, the instinctive Pollution of water and general cruelty and courage of the insanitation were allowed to a rapacious beast of prey, the degree that would have renprimeval instinct that civilisa- dered our own sanitation officers tion denies to us of the West. speechless. The actual valour The general standard of the of the French officer and soldier officers of the French Colonial is, as it has ever been, above Army is not, perhaps, as high discussion. KEPI. WAR OFFICE REMINISCENCES. BY COLONEL C. E. CALLWELL, C.B. No public institution in the country probably comes in for more criticism than the War Office. A good deal of this criticism is perhaps not wholly undeserved; but an old hand who has learnt the disabilities under which it often suffers, and who is aware of the unobtrusive labours of its staff, military and civilian, realises how often adverse judgments on the department are arrived at under misapprehension, and recognises that sins are frequently laid to its charge which have in reality been committed by other branches of the public service. Even soldiers often scoff at decisions and enactments emanating from Whitehall, who would be the first to admit their wisdom if fully acquainted with all the factors which have been taken into consideration when coming to a conclusion. It is the case, indeed, that one of the strongest objections which can be raised against the too common practice of moving particular officers on from one appointment to another in the office, so that they spend a considerable portion of their career within its portals, is that this practice tends to limit the numbers who pass through the mill. There can be no question but that experience at Headquarters tends to develop a sense of proportion when surveying military problems in general, and that officers who attain high rank without ever having held a War Office appointment are at a a disadvantage in consequence-at least in peace time. These, however, are matters of high policy. In looking back upon two somewhat prolonged periods spent in the department, it is rather the mistakes one made from time to time and the absurdities which occasionally occurred within its precincts that come to mind. The Intelligence Department was located in Queen Anne's Gate in the later 'eighties, when I joined it to serve under General Brackenbury, to whom it owes so much of the efficiency which it has enjoyed ever since he took over charge. Those were the days when the Khalifa was dominating what is now the Anglo- Egyptian Sudan, and, as intelligence work in connection with Egypt was my special province, questions of live interest were constantly passing through my hands. Private letters telling of battle, murder, and sudden death used to reach me almost weekly from the then Head of the Intelligence Department of the Egyptian Army, Major Wingate, who rules to-day as Sirdar and Governor-General-a benevolent, prescient, progressive despot-over what is perhaps the best-governed country in the world. Osman Digna is |