and large fums of money, it was faid, fubfcribed, for the prefervation of the antient conftitution, and the ftadtholder's rights; while every new measure or incident on either fide increased the animofity on the other, until nothing could exceed the virulence of their mutual reproach and accufation; the ftadtholder's friends openly charging the republican party with having been long the betrayers of their country to French gold, and thefe retorting, that their adverfaries wanted to overthrow the free conftitution of the republic, and toeftablith a regal defpotifin, though at firft perhaps without the name, in the perfon of the prince of Orange. The fituation of the republican party became exceedingly critical. They had been foiled in all their late attempts; they had loft their principal and fuppofed impregnable fortrefs in Amfterdam. In the next great city, that of Rotterdam, they were entirely maftered; a majority of the provinces, thofe of Friefland, Zealand, Utrecht, and Guelderland, were decidedly againft them; and they had now finally loft their influence in the affembly of the ftates of Holland; fo that the two small and weak provinces of Groningen and Overyffel were all that continued firmly on their fide. It was then evident, that nothing lefs than the most prompt and decifive measures could retain or retrieve any part of their power and confequence as a party. Thefe could not but be hazardous and dangerous, but it was the last stake, and all things must be rifqued; if fortune favoured, fuccefs would afford a fufficient fanction to the proceedings. They taw, at the fame time, that in fuch circumftances, all farther temporifing with the democratical parties must be at an end; that the ariftocracies muft now cordially admit their claims; and that they had no other alternative than that of fubmiffion to the prince of Orange; an idea more dreadful than even that of a foreign conqueft. It was accordingly determined that the armed burghers fhould be the inftruments of reforming the state and government; and that when they had effectually fucceeded in fubverting the old, their order fhould be entitled to fuch a fhare in the new conftitution, as they might hereafter agree upon. It was not to be fuppofed, that the burghers would be flack in embracing an opportunity of fulfilling their own purpofes, and attaining thofe objects which they had long fo eagerly fought. They had fome time before entered into a combination for introducing a democratical revolution in the city of Rotterdam; and petitioned the ftatesof Holland for their fanétion in new modelling the fenate, by encreafing the numberfromtwenty-four, thepresent eftablishment, to forty perfons. But this petition was received very unfavourably by the ftates, who referred them back to their own magiftracy; and thefe immediately publifhed a declaration, in which they ftrongly infifted, that the fenfe of the different towns of the republic could not be legally known or communicated through any other medium than that of their refpective fenates, and that confequently the ftates of Holland had no right or authority to take any petition from their citizens into confideration. Notwithstanding thisdefeat, which took place about the clofe of the paft, or the commencement of the prefent prefent year, the inceffant efforts of the democratic party to overturn, and the refiftance of their oppofers to preserve inviolate the established conftitution and government, had fince kept that city in a conftant ftate of tumult and diforder. In this course of domeftic warfare, counter affociations were formed and subscribed to by the contending parties, when it foon appeared that the number of those who united in favour of the prince more than doubled that of their antagonists. But the new and powerful energy which was at length communicated, the coufidence derived from having arms in their hands, and the courage inspired by the correfpondence and advice received from their brethren in other places, rendered the burghers regardless of the fuperior number of their adverfaries, and induced them fearlessly to proceed to the laft extremities. In this determination April 22d. they furrounded the fe 1787. nate-house, compelled the fenate to depofe feven fuch members of their body as they confidered the moft adverfe to their defigns, and, under the form of a mock election, had their places inftantly filled up with feven of the moft violent of their own party. The deputies of the city in the affembly of the provincial ftates being among the degraded fenators, the reprefentation of Rotterdam was of course totally changed. It was to little purpofe that the injured fenators appealed to the laws, to the conftitution, and to the ftates of Holland; no redrefs was any where to be obtained. The deputies at the Hague had the courage to endeavour to keep their feats, alledging that they were the only legal reprefentatives of their city, the new ones being ufurpers brought in by force and violence; but the provincial affembly itself being by that time garbled, had likewife changed its nature, and, pretending that they had no right to interfere in the private difputes of any city, received the new deputies without regard to the complaints or rights of the old. On the very fame day that the fenate of Rotterdam was purged in this manner by the armed burghers, fimilar meafures were pursued by their brethren at Amfterdam. They furrounded the fenate-houfe betimes in the morning, and the affrighted magiftrates entered into a negociation with them, which was fpun out until the evening, when finding that they had no alternative, they were obliged to fubmit to the demands of the burghers, by declaring that nine members of their body, who were thofe nominated to them, had abdicated their offices. Among thefe victims to the revolution, were three deputies to the affembly of the provincial ftates, who had lately voted on fome occafion on the fide of the ftadtholder. At the fame time that they were clearing the fenate of their adverfaries, the four colonels of the city militia, and confequently the only legal commanders of the burghers, were doomed to undergo their perfecution, and obliged to fend in their refignations. About the fame time the city of Utrecht, proud in its wealth, and confident in the circumftance of its contributing as much or more towards the public expence than the reft of the province, determined at once to thew its fuperiority, and to reduce the ftates at Amersfort to [B] 2 beggary, beggary, and an incapacity of carrying on butineis, by withdrawing its allotted quota of revenue entirely from their difpofal. This meafure admitting of no alternative, ferved to cure that flack nefs and indecifion which had marked the conduct of the provincial ftates, and compelled them to adopt the moft vigorous meafures for reducing that turbulent city to obedience. For this purpofe their own troops, in concert with thofe of their allies the ftates of Guelderland, and fuch as the ftadtholder could furnish, feemed to be competent; but the great clog to the undertaking lay in the apprehenfion and danger, that Holland would take an open and direct part in the conteft, and, throwing its whole force into the oppofite fcale, fink the balance entirely against them. For though fuch a measure would not only be a direct breach, but amount to a diffolution of the general confederacy (Utrecht, like every other province, being abfolutely paramount and fovereign within its own territories) yet they bad feen fo many inftances of the daring spirit of that party now dominant in Holland, that they trufted as little to their prudence in weighing general confequences, as to their juftice with respect to the rights of others. It became accordingly the firft object of policy with the ftadtholder's friends, as well as with the ftates of Utrecht and Guelderland, to ufe all the civil means which the nature of the conftitution and government admitted, to reftrain the violence of Holland; and if these failed of effect, their fecond object, and laft apparent refource was, to call in the aid of the provinces of Zealand and Frief land (which they had a well-founded hope of obtaining) and prepare to defend their territorial rights, and vindicate their fovereign authority by arms. The ftates general had hitherto preferved the moft guarded neutrality through the whole courfe of thefe diffenfions; fo that it could not even be furmifed what their private opinions as men might be, relative to any of the questions which had been fo violently agitated. In fact, by the conftitution of that body, though their powers and authority were great, they were directed rather to general than to particular objects. Their high mightineffes were the watchful guardians of the interefts of the republic as a whole; they were to look particularly to them with refpect to foreign nations; they were to watch the approach of danger from without, to eftimate its degree, and to make a timely provition for the public fecurity. In war, their powers were great, and their authority in a great measure conclufive; and in peace, they were to preferibe the force to be fupported by fea and land, to infpect into the flate of the fleets and armies, and to look to every part of the public defence at home and abroad. But with respect to internal affairs, or the differences between particular ftates, their powers of controul, if not abfolutely limited, are at least unknown, as their exertion is probably without a precedent. But in cafes of extreme neceflity, even with refpect to internal affairs, where the peace or unity of the republic were endangered, the occafion would undoubtedly fanctify the application of thefe undefined powers, and the effect would be the the greater from the rareness of the exertion. It seemed as if the states general confidered the occafion for calling forth that fupreme power, which, however concealed or dormant, must fubfift in all states, as now arrived, by that war which was on the point of breaking out between Holland and the ftates of Utrecht with their allies. But, previous to their direct interference, the friends of the ftadtholder deemed it neceffary to obtain the fanction of another great body in the ftate, as an effential preparatory measure. This was the council of ftate for the feven provinces, a body of the firft dignity and power with respect to the mere executive authority in the republic. This council, which fits conftantly at the Hague, is compofed, like the ftates general, of deputies from all the provinces of the union; and is the conftant reprefentative of that body, which meets only on ftated days, not only in thofe fhorter intervals, but in the cafes of feparation or prorogation, and in these feafons fuperintend the execution of all fuch refolutions as they have paffed on public affairs. The council of ftate likewife fuperintend the public revenues, the neceffary provifions for the army, and the affairs of the generalité; by which term is to be understood thofe countries, diftricts, or towns, which, by conqueft or otherwife, have fallen to the republic fince the union, and which confequently are not included in it. The ftadtholder, in better times, had ufually poticed a great and neceffary influence in this body; but the diforders and confufion which fo long prevailed, perhaps rendered their prefent difpofition doubtful. However that was, the council of ftate now declared themselves, and paffed a refolution, on the 28th of April, forbidding all colonels, or other officers commanding regiments, from marching their troops upon the territories of any other province, without the confent of that fovereignty firft obtained; and difcharging them from all obedi ence to any orders whatever of a contrary nature. This refolution being confirmed by the ftates general, became an abfolute decree. This produced a re ply from the tates of May 10th. Holland, in which they declared, that the refolution of the ftates general would have been perfectly conclufive on them, if the confe deracy had maintained its proper fituation; but that this had been already changed, by the hoftile march of the troops of one province against the inhabitants of another; from which they confidered the bond of union as broken, and confequently were no longer bound to its obfervation. At the fame time they deemed it neceffary to try, what effect this interference of the ftates general might have upon the difpofition of their troops, and accordingly iffued an order, that the officers fhould peremptorily declare, whether they were ready to obey their matters, the provincial ftates, in all cafes without exception; and that thofe who refufed, or who hefitated in giving a fatisfactory explanation, thould be im'mediately fufpended. But in the intermediate time, things were arrived at fuch a crifis on the fide of Utrecht, as to preclude all farther hope of fuccefs from civil intrigue or negociation, [B] 3 towards towards the prefervation of peace, or the restoration of harmony; and the first blood was now publicly drawn in a military manner through thefe contests. We have already feen that the provincial ftates affembled at Amerffort, had at length determined to proceed to the last extremities, in order to restore the government of their turbulent capital, and to reduce it to a due ftate of obedience to and conformity with the ancient government and conftitution. The better to effect this purpose, it was refolved in the first inftance, as the neceffary prelude to a ficge, to feize the principal pofts which furround the city of Utrecht, and thereby cut off its communications in general, but particularly with the province of Holland, from which only it looked for support and affiftance. No measures were ever worse conducted than those adopted upon this occafion. The poffeffion of the poft of Vreefwyk, near Utrecht, was a matter of the utmoft importance to both parties, and neither feemed to make a proper estimate of its value. Its fituation upon a great canal, rendered it the medium of communication between Utrecht and South Holland, and it was befides the feat or head of the fluices, by which a confiderable part of the neighbouring territories in both provinces were liable to be laid at any time under water. Yet the city of Utrecht had not placed the smallest guard to protect a place fo near, and of fo much confequence to its fecurity. On the other fide, the fiates fent the Count d'Efferen, with a weak battalion of his regiment, amounting only to about 350 men, with out artillery, and, so far as appears; without any means of throwing up intrenchment or defence of any fort, not only to poffefs and maintain this poft, but another, at a confiderable diftance, on the way to Utrecht, which was neceffary to its prefervation, being a village called Jutphaas. It cannot but appear aftonishing, how any council, how ever ignorant of war, or any com mander of a regiment, however little verfed in actual fervice, could deem it poflible for fuch a handful of men to maintain their ground in two potts confiderably feparated, and in the vicinity of a great and turbulent city, poffeffing feveral thousands of well-armed and longdifciplined burghers, whofe courage was inflamed by the violence of their enthufiafm, and the long fuccefs which had attended their proceedings. Count d'Efferen fully fuccceded in performing the first part of his miffion, by taking poffeffion, on the afternoon of the 9th of May, both of Vreefwyk and Jutphaas; pofting four companies of his detachment in the firft, and three in the other. The furprise, and the delay of affembling the council in Utrecht, occafioned its being about feven o'clock in the evening, before a fmall party, which feemed infufficient for the purpose, were permitted to march to repel the invaders; for, whether it proceeded from their contempt of the regular troops (whofe force they were acquainted with) or from whatever other caufe, the eagerness of the burghers to go as volunteers was fo ftrongly controuled, that only 200 of that body, accompanied with 30 light marktimen, were fuffered to proceed on this fervice; they how |