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few volumes more facts, than many much larger works. The fourth volume contains a rich collection of literature, and of quotations, and proves the profound knowledge, which the author has of sources. Yet to him, every action is a mere occurrence, a phenomenon, to whose internal nature, purpose, or design, the author feels entirely indifferent, so that that truth, on account of which alone we study church history, does not every where appear. Both Engelhard, and Gieseler desire to give pure history and nothing else, to attach fact to fact, without expressing any opinion of their own. This is laudable and noble ; yet the mere facts and their arrangements do not give a full history.

Evangelical School.

In a former paragraph, I have alluded to the fact, that both Rationalists and Pietists coincided in the wish, that church history should be impartial. They remained united, however, only until this impartiality was converted into indifference, and finally into anti-christianism, when a reaction took place in the bosoms of the Pietists, against the Rationalists. At first Milner's work, whose design was practical christianity, satisfied their wishes; afterwards a more poetical representation was looked for, since the shallowness, the dry and lifeless manner of the rationalizing school, had on this point also, caused a counThis desire found its satisfaction in Stollberg's large history, though it was written in the spirit of Catholicism. Stollberg (born 1750, d. 1810), Die Geschichte der Religion Jesu Christi, 18 vols., 1811-18, continued by Kerz, 7 vols., 1824-31. Works however, like those of Stollberg and Milner, wanted a solid foundation, and it was only Neander that gave this school, whose friends might be called Supernaturalists, a scientific character. We are struck at once with the learning of Neander, his thorough acquaintance with historical fountains, and his independent investigations into antiquities, which frequently produce entirely new results, confirm what was before doubtful, and explain what had already been acknowledged. He has likewise entered regions inaccessible, or unknown before, as may especially be seen from the third volume of his work. It is on this account that his history must become voluminous, though it is the great art of historiography, to select from the large mass of materials what is most important, and to

connect with ease, what has been gained by labor and perseverance; to articulate facts, as in an organization, of which one member supports another. In this latter respect, Neander has not perhaps been so successful as others. The design of his work is the edification of the reader, and he endeavors to effect this by the whole representation, and occasionally by pious and devotional reflections. Personal piety is his highest aim, and he desires to show its development in historical characters, as qualified by circumstances and education, and to exhibit how, from this individual piety—which in his view is peculiar in every person, according to the disposition, intellect, etc. -many differences in doctrine have proceeded. Hence he does not acknowledge the idea of the christian church in the common sense of the term, nor a perfect agreement in faith, but considers symbolical books a misfortune, limiting the free cultivation of individual piety, in which every one would have a faith of his own, though derived from the one faith.

In the latter respect, the recently published work of Guericke may be said to be more definite, and more decided. In the opinion of Neander, it matters little whether a man is an Arian, a Nestorian, or a Calvinist, if he be only pious: Guericke regards symbolical books as necessary, and is a zealous Lutheran. He desires a union between church and State, whilst Neander is strongly opposed to an established church. Guericke admits that the church should be a visible body. Neander is in favor of no constitution. Guericke's design is likewise to promote personal piety, and to oppose Rationalism, both in its frivolity, and indifference. Yet he dwells less on the development of piety in individuals, than on the life of the church; her spirit lives in him, as his history testifies, though in the form of feeling, and not in that of pure science, which, if the right kind, includes the former.

12. Influence of the so called "newest philosophy" on Historiography.

The results of Jacobi's and Kant's philosophy were the same with regard to religion, as I have mentioned in a former paragraph; but there was a great difference in the process, by which they attained them. What Jacobi called "faith" was based on an instinctive feeling, that constrains us to believe, and the term "faith" was according to him to be extended even to

empirical and sensual knowledge. We must believe that things are as they appear, or else question our knowledge of them. Kant's "faith" on the other hand originated in the postulates of the so called practical reason, or of the moral sense. With the followers of the latter, after they attempted to reconcile the demands of Rationalism with revelation, reason became the medium, by which to try the truth of a dogma, so that revelation was considered true, if it revealed nothing contrary to reason; while its truths, like the light of the sun to the nature of the eye, would conform to the wants of reason. As, however, the light is the medium, through which alone the eye is enabled to see, and on which it depends for sight, so reason is entirely dependent for eternal truth on revelation. Those on the other hand, who embraced Jacobi's system, made religious feeling, whose seat was the heart, the touchstone of every revealed truth, and the source of all piety. The immediate effects of Kant's opinions on historiography gave it a more moral tendency; the extreme, to which this was carried, called forth the opposite, and instead of a history made up of psychological reasoning, we receive one, in which facts are attached to facts, without ever polluting historical truth by intermingling individual opinion. Neander and his school, on the other hand, united the spirit of Pietism with the principles of Jacobi. The soul of faith according to them is personal conviction. Whatever faith be, if it be based on conviction, it is sufficient. This conviction must rest on religious feeling, which imperatively demands acquiescence in it; yet qualified by this feeling, which differs in every one, it must be peculiarly characterized in each Christian, and should it, therefore, be forced into a dogmatical system, or be modelled by symbolical books, it would be cramped, and its free development would be impeded.

Hegel's school, that again insists on the necessity of symbolical books, and on preserving their binding authority, opposes that of Neander. Without entering however further into particulars, I shall try to give in as few words as possible, a sketch of the manner, in which Hegel's school desires ecclesiastical history to be written.

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The idea of the church, as existing in Christ, and in its

Without pretending to give in a short note an accurate definition of the term "idea," as used with a slight shade of difference by Schell ing and Hegel, I intend only to show by an imperfect comparison the

eternal nature being invisible and unchangeable, beyond space and time, becomes visible by the grace of God in doctrines, discipline and rites, thus receiving existence on earth, has an external history, for it is the nature of life and of spirit, that what they contain in the abstract they unfold and manifest. This idea of the church, as existing in Christ, is without differences or oppositions, is a totality, a unity, one whole. But accominodating itself to the consciousness of man, in which it exists spiritually, it shoots forth many branches, and develops itself in many degrees and under many forms, yet in each of them it is contained, and that which affiliates them, and thus makes them members of the same body, is the eternal idea of the church, from which all proceed. This historical development of the idea of the church does not alter it, nor change any thing in it, but serves to render it more clear, more distinct, more manifest by exhibiting it under many different aspects, in all of which it is the same, though none of them contains it fully. As one life pervades root, trunk, branches, leaves, blossoms and seed, as one

sense, in which it is to be understood above. We speak of genera and species, in the animal world. These genera are not the products of a mere arbitrary division, which man made for his convenience; they do not exist merely in our thoughts and through them, but they exist really, and every genus preserves itself in its species and its individuals from time to time. The genus as such, is invisible (the mere potentia, dvvάus) but in developing itself, (in proceeding from dvváus to vegysia, from polentia to actus) it produces species and individuals, in which it becomes visible. If we now would classify animals, we can do it only by referring the single individuals to their genus, by which they are distinguished from other individuals. This genus is the same as "idea," comprising all its species and individuals under it. Living and becoming visible in its species and individuals, it is, however, more than they, and no single individual is the genus itself, though each contains it. If now all genera again are considered in subordination to one, that is highest, then this will be the idea, which runs throughout all of them. Compare Bockshammer on the Freedom of the Human Will, translated by Kaufman, p. 18, note.

It is extremely difficult, even for those who are intimately acquainted with the German genius, to understand Hegel's philosophy, and it seems to me, that it would be utterly impossible to any one, who would not be willing to spend years in studying it. Without eulogizing this system, or any philosophy, I would say, that Hegel opposes nothing so strongly as Pantheism. Every page of his works goes to prove this.

blood pulsates in all the members, so all the different portions of the visible church on earth are penetrated by the idea of the invisible church. This idea is not only the centre, but lives also in the periphery, which springs forth from it. It is not only the fountain of all light, but springing forth, remains in contact with itself in all its expansions.

Neander likewise makes the idea of the invisible church the principle of historiography, but maintains that the visible church on earth is at variance with this idea, that consequently it is not the product of the latter, but of opinions and actions, which depend on a combination of circumstances.

The first and most indispensable requisite in the historian, according to Hegel's school, is not only the acknowledgment of this idea of the invisible church as realizing itself in history, but to exhibit all ecclesiastical actions and all systems of divinity as proceeding from it or as being at least indirectly qualified by it, not indeed in an abstract way, but by being communicated to the mind of man and by living and acting in it. The historian must resist the desire to handle history according to his views, make decisions of his own and the like, but must yield all personal wishes and opinions (ne inferas, sed efferas) to the truth of the idea of the church, which has articulated itself into comprehensive epochs, before ever an historian thought of dividing it; just as the natural historian does not divide the tree into trunk and branches, but the life in the tree has performed this function itself, and the natural historian has only to observe this and to follow. Thus the study of ecclesiastical history would become the same as that of pure systematical divinity, with the only difference, that the various parts of truth appear frequently in history according to the fullest development of which they are susceptible, when they strike a nation or some of its individuals more forcibly than all the others. Hence ecclesiastical history aids and illustrates systematical divinity. Neither must the historian ever indulge the opinion, that any event in church history could have been otherwise than it really occurred, as if any actions or series of actions were accidental; it is much more the triumph of historiography to prove that the different periods and their regular succession were necessary, as it is necessary for the seed first to sink the root into the soil, and then shoot forth its trunk, and afterwards the branches, etc. But whilst each period of ecclesiastical history was necessary, none can claim the privilege to be the last, but must suffer itself in the progress of time, and of

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