PART II.

OF DISPOSITION.

As invention supplies the orator with necessary materials, so disposition directs him how to place them in the most proper order. What is here chiefly intended by it is, the placing the several parts of a discourse in a just method and dependence upon one another. Writers are not all agreed in determining the parts of an oration: though the difference is rather in the manner of considering them than in the things themselves. Cicero mentions six, viz. introduction, narration, proposition, confirmation, confutation, and conclusion.

I. Of the introduction.-The design of the introduction is to prepare the minds of the hearers for a suitable reception of what is to follow. For this end, three things are requisite; that the orator gain the good opinion of his hearers, that he secure their attention, and give them some general notion of his subject. As to attention, Cicero says, We shall be heard attentively on one of these three things; if we propose what is great, necessary, or for the interest of those to whom the discourse is addressed. Some general account of the subject of the discourse is always necessary. For every one expects to be soon informed of the design of the speaker, and what he proposes to treat of. These are the heads which commonly furnish matter for this part of a discourse. In some cases, orators have recourse to a more artful way of opening their subject, endeavouring to remove jealousies, apologise for what they are about to say, and seem to refer it to the candor of the hearers to judge of it as they please. This is called insinuation; and may be necessary, where a cause is in itself doubtful, or may be thought so from the prejudices of the hearers, or the impressions already made upon them by the contrary side. An honest man would not knowingly engage in a bad cause; and yet, through prevailing prejudice, that may be so esteemed which is not so in itself. In these cases great prudence is necessary to give such a turn to things as may be least liable to offence.

II. Of narration. The orator having prepared his hearers to receive his discourse with candor, and acquainted them with his general design, before he proceeds directly to his subject, often finds it necessary to give some account of what preceded, accompanied, or followed upon it. And this he does to enlarge the view of the particular point in dispute, and place it in a clearer light. This is called narration; which is a recital of something done, in the order and manner in which it was done. Those things which properly enter into a narration are the cause, manner, time, place, and consequences of an action; with the temper, fortune, views, ability, associates, and other circumstances of those concerned in it. In relating a fact, the orator describes it in so strong and lively a manner as may give the greatest evidence to his hearers, and make the deepest impression upon their minds. There are four properties required in a good narration; that it be short, perspicuous, probable, and interesting.

III. Of the proposition.- In every regular discourse, the speaker's intention is to prove or illustrate something. And, when he lays down his subject in a distinct and express manner, this is called the proposition. Orators use several ways in laying down the subject of their discourses. Sometimes they do it in one general proposition. At other times, to give a clearer and more distinct view of their discourse, they subjoin to the proposition the general heads of argument by which they endeavour to support it. But when the subject relates to several different things, which require to be separately laid down in distinct propositions, it is called a partition. Some have made two kinds of partition, one called separation, and the other enumeration. By the former, the orator shows in what he agrees with his adversary, and wherein he differs from him. By the latter he acquaints his hearers with the several parts of his discourse upon which he designs to treat. And this alone, properly speaking, is a partition. There are three things requisite in a good partition; that it be short, complete, and consist but of a few members. A just partition is attended with considerable advantages. It gives both light and ornament to a discourse. In a sermon, or a pleading at the bar, few things are of greater consequence than a proper division. It should be studied with much care; for, if one take a wrong method at first setting out, it will lead him astray in all that follows, and render the whole discourse either perplexed or languid.

IV. Of confirmation.-The orator, having acquainted his hearers, in the proposition, with the subject on which he designs to discourse, usually proceeds either to prove or illustrate what he has laid down. Some discourses require nothing more than an illustration, to set them in a proper light, for which reason, they have often no distinct proposition. But, where arguments are brought in defence of the subject, this is properly confirmation. Cicero defines confirmation, that which gives proof, authority, and support, to a cause, by reasoning.' If any thing in the proposition seems obscure, or liable to be misunderstood, the orator first explains it, and then offers such arguments in proof of it, and represents them in such a light, as seem most proper to gain the assent of his hearers. Two methods of reasoning are employed by orators, the synthetic and analytic.

1. Every piece of synthetic reasoning may be resolved into a syllogism or series of syllogisms. As a logical syllogism consists of three parts or propositions, a rhetorical syllogism frequently contains four or five. Cicero reckons this last the most complete. But all that is said in confirmation of either of the premises is accounted but as one part. But orators do not often use complete syllogisms, but most commonly enthymemes. An enthymeme is an imperfect syllogism, consisting of two parts; the conclusion, and one of the premises: and, in this kind of syllogism, that proposition is omitted, whether it be the major or minor, which is sufficiently manifest of itself, and may easily be supplied by the hearers. But the proposition that is expressed is usually called the antecedent, and

the conclusion of the consequent. It is reckoned a beauty in enthymemes when they consist of contrary parts: because the turn of them is most acute and pungent. Such is that of Micipsa in Sallust: What stranger will be faithful to you who are an enemy to your friends?' Orators manage enthymemes in the same manner they do syllogisms; that is, they invert the order of the parts, and confirm the proposition by one or more reasons: and therefore a rhetorical enthymeme frequently consists of three parts, as a syllogism does of five. Though, strictly speaking, a syllogism can consist of no more than three parts, and an enthymeme but of two.

2. The other method of reasoning is the analytic, in which the orator conceals his intention concerning the point he is to prove, till he has gradually brought his hearers to the designed conclusion. They are led on, step by step, from one known truth to another, till the conclusion be stolen upon them, as the natural consequence of a chain of propositions. Under the analytic may be comprehended reasoning by example. Rhetoricians use this word in a different sense from the common acceptation. In oratory the word example is used for any kind of similitude; or, as Vossius defines it, when one thing is inferred from another, by reason of the likeness which appears between them.' Hence it is called an imperfect induction, which infers something from several others of the like nature, and has always the greatest force when the examples are taken from facts. But comparisons are sometimes made between facts and other things, to infer some difference or opposition between thein. In comparing two facts, on account of some disagreement and unlikeness, the inference is made from the difference between one and the other in that particular respect only. Thus we have given a brief account of the principal methods of reasoning used by orators. As to the disposition of arguments, or the order of placing them, some advise to put the weaker, which cannot wholly be omitted, in the middle: and such as are stronger partly in the beginning, to gain the esteem of the hearers, and render them more attentive; and partly at the end, because what is last heard is likely to be retained longest: but, if there are but two arguments, to place the stronger first, and then the weaker; and after that to return to the former, and insist principally upon it. But this must be left to the prudence of the speaker. Nor ought arguments to be crowded too closely upon one another; for that takes off from their force, and does not leave the hearers sufficient time duly to consider them.

V. Of confutation.-The forms of reasoning here are the same as have been explained under confirmation. Confutation, however, is often the more difficult task; because he who is to prove a thing comes usually prepared; but he who is to confute it is frequently left to a sudden answer. Therefore, not only a good judgment, but a readiness of thought is necessary. Those arguments that are foreign to the subject may in a very few words be shown to be insignificant. There ought also to be a distinction made between such things as relate to the

subject, according to their importance. Those that appear to have no great weight should be slightly remarked; and are generally better turned off with an air of neglect, a pungent question, or an agreeable jest, than confuted by a serious and labored answer. But those which relate to the merits of the cause may be confuted either by contradicting them, or by showing some mistake in the reasoning, or their invalidity when granted.

Things may be contradicted several ways. What is apparently false may be expressly denied. And what the adversary cannot prove may likewise be denied. It is a handsome way of contradicting a thing, by showing that the adversary himself maintained the contrary. An adversary is never more effectually silenced than when he is charged with contradictions; for this is stabbing him with his own weapon. Sometimes a thing is not in express terms denied, but represented to be utterly incredible. And this method exposes the adversary more than a bare denial. There is likewise an ironical way of contradicting a thing, by retorting that and other things of the like nature upon the adverse party. Such an unexpected return is sometimes of great service to abate the confidence of an adversary.

A second method of confutation is, by observing some flaw in the reasoning of the adverse party. Syllogisms may be refuted, either by showing some mistake in the premises, or that the conclusion is not justly deduced from them. Enthymemes may be refuted, either by showing that the antecedent is false, or the consequent not justly inferred from it. As to induction and example, by which the truth or equity of a thing is proved from its likeness to other things, the reasoning is invalid if the things so compared can be shown not to have that similitude or agreement on which the inference is founded. The last method of confutation is when the orator does in some sense grant the adversary his argument, and at the same time shows its invalidity. This is done by a variety of ways, according to the nature of the subject. Sometimes he allows what was said may be true; but pleads that what he contends for is necessary. At other times he pleads that, although the contrary opinion may seem to be attended with advantage, yet that his own is more just or honorable. Such was the case of Regulus. Another way of confutation is by retorting upon the adversary his own argument. The orator takes this advantage where an argument proves too much, that is, more than the person intended who made use of it. Inversion resembles this, by which the orator shows that the reasons offered by the opposite party make for him. Sometimes the charge is acknowledged, but the crime shifted off to another. Another method is to alleviate the charge, and take off the force or it, by showing that the thing was not done with that intention which the adversary insinuates. Such are the methods of confutation used by orators, in answering arguments brought by the contrary party. But sometimes they raise such objections themselves to what they have said as they imagine may be made by others;

which they afterwards answer, the better to induce their hearers to think that nothing considerable can be offered against what they have advanced, but what will admit of an easy reply. This is an effectual way of defeating an adversary, when the objection is well stated, and clearly answered.

VI. Of the conclusion.-Rhetoricians make the conclusion of a discourse to consist of two parts: recapitulation, and an address to the passions.

1. Recapitulation is a summary account of what the speaker has before offered in maintenance of his subject; and is designed both to refresh the memory of the hearers, and to bring the principal arguments together into a narrow compass, that they may appear in a stronger light. There are several things necessary to a good recapitulation. (1.) It must be short and concise, as it is designed to refresh the memory, and not to burden it. The chief things only are to be touched, on which the cause principally depends; the general heads of the discourse, with the main arguments brought to support them. (2.) They should be recited in the same order in which they were at first laid down. The hearers will thus be enabled better to keep pace with the speaker as he goes along. Every thing ought to be represented in the strongest terms, and in so lively a manner as may at the same time both entertain the audience, and make the deepest impression upon their minds. Sometimes a repetition is made, by running a comparison between the speaker's own arguments and those of the adverse party. But when the discourse is very long, and the arguments insisted on have been many, to prevent the hearers losing patience by a more particular recital, the orator sometimes only just mentions such things as he thinks of least consequence by saying that he omits or passes over them, till he comes to what is of greater moment, which he represents more fully. And this is what the writers upon this art call preterition.

2. By an address to the passions, the orator sometimes endeavours occasionally to work upon his hearers in other parts of his discourse, but especially in the conclusion, where he is warmest himself, and labors to make them so. For the main design of the introduction is to conciliate the hearers; of the narration, proposition, and confirmation, to inform them; and of the conclusion, to move them. And, therefore, says Quintilian, 'here all the springs of eloquence are to be opened. It is here we secure the minds of the hearers, if what went before was well managed. Now we are past the rocks and shallows, all the sails may be hoisted. And, as the greatest part of the conclusion consists in illustration, the most pompous language and strongest figures have place here.' The passions, which the orator addresses, differ according to the nature of the discourse. In demonstrative orations, when laudatory,-love, admiration, and emulation, are usually excited; but, in invectives,-hatred, envy, and contempt. In deliberate subjects, either the hope of gratifying some desire is set in view, or the fear of some impending evil. And, in judicial discourses, almost

all the passions have place, but more especially resentment and pity. But the same passion may be excited by very different methods. Horace endeavours to recommend virtue by laughing vice out of countenance; Persius moves us to an abhorrence of vice, with the severity of a philosopher; and Juvenal by open and vehement invectives. So orators make use of all these methods, but they should not dwell long upon the same passion. When the emotion is once carried as high as it can be, the hearers should be left under its influence.

Orators sometimes endeavour to raise contrary passions, as they are concerned for opposite parties. So the accuser excites anger and resentment, but the defendant pity and compassion. But the orator should always express the same passion himself with which he endeavours to affect others, in his action, voice, language, words, and expression. But a decency and propriety of character is always to be observed. This justness of character is admirably well observed by Cicero, in his defence of Milo; who being a man of most undaunted courage, it would have been improper to introduce him moving pity, and begging for mercy. Cicero therefore takes this part upon himself; and what he could not do with any propriety in the character of Milo, he performs in his own. But, as persons are commonly more affected with what they see than with what they hear, orators sometimes call in the assistance of that sense in moving the passions. For this reason it was usual among the Romans, in judicial cases, for accused persons to appear with a dejected air and a sordid garb, attended by their parents, children, &c., with the like dress and aspect. The Areopagites at Athens, if the orator began to say any thing which was moving, an officer immediately bade him be silent. There is certainly a medium between these extremes.

VII. Of digression, transition, and amplification.-Besides the number, order, and nature of the parts which constitute a complete and regular oration, explained in the preceding chapters, there are several other things necessary to be known by an orator, which come under the second branch of his art. These are, digression, transition, and amplification.

1. Digression, as defined by Quintilian, is, a going off from the subject we are upon to some different thing, which may, however, be of service to it.' As where a subject is of itself dry, or requires close attention, it relieves the mind by something entertaining. But they should neither be too frequent nor too long. Indeed orators sometimes, when sore pressed, and the cause will not bear a close scrutiny, artfully run into digressions, to divert the attention of the hearers from the subject, and turn them to a different view. And in such cases, to be unobserved, they do it tacitly, that they may get clear of a difficulty, till they enter upon some fresh topic.

2. Transitions are often used not only after a digression, but upon other occasions, and recapitulate in a few words both what has been said already, and what is next designed to be said. Where a discourse consists of several

parts, this is very proper, especially when the parts are of a considerable length; for it assists the hearers to carry on the series of the discourse in their minds. But sometimes, in passing from one thing to another, a general hint may be thought sufficient; at other times, for greater brevity, the transition is imperfect, and mention made only of the following head.

3. By amplification is meant, not barely enlarging upon a thing, but the representation of it in the fullest and most comprehensive view, so that it may in the liveliest manner strike the mind. Rhetoricians have observed several ways of doing this. One is to ascend from a particular thing to a general. Thus Cicero in his defence of Archias, having commended him as a poet, says many things in praise of polite literature in general. A contrary method is, to descend from generals to particulars. As if any one, while speaking in commendation of eloquence, should illustrate what he says from the example of Cicero, and show the services he rendered his country, and the honors he gained to himself, by his admirable oratory. A third method is the enumeration of parts. Such representations greatly enlarge the image of a thing, and afford the mind a much clearer view of it than if it were contracted into one single proposition: and a thing may likewise be illustrated by its opposite. Thus the blessings and advantages of peace may be recommended from the miseries and calamities of war.

4. Gradation is another beautiful way of doing this. As when Cicero would aggravate the cruelty and barbarity of Verres for crucifying a Roman citizen, by showing it to be a punishment only inflicted upon slaves. Facts may be amplified from their circumstances; as time, place, manner, event, and the like. As the design of amplification is not barely to prove the truth of things, but to adorn and illustrate them, it requires a florid and beautiful style, strong and emphatic words, flowing periods, harmonious numbers, lively tropes, and bright figures.

PART III.

OF ELOCUTION.

On this subject we need only here observe, that it has been divided by rhetoricians into three parts: elegance, composition, and dignity. A discourse which has all these properties suitably adjusted, must, with respect to the language, be perfect in its kind.

I. ELEGANCE Consists in purity and perspicuity; both with respect to single ords id their construction in sentences.

1. Purity includes the choice of such words and phrases as are agreeable to the use of the language in which we speak and so grammarians reduce the faults they oppose to it to two, barbarism and solecism; the former of which respects single words, and the latter their construction. But in oratory, neither all words nor all expressions are called pure which occur in language; but such only as come recommended by the authority of those who speak or write with accuracy and politeness. Orators must also abstain from antiquated or obsolete

words and phrases, as well as vulgar or sordid ones; and the use of new terms, until they have been established, should also be carefully avoided.

2. Perspicuity, as well as purity, consists partly in single words, and partly in their construction.

i. As to single words those will be best understood which are used in their proper sense; and all words may be divided into proper words and tropes. Tropes are such words as are applied to some other thing than what they properly denote, by reason of some similitude, relation, or contrariety between the two things. So, when a subtle man is called a fox, the reason of the name is founded in a similitude of qualities. If we say, Cicero will always live, meaning his works, the cause is transferred to the effect. All words must at first have had one original and primary signification, which, strictly speaking, may be called their proper sense. But, through length of time, words lose their original signification, and assume a new one, which then also becomes their proper sense. For example, the word knave anciently signified a servant.

Sometimes two or more words have the same signification, and may therefore be used synonymously. Of this kind are the words pity and compassion. There are other words of so near an affinity to each other, that they are commonly thought synonymous. Such are mercy and pity; though mercy in its strict sense is exercised towards an offender, and pity respects one in distress. This peculiar force and distinction of words is carefully to be attended to. Though words, when taken in their proper signification, generally convey the plainest and clearest sense, yet some are more forcible, sonorous, or beautiful, than others. And by these considerations we must often be determined in our choice of them. So whether we say, he got, or he obtained, the victory, the sense is the same: but the latter is more full and sonorous. As to tropes, though generally speaking they are not to be chosen where perspicuity is only designed, and proper words may be found; yet, through the penury of all languages, the use of them is often necessary. And some, especially metaphors, which are taken from the similitude of things, may, when custom has rendered them familiar, be considered as proper words, and used in their stead. whether we say, I see your meaning, or I understand your meaning, the sense is equally clear, though the latter expression is proper, and the former metaphorical.

Thus,

ii. But perspicuity arises not only from a choice of single words, but likewise from the construction of them in sentences. For the meaning of all the words in a sentence, considered by themselves, may be very plain and evident; and yet, by a disorderly construction, or confusion of the parts, the sense of the whole may be obscured.

Ambiguity of expression is one cause of obscurity. This sometimes arises from the different senses in which a word is capable of being taken. In all serious discourses ambiguities ought carefully to be avoided. But obscurity more frequently arises from the ambiguous construction

of words, which renders it difficult to determine in what sense they are to be taken. Quintilian gives us this example: A certain man ordered in his will, that his heir should erect for him a statue holding a spear made of gold.' A question arose here, of great consequence to the heir, from the ambiguity of the expression, whether the words made of gold were to be applied to the statue or the spear.

Obscurity is also occasioned either by too short and concise a manner of speaking, or by sentences too long and prolix: and parentheses, when either too long or too frequent, have the same effect.

II. OF COMPOSITION.-Composition, in the sense here used, gives rules for the structure of sentences, with the several members, words, and syllables of which they consist, in such a manner as may best contribute to the force, beauty, and evidence of the whole. It consists of four parts, which rhetoricians call period, order, juncture, and number. The first treats of the structure of sentences; the second of the parts of sentences, which are words and members; and the two last of the parts of words, which are letters and syllables. For all articulate sounds, and even the most minute parts of language, come under the cognizance of oratory.

1. Of period.-In every sentence or proposition something is said of something. That of which something is said logicians call the subject, and that which is said of it the predicate: but, in grammatical terms, the former is a noun substantive, and the latter a finite verb, denoting affirmation, and some state of being, acting, or suffering. A simple sentence consists of one such noun and verb, with whatever else is joined to either or both of them. And a compound sentence contains two or more of them; and may be divided into so many distinct propositions as there are such nouns and verbs, either expressed or understood. Some sentences consist, either wholly or in part, of such members as contain in them two or more compound ones, which may, therefore, for distinction's sake, be called decompound members. In the proper distinction and separation of the members, in such complex sentences, the art of pointing chiefly consists. For the principal use of a comma is to divide the simple members, a semicolon the compound ones, a colon such as are decompounded, and a period the whole, from the following sentence. See PUNCTUATION.

Sentences, with respect to their form or composition, are distinguished into two sorts, called by Cicero tracta, straight or direct; and contorta, bent or winding. By the former are meant those whose members follow each other in a direct order, without any inflection; and by the latter those which strictly speaking are called periods. For Tepuodos in Greek signifies a circuit or circle: and so the Latins call it circuitus and ambitus: by which both mean a sentence consisting of correspondent parts, so framed that the voice in pronouncing them may have a proper elevation and cadency, and distinguish them by its inflection; and as the latter part returns back, and unites the former, the period, like a circle, surrounds and encloses the whole sense. This eleVOL. XVI.

vation of the voice, in the former part of the period, is by the Greeks called роraσis and by the Latins propositio; and the depression of it, in the latter part, by the one aroоdoo, and by the other redditio. As simple sentences have not these correspondent parts which require any inflection of the voice, nor a circular form, by reason of their brevity, they are not properly periods, in the strict sense of the word: though, in common speech, the words sentence and period are used as equivalent terms. As to those compound sentences whose members follow each other in a direct order, without any inflection, there is little art required in their composition. Since such sentences, therefore, may be limited at pleasure, it seems more convenient both for the speaker and hearers to confine them to a moderate length.

But the principal art relating to this part of composition lies in the frame and structure of such compound sentences as are properly called periods. In the formation of these, two things are chiefly to be regarded; their length and cadency. As the length ought to be suited to the breath of the speaker, the ancient rhetoricians scarcely admit of more than four colons; by which we may understand compound members of a moderate size, which will be generally found a suitable and proportionate length. As to the cadency, Cicero has observed that the ears judge what is full and what is deficient; and direct us to fill up our periods, that nothing be wanting of what they expect. When the voice is raised at the beginning of a sentence, they are in suspense till it be finished; and are pleased with a full and just cadency, but are sensible of any defect, and displeased with redundancy. Therefore care must be taken that periods be neither deficient, and as it were maimed, so as to defraud the ears of what seemed to be promised them; nor, on the other hand, offend them by too long and immoderate excursions. This rise and cadency of the voice, in pronunciation, depend on the nature and situation of the members. By the word members is to be understood such as are uncompounded. In a period of two members the turn of the voice begins with the latter member. If a sentence consist of three members, the inflection is best made at the end of the second; for, if it begin immediately after the first, the voice will be either apt to sink too low, and not to be heard, before it reach the end; or else be precipitated, to prevent it. But a period of four members is reckoned the most complete and perfect, where the inflection begins at the middle, that is with the third member. An equality of the members should also be attended to in the composition of a period, the better to adjust their rise and cadency. And for this reason, in sentences of three members, where the cadency begins with the third, or in those of four members, where it begins at the fourth, it promotes the harmony to make the last number longest. This is properly the nature of rhetorical periods, which, when rightly formed, have both beauty and dignity. But as all discourse is made up of distinct sentences, and whenever we express our thoughts it is in some of the forms above mentioned, so the use of them is not promiscuous, but suited to answer different