their governments, and several other accidents may intervene, either to obstruct commerce or to turn its current another way. Upon such a failure, the nation which has no other support, no intrinsic strength, nor well regulated alliances, must necessarily be a prey to every invader: elated with all the pride of former wealth, yet enfeebled by all the misery of present distress; fancying itself strong, but actually weak -such a nation may and will engage in wars which will at length, turn to its own ruin. Venice and Antwerp may serve as instances of the truth of an assertion which seems self-evident, without the assistance of history to confirm it.

The expediency of continental connexions being shewn, it will be proper, in the next place, to consider the most natural of those connexions which Great Britain should cultivate; what countries are most likely to be of service to her and to posterity, and what will, probably, be the consequence of her alliances already contracted. It is almost unnecessary to mention, that whatever promotes our wealth and secures our liberties, is conducive to the good of the country; and whatever weakens, impairs, or circumscribes either, is repugnant thereto. We may easily, considering things in this light, derive from thence a true notion of the interest of Great Britain with respect to the other powers of Europe, and be able to judge when that interest is really pursued, and when it is either neglected or abandoned.

The first point which our interest demands, is the maintaining others in their rights, and to support the independency of the other powers of Europe; because an accumulation of power in any one potentate, naturally diminishes the inhabitants of the countries put under subjection; it extinguishes industry and impoverishes them, and consequently must be detrimental to us, whose wealth is, in some measure, derived by commerce from those countries oppressed by

another's power. Besides, inordinate power upon land may, in time, produce an equal degree of naval strength; and a rivalry there would be inevitably fatal.

Another point is the stipulating with foreign nations proper terms of security, indulgence, and respect for our subjects, and for the effects which, from time to time, they shall carry into those countries; in return for which, we must covenant on our parts to perform what may be thought reasonable. When these kind of alliances are made with proper deliberation, they become binding to us in the most solemn manner, and we are obliged to fulfil them punctually; so that whatever different form appearances may wear, the true interest of Great Britain is always to comply exactly with her treaties. A third rule is to resent wrongs done us vigorously, and without delay, more especially where it is in our power to do it by employing our naval strength; as in such a case it redresses the present injury, raises our reputation for the future, and employs that force which might be enfeebled by long habitudes of peace. We ought, likewise, to assist any nation that is unjustly attacked, or in danger of oppression, not only from the motives already assigned, but in order to testify our love of freedom, to shew that we are not only ready to assert, with respect to ourselves, the natural prerogatives of mankind, but vindicate the privileges of others.

Then there still remains another demand we have from foreign powers; viz. the same protection from them that we afford to others, and a reciprocal intercourse of good offices; for instance, it is expected that no foreign power professing friendship with England, will give to others the title of ensigns or royalty contrary to what the body of his nation have established by law. This point our liberty demands to be complied with, and on this Britains should ever insist.

These rules constantly attended to, are sufficient to keep us upon good terms with all the world, and to make it the interest of every potentate and state of Europe to court and to respect our friendship; which should never be venal, but given with the generosity of a people too rich to receive rewards, and too brave to desert the oppressed. If these rules should at any time be incompatible with private interest, (as no doubt they often will) the happiness of individuals, or any private body of men, should ever be sacrificed to public advantage, and a less immediate good to one greater, likely to accrue to posterity.

It appears in some measure from our history, and much more from our records, that we have always had a close connection with the northern powers. Our old treaties with Sweden, Denmark, and Poland confirm this, and our alliances with Russia seem older than those contracted with most other powers. We have, as occasion required, acted either as mediators or allies, in favour of all those powers. The Swedes in particular have been frequently indebted to us for assistance; and in the last century they detached themselves, in great measure, from the interest of France, for the sake of our friendship; which was a measure very beneficial to all Europe. Their friendship must ever be more useful to us than ours is to them; as it must, in general, with all those countries from whence we have materials for employing industry at home, and commodities which we may manufacture for foreign markets. Whatever wars, then, they carry on among themselves; whatever alliances they contract, or friendships they experience, it is our interest to take no part that may embroil us with either. With them, we can always act a neutral part, unaffected by their jealousies, and unendangered by their most violent debates. From their situation and climate, from the nature of the people and barrenness of their soil, it is

impossible they should ever be able to rival us in commerce it is our business, therefore, rather to cherish than repress those northern nations, since even if they should at any time grow too powerful by land, there is a wide extended frontier, not less than the greatest part of Europe, between us. But this is a change not likely to happen; at least, within the compass of human foresight.

The next natural connection-by which I mean such connections as are prejudicial to neither party-is with Italy. Notwithstanding the remote situation of this country, we have hitherto shewn a just and laudable regard to its interests; in truth, distance is a consideration of small consequence, especially to a maritime power. Our commerce in the Mediterranean and Levant is of the utmost importance, and we cannot but be sensible, that whatever alterations may have been made in Italy have affected our commerce also in a high degree; so that whatever steps we have taken, either during the continuance of peace by negociations, or in time of war by supporting the only prince in Italy who declared for the common cause, and was true to his own interests, which were likewise ours, were right and just measures, and have left those impressions which will never be effaced by any arts or intrigues; whatever may be given out, to serve their own purposes, by those who have an interest in pursuing contrary measures.

Spain is next to be considered; with which crown our affairs have a long time been in a very perplexed situation, notwithstanding that it is generally thought the Spanish ministers have such true notions of their own interests, as never to be willing to give any cause of jealousy to the crown of England. They have long been sinking in the estimation of the rest of the powers of Europe it is certainly, therefore, their interest to stand neuter in the con

troversies of other potentates, but at the same time to infuse such jealousies into the powers with whom they might desire to appear formidable, as to make their enmity dreaded, at the same time that they may be courted for their friendship by the opposite party. Without all doubt, it is our interest to live in a perfect correspondence with that court such measures have been long since pursued, and no pains have been spared that are requisite to remove all jealousies and discontents on both sides. The peace of Aix-la-Chapelle was ineffectual for this purpose; and it is owing to the address of our ministers since that time, that those differences have been concluded in such a manner as to prevent at least any colour for beginning a new war. It is, however, from future negociations, when Great Britain is more unemployed, and consequently at leisure for the inspection of minute matters, that we are to hope an absolute conclusion and adjustment of the terms of friendship to be observed by both nations. It is true, delays are disagreeable; but they are sometimes necessary, and at present to demand abrupt explanations might be attended with consequences repugnant to our mutual interests. At a proper time, it is to be hoped that each nation will go the bottom of their grievances, that succeeding ministers may have a full, explicit, and well concerted treaty for their guide, upon which the subjects of both crowns may rely, without ambiguities to perplex, or any other colour for collusive evasion.

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We have long lived in a state of the utmost friendship with the crown of Portugal. The subjects of each country carry on a very extensive traffic to their mutual advantage; we have had, till very lately, all the benefits and advantages that the most sanguine avarice could expect, in favour of our merchants; and if there happen to be at present some little discontents, it is to be hoped that they will be redressed