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cide with any interefts, however difcordant, that afforded even a poffibility of fuccefs. Perhaps he thought it neceffary, at the opening of a new reign, to hold out fuch inftances of moderation, juftice, and a defire of preferving the general tranquillity, as might ferve to fecure the opinions of mankind in his favour, and to prepare them for that future decifion which he forefaw would be inevitable. Perhaps likewife the character of his predeceffor, or the public impreffion founded on it, might not have been without its effect in regulating his conduct upon this occafion.

As the offer of his joint mediation with Great Britain had been flighted by the adverse faction (their mutual connections with the ftadtholder, and avowed predilection for his interefts, affording no fmall room for objecting to their arbitration) he endeavoured to remove this impediment, by propofing that France, the avowed friend and clofe ally of the republic, fhould, along with himself, undertake the kind office, but arduous task, of settling and compofing the differences by which it was diftracted. The feafon of the year was favourable, as the near approach of winter muft neceffarily reftrain the active violence of the contending parties, afford leifure for mediation. and, as men's minds cooled by inaction, they would become more placable, and be the better difpofed to liften to the voice of conciliation.

The propofal being communicated by the Pruflian minifter to the court of Verfailles, was received in fuch a manner, as feemed flattering to the king's difcernment in adopting the project. That court embracing it with every mark of

the greatest cordiality, immediately appointed M. de Rayneval (who had already acquired fome confiderable credit in negociation, particu larly in concluding the late treaty of commerce with England) to be the French King's reprefentative in the office of mediation; and fo hearty did that court appear in the bufinefs, that the French minifter arrived at the Hague before the end of November, 1788, where he was to act in concert with the Baron de Goertz, the extraordinary, and M. Thulemeyer, the refident minifter of Pruffia, in endeavouring to accomplish the defired fettlement.

But fair as these appearances were, it was little hoped by those who looked closely into the ftate and nature of things, that this negociation thould produce the effect apparently fought by one mediator, and eagerly withed by the other. They could not bring themselves to believe that France, who they knew to be not only the nurfe, protectrefs, and encourager of the adverfe faction, but to have been the prime fomenter and inftigator of all their violences, fhould now at once undo the effects of all her former craft and labour, by becoming the inftrument of reitoring the prince of Orange to any thing near that share of weight and power which he before held in the republic. This would have been to facrifice her own immediate interefts to the gratification of the king of Pruflia, to abandon one of the longeft and deareft objects of her policy, to mifs the only opportunity that had ever offered of her eftablishing a fupreme and permanent controul in the affairs of the republic, and for ever to lofe, without benefit or effect, all that gold which the had for [4] 2

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feveral years fo unfparingly beftowed in fupporting her influence in Holland, and in feeding the contention. This was a fource of expence fo abundantly fupplied, that a writer who appears to have poffeffed very unusual fources of information, and more than a common fhare of political acumen, has ventured to affert, that one half of the money thus expended, if it had been properly applied in the ftadtholder's court, would have produced an influence there, infinitely more beneficial in advancing and eftablishing her purposes, than any thing the derived or could derive from the services of the republican leaders on whom it was bestowed *. It was argued, that fuch a coincidence on the part of France, with the views of the king of Pruffia, would not merely be a dereliction of the caufe and party which fhe had fo long efpoufed, but a scandalous act of treachery. She had led them into a courfe of violent and indefenfible measures, and confequently involved them in circumftances of great danger; and now to abandon them in the inftant of their warmeft hopes, when the object of their long and mutual purfuit feemed nearly within reach, would fhock the feelings of all mankind, and appear as foolish as it would infamous. The crooked policy which fhe had purfued for fome ages, by which The became confidered as the common disturber of the tranquillity of Europe, and as facrificing all faith and principle to her own advantage, had been the means of involving her in the greateft difficulties, and moft dangerous fituations, fo that her very existence at one time feem

ed little lefs than trufted to the caft of a die. She seemed of late to adopt a fairer policy, and to be ftudious of eftablishing a different character; but if fhe relapfed now, it would have a worfe effect than merely overthrowing what the had hitherto done for that purpose.

On the other hand, it could fcarcely be fuppofed, that the king of Pruffia would facrifice the interefts of the stadtholder fo far, as to admit of thofe great conceffions, which could alone aufwer the views of France, or afford any fatisfaction to the high republicans. All conceffions merely palliating would undoubtedly be agreed to; fome limi tations perhaps admitted, in order to prevent any encroachment of the executive power upon the other orders of the ftate and government; and every thing that tended to a perfect oblivion of all that was past, to the conciliation of parties, to the fecurity, and even gratification of the adverfe faction, would certainly have been granted with a good grace and a willing mind. But it was not to be conceived from any part of the king of Pruffia's conduct which had yet appeared, much lefs from any due confideration of the clofe ties of affinity and policy which united the two families, that he would ever confent to, or indeed fuffer, except through inevitable neceflity, the abridgement in any effential degree of those rights, which, by the general voice of the nation, and the univerfal concurrence of all the parts and orders of the commonwealth, had, in the year 1749, been annexed to the office of ftadtholder, and rendered hereditary in the family.

See Introduction to the History of the Dutch Republic, &c. p. 272.

It may be added, that the experience of other countries had not warranted a very fanguine expectation from the interference of rival and powerful ftates. Happy is that nation which is able to maintain the balance of its internal political forces without recurring to foreign mediation. But when two great foreign powers acquire leading interefts, and intermingle themfelves intimately in the diffentions of any ftate, it is hardly poffible that thofe diffentions fhould have a favourable iffue. A fincere difpofition to refolve all partial and particular interefts into the general mafs of the national intereft, is to be expected only from a patriotifm of no ordinary clafs, and yet is effential to the accommodation of national troubles. All that is to be hoped from foreign fincerity is, to prevent things from running to extremes, and to keep the fcale even between the parties for a time. The intereft of the ftate to be pacified is not the intereft of the mediators, who moftly endeavour to fight their own political battle on the ground which is neutral, but which each endeavours to appropriate. Whatever were the intentions of the powers now in queftion, their negociation ended in a civil war.

Under fuch doubtful, and indeed inauspicious aspects, was this negociation commenced.

The prince of Orange kept his court at Nimeguen, whither the Count de Goertz departed in the latter end of December; leaving M. de Thulemeyer to tranfact the business on the spot with the French minifter, while he was himself the medium through which the correfpondence was conveyed. The Count

carried with him a draught of the conditions, which the States of Holland laid down as the bafis of a final accommodation. By this arrangement the ftadtholder was to renounce the influence which he poffeffed in the several town fenates or regencies, by giving up his right of rejection or nomination in filling up the occafional vacancies. Upon acceding to this propofition, he was to be restored to the nominal office of captain-general; he being bound to receive it on the new and heavy condition of furrendering that right or prerogative, by which he was enabled to march the troops into or out of any province; whereas he was now to be restrained from any fuch measure, without a previous communication with, and leave obtained for the purpose from, the re fpective ftates of the provinces concerned. By the final propofition, he was to be restored to the government and command of the garrifon of the Hague; but this was likewife clogged with another condition, which was that of compliance with a refolution paft fome time before by the fenate of Amfterdam, that the command fhould at all times be revocable at the pleasure of the states of the province.

By the first of thefe propofitions, that of the ftadtholder's giving up the right of nomination, and confequently all influence in the town' fenates, it was conceived the executive power would have become totally inefficient in the ftate; as nothing less than a strong prefiding influence, which otherwife could only be obtained by an expence in money, far beyond the revenues of the ftadtholderate, could poffibly produce unanimity or decifion a

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mong such a number of petty fovereignties and difcordant interefts; it being one of the moft apparent vices of that conftitution, that though well enough calculated for the internal government of their towns individually, their public union can only be procured by the fordid means of corruption. An opinion confirmed by the moft indubitable authorities, through various parts and different periods of the hiftory of the republic; and a circumftance, which has heretofore, as well as now, afforded an opportunity to France to domineer in their interior as well as public councils.

The fecond propofition, with refpect to the difpofal and movements of the troops, would, if acceded to, have been infinitely more dangerous to the ftate, than in any other degree prejudicial to the ftadtholder, as it would have difabled him, in cafe of fudden emergency and unforefeen danger (things which they now had fufficient caufes to be apprehenfive of) from providing thofe immediate means for the public defence on which the prefervation of the country might depend. The laft condition would have expofed him to continual degradation and infult in the place of his refidence, and in the view of all the world, and have rendered him contemptible even to his own guards, whenever his mafters (which was now the favourite language) fhould choose to remind the public of their fupreme power, and of his fervile dependence on them.

Now as public opinion, and the reverence founded on it, are indifpenfably neceflary to the fupport of all government, fo thefe conditions, taken all together, would have

proved fuch a degradation of the ftadt holder in the eyes both of natives and foreigners, as would render him totally incapable of difcharging the duties, and incompetent to the filling, with propriety or effect, the various great offices which he ftill retained, whether perfect or mutilated. They would befides have eftablished a precedent the most ruinous to himself and his fucceffors that could be devifed. For if it was once found that the eftablished conftitution could thus easily be broken through, and that he fubmitted in facrificing to the pretenfions of a faction or a province, thofe rights and authorities which had been deemed inalienable, and inherent to his office, he furrendered the only principle on which he could defend the remainder; and every other faction, and every other province, might in its turn and proper feafon follow the example.

Such, however, were the preliminaries laid down by the province of Holland, as the ground work of an accommodation!

The event foon confirmed the opinion of thofe who had placed no confidence in the fuccefs of the prefent negociation. The princess of Orange, whofé genius, fpirit, and abilities were well understood on all fides, undertook to fupply the place of the prince in the conduct of this bufinefs; and her management of it did not in any degree derogate from thofe qua'itics. It would feem, however, that the was by no means difpofed to give up any of the ftadtholderian rights; nor perhaps fufficiently practicable with refpect to fmaller compliances. The correfpondence between Nimeguen and the Hague was carried on for feve

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fal weeks; but was at length abruptly broken off by M. de Rayneval, who fuddenly fet out upon his return to Paris about the middle of January 1787.

Nothing could exceed the bitternefs of recrimination which paffed between the contending parties upon the failure of this treaty or negociation. It was faid on the fide of the stadtholder, that it proceeded entirely from the precipitate arrogance, the haughty affectation of fuperiority, and the imperious fpirit of the French minifter. That he would listen to no terms but thofe of his own prescribing, or such as were dictated by the adverse faction. That he appeared rather as the appointed advocate of that party, than in the character of a common friend, or a cool and impartial mediator. That he rather seemed to confider the ftadtholder as a guilty perfon interceding for favour and forgiveness, than as a prince, who was placed by the conftitution at the head of the republic, claiming his juft rights, and demanding redrefs of the injuries he had fuftain

ed.

would be in the highest degree intolerable, that he thould acknow ledge a guilt where none exifted. That the French minifter had required as another preliminary, that, in order to gratify the ftates of Holland, the ftadtholder thould violate the conftitution and invade the rights of other provinces, by binding him to bring the ftates of Gueldres and Utrecht, without regard to the means which he was to use for accomplishing fo abfurd and extraordinary a measure, to refcind refolutions which they had paffed, and forego measures which they had already adopted for their own internal regulation; and, as if it were to render him ftill more culpable, by exceeding his own authority, and a farther violation of the conftitution, it was infifted that he fhould withdraw the garrifons from Elbourg and Hattem, without any regard to the fovereignty under whofe orders he had acted in placing those garrifons, and by whole commands they were ftill continued. And, finally, that the French envoy, inftead of giving time for paffion to cool, or prejudices to fubfide on either fide, as foon as he found that his arbitrary dictum was not inftantly obeyed, and all his propofitions immediately and implicitly acceded to, abruptly broke off the negociation, when, by a better temper and difpofition on his fide, there were very good reasons for believing, that things might in a little time have been put in a fair train of accommodation.

In defcending to particulars, they faid, that the French minifter had laid it down as an indifpenfable preliminary condition to his being reftored to his office of captain-general, that the prince fhould make fuch a public fubmiffion to his fovereigns the ftates of Holland, as would have been an acknowledgement to all the world of his deferving the fufpenfion laid on, and of his being culpable in all the accufations which they had brought against him. That as it would be ridiculous for the ftadtholder, who had committed no fault, to make apologies or to alk pardon, fo it,

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