blish a new colony or two in those parts, or extend an old colony to particular passes, greatly to the security of our present frontiers, increase of trade and people, breaking off the French communication between Canada and Louisiana, and speedy settlement of the intermediate lands. Particulur colonies are at present backward to build forts at their own expense, which they say will be equally useful to their neighbouring colonies; who refuse to join, on a presumption that such forts will be built and kept up, though they contribute nothing. This unjust conduct weakens the whole; but the forts The power of settling new colonies is there-being for the good of the whole, it was thought fore thought a valuable part of the plan, and what cannot so well be executed by two unions as by one. LAWS TO GOVERN THEM. That they make laws for regulating and governing such new settlements, till the crown shall think fit to form them into particular governments. best they should be built and maintained by the whole, out of the common treasury. In the time of war, small vessels of force are sometimes necessary in the colonies to scour the coast of small privateers. These being provided by the union will be an advantage in turn to the colonies which are situated on the sea, and whose frontiers on the land-side, being covered by other colonies, reap but little immediate benefit from the advanced forts. The making of laws suitable for the new colonies, it was thought, would be properly vested in the president-general and grand council; under whose protection they must at POWER TO MAKE LAWS, LAY DUTIES, &c. first necessarily be, and who would be well That for these purposes they have power acquainted with their circumstances, as hav- to make laws, and lay and levy such general ing settled them. "When they are become duties, imports, or taxes, as to them shall apsufficiently populous, they may by the crown pear most equal and just (considering the be formed into complete and distinct govern-ability and other circumstances of the inha ments. The appointment of a sub-president by the crown, to take place in case of the death or absence of the president-general, would perhaps be an improvement of the plan; and if all the governors of particular provinces were to be formed into a standing council of state, for the advice and assistance of the presidentgeneral, it might be another considerable improvement. RAISE SOLDIERS, AND EQUIP VESSELS, &c. That they raise and pay soldiers and build forts for the defence of any of the colonies, and equip vessels of force to guard the coasts and protect the trade on the ocean, lakes,* or great rivers; but they shall not impress men in any colony without the consent of the legislature. bitants in the several colonies,) and such as may be collected with the least inconvenience to the people; rather discouraging luxury, than loading industry with unnecessary burdens. The laws which the president-general and grand council are impowered to make are such only as shall be necessary for the government of the settlements; the raising, regulating, and paying soldiers for the general service; the regulating of Indian trade; and laying and collecting the general duties and taxes. (They should also have a power to restrain the exportation of provisions to the enemy from any of the colonies, on particular occasions, in time of war.) But is it not intended that they may interfere with the constitution and government of the particular colonies; who are to be left to their own laws, and to lay, levy, and apply their own taxes as before. GENERAL TREASURER AND PARTICULAR TREA- It was thought, that quotas of men, to be raised and paid by the several colonies, and joined for any public service, could not always be got together with the necessary expedition. For instance, suppose one thousand men should be wanted in New Hampshire on any That they may appoint a general treasuremergency; to fetch them by fifties and hun-er and particular treasurer in each governdreds out of every colony, as far as Southment, when necessary; and from time to time Carolina, would be inconvenient, the trans- may order the sums in the treasuries of each portation chargeable, and the occasion perhaps government into the general treasury; or passed before they could be assembled; and draw on them for special payments, as they therefore that it would be best to raise them find most convenient. (by offering bounty-money and pay) near the The treasurers here meant are only for the place where they would be wanted, to be dis-general funds, and not for the particular funds charged again when the service should be over. of each colony, which remain in the hands of their own treasurers at their own disposal. "According to a plan which had been proposed by governor Pownall, and approved of by congress."-Administration of the Colonies, vol. ii. p. 148. MONEY HOW TO ISSUE. Yet no money to issue but by joint orders of the president-general and grand council; fore, if the crown appointed a vice-president, except where sums have been appropriated to to take place on the death or absence of the particular purposes, and the president-gene-president-general: for so we should be more ral is previously impowered by an act to draw sure of a suitable person at the head of the such sums. colonies. On the death or absence of both, the speaker to take place (or rather the eldest king's-governor) till his majesty's pleasure be known. To prevent misapplication of the money, or even application that might be dissatisfactory to the crown or the people, it was thought necessary, to join the president-general and grand council in all issues of money. ACCOUNTS. That the general accounts shall be yearly settled and reported to the several assemblies. By communicating the accounts yearly to each assembly, they will be satisfied of the prudent and honest conduct of their representatives in the grand council. QUORUM. That a quorum of the grand council, impowered to act with the president-general, do consist of twenty-five members; among whom there shall be one or more from a majority of the colonies. The quorum seems large, but it was thought it would not be satisfactory to the colonies in general, to have matters of importance to the whole transacted by a smaller number, or even by this number of twenty-five, unless there were among them one at least from a majority of the colonies; because otherwise, the whole quorum being made up of members from three or four colonies at one end of the union, something might be done that would not be equal with respect to the rest, and thence dissatisfaction and discords might rise to the prejudice of the whole. LAWS TO BE TRANSMITTED. OFFICERS HOW APPOINTED. That all military commission officers, whether for land or sea service, to act under this general constitution, shall be nominated by the president-general; but the approbation of the grand council is to be obtained before they receive their commissions. And all civil officers are to be nominated by the grand council, and to receive the president-general's approbation before they officiate. : It was thought it might be very prejudicial to the service, to have officers appointed unknown to the people, or unacceptable, the generality of Americans serving willingly under officers they know and not caring to engage in the service under strangers, or such as are often appointed by governors through favour or interest. The service here meant, is not the stated settled service in standing troops; but any sudden and short service, either for defence of our colonies, or invading the enemy's country; (such as, the expedition to Cape Breton in the last war; in which many substantial farmers and tradesmen engaged as common soldiers, under officers of their own country, for whom they had an esteem and affection; who would not have engaged in a standing army, or under officers from England.) It was therefore thought best, to give the council the power of approving the of ficers, which the people will look upon as a That the laws made by them for the pur-great security of their being good men. poses aforesaid shall not be repugnant, but, as near as may be, agreeable to the laws of England, and shall be transmitted to the king in council for approbation, as soon as may be after their passing; and if not disapproved within three years after presentation, to remain in force. And without some such provision as this, it was thought the expense of engaging men in the service on any emergency would be much greater, and the number who could be induced to engage much less; and that therefore it would be most for the king's service and general benefit of the nation, that the prero throughout all the colonies in America; as it had already done much more in the charters of some particular colonies, viz. Connecticut and Rhode Island. This was thought necessary for the satis-gative should relax a little in this particular faction of the crown, to preserve the connexion of the parts of the British empire with the whole, of the members with the head, and to induce greater care and circumspection in making of the laws, that they be good in themselves and for the general benefit. DEATH OF THE PRESIDENT-GENERAL. That in case of the death of the presidentgeneral, the speaker of the grand council for the time being shall succeed, and be vested with the same powers and authorities, to continue till the king's pleasure be known. It might be better, perhaps, as was said be The civil officers will be chiefly treasurers and collectors of taxes; and the suitable persons are most likely to be known by the council. VACANCIES HOW SUPPLIED. But in case of vacancy by death, or removal of any officer civil or military under this constitution, the governor of the province in which such vacancy happens may appoint, till the pleasure of the president-general and grand council can be known. The vacancies were thought best supplied by the governor in each province, till a new appointment can be regularly made; otherwise the service might suffer before the meeting of the president-general and grand coun cil, EACH COLONY MAY DEFEND ITSELF ON EMER GENCY, &c. plan, with thanks to your excellency for communicating them. I apprehend, that excluding the people of the colonies from all share in the choice of the grand council will give extreme dissatisfaction; as well as the taxing them by act of parliament, where they have no representation. It is very possible, that this general government might be as well and faithfully administered without the people, as with them; but where heavy burdens are to be laid upon them, it has been found useful, to make it as much as possible their own act; for they bear better, when they have, or think they have, some share in the direction; and when any public measures are generally grievous, or even distasteful, to the people, the wheels of That the particular military as well as civil establishments in each colony remain in their present state, the general constitution notwithstanding; and that on sudden emergencies any colony may defend itself, and lay the accounts of expense thence arising before the president-general and general coun-government move more heavily. cil, who may allow and order payment of the same, as far as they judge such accounts just and reasonable. Otherwise the union of the whole would weaken the parts, contrary to the design of the union. The accounts are to be judged of by the president-general and grand council, and allowed if found reasonable: this was thought necessary to encourage colonies to defend themselves, as the expense would be light when borne by the whole; and also to check imprudent and lavish expense in such defences.* ALBANY PAPERS-continued. 1. Letter to governor Shirley, concerning the Imposition of direct Taxes upon the Colonies, without their consent.† Tuesday morning. SIR,—I return you the loose sheets of the * This plan of union was rejected, and another pro. posed by the English minister, which had for its object, taking power from the people in the colonies, in order to give it to the crown. †These letters to governor Shirley first appeared in the London Chronicle for Feb. 6-8, 1766, with an introduction signed A Lover of Britain. In the beginning of the year 1776, they were republished in Almon's Remembrancer, with an additional prefatory piece, under the signature of A Mourner over our Calamities.-The subject of them in the words of one of these writers is as follows: "The Albany Plan of Union was sent to the government here for approbation: had it been ap proved and established by authority from hence, Engfish America thought itself sufficiently able to cope with the French, without other assistance; several of the colonies having alone, in former wars, withstood their whole power, unassisted not only by the motherCountry, but by any of the neighbouring provincesThe plan, however, was not approved here; a New one was formed instead of it; which proposed, that "the governors of all the colonies, attended by one or two members of their respective councils, should assemble, and concert measures for the defence of the whole, erect forts where they judged proper, and raise what troops they thought necessary, with power to draw on the treasury here for the sums that should be wanted, and the treasury to be reimbursed by a tax laid on the colonies by act of parliament "-This New Plan being communicated by governor Shirley to Dr. Franklin then in Boston, and produced this correspondence. II. Letter to the same; concerning direct Taxes in the Colonies imposed without consent, indirect Taxes, and the Albany Plan of Union. Wednesday morning. SIR, I mentioned it yesterday to your excellency as my opinion, that excluding the people of the colonies from all share in the choice of the grand council would probably give extreme dissatisfaction, as well as the taxing them by act of parliament, where they have no representation. In matters of general concern to the people, and especially where burdens are to be laid upon them; it is of use to consider, as well what they will be apt to think and say, as what they ought to think: I shall therefore, as your excellency requires it of me, briefly mention what of either kind occurs to me on this occasion. tice, that the body of the people in the colonies First, they will say, and perhaps with jusare as loyal, and as firmly attached to the present constitution, and reigning family, as any subjects in the king's dominions. That there is no reason to doubt the readiness and willingness of the representatives they may choose, to grant from time to time such supplies for the defence of the country, as shall be judged necessary, so far as their abilities will allow. That the people in the colonies, who are to feel the immediate mischiefs of invasion and conquest by an enemy, in the loss of their estates, lives, and liberties, are likely to be better judges of the quantity of forces necessary to be raised and maintained, forts to be built and supported, and of their own abilities to bear the expense than the parliament of England, at so great a distance. That governors often come to the colonies merely to make fortunes, with which they intend to return to Britain; are not always men of the best abilities or integrity; have many of them no estates here, nor any natural connexions with us, that should make them expeditions, might be grievous and ruinous heartily concerned for our welfare; and might to the people, and would put them upon a possibly be fond of raising and keeping up footing with the subjects of France in Canada, more forces than necessary, from the profits that now groan under such oppression from accruing to themselves, and to make provision their governor, who for two years past has for their friends and dependents. harassed them with long and destructive marches to Ohio. That the counsellors in most of the colonies, being appointed by the crown, on the recommendation of governors, are often persons of small estates, frequently dependent on the governors for offices, and therefore too much under influence. That there is therefore great reason to be jealous of a power, in such governors and councils, to raise such sums as they shall judge necessary, by drafts on the lords of the treasury, to be afterwards laid on the colonies by act of parliament, and paid by the people here; since they might abuse it, by projecting useless expeditions, harassing the people, and taking them from their labour to execute such projects, merely to create offices and employments, and gratify their dependents, and divide profits. That the parliament of England is at a great distance, subject to be misinformed and misled by such governors and councils, whose united interests might probably secure them against the effect of any complaint from hence. That it is supposed an undoubted right of Englishmen, not to be taxed but by their own consent, given through their representatives. That the colonies have no representatives in par 'ament. Th to propose taxing them by parliament, and refuse them the liberty of choosing a representative council, to meet the colonies, and consider and judge of the necessity of any general tax, and the quantum, shows a suspicion of their loyalty to the crown, or of their regard for their country, or of their common sense and understanding; which they have not deserved. That compelling the colonies to pay money without their consent, would be rather like raising contributions in an enemy's country, than taxing of Englishmen for their own public benefit. That it would be treating them as a conquered people, and not as true British subjects. That a tax laid by the representatives of the colonies might be easily lessened as the occasion should lessen; but being once laid by parliament under the influence of the representations made by governors, would probably be kept up, and continued for the benefit of governors; to the grievous burden and discontentment of the colonies, and prevention of their growth and increase. That if the colonies in a body may be well governed by governors and councils appointed by the crown, without representatives; particular colonies may as well, or better be so governed; a tax may be laid upon them all by act of parliament for support of government; and their assemblies may be dismissed as an useless part of the constitution. That the powers proposed by the Albany plan of union, to be vested in a grand council representative of the people, even with regard to military matters, are not so great, as those which the colonies of Rhode Island and Connecticut are entrusted with by their charters, and have never abused; for by this plan, the president-general is appointed by the crown, and controls all by his negative; but in those governments, the people choose the governor, and yet allow him no negative. That the British colonies bordering on the French are properly frontiers of the British empire; and the frontiers of an empire are properly defended at the joint expense of the body of the people in such empire:-it would now be thought hard by act of parliament to oblige the Cinque Ports or sea coasts of Britain, to maintain the whole navy, because they are more immediately defended by it, not allowing them at the same time a vote in choosing members of the parliament; and, as the frontiers of America bear the expense of their own defence, it seems hard to allow them no share in voting the money, judging of the necessity and sum, or advising the measures. That besides the taxes necessary for the defence of the frontiers, the colonies pay yearly great sums to the mother country unnoticed: for 1. Taxes paid in Britain by the landholder or artificer must enter into and increase the price of the produce of land and manufactures made of it; and great part of this is paid by consumers in the colonies, who thereby pay a considerable part of the British taxes. 2. We are restrained in our trade with foreign nations; and where we could be supplied with any manufacture cheaper from them, but must buy the same dearer from Britain, the difference of price is a clear tax to Britain. 3. We are obliged to carry a great part of our produce directly to Britain; and where the duties laid upon it lessen its price to the planter, or it sells for less than it would in foreign markets, the difference is a tax paid to Britain. That a power in governors, to march the inhabitants from one end of the British and French colonies to the other, being a country of at least one thousand five hundred miles long, without the approbation or the consent 4. Some manufactures we could make, but of their representatives first obtained to such are forbidden, and must take them of British VOL. II....2 A 16* merchants: the whole price is a tax paid to Britain. 5. By our greatly increasing the demand and consumption of British manufactures, their price is considerably raised of late years; the advantage is clear profit to Britain, and enables its people better to pay great taxes; and much of it being paid by us, is clear tax to Britain. 6. In short, as we are not suffered to regulate our trade, and restrain the importation and consumption of British superfluities (as Britain can the consumption of foreign superfluities) our whole wealth centres finally amongst the merchants and inhabitants of Britain; and if we make them richer, and enable them better to pay their taxes, it is nearly the same as being taxed ourselves, and equally beneficial to the crown. These kind of secondary taxes, however, we do not complain of, though we have no share in the laying or disposing of them: but to pay immediate heavy taxes, in the laying, appropriation, and disposition of which, we have no part, and which perhaps we may know to be as unnecessary as grievous, must seem hard measures to Englishmen, who cannot conceive, that by hazarding their lives and fortunes in subduing and settling new countries, extending the dominion, and increasing the commerce of the mother nation, they have forfeited the native rights of Britons; which they think ought rather to be given to them, as due to such merit, if they had been before in a state of slavery lency was pleased to honour me with, on the subject of uniting the colonies more intimately with Great Britain, by allowing them representatives in parliament, I have something further considered that matter, and am of opinion, that such an union would be very acceptable to the colonies, provided they had a reasonable number of representatives allowed them, and that all the old acts of parliament restraining the trade or cramping the manufactures of the colonies be at the same time repealed, and the British subjects on this side the water put, in those respects, on the same footing with those in Great Britain, till the new parliament, representing the whole, shall think it for the interest of the whole to reenact some or all of them: it is not that I imagine so many representatives will be allowed the colonies, as to have any great weight by their numbers; but I think there might be sufficient to occasion those laws to be better and more impartially considered, and perhaps to overcome the interest of a petty corporation, or of any particular set of artificers or traders in England, who heretofore seem, in some instances, to have been more regarded than all the colonies, or than was consistent with the general interest, or best natural good. I think too, that the government of the colonies by a parliament, in which they are fairly represented, would be vastly more agreeable to the people, than the method lately attempted to be introduced by royal instruction; as well as more agreeable to the nature of an English constitution, and to English liberty; and that such laws, as now seem to bear hard on the colonies, would (when judged by such a parliament for the best interest of the whole) be more cheerfully submitted to, and more easily executed. These, and such kinds of things as these, I apprehend, will be thought and said by the people, if the proposed alteration of the Albany plan should take place. Then the administration of the board of governors' and council so appointed, not having the repre- I should hope too, that by such an union, sentative body of the people to approve and the people of Great Britain, and the people of unite in its measures, and conciliate the the colonies would learn to consider themminds of the people to them, will probably be-selves, as not belonging to different commucome suspected and odious; dangerous ani- nities with different interests, but to one commosities and feuds will arise between the go-munity with one interest; which I imagine vernors and governed; and every thing go would contribute to strengthen the whole, into confusion. and greatly lessen the danger of future sepaPerhaps I am too apprehensive in this mat-rations. ter; but having freely given my opinion andIt is, I suppose, agreed to be the general inreasons, your excellency can judge better terest of any state, that its people be numerthan I, whether there be any weight in them, ous and rich; men enow to fight in its deand the shortness of the time allowed me will fence, and enow to pay sufficient taxes to deI hope in some degree excuse the imperfec- fray the charge; for these circumstances tend tions of this scrawl. to the security of the state, and its protection from foreign power. But it seems not of so much importance, whether the fighting be done by John or Thomas, or the tax paid by William or Charles. The iron manufacture Co-employs and enriches British subjects, but is it of any importance to the state, whether the manufacturer lives at Birmingham or Sheffield, or both; since they are still within its SIR,-Since the conversation your excel-bounds, and their wealth and persons still at With the greatest respect and fidelity, have the honour to be B. FRANKLIN. I III. Letter on the subject of uniting the lonies more intimately with Great Britain, by Representatives in Parliament. FTON, Dec. 22, 1754. |