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designs in speaking. And in this view they are considered and made use of by the orator. Examples of all these might be quoted from Cicero and other ancient orators; but it is unnecessary to swell this article with long quota

tions.

2. Of order.-Order is of two kinds, natural and artificial; and each of these may be considered with respect to the parts, either of simple or compound sentences. i. As to simple sentences, we call that order natural, when all the words in a sentence are so placed as they are connected with or follow each other in a grammatical construction. ii. Artificial order, as it respects simple sentences, has little or no regard to the natural construction of words; but disposes them in such a manner as will be most agreeable to the ear, and best answer the design of the speaker.

As to compound sentences, or such as consist of two or more members, either simple or compounded, what relates to the words in each member separately is the same as in simple sentences. But, with regard to the disposition of the several members, that is called the natural order which so places them as they mutually depend on each other. When this order is inverted, it is styled artificial. It is unnecessary to enlarge farther, or to adduce examples upon this subject, as it is discussed, and the beauties as well as defects of the analogous and transpositive languages pointed out under the article LAN

GUAGE.

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But there are some other considerations relating to order, which, being taken from the nature of things, equally suit all languages. So, in amplifying, there should be a constant gradation from a less to a greater; as when Cicero says, 'ambition creates hatred, shyness, discords, seditions, and wars.' On the contrary, in extenuating, we should descend from a greater to a less; as if, speaking of the ancient laws of Rome, one should say, they were so far from suffering a Roman citizen to be put to death, that they would not allow him to be whipt, or even to be bound. In constituting any whole, we put the parts first; as, 'invention, disposition, elocution, and pronunciation, make up the art of oratory.' But in separating any whole, the parts follow; as, the art of oratory may be divided into these four parts; invention, disposition, elocution, and pronunciation.' In every enumeration care must be taken not to mix the whole with the parts; but, if it be mentioned at all, it must either be put first or last. So it would be wrong to say 'he was a man of the greatest prudence, virtue, justice, and modesty' for the word virtue here contains in it the other three, and therefore should not be inserted among them.

3. Juncture and number relate to letters and syllables; the former treating of their connexion, and the latter of their quantity.

Juncture respects the quality of syllables. A due attention is to be paid to the nature of the vowels, consonants, and syllables in the connexion of words, with regard to the sound. When a word ends with a vowel, and the next begins either with a different vowel, or the same repeated. it usually renders the pronunciation

hollow and unpleasant. Those which have the weakest and smallest sound follow best; because they occasion the least alteration of the organ in forming the two sounds. If a word end with a vowel, the next ought to begin with a consonant, or such a vowel whose sound may agree well with the former. But, if a word conclude with a consonant, either a vowel should follow, or such a consonant whose proper pronunciation will suit with it. And the same syllable ought not to be repeated at the end of one word, and the beginning of the next. This last, however, rarely happens in our language, which abounds with consonants.

4. Number respects the quantity of syllables. In the Greek and Roman languages every syllable has its distinct quantity; and is either long, short, or common: two or more of which joined together in a certain order make a foot, and a determinate number of these in a different order constitute their several sorts of verse. Though their prose was not so confined with regard to the feet, either as to the kind or place of them, as their metrical compositions, yet it had a sort of measure, more especially in the rise and cadency of their periods. This they called rhetorical number. But their rules are not applicable to our language, which has not that accurate distinction of quantity in its syllables. A great number of monosyllables do not sound well together. For as there ought to be a greater distance in the pronunciation between one word and another than between the syllables of the same word, such pauses, though short, yet, when too frequent, make the sound rough, and thus spoil its harmony. This is the more necessary to be attended to, because the English language abounds with monosyllables. On the contrary, a continuation of many long words makes a sentence move too slow and heavily. And, therefore, such periods generally run best which have a proper mixture of words of different lengths. Besides, as every word has its accent, which with us stands for quantity, a number, either of monosyllables or long words coming together, abates the harmony, as it lessens the variety. Several words of the same ending do not sound well together, especially where the accent falls upon the same syllable in each of them. For this creates too great a jingle by the similitude of sound; and displeases from an appearance of affectation. Of this kind is the following sentence: Nothing is more welcome, delightsome, or wholesome, than rest to a wearied man.' In such expressions, if the order of the words cannot well be altered, some other word should be substituted in the room of one of them at least. But, if a sentence end with a monosyllable, it is apt to hurt the cadence, and disappoint the ear; whereas words of a moderate length carry a greater force with them by the fulness of their sound, and afford the ear what is expected. There is one sort of monosyllables, especially, which never sound well at the conclusion of a period, viz. the signs of cases; as when we say, 'avarice is a crime which wise men are too often guilty of;' instead of avarice is a crime, of which wise men are too often guilty.' Nor are very long words we'i suited either to the beginning or conclusion of a pe

riod; for they retard the pronunciation at first, and fall too heavy at the end.

III. OF DIGNITY. Dignity chiefly consists in the right use of tropes and figures. It is not sufficient for an orator to express himself with propriety and clearness, or in smooth and harmonious periods; but his language should be suited to the nature and importance of the subject. And therefore, as elegance gives rules for the first of these, and composition for the second, so does dignity for the last. It is evident that different subjects require a different style and manner of expression; for, as Quintilian says, 'what is magnificent in one discourse would be turgid in another.' This variety in the manner of expression arises in a great measure from tropes and figures, which not only enliven and beautify a discourse, but give it likewise force and grandeur.

1. Of tropes.-A trope is a figure of words, and has been usually defined to be the change of a word from its proper signification to some other with advantage, either as to beauty or strength. But this definition is not strictly just; for, in every trope a reference is had to two things, which occasions two ideas; one of the thing expressed, and another of that to which it has a respect. For all tropes are taken, either from things internally or externally related; or from some similitude between them; or from a contrariety. The first of these is called synecdoche, the second metonymy, the third metaphor, and the last irony. The reasons which occasioned the introduction of tropes, as Quintilian observes, are three; necessity, emphasis, and beauty.

i. Tropes were first introduced from necessity, deriving their origin from the barrenness of language; because no language contains a sufficient number of proper words to express all the different conceptions of our minds: but the principal cause of their introduction seems to be that extensive influence which imagination possesses over every kind of speech. The mind considers the same thing various ways; views it in different lights; and compares it with other things. Hence it is furnished with an almost infinite number of ideas, which cannot all be expressed by proper words, since new ideas occur daily. And, were this possible, yet would it be impracticable; because the multitude of words must be so vastly great, that the memory could not retain them, nor recall them as occasion required. Tropes have remedied both these inconveniencies. Thus, where a word is wanting to express any particular thing, it is clearly represented by the name of some other thing resembling it; the cause is signified by the effect, the subject by the adjunct, or the contrary, and the whole is often understood by a part, or a part by the whole. Thus, by the use of tropes, the mind is helped to conceive of something not expressed, from that which is expressed.

ii. A second use of tropes is emphasis. Tropes often express things with greater force than can be done by proper words. Sometimes a lively trope conveys a fuller and more just idea of a thing than a large periphrasis. Thus, when

Virgil calls the Scipios two thunderbolts of war, he gives a more lively image of the rapid force and speedy success of their arms than could have been conveyed by a long description in plain words. And in many cases the tropical use of words is so emphatical that in this respect it may be justly esteemed the most proper. So, incensed with anger, inflamed with desire, fallen into an error, are all metaphorical expressions, yet perhaps no proper words can be made use of which will convey a more lively image of the thing we design to represent by them.

iii. Beauty and ornament have been another cause of the use of tropes. Some subjects require a more florid and elegant dress than others And it is the business of an orator to entertain his hearers while he instructs them. Cicero has observed, that as garments were first invented from necessity, to secure us from the injuries of the weather, but improved afterwards for ornament and distinction; so the poverty of language first introduced tropes, which were afterwards increased for delight.' As a moderate use of tropes, justly applied, beautifies and enlivens a discourse, so an excess of them causes obscurity, by running it into abstruse allegories and riddles. Tropes are not the ordinary dress of our thoughts, but a foreign habit; and therefore he who fills his discourse with a continued series of them, acts like one who appears in public in a strange dress. Care should also be taken not to transfer tropes from one language into another.

Primary tropes are subdivided into four species: 1. Metaphor; 2. Metonymy: 3 Synecdoche: 4. Irony.

1. A metaphor is usually defined, a trope, which changes words from their proper signification to another different from it, by reason of some similitude between them. But it is certain that a word, when used metaphorically, does not alter its signification, but retains its proper sense. Cicero calls a metaphor a similitude reduced to a single word. It is a similitude, when I say of a man, he has acted like a lion; and a metaphor, when I say, he is a lion. Metaphors are derived from every part of nature. 1. From similitudes between animate, and from similitudes between inanimate beings. 2. From similitudes between inanimate things and animals and 3. Those are esteemed the finest and strongest which ascribe life and action to inanimate things. All forced and harsh metaphors should be avoided, nor should they be too numerous; in a word, they ought not to be used, but either where a proper word is wanting, or where they are more significant or beautiful than the proper word. See METAPHOR.

2. Metonymy, as defined by Quintilian, is the putting one word for another. But Vossius describes it more fully, when he calls it, 'a trope which changes the names of things that are naturally united, but in such a manner as that one is not the essence of the other.' A word used as a metonymy changes its sense, and denotes something different from its proper signification. Thus, when Mars is put for war, and Ceres for corn, they lose their personal sense, and stand for the effects of which those deities were said to to be the cause. A metonymy is not so exten

sive as a metaphor, nor altogether so necessary; because nothing is said by a metonymy which cannot be expressed in proper words; whereas metaphors are often used for want of proper words to express some ideas. However, metonymies enrich a discourse with an agreeable variety, and give both force and beauty to an expression. And some metonymies, in common discourse, are more frequently made use of than the proper words in whose room they are put. So, it is more usual to say, this is such a person's hand, or I know his hand, than his writing, when we intend this last sense of the word. Metonymies commonly receive their names from the cause and effect, the subject and the adjunct.

i. A metonomy of the cause is when the external cause is put for the effect; as tongue for language, sword for slaughter, &c.

ii. The second kind of metonymy puts the effect for the efficient cause, whether the agent, or only the means and instrument. So Virgil calls the two Scipios the destruction of Libya, because they were the agents who effected it.

iii. The third kind of metonymy is when the subject is put for the adjunct. Thus the seat of any faculty or affection is used for the faculty or affection itself. So it is usual to say, a man of a clear head, when we mean a clear mind; or of a warm heart, when we mean kind affections. Thus also the time is put for the persons living in it; as the degeneracy of the present age, the virtue of former times. The popish doctrine of transubstantiation is founded upon an abuse of this trope. For when our Saviour, speaking of the bread and wine then before him, says, this is my body, and this is my blood,' his plain meaning is they were the signs of his body and blood, the thing signified being put for the sign by this sort of metonymy. In like manner, our Saviour, in a metaphorical sense, calls himself a vine, and a door, expressions which even the Catholics themselves do not interpret literally.

iv. The fourth kind of metonymy is that wherein the adjunct is put for the subject. As when Virgil says, they lie down upon purple;' that is, upon couches died with purple. By this trope virtues and vices are put for the persons in whom they are found. As in that beautiful passage of Cicero, where, comparing the profligate army of Catiline with the forces of the state, he says, 'on this side modesty is engaged, on that impudence; on this chastity, on that lewdness; on this integrity, on that deceit; on this piety, on that profaneness; on this constancy, on that fury; on this honor, on that baseness; on this moderation, on that unbridled passion; in a word, equity, temperance, fortitude, prudence, and all virtues, engage with injustice, luxury, cowardice, rashness, and all vices.' A third use of this trope is by putting a thing for the time in which it was done. Thus we say of a person, he has served so many campaigns, meaning so many summers. Lastly, the sign is put for the thing it signifies; as, the crown for the regal dignity, and the sword for the authority of the magistrate.

3. Synecdoche is a trope by which either the whole of a thing is put for a part of it, or a part for the whole; so that the things whose ideas are

presented to the mind in this trope are internally related to each other. In a synecdoche the word retains its proper sense, and the expression is elliptical.

i. One species of synecdoche puts the genus for the species. Thus, virtue in general is sometimes used to denote some particular virtue; as, when Cicero mentions virtue as one of the four qualifications necessary in a general, he means greatness of mind.

ii. The second kind of synecdoche puts the species for the genus. Thus bread denotes any kind of food: as when a person is said to get his bread by his labor; and money is put for any kind of wealth.

iii. The third species is, when the essential whole is put for one of its parts; that is, either for the matter or form. Thus, it is usual to say of a deceased person, he was buried at such a time. And, in the inscriptions of sepulchral monuments, here lies such a one, that is, his corpse. iv. The fourth kind of synecdoche is when either the matter or form is put for the whole being. Thus silver and gold are used to signify money made of those metals. And soul is put for the whole person. This way of speaking occurs nowhere more frequently than in the sacred writings. But sometimes only part of the matter stands to express the whole essence or being; thus, so many head of cattle means entire cattle.

v. By the fifth species of synecdoche the whole of any material thing or quantity, whether continued or discrete, is put for a part of it. So when Cicero says, a war is kindled through the whole world, he calls the Roman empire the world. The same figure is used by St. Luke, ch. ii. ver. i.

vi. The sixth and last kind of synecdoche puts a part of any material thing or quantity for the whole of it. So we say of a fleet, that it consists of so many sail; meaning so many ships. And by this trope, that is ascribed to a single person which was done by the assistance of others, and in conjunction with them: as when it is said, that Lord Nelson defeated the French at Aboukir. To this kind of synecdoche may also be referred expressions in which the singular number is put for the plural; as, a man is liable to be misled by irregular passsions ; meaning mankind in general.

4. Irony is a trope in which one contrary is signified by another: as if any one should say, well done; when his design is to intimate that the thing was ill done. Not that the word is changed from its usual signification; but, by the circumstances attending the expression, we perceive the contrary to what is spoken is intended. Quintilian observes, that an irony may be known by one of these three ways: By the manner of pronunciation, or from the nature of the person or the thing. For, where any of these do not suit with the words, it is plain the speaker intends the contrary.' The proper subjects of irony are vices and follies of all kinds; and this way of exposing them is often more effectual than serious reasoning. Socrates used it so much that he got the name of pwv, that is, the droll.

II. Secondary tropes are so called, because

they are all of the same nature with the former, and may be referred to some one or other of them, though they have received different names. They are eight in number; antonomasia, communication, litotes, euphemism, catachresis, hyperbole, metalepsis, and allegory. The three first are simple tropes, and may all be referred to synecdoche. But the five last are of a mixed or complex nature, and not confined to any one of the primary tropes.

1. Antonomasia.-A common or general word is sometimes used for the proper name of some particular thing or person, who upon any account is eminent and remarkable. So we say, he is gone to, or he came from the city, that is, London. By the Scriptures we mean the Bible. The orator is used for Cicero, the poet for Homer or Virgil, the philosopher for Aristotle; and the apostle for St. Paul. On the contrary, the proper names of things or persons are sometimes applied to any other of the same character. Thus we use the word gospel for any certain and undoubted truth. And punic faith proverbially stood for falsehood among the Romans.

2. Communication, among orators, signifies a change of persons. Sometimes, to prevent the imputation of pride, in assuming to themselves the praise of any laudable action, they ascribe it to their hearers, and do not say we, but ye, did so and so. At other times, when it is necessary to remind them of something they have done amiss, or to caution them against some wrong step, they take it upon themselves, or join them selves with them, and do not say, you have done this, or do not do this; but we have done it, or let us not do it. At other times, in compliment to their hearers, they join them as partners in the commendable actions or virtues of other persons. Such tropes often occur both in Demosthenes and Cicero.

3. But there is a mode of speech in which, by denying the contrary, more is intended than the words express. This is called litotes; and is often used where a person is led to say any thing in his own praise, or to soften an expression which in direct terms might give offence. As if one should say, I do not commend you for that; meaning, I greatly discommend or blame you for it.

4. When any displeasing or ungrateful thing is expressed by a more soft and agreable word, it is called euphemism. As death carries in it a disagreeable idea, instead of saying a person is dead, we often say he is departed. But when St. Luke, speaking of Stephen, who was stoned to death, says he fell asleep; this is a beautiful metaphor.

5. Catachresis signifies in general any harsh trope, though it is most commonly found in metaphors. It is principally used by poets, to enforce an expression, where the proper word does not seem strong enough. As when Milton, in describing the angel Raphael's descent from heaven, says, he sails between worlds and worlds. 6. Hyperbole is the boldest of all tropes: for it exceeds the strict bounds of truth, and purposely represents things either greater or less, better or worse, than they really are. But the representation is made in such a manner as not to im

pose on the hearers. The excess in this trope is called auxesis; as when we say of any thing that is very high, it reaches to the skies. The defect, or contrary extreme, is termed meiosis; so we say of a very lean person, he is nothing but skin and bones, or a mere skeleton. Those hyperboles which are expressed comparatively are commonly most emphatical. To say a thing is as light as a feather, carries the idea very far; but to say it is lighter, heightens it greatly.

7. Sometimes two or more tropes, and those of a different kind, are contained under one word; so that several gradations, or intervening senses, come between the word that is expressed and the thing designed by it. And this is called a metalepsis. The contests between Sylla and Marius proved very fatal to the Roman state. Julius Caesar was then a young man. But Sylla, observing his aspiring genius, said of him, in this young man there are many Mariuses.' In this expression there is a metalepsis, containing a synecdoche, an antonomasia, and a metonomy. So that Sylla's meaning, divested of these tropes, was, that Cæsar would prove a most dangerous person to the Roman republic; which afterwards proved true.

8. Allegory is a continuation of several tropes in one or more sentences. Thus Cicero says, fortune provided you no field, in which your virtue could run and display itself;' where the words field and run are metaphors taken from corporeal things, and applied to the mind. But in allegories, care should be taken that the same kind of trope be carried through the whole, so as to compose one uniform and consistent set of ideas. It is likewise necessary that the allusions be all evident. These are called pure allegories. See ALLEGORY.

II. Of figures.-This term seems to have been borrowed from the stage, where the different habits and gestures of the actors, suitable to the several characters they sustained, were by the Greeks called oxnuara, and by the Latins figuræ ; and it is usual to say of a person, both with respect to his dress and action, that he makes a very bad, or a very graceful figure. As language is the dress of our thoughts, in which they appear to others; so any particular manner of speaking may be called its figure. But rhetoricians restrain the sense of the word to such forms of speech as differ from the ordinary ways of expression; as the theatrical habits of actors on the stage differ from their usual garb at other times. A figure, therefore, in the sense used by rhetoricians, is a mode of speaking different from, and more beautiful and emphatical than, the usual way of expressing the same sense.

Figures seem to have been among the last ornaments introduced into the art of oratory. Aristotle, who treats so accurately upon other parts, says very little of this. But the Greek writers who came after him have supplied that deficiency. They took notice of the several modes of expression, observed their force and beauty, and gave them distinctive names. And indeed they have treated the matter with such minuteness that Quintilian thinks they have multiplied figures to excess. The author of Homer's life, which some ascribe to Plutarch, has shown that

there is scarcely a figure mentioned by rhetoricians but is to be met with in that most ancient poet. And, from the nature of speech, we may easily perceive that mankind must have very early introduced tropes to supply the want of proper words to express their simple ideas; and the like necessity must have put them upon the use of figures to represent their passions. When the mind is disturbed, we show it by our words as well as by our countenances and actions. Hence some have styled figures the language of the passions. And Cicero calls them the principal weapons of an orator.' His oration against Catiline, when he had just discovered his plot to destroy the Roman state and burn the city, affords a grand specimen of the strongest and most moving figures. And the discourse had its desired effect; for, when Catiline stood up to make his defence, the whole senate were so inflamed by what Cicero had said, that they had not patience to hear him speak; upon which he immediately left the city. Of a different description, but equally excellent, are those of Virgil, when Dido finds that Æneas is about to leave her, and using all her arts to detain him, she discovers her fear, anger, and revenge, with the whole crowd of passions which possessed her mind.

Figures should always be accommodated to the sentiments, and rise in proportion to the images, designed to be conveyed by them: but where the language outstrips the thought, though it may please the ear, yet an intelligent hearer will soon feel the impropriety. In the use of pathetic figures, it is generally better to be nervous than copious, that the images, by their closer union, may impress the mind with greater energy. All figures should be so interwoven in a discourse as not to render the style rough and uneven, sometimes high, and at other times low. In a word, they should rather seem to arise from nature than art.

Figures are divided into figures of words, and figures of sentences. The difference consists in this; that in the former, if we alter the words, or even the situation of them, we destroy the figure; but in the latter the figure remains, whatever words are used, or in whatever manner the order of them is changed. Thus, when the name of a person or thing is repeated, to intimate some known property or quality thereof, it is a verbal figure called ploce. Cicero was a true patriot; and therefore we say that at the time of Catiline's conspiracy, Cicero appeared like Cicero. The sense would remain the same, but the figure would be lost, if we should say, at that time Cicero appeared like himself. So when two or more sentences, or members of a sentence, end with the same word, it is called epistrophe; as when we say, to lose all relish of life is in effect to lose life. But if the order of the words be changed in the latter clause, thus, to lose all relish of life, is to lose life in effect; the figure vanishes. Such is the nature of the verbal figures. But it is not so in figures of sentences; they continue the same, whatever alterations are made in the words.

I. Verbal figures may be distinguished into three sorts, as they consist in a deficiency, a redundancy, or a repetition, of words.

Of the first sort are ellipsis and asindeton. 1 Ellipsis is when one or more words are wanting in a sentence, to complete the construction, and fully express the sense. This figure is often used in proverbial expressions: as when we say, Many men, many minds; i. e. have many minds; and, the more danger, the more honor; i. e. gains more honor. But where more is intended by such expressions than mere brevity, and especially when they are the effect of some passion, the figure is called aposiopesis. 2. Asyndeton is when the particles that connect the members of a sentence are left out, to represent either the celerity of an action, or the haste and eagerness of the speaker. Thus Cæsar expresses his speedy conquest of Pharnaces: I came, I saw, I conquered. If he had inserted the copulatives, and said, I came, and I saw, and I conquered, it would have retarded the communication of his ideas, and not given so just an idea of the swiftness of the action. We took notice, in a preceding section, of the vehement and impetuous manner in which Cicero attacked Catiline in his first oration, where his design was to fire the minds of the senate against him, and oblige him to leave the city. The next day, when Catiline was gone, he calls together the citizens, and in a sort of rapture thus begins, he is gone, departed, escaped, broke out; intimating both the excessive rage in which Catiline left Rome, and the great pleasure with which he was himself affected on that account. This concise way of speaking adds likewise a great emphasis to an expression, and affects the mind with great force.

ii. The second sort of verbal figures is contrary to these, and consists in a redundancy or multiplicity of words; which are likewise two, pleonasmus and polysyndeton. 1. When we use more words than are necessary to express a thing it is called pleonasmus. This is done sometimes for greater emphasis, as when we say, Where in the world is he? At other times it is designed to ascertain the truth of what is said: so the servant in Terence, when the truth of what he had related was called in question, replies, It is certainly so; I saw it with these eyes. 2. When the several parts of a sentence are united by proper particles it is called polysyndeton. This adds a weight and gravity to an expression, and, by retarding the course of the sentence, gives the mind time to reflect upon every part distinctly. We often meet with this figure in Demosthenes. Thus he encourages the Athenians to prosecute the war against Philip II. from this consideration, that now they had ships, and men, and money, and stores, and all other things which might contribute to the strength of the city, in greater number and plenty than in former times.' Every article here has its weight; but, if we remove the copulatives, the sentence will lose much of its force.

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iii. The third kind of verbal figures consists in a repetition. Either the same word in sound or sense, is repeated; or one of a like sound or signification, or both. Of the former sort there are ten, called antanaclasis, ploce, epizeuxis, climax, anaphora, epistrophe, symploce, epanalepsis, anadiplosis, and epanodos. The two first of these agree in sound, but differ in sense; the eight following agree in both.

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