THE LITERARY PANORAMA, AND National Register: For JUNE, 1818. NATIONAL AND PARLIAMENTARY NOTICES, (British and Foreign,) PROSPECTIVE AND RETROSPECTIVE. DEFINITIVE ARRANGEMENT OF THE DEBTS OF FRANCE. DEFINITIVE ARRANGEMENT OF THE Debts of France DUE TO THE of the French nation, than to its integrity, its honour and justice. Where terror and oppression are the prevailing powers, many acts of violence may, and indeed, must, be endured by sufferers, from the necessity SUBJECTS OF THE ALLIED POWERS. of the moment. To complain, is to in-, vite fresh insults; to remonstrate, is to attract resentment, and to provoke barWhen it became our duty to report barity. It must, unhappily, be acknowon that statement of the condition of the ledged, that the operations of armies, Finances of France, which the Minister whether friends or foes, are but too then in office addressed to the Legis- often scenes of unremitted distress to lature of that country, we hinted our con- those who inhabit the seat of war. viction that much had been kept back Even the best conducted troops are not from the public eye, and that the Re- free from this destructive accompaniporter had indulged a solicitude equally ment; and where it is not the result of political and anxious to conceal the worst malevolence, it is but too strongly from his country and from Europe. The chargeable on inattention or ignorance;† Department of the Finances was post--the consequences are the same. poned to the last place in his Report-But the French armies, from the very Many articles connected with it were date of their institution and revolutionary said to be founded on estimate, or ra-fury, accustomed themselves to habits ther on guess; and considerable items of plunder the Generals placed in rewere omitted, with merely a general acquisition property of all kinds; and the knowledgement of their existence. It was evident also, that the Finances were considered rather in reference to the aspect they bore on creditors in France, than to demands which might be outstanding in foreign countries; they appealed rather to the policy and prudence Compare LIT. PAN. O. S. Vol. XV. p. 1183. soldiery made their own, whatever fortune threw in their way, whatever they could seize by force or fraud. There is abundant evidence that the same system was indulged by Buonaparte, though, perhaps, with somewhat of an attention to appearances. His troops wanted + Compare LIT. PAN, O. S. Vol. VII, pp. 228, 229. necessaries; and necessaries they would | This enquiry involved the fact of delihave; no matter at whose expence, or at what cost: but, as cash for payment was not prompt, vouchers and promises were given as security; and the articles were converted and carried off; leaving to the stipulated indemnification the proof of its validity when time and opportunity should serve. very, the equitable terms on which the delivery was completed, with a number of other circumstances, all affecting the validity of the claim. And where money advanced was in question the time when the authorities to whom-the conditions, &c. were all necessary items of examination; for, the fact was clear enough, and too clear, that if France was to compensate one half of the miseries she had brought on Europe and the world, the fee-simple of all her provinces would not meet the mighty mass of charge We must, therefore, dismiss from our minds all reference to the debts due by France to Governments and Sovereigns,* and restrict our attention to those only which had been contracted with indivi It will scarcely be thought that goods furnished under these circumstances were sold on the lowest possible terms: every merchant would, as a matter of course, demand that price which, if ever he got paid, would go as far as possible to indemnify him against loss. He calculated the supposable chances in his favour against those which he knew opposed him he could not retain his property; he considered himself as plun-duals, on the public faith of the French dered, beyond all question; he suffered nation. To leave these unnoticed, and under a forced loan; but, nevertheless, unpaid, in whole, or in part, were to he would obtain such evidence of the leave a stain on France, herself; not transaction as should leave no doubt on merely on the individuals who contracted the facts pleaded, and the hardships re- these debts in the name of their counsulting from those facts, in case an op- try; but on that country in the name of portunity of soliciting relief or redress which they acted, and whose sovereignshould ever be offered. It may remain ty, wheresoever it resided, they repremore than doubtful, whether, if Buona-sented, in the parts and places where parte had continued in power, accounts they were commissioned to exercise such as these would, or could, have been their public functions. presented; or if presented, whether they would have been settled; or if settled, whether the Recettes Extérieures would not have been assigned for the requisite funds; and thus the impositions on the countries pillaged would have furnished the means of paying for the pillage committed. The King of France, unconscious of the extent to which the system had been carried, bound himself by an article of the peace concluded with the Allies, to cause these demands to be enquired into, and to be duly paid. It was, then, not the political debts of Government to Government, nor the incumbrances arising from the difficult duty of endeavouring to make compensation for damages and devastations, that were now to be discharged; it was to ascertain and liquidate demands for value really delivered by individuals, that became the embarassing task of those public officers who might be supposed most conversant with such affairs. The reasons why the amount of these incumbrances could not be anticipated, are stated by the Minister with suffcient clearness. Their whole extent could not be known, till it was brought into one mass. The time allotted for this was one year; and it was not till that year had elapsed that the materials for a complete summation were in hand. As the limited period approached, the accumulation became gradually more and more alarming; and at length the total displayed itself in the most terrific form. It was no less, says the Minister, than 1,600,000,000 of francs. A most enormous amount!—and yet, something not absolutely unlike what it has proved to be, might have been expected; for, it was notorious that the expences of the latter years of the Emperor and King had increased in a most rapid for instance, Britain gave up a balance of se * These had been mostly relinqnished; as, veral millions sterling, due for the mainte nance of French Prisoners of war, &c. &c. ratio. His budgets declared that they | vernment. Let the party who was bewere at first, not less than In 1803 In 1804 341 millions of francs. 444 500 600 in peace nehtted by these contracts fulfil them; -but, the King of France was not benefitted by these contracts. Did not those who trusted Buonaparte with their property, connect with their confidence all the hazards and chances attached to his authority? Surely they did: and, surely, they knew that they did so. These two considerations-the enormous charges made (with, no doubt, additions of interest, and other expenses) In 1811 which was afterwards acknowledged to be 1,300 millions; but was understood to equal at least 2,000 millions. And it is shrewdly suspected, that even this estimate did not include the supplies and the disposition with which the forced from the reluctant owners, extra his own territories. transactions to be remunerated were conducted, may naturally enough be supIt may be useful to cast a slight glance posed to have had no small effect in at the different characters to which the contributing to a jealous reduction of body of these debts was owing;- that mass of figures, which formed a and with this might also be connected spectacle so astonishing, at the foot of the different periods in the prolonged the account. It may also be supposed, war now closed, at which they were without any great violation of charity, contracted; not omitting the purposes that many claims would be urged, in to which they were subservient, and the hope of participation, now something duty of every man to his country in like a prospect of repayment was opentimes of difficulty, distress and oppres-ing, although the nature of these sion, occasioned by the presence of a tyrannic, vindictive, and most ferocious enemy. It was the policy of the French revolutionists to prepare the way for their armies, by means of troops of spies, agents, and "friends of liberty," sent en avance to propagate with contagious zeal their pernicious principles. Of course, they met with some success; they made some partizans, by fraud and deceit the armies followed, and finished the work by force. Undoubtedly these partizans, when they saw their party triumph, furnished willingly what was necessary to support their cause; especially, as at the same time they obtained various personal and commercial advantages, exemptions, and profitable favors. But, it becomes a question, not less on principles of equity than policy, how far those who contributed to the subjugation of their own country, have now a right to solicit the interference of that country on their behalf. How far those who supported the interest of a tyranical foreign power, can justly claim, through the medium of their legitimate government, the fulfilment of those contracts which enabled that foreign power to distress and to expel, that very go claims, and of the services on which they were founded, were very dubious and equivocal. It is not possible to say from how far back some might think proper to adduce their claims. As Germany had been more than once over-run by the French, those who had suffered in the earlier inroads might hope to obtain, from compassion, what they could not fairly expect from justice. It is not possible to say how far French agents might have pledged themselves in promises, without adequate authority from their principals: neither is it possible to say, to what extent knavery might have taken advantage of circumstances, to enable it to plunder simplicity; which deceptions must rather be placed to the account of private swindling, than of public supplies. To these considerations must be added some attention to the ability of France to meet these demands. Truth is gradually becoming explicit; and the event has justified what we have long insisted on, that, in spite of the boasts of the Emperor and King, that numéraire was abundant throughout his dominions, they were, in fact, very ill furnished with "the needfull." To hear him talk, gold glittered every where; and so it did, on | considerable portion of the debts which his liveries; but the country at large encumbered his Royal Master :-he reknew little of superfluous gold. Paris jected from one branch of these enquiundoubtedly, could shew Napoleons ries, only, no less a sum than 80,000,000 without difficulty: but, was this true liv.-he directed his cross-examinations of the provincial towns and cities? to the financiers, who had derived great Far from it. Our pages bear witness to profit from the wants of the King; but, the very great struggles necessary to they bought him off, by a gift of most of them in effecting payments, 1,200,000 under the name of a loan. especially in the south. No nation ever He suppressed-but his suppressions became permanently enriched by war; were not equal to those of Colbert, who, and where commerce was cut up by the at a considerable distance of time, sucroots, as it was in France, real wealth ceeded into his office. Colbert instituted could not possibly be accumulated. The what he called "a Chamber of Justice," substance was wanting, notwithstanding which suppressed ALL the rentes (anappearances; and we are persuaded, nuities,) created after a given time that more real and permanent pro- (1656)-This chamber extended its perty has been acquired during the last operations still further, and either anyear alone, than in all the years that nulled the rentes created since 1630, were taken as occasions of such mighty or forced those who held them to pay flourishings under the administration of an addition to the price at which they the "invincible" Napoleon. had bought them. What was the consequence of these suppressions? On the very next occasion when the King wanted money or credit, nobody would advance either, but on terms so extravagant as warranted a remunerating profit, before the principle of suppression could be brought into exercise, and directed against the terms of his contract. France is a country of production. We learn, and we learn it with pleasure, that the first quarter's customs of the present year have risen above the corresponding quarter of the last year, no less than four millions and a half of francs. This is as it should be: had double the sum been obtained by conquest, it would not have effectuated equal wealth; it would not have enriched We are far from saying that suppresthe country half so much as the sums sions will be again the order of the day brought in by the commerce, represent-in France, and especially under the ed by this amount of duties. This invigorates industry; that would have promoted idleness. This will be again directed to re-production; that would have occasioned further expenses, without producing any thing. This will go into ten times, or a hundred times, the number of hands more than the other would or could have reached. In short, this is a remedy against pauperism, the other makes beggars ex professo. France, we say, is a country of production: not able to pay down a prodigious sum in one vast heap; but able by degrees to meet and to liquidate much more than it is the policy of her ministers at this time to acknowledge. From the days of Henri IV. and the administration of Sully, the system of postponement and procrastination has prevailed in France. That laborious financier examined and annulled no in government of Louis XVIII. but, there is no impossibility included in the supposition that some unprincipled minister in future days, should think it wise, under the pressure of present difficulties, to prefer the interests of the state to those of private annuitants, and should enlarge on the injustice of continuing to pay incumbrances which were, forcibly, exacted from France, at a moment when she was in distress, and unable to resist such manifest imposition; but, which now no good Frenchman, no man jealous of French honour, can think of enduring." It is, however, gratifying to see the sum of rentes, whether larger or smaller, and whatever proportion it may bear to the total which it ought to represent, inscribed on the Great Book of France, on the general credit of the nation, publickly, and in the open face of day, by au thority of the legislative body, and of the | done that could be done-all is obtained King, acting in their national capaci- that can be obtained; and the exhortaties, respectively. This has much the tion to acquiescence will end with the advantage of Royal Edicts, issued by observation-why, you know Sir, that the minister, varied, perhaps cancelled if Napoleon had triumphed, as might by his successor. It is not to be sup- possibly have been the case, we should posed that any prevarication is at hand; not have had the pleasure of paying you or that this generation will have occa- one single farthing! sion to add any breach of faith in this instance, to those which have heretofore stained the financial annals of France with indelible disgrace. We make no allusion to those dreadful documents Assignats, Mandats, Hypotheques, &c. the knaveries and cheats of a virtuous! Revolution: but, we think it extremely probable that in a reasonable time no great proportion of these new securities will remain in the hands of foreigners. They will sell those allotted them, at the best price they can obtain: nor will they know, till they have received that price, what proportion of their debts they have recovered. It is clear, that when the French five per cent. funds were at 56, the value of an annuity was very different from what it is now they are at 66: and should they rise to 76, the value will be much increased from what it is at this time. Nay farther, should peace continue, confidence be augmented, commerce increase, and good faith prevail, (which is the best policy of states,) who can foresee any impossibility in that honourable word par, being marked against the column of French funds, in our Literary Journal? That time, perhaps, is distant; but less likely things have happened. It is scarcely possible to close this slight Introduction without casting a glance at the ci-devant hero to whose unbridled and unprincipled ambition. this embaras, this brouillerie, this abyss of perplexities is greatly owing. If a moment's reflection ever invades his breast, the distresses he has produced may possibly excite a sigh; but, to say truth, we much more greatly fear that his sighs are rather likely to be excited by the prospect of any arrangement made, of any termination, and on whatever conditions, to those calamities which time has proved to have been the inevitable consequences of his misconduct. Perhaps, too, he may sigh on reflecting to whose hand the arrangement of these intricacies has been committed. The hero of Waterloo has not only proved himself his superior in the field, but, by the unanimous voice of Europe has been selected to fill the most important (but unenviable) office of arbitrator on this momentous occasion. The qualifications for a warrior, all know, who have watched the progress of his Grace; but what might be equal to the consolidation of a peace acquired by valour, none can tell. Undoubtedly, his Grace must have met with many mortifications and much unreasonable obstinacy, in the course of this business; every individual would urge his own claim with inflexible perseverance; wondering all the while that the arbitrator cannot see his just title to entire indemnity. France does not take on herself to pay each individual creditor which has made application, and has proved the justice of his demand; but, very wisely confides to each government a certain quantity of rentes, and leaves that go- These, and a thousand other obstavernment to settle the account finally cles overcome, entitle his Grace to the with its own subjects. This relieves thanks of the civilized world; they place France from a great part of the impu-him where never before a mortal man tation of dishonesty, which not a few of the sufferers will attach to what they will consider as incomplete payment. Their murmurs will be divided between home and abroad; and being divided will be little felt by either. But this the claimants will be assured that all has been was placed; and they enable him to say, that whereas with his sword he formerly defeated the power of France, he has now with his pen subdued those still more obstinately resisting powers, the opinions, the prejudices, and the self-interests of allied Europe. |