nary entities, and vanish the moment you try to substitute operations for faculties. Had the sentence here quoted proceeded from an English pen, it would have been at once stigmatised as jargon; nor can I pass a more favourable judgment on such phrases as "I myself am the instrument with which I know everything:" "c'est moi qui suis l'instrument avec lequel je connois toute chose."* When, again, he speaks of the will being "the centre of consciousness, and reason its light," I am incapable of finding any state of mind in myself answering to these plausible expressions. It is anything but satisfactory to know that some of our English philosophers have fallen into similar nullities; as, for example, Dr. Reid, in a passage before quoted, where speaking of mankind's irresistible belief in an external world, he says, "if Reason should stomach and fret ever so much at this yoke, she cannot throw it off: if she will not be the servant of Common Sense, she must be her slave." The prevalence of such imaginary facts in metaphysical writings, indicates that mankind have arrived at about the same stage in mental philosophy as they had in physical science when they talked of the transmutation of the metals, the elixir of life, the influence of the stars on human destiny, the existence of positive levity, nature's horror of a vacuum, and the like. Fragmens Philosophiques. I have already explained the effect of figurative language in misleading us into false conclusions; and this is equally the effect of chimerical facts, whether dressed in a plain or metaphorical garb. But where they are harmless in this respect, if such innocuousness is possible,-they all produce, like the physical errors I have named, another and scarcely less extensive evil; they obstruct the progress of science by a false semblance of having solved some proposed question or problem; by which fallacious solution mankind-prone to accept any plausible explanation of their difficulties-are for a time satisfied, and the spirit of inquiry among them is lulled to sleep. Nor is this all. The mode of dealing with the subject on which I have here animadverted is especially calculated in these days to banish the philosophy of mind from the attention of all men of sense and science; and thus tends, by different but concurrent means, to keep it at the comparatively low point at which it now stands. No one, after reading the extracts I have presented to you in the two or three preceding letters, can be surprised to hear of a declaration made by men of eminent abilities, that, after years of study, they had not succeeded in gathering one clear idea from the speculations of Kant. I should have been almost surprised if they had.* "I am endeavour "In or about 1818 or 1819, Lord Grenville, when visiting the lakes of England, observed to Professor Wilson, that, ing," exclaims Sir James Mackintosh, in the irritation evidently of baffled efforts, "to understand this accursed German Philosophy." Neither can one greatly wonder that a recent philosopher of high reputation, M. Comte, has attempted to discredit the whole subject, asserting that the pretended direct contemplation of the mind by itself, is a pure illusion. On this point, as I utterly dissent from him, I shall probably have something to say hereafter. after five years' study of this philosophy [Kant's], he had not gathered from it one clear idea. Wilberforce, about the same time, made the same confession to another friend of my own."De Quincey, in Tait's Magazine, June, 1836. LETTER VI. CLASSIFICATION OF THE PHENOMENA OF CON- IF, according to my representation, the mental powers and capacities of man are to be considered as only classified operations, or states of consciousness, you will probably be disposed to ask, what is the classification that I myself adopt? This is a very reasonable inquiry, which I will endeavour to satisfy; and, indeed, the very course of the exposition I have undertaken requires me to attempt it. But I must remark, at the outset, that classification in this department of knowledge, as in many others, is to a certain extent arbitrary, and that in the present case some of the operations necessarily include or presuppose others. My aim will be to present such an arrangement as, if not complete in itself, will be correct as far as it goes, and will, at all events, enable me to explain with clearness and in definite language, those views of the human mind which I have to unfold. Hume has well described the task before me, its advantages and its difficulties; although, in saying so, I would not be understood as concurring in every position he lays down, or every expression he employs. "It is remarkable," he says, "concerning the operations of the mind, that, though most intimately present to us, yet, whenever they become the object of reflection, they seem involved in obscurity; nor can the eye readily find those lines and boundaries which discriminate and distinguish them. The objects are too fine to remain long in the same aspect or situation; and must be apprehended in an instant by a superior penetration, derived from nature, and improved by habit and reflection. It becomes, therefore, no inconsiderable part of science, barely to know the different operations of the mind, to separate them from each other, to class them under their proper heads, and to correct all that seeming disorder in which they lie involved, when made the object of reflection and inquiry. This task of ordering and distinguishing, which has no merit when performed with regard to external bodies, the objects of our senses, rises in its value when directed towards the operations of the mind, in proportion to the difficulty and labour which we meet with in performing it. And if we can go no further than this mental geography, or delineation of the distinct parts and powers of the mind, it is at least a satisfaction to go so far; and the more obvious this science may appear (and it is by no means obvious), the more contemptible still must |