513 about which he judges or pronounces. And furely he does always judge and determine of things according as they are; that is to fay, of a contingent thing, as it is contingent; and of a neceffary thing as it is neceffary. Whence it comes to pafs, that thofe things which are contingent and proceed from a free principle of acting, are allowed to be feen by God's confent.

"But, not to confine God's omniscience within narrower, nor afcribe to it wider bounds than we do to his omnipotence, which all fuppofe to be an ability to do whatever implies not a contradiction; let us dispatch the difficulty in a few words, by faying, that the foreknowledge of contingent effects, which proceed from a free principle of acting, does either imply a contradiction, or it does not. If it does imply a contradiction, then such effects are not the object of God's omniscience, nor determined by it, nor rightly fuppofed to be determined at all. But if it does not imply a contradiction, then we actually confefs, that divine preScience, and human freewill, are not inconfiftent, but that they may ftand together."

The most decifive argument, however, against the fatalifts, is, the extravagant conclufions to which this gloomy and comfortless doctrine leads, and the horrible confequences which are attached to it. If man is a necessary agent, he cannot poffibly be an accountable being; for how prepofterous is the thought, how inconfiftent would it be with every principle of juftice, to punish any being whatever, or in any degree, for what he could not have avoided? In a theological view, therefore, this doctrine appears to conduct directly to atheism; for we cannot conceive of the Deity in fuch a manner as to fuppofe him wantonly cruel or unjuft. To fay that future punishments are not to be (as the orthodox party conceive) eternal in their duration, does not remove the difficulty; to punish at all VOL. III.

LI

for

Extravagant and melancholy

514 [Book X. for involuntary offences, is cruelty and injuftice. The fyftem of free agency, on the contrary, is confiftent with all the attributes of God, and is highly confolatory and inftructive to man. This fyftem refts upon the cleareft bafis of juftice. Man is created free; he has good and evil placed before him, with the strongest and moft conciliating motives in the Chriftian difpenfation to pursue the one, and to avoid the other. If he perversely takes the wrong course, and proves incorrigibly wicked, every principle of reafon and equity, fanctions the juftice of his punishment.-Into the nature of that punishment, it is not our prefent business to inquire. It will doubtlefs be fuch as to fatisfy infinite juftice, yet tempered by the fweet and falutary exercife of infinite mercy.

If the divine laws are thus outraged by the prepofterous hypothefis of a fatal neceffity; human laws, I fear, will not ftand upon a much firmer foundation. To punish any criminal for an error which he could not avoid, is certainly not only cruel, but wicked in the extreme; and yet fuch muft be the cafe, if the doctrine of the fatalifts is true *.

* In the courfe of a very few years, it will scarcely be credited, that a book has been lately published on this very principle, and the argument of the author is briefly this. Man is a neceffary agent, he is therefore not an accountable being; his actions are all determined by his fituation and circumftances, taking in amongst these his education and the degree of knowledge he has been enabled to acquire. What are called crimes therefore are only mistakes, perfectly involuntary on his part, and he therefore. (whether he is a thief, a murderer, or a parricide) ought not to be punished, but inftructed and reafoned with. As no criminal ought to be punished, all laws or regulations must be perfectly nugatory in fociety, and even pernicious; marriage is law, and therefore it is pernicious, and ought to be abolished.It is happy for the caufe of truth, when fuch books are published; for if the farcaftic genius of a Swift could have more effectually borlefqued the doctrine of neceffity, I am no judge of irony.

On

On the whole, it is the part of true philofophy to avoid equally the dangerous extremes of an arrogant dogmatifin, which profeffes, like the ignorant opponents of Socrates, to know every thing, and of that perplexing skepticifm which would deprive the human understanding of capacity and intelligence. As finite beings, many facts are neceffarily placed beyond the reach of our refearches. They are neither fuited to our faculties, nor our fituation in this life; and where we have no bafis of fact on which to reafon, error will generally be the confequence of our indulging in vifionary fpeculations.

To confole us for this deficiency, we may ftill remark, with fatisfaction and gratitude, that if much is concealed, much alfo is known. There is an immense fund of practical kuowledge perfectly within the grafp of our faculties. There is fcarcely any human fcience, which, to know it well, is not fufficient to employ the moft protracted existence of man. It will be more confiftent with happiness, as well as with modefty, to acquaint ourselves with thefe, before we launch into the unfathomable abyfs of metaphyfical fpeculation; nor indeed can any thing be more difgufting, than to hear a loquacious difputant, who is unacquainted with the plainest and most useful branches of knowledge, prefuming to arraign the appointments of omniscience, to

re-judge his juftice," to annihilate the intellectual, and to confuse and difturb the moral world. Much greater is his merit, much founder is his judgment, who fabricates the fimpleft machine, or plans or executes the plaineft' undertaking that may be practically ufeful to mankind.

Yet we may innocently amuse our curiofity; we may innocently gratify our thirst of knowledge; we may innocently exercise our faculties. But let us, in the

Utility recommended.

516 [Book X. name of reafon, exercise them on their proper objects;

let us feek for knowledge where it is really to be found; let our curiofity employ itself where fact, experiment, and observation, may lead to fome certain conclufion. The book of nature is open to us; the material world is difplayed for our inspection, and for our improvement; the intellectual world is covered with an almost impenetrable veil. What God has chosen to reveal of himfelf in the holy fcriptures, may be eafily comprehended; what he has chofen for the prefent to keep in reserve, no mortal efforts will ever be able to develope. The fimpleft and most unlearned person who studies, with a pure heart, and an undepraved mind, the facred volume, is practically wife; the brightest understanding, the most exalted genius, who attempts to go beyond it, becomes inevitably a fool.