extreme richness and fertility of the land; the healthy temperature of the air, and mildness of the climate; the plenty of hunting, fishing, and fowling; the facility of trade with the Indians; and the vast convenience of inland navigation or water-carriage by the lakes and great rivers, many hundred of leagues around. From these natural advantages it must undoubtedly (perhaps in less than another century) become a populous and powerful dominion; and a great accession of power either to England or France. The French are now making open encroachments on these territories, in defiance of our known rights; and, if we longer delay to settle that country, and suffer them to possess it,-these inconveniences and mischiefs will probably follow : 1. Our people, being confined to the coun its command? Could the Goodwin Sands be mountains, on both sides the Ohio, and belaid dry by banks, and land equal to a large tween that river and the lakes is now well county thereby gained to England, and pre-known, both to the English and French, to be sently filed with English inhabitants, would one of the finest in North America, for the it be right to deprive such inhabitants of the common privileges enjoyed by other Englishmen, the right of vending their produce in the same ports, or of making their own shoes; because a merchant or a shoemaker, living on the old land, might fancy it more for his advantage to trade or make shoes for them? Would this be right even if the land were gained at the expense of the state? And would it not seem less right, if the charge and labour of gaining the additional territory to Britain had been borne by the settlers themselves? And would not the hardships appear yet greater, if the people of the new county should be allowed no representatives in the parliament enacting such impositions? Now I look on the colonies as so many counties gained to Great Britain, and more advantageous to it, than if they had been gained out of the seas around its coasts, and joined to its lands; for being in different climates, they afford greater variety of produce, and materials for more manufactures; and being separatel by the ocean, they increase much more its shipping and seamen: and, since they are all included in the British empire, which has only extended itself by their means; and the strength and wealth of the parts is the strength and wealth of the whole; what imports it to the general state, whether a mer-pulse, or delay. chant, a smith, or a hatter, grows rich in Old or New England and if, through increase of the people, two smiths are wanted for one employed before, why may not the new smith be allowed to live and thrive in the new country, as well as the old one in the old? In fine, why should the countenance of a state be partidity afforded to its people, un-dians. This is a measure that will be effectual; and less it be most in favour of those who have most merit? And if there be any difference, those who have most contributed to enlargement in it. Britain's empire and commerce, increase her strength, her wealth, and the numbers of her people, at the risk of their own lives and private fortunes in new and strange countries, methinks ought rather to expect some preference. With the greatest respect and esteem, I have the honour to be, your excellency's most obedient and humble servant, even this cannot be carried -into execution -All species of barrier should be thought of for which no- an army, or as an emigration of colonists, can march without posts communicating among each other by prac It is a fact, which experience evinces the truth of, that we have always been able to outsettle the French; and have driven the Indians out of the country more by settling than fighting; and that whenever our settlements have been wisely and completely made, the French, neither by themselves nor their dogs of war, the Indians, have been able to remove us. It is upon this fact I found the propriety of the measure of settling a barrier colony in those parts of our frontiers, which are not the immediate residence or hunting grounds of our In will not only in time pay its expense, but make as great returns as any of our present colonies do; will give strength and unity to our dominions in North America; and give us possession of our country, as well as settleBut above all this, the state and circumstances of our settlements render such a measure not only proper and eligible, but absolutely necessary. The English settlements, as they are at present circumstanced, are absolutely at a stand; they are settled up to the mountains; and in the mountains there is no enough to subsist by itself, and to defend itself, and where together land sufficient for a settlement large preserve a communication with the present settlements If the English would advance one step further, or cover themselves where they are, it must be at once, by one large step over the mountains, with a numerous and military colony. Where such should be settled, I do not take upon me to say; at present I shall only point out the measure and the nature of it, by inserting two schemes, one of Dr. Franklin's, the other of your memorialist; and if I might indulge myself with scheming, I should imagine that two such were sufficient, and only requisite and proper: one at the back nations and southern confederacy, and connecting into our system, our barrier; the other somewhere in the Cohass or Connecticut river, or wherever best adapted to cover the New England colonies. These, with the little settlements mentioned above in the Indian countries, complete my idea of this branch."-See Governor Pownall's Administration of the Colonies. Vol. II. p. 228--231, 5th edition. of Virginia, filling up the vacant space between the five nations, greatly to the benefit of Britain. try between the sea and the mountains, can- | country, among many numerous and distant not much more increase in number; people increasing in proportion to their room and means of subsistence. (See the Observations on the Increase of Mankind, &c. Vol. II.) 2. The French will increase much more, by that acquired room and plenty of subsistence, and become a great people behind us. 3. Many of our debtors, and loose English people, our German servants, and slaves, will probably desert to them, and increase their numbers and strength, to the lessening and weakening of ours. 4. They will cut us off from all commerce and alliance with the western Indians, to the great prejudice of Britain, by preventing the sale and consumption of its manufactures. 5. They will both in time of peace and war (as they have always done against New England) set the Indians on to harass our frontiers, kill and scalp our people, and drive in the advanced settlers; and so, in preventing our obtaining more subsistence by cultivating of new lands, they discourage our marriages, and to keep our people from increasing; thus (if the expression may be allowed) killing thousands of our children before they are born 5. The settlement of all the intermediate lands, between the present frontiers of our colonies on one side, and the lakes and Mississippi on the other, would be facilitated and speedily executed, to the great increase of Englishmen, English trade, and English power. The grants to most of the colonies are of long narrow slips of land, extending west from the Atlantic to the South Sea. They are much too long for their breadth; the extremes at too great a distance; and therefore unfit to be continued under their present dimensions. Several of the old colonies may conveniently be limited westward by the Alleghany or Apalachian mountains; and new colonies formed west of those mountains. A single old colony does not seem strong enough to extend itself otherwise than inch by inch: it cannot venture a settlement far distant from the main body, being unable to support it: but if the colonies were united under one governor-general and grand council, agreeable to the Albany, plan, they might easily, by their joint force, establish one or more new colonies, whenever they should judge it necessary or advantageous to the in If two strong colonies of English were set-terest of the whole tled between the Ohio and lake Erie, in the places hereafter to be mentioned, these advantages might be expected: 1. They would be a great security to the frontiers of our other colonies; by preventing the incursions of the French and French Indians of Canada, on the back parts of Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, and the Carolinas; and the frontiers of such new colonies would be much more easily defended, than those of the colonies last mentioned now can be, as will appear hereafter. 2. The dreaded junction of the French settlements in Canada with those of Louisiana would be prevented. 3. In case of a war, it would be easy, from those new colonies, to annoy Louisiana, by going down the Ohio and Mississippi; and the southern part of Canada, by sailing over the lakes; and thereby confine the French within narrow limits. But if such union should not take place, it is proposed that two charters be granted, each for some considerable part of the lands west of Pennsylvania and the Virginian mountains, to a number of the nobility and gentry of Britain; with such Americans as shall join them in contributing to the settlement of those lands, either by paying a proportion of the expense of making such settlements, or by actually going thither in person, and settling themselves and families. That by such charters it be granted, that every actual settler be entitled to a tract of acres for himself, and acres for every poll in the family he carries with him; and that every contributor of guineas be entitled to a quantity of acres, equal to the share of a single settler, for every such sum of guineas contributed and paid to the colony treasurer; a contributor for have an additional share gratis; that settlers may likewise be contributors, and have right of land in both capacities. shares to 4. We should secure the friendship and trade of the Miamis or Twigtwees (a numerous people consisting of many tribes, inhabit- That as many and as great privileges and ing the country between the west end of lake powers of government be granted to the conErie, and the south end of lake Huron, and tributors and settlers, as his majesty in his the Ohio) who are at present dissatisfied with wisdom shall think most fit for their benefit the French, and fond of the English, and and encouragement, consistent with the gewould gladly encourage and protect an in-neral good of the British empire; for extraor fant English settlement in or near their country, as some of their chiefs have declared to the writer of this memoir. Further, by means of the lakes, the Ohio, and the Mississippi, our trade might be extended through a vast dinary privileges and liberties, with lands on easy terms, are strong inducements to people to hazard their persons and fortunes ir settling new countries: and such powers of government as (though suitable to the circumstances, and fit to be trusted with an infant colony) might be judged unfit, when it becomes populous and powerful; these might be granted for a term only; as the choice of their own governor for ninety-nine years; the support of government in the colonies of Connecticut and Rhode Island (which now enjoy that and other like privileges) being much less expensive, than in the colonies under the immediate government of the crown, and the constitution more inviting. of That the first contributors to the amount of guineas be impowered to choose a treasurer to receive the contribution. That no contributions be paid till the sum thousand guineas be subscribed. That the money thus raised be applied to the purchase of the lands from the Six Nations and other Indians, and of provisions, stores, arms, ammunition, carriages, &c. for the settlers; who, after having entered their names with the treasurer, or person by him appointed to receive and enter them, are, upon public notice given for that purpose, to rendezvous at a place to be appointed, and march in a body to the place destined for their settlement, under the charge of the government to be established over them. Such rendezvous and march however not to be directed, till the number of names of settlers entered, capable of bearing arms, amount at least to thousand It is apprehended, that a great sum of money might be raised in America on such a scheme as this; for there are many who would be glad of any opportunity, by advancing a small sum at present, to secure land for their children, which might in a few years become very valuable; and a great number it is thought of actual settlers might likewise be engaged (some from each of our present colonies) sufficient to carry it into full execution by their strength and numbers; provided only, that the crown would be at the expense of removing the little forts the French have erected in their encroachments on his majesty's territories, and supporting a strong one near the falls of Niagara, with a few small armed vessels, or half-galleys to cruize on the lakes. For the security of this colony in its infancy, a small fort might be erected and for some time maintained at Buffalo-creek on the Ohio, above the settlement; and another at the mouth of the Tioga, on the south side of lake Erie, where a port should be formed, and a town erected, for the trade of the lakes. The colonists for this settlement might march by land through Pennsylvania The river Sciota, which runs into the Ohio about two hundred miles below Logs Town, is supposed the fittest seat for the other colony; there being for forty miles on each side of it, and quite up to its heads, a body of all rich land; the finest spot of its bigness in all North Ame rica, and has the particular advantage of seacoal in plenty (even above ground in two places) for fuel, when the woods shall be destroyed. This colony would have the trade of the Miamis or Twigtwees; and should, at first, have a small fort near Hockockin, at the head of the river; and another near the mouth of Wabash. Sanduski, a French fort near the lake Erie, should also be taken; and all the little French forts south and west of the lakes, quite to the Mississippi, be removed, or taken and garrisoned by the English.-The colonists for this settlement might assemble near the heads of the rivers in Virginia, and march over land to the navigable branches of the Kanhawa, where they might embark with all their baggage and provisions, and fall into the Ohio, not far above the mouth of Sciota. Or they might rendezvous at Will's Creek, and go down the Monongahela to the Ohio. The fort and armed vessels at the strait of Niagara would be a vast security to the frontiers of these new colonies against any attempts of the French from Canada. The fort at the mouth of the Wabash would guard that river, the Ohio, and Outawa river, in case any attempt from the French of Mississippi. (Every fort should have a small settlement round it; as the fort would protect the settlers, and the settlers defend the fort and supply it with provisions.) The difficulty of settling the first English colonies in America, at so great a distance from England, must have been vastly greater than the settling these proposed new colonies: for it would be the interest and advantage of all the present colonies to support these new ones; as they would cover their frontiers, and prevent the growth of the French power behind or near their present settlements; and the new country is nearly at equal distance from all the old colonies, and could easily be assisted from all of them. And as there are already in all the old colonies many thousands of families that are ready to swarm, wanting more land; the richness and natural advantage of the Ohio country would draw most of them thither, were there but a tolerable prospect of a safe settlement. So that the new colonies would soon be full of people; and from the advantage of their situation, become much more terrible to the French settlements, than those are now to us. The gaining of the back Indian trade from the French, by the navigation of the lakes, &c. would of itself greatly weaken our enemies:-it being now their principal support, it seems highly probable, that in time they must be subjected to the British crown, or driven out of the country. Such settlements may better be made now, than fifty years hence, because it is easier to settle ourselves, and thereby prevent the French settling there, as they seem now to intend, than to remove them when strongly best information, there are, I apprehend, in the settled. If these settlements are postponed, then more forts and stronger, and more numerous and expensive garrisons must be established, to secure the country, prevent their settling, and secure our present frontiers; the charge of which may probably exceed the charge of the proposed settlements, and the advantage nothing near so great. The fort at Oswego should likewise be strengthened, and some armed half-gallies, or other small vessels, kept there to cruise on lake Ontario, as proposed by Mr. Pownall in his paper laid before the commissioners at the Albany treaty. If a fort was also built at Tirondequat on lake Ontario, and a settlement made there near the lake side, where the lands are said to be good, (much better than at Oswego;) the people of such settlements would help to defend both forts on any emergency. THE CANADA PAMPHLET. The Interest of Great Britain considered, with regard to her Colonies, and the Acquisitions of Canada and Guadeloupe.* I HAVE perused with no small pleasure the "Letter addressed to Two Great men," and the Remarks on that letter. It is not merely from the beauty, the force, and perspicuity of expression, or the general elegance of manner conspicuous in both pamphlets, that my pleasure chiefly arises; it is rather from this, that I have lived to see subjects of the greatest importance to this nation publicly discussed without party views, or party heat, with decency and politeness, and with no other warmth, than what a zeal for the honour and happiness of our king and country may inspire; and this by writers, whose understanding (however they may differ from each other) appears not unequal to their candour and the uprightness of their intentions. But, as great abilities have not always the * In the year 1760, upon the prospect of a peace with France, the Earl of Bath addressed a Letter to Two Great Men (Mr. Pitt and the Duke of Newcastle) on the terms necessary to be insisted upon in the negotiation. He preferred the acquisition of Canada, to acquisitions in the West Indies. In the same year there appeared Remarks on the letter addressed to two great men, containing opposite opinions on this and other subjects. At this moment a philosopher stepped into the contro versy, and wrote a pamphlet entitled, "The Interest of Great Britain considered, with Regard to her Colonies," &c. The arguments he used, appear to have carried weight with them, for Canada was kept by the peace. The above piece first appeared in the shape of a pamphlet, printed for Becket, 1761. In the original, the author had added his observations concerning the Increase of Mankind. Peopling of Countries, &c. (printed in another part of this edition) introduced by the following note. "In confirmation of the writer's opinion concerning population, manufactures, &c. he has thought it not amiss to add an extract from a piece written some years since in America, where the facts must be well known, on which the reasonings are founded. It is entitled, Observations, &c.' Remarks, some opinions not well founded, and some mistakes of so important a nature, as to render a few observations on them necessary for the better information of the public. The author of the Letter, who must be every way best able to support his own sentiments, will, I hope, excuse me, if I seem officiously to interfere; when he considers, that the spirit of patriotism, like other qualities good and bad, is catching; and that his long silence since the Remarks appeared, has made us despair of seeing the subject farther discussed by his masterly hand. The ingenious and candid remarker, too, who must have been misled himself before he employed his skill and address to mislead others, will certainly, since he declares he aims at no seduction, be disposed to excuse even the weakest effort to prevent it. And surely, if the general opinions that possess the minds of the people may possibly be of consequence in public affairs, it must be fit to set those opinions right. If there is danger, as the remarker supposes, that "extravagant expectations" may embarrass "a virtuous and able ministry," and "render the negotiation for peace a work of infinite difficulty;" there is no less danger that expectatations too low, through want of proper information, may have a contrary effect, may make even a virtuous and able ministry less anxious, and less attentive to the obtaining points, in which the honour and interest of the nation are essentially concerned; and the people less hearty in supporting such a ministry and its measures. The people of this nation are indeed respectable, not for their numbers only, but for their understanding and their public spirit: they manifest the first, by their universal approbation of the late prudent and vigorous measures, and the confidence they so justly repose in a wise and good prince, and an honest and able administration; the latter they have demonstrated by the immense supplies granted in parliament unanimously, and paid through the whole kingdom with cheerfulness. And since to this spirit and these supplies our "victories and successes" have in great measure been owing; is it quite right, is it generous to say, with the remarker, that the people "had no share in acquiring them?" The mere mob he cannot mean, even where he speaks of the madness of the people; for the madness of the mob must be too feeble and impotent, armed as the government of this country at present is, to "overrule," even in the slightest instances, the virtue "and moderation" of a firm and steady ministry. While the war continues, its final event is quite uncertain. The victorious of this year may be the vanquished of the next. It may therefore be too early to say, what advantages we ought absolutely to insist on, and make the sine quibus non of a peace. If the necessity of our affairs should oblige us to accept of terms less advantageous than our present successes seem to promise us; an intelligent people, as ours is, must see that necessity, and will acquiesce. But as a peace, when it is made, may be made hastily; and as the unhappy continuance of the war affords us time to consider, among several advantages gained or to be gained, which of them may be most for our interest to retain, if some and not all may possibly be retained; I do not blame the public disquisition of these points, as premature or useless. Light often arises from a collision of opinions, as fire from flint and steel; and if we can obtain the benefit of the light, without danger from the heat sometimes produced by controversy, why should we discourage it? Supposing then, that heaven may still continue to bless his majesty's arms, and that the event of this just war may put it in our power to retain some of our conquests at the making of a peace; let us consider, 1. The security of a dominion, a justifiable and prudent ground upon which to demand cessions from an enemy. value of Canada to the French; the right we have to ask, and the power we may have to insist on an indemnification for our expenses; the difficulty the French themselves will be under of restraining their restless subjects in America from encroaching on our limits and disturbing our trade; and the difficulty on our parts of preventing encroachments, that may possibly exist many years without coming to our knowledge. But the remarker "does not see why the arguments, employed concerning a security for a peaceable behaviour in Canada, would not be equally cogent for calling for the same security in Europe." On a little farther reflection, he must I think be sensible, that the circumstances of the two cases are widely different.-Here we are separated by the best and clearest of boundaries, the ocean, and we have people in or near every part of our territory. Any attempt to encroach upon us, by building a fort even in the obscurest corner of these islands, must therefore be known and prevented immediately. The aggressors also must be known, and the nation they belong to would be accountable for their aggression. In America it is quite otherwise. A vast wilderness, thinly or scarce at all peopled, Whether we are to confine ourselves to those conceals with ease the march of troops and possessions only that were "the objects for workmen. Important passes may be seized which we began the war." This the remark- within our limits, and forts built in a month, er seems to think right, when the question at a small expense, that may cost us an age, relates to "Canada, properly so called; it and a million, to remove. Dear experience having never been mentioned as one of those has taught this. But what is still worse, the objects, in any of our memorials or declara-wide extended forests between our settletions, or in any national or public act whatso-ments and theirs, are inhabited by barbarous ever." But the gentleman himself will pro- tribes of savages, that delight in war, and take bably agree, that if the cession of Canada would be a real advantage to us; we may demand it under his second head, as an "indemnification for the charges incurred" in recovering our just rights; otherwise, according to his own principles, the demand of Guadaloupe can have no foundation.-That "our claims before the war were large enough for possession and for security too," though it seems a clear point with the ingenious remarker, is, I own, not so with me. I am rather of the contrary opinion, and shall presently give my reasons. But first let me observe, that we did not make those claims because they were large enough for security, but because we could rightfully claim no more. Advantages gained in the course of this war may increase the extent of our rights. Our claims before the war contained some security; but that is no reason why we should neglect acquiring more, when the demand of more is become reasonable. It may be reasonable in the case of America, to ask for the security recommended by the author of the Letter, though it would be preposterous to do it in many cases. His proposed demand is founded on the little pride in murder; subjects properly neither of the French nor English, but strongly attached to the former by the art and indefatigable industry of priests, similarity of superstitions, and frequent family alliances. These are easily, and have been continually, instigated to fall upon and massacre our planters, even in times of full peace between the two crowns; to the certain diminution of our people and the contraction of our settlements. And though it is known they are supplied by the French, and carry their prisoners to them, we can, by complaining, obtain no redress; as the governors of Canada have a ready excuse, that the Indians are an independent people, over whom they have no power, and for whose actions they are therefore not accountable. Surely circumstances so widely different may reasonably authorize different demands of security in America, from such as are usual or necessary in Europe. The remarker however thinks, that our real dependence for keeping "France or any other nation true to her engagements, must not be in demanding securities which no nation whilst independent can give; but on our own strength and our own viligance. No |