LETTERS

ON THE

PHILOSOPHY OF THE HUMAN MIND.

LETTER I.

M. COMTE ON PSYCHOLOGY.

In the conclusion of my Second Series of Letters on the Philosophy of the Human Mind, I held out to you a promise, that if I should live to publish another series, I would examine Comte's doctrine that the direct contemplation of the mind by itself is a pure illusion, and that hence there can be no such science as the so-called Psychology.*

ones.

He goes on to tell us that the human mind can observe directly all phenomena but its own proper For by what or by whom shall the observation be made? It is conceivable, with regard to moral phenomena, that man can observe him self as to the passions which animate him, for the

Cours de Philosophie Positive, par M. Auguste Comte, tome i. p. 35.

anatomical reason that the organs which are their seat are distinct from those destined to the observing functions.

Such observations, however, cannot, he holds, be of much scientific importance, and the best means of knowing the passions will be to observe them externally, for all marked state of passion is necessarily incompatible with the state of observation.

But as to observing in the same way the intellectual phenomena while they are passing, there is in it a manifest impossibility. The thinking individual cannot divide himself into two, one of which shall reason and the other look on. The observed and observing organs being in this case identical, how can the observation take place?

The passage in Comte's Positive Philosophy of which the above is a faithful representation, appears to me to abound in errors, and errors, too, lying on the surface. I marvel that a man of his powers could fall into such transparent fallacies.

These errors combined show an utter misconception of the way in which the knowledge of our own minds arises, and prove, at the same time, the danger of indiscriminately applying to purely mental phenomena the language which originates in our perception of what is external- an application which our author makes with unsuspecting intrepidity. A great part of Comte's argument, it

*The original text is given in Note A at the end of the present volume.

will doubtless have been remarked, turns on the word "observe."

If we borrow this term from the cognisance we take of external things, and apply it to that which we have of mental conditions, we must bear in mind that, like other language used to designate the incidents of thought and feeling, it is figurative; and we shall grievously err if, from the analogy implied in the term, we proceed as a matter of course to impose upon internal phenomena consequences which may be truly enough ascribed to those external events to which the term is literally applicable.

We "observe" external things, says M. Comte, through the eye, while we do not see the eye itself, nor the picture on the retina, or, to express the latter proposition in common but erroneous language, the eye does not "observe" itself. The fact, howsoever it may be described, is admitted.

It is admitted, too, that we may use the same term "observe" in speaking of mental phenomena: we may correctly enough say that we "observe " internal states and operations.

So far the expression can involve no mistake, but here the analogy between the cognisance of external and that of internal phenomena ceases.

There is nothing in the mind of which we can go on to say, as we say of the eye, that it cannot be seen by the observer in the act of observation; or in shorter phrase cannot observe itself.

99

The expression "we observe our internal states,' simply means we are conscious of them, and the real amount of the assertion M. Comte makes is, that we, being the intelligent entities of whom states of consciousness are affections, cannot be conscious of them—that is, cannot be conscious of what we are conscious of. If we ascribe a more complex signification to the phrase "observing internal states," by including in it not only the consciousness of a direct mental act, but the subsequent recollection of it, or reflection upon it, the argument against M. Comte would be strengthened, were it for no other reason than this, that recollection and reflection are themselves modes of consciousness.

He

M. Comte, it is true, disguises this fallacy from himself by appealing to the phrenological organs, and in them finds an analogy with the eye. has recourse to what he terms the anatomical reason, that as the eye cannot observe itself, so the organ of observation in the brain, although it may observe the organs of the passions, cannot observe itself.

This allegation, however, will not avail him, even if we admit the existence of phrenological organs. Organs of any kind, whether of the senses, or cranial, or cerebral, can neither observe nor feel. It is only figuratively that we talk of the eye seeing. It is not the eye that sees but the man through the instrumentality of the eye. So