THE LITERARY PANORAMA, AND National Register : For JANUARY, 1819. NATIONAL AND PARLIAMENTARY NOTICES, (British and Foreign,) PROSPECTIVE AND RETROSPECTIVE. CONCLUDING ACTS OF CONGRESS. OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS, BEING THE CONCLUDING ACTS OF THE CONGRESS AT AIX-LA-CHAPELLE. 1. Note addressed to the Duke of Richelieu by the Plenipotentiaries of the Courts of Austria, Great Britain, Prussia, and Russia, November 4, 1818. 2. Copy of the Note of M. the Duke of Richelieu in answer to that of the Plenipotentiaries of the Allied Courts. 3. Protocol signed at Aix-la-Chapelle, November 15, 1818, by the Plenipotentiaries of the Allied Courts. (willing to be persuaded) that Now was the moment to bumiliate Britain to the very dust but France kept her eyes closed against the probable cost of the enterprize. Spain was in her turn persuaded to assist in the honourable! attempt of ruining the " poor petty island" by depriving her of her colonies: Spain was warned of the consequences; some of them she actually suffers, but the whole of the penalty, as yet, exceeds her arithmetic. Sorry we are to say, that these documents present no conclusion to her miseries. They still continue to afflict humanity. So far, then, as we may, we rejoice in seeing one branch of this painful history terminate; as to what concerns another branch, we must await 5. Extract from the Protocol of No- ulterior events; and watch them, as they vember 29, on the subject of the Fi- rise above our horizon in obedience nancial operations, as stated by the Go-to the all-explaining revolutions of time. vernment of France, and the SecurityBankers. 4. Declaration of the Plenipotentiaries, announcing the termination of the Congress. We contemplate with pleasure the papers now presented to the reader; they are the last acts, we trust, in reference to that long series of calamities to which this part of the globe has been recently subjected.-Or, if that be expressing too much, they are the termination of that part of the American war which concerns the North of Europe.There still remains Spain in distress and affliction: and, when her agony will end, God only knows. Such is the retribution of political depravity! America had the address to persuade France, VOL. VIII. No. 52. N. S. Lit. Pan. Jan. 1. The Sovereigns, parties to these documents, tell us, that "they regard this solemn act as the completement of the general peace." And whoever takes a view of the circumstances under which they have been ratified, may warrantably indulge a hope that this peace will be lasting. We should express ourselves still more strongly-we should commit ourselves without reserve-did we not recollect the famous misapprehension of Mr. Pitt, who flattered himself, and was not reluctant to announce it to the nation, with a peace of fifteen years' duration, when fifteen months were more than sufficient to plunge the whole world into anarchy and war. 3 K Yet we indulge our hopes :-experience has taught invaluable lessons to all ranks; to Sovereigns, who have now headed their armies, and have seen their best friends perish by their sides;-to their princes and counsellors, who have witnessed the cost of human life, and of personal property, and of domestic comfort, which inevitably attends inordinate ambition;—to the people at large, who may now see the difference between the commencement of indulgence to the angry passions, and the close of what may follow at the heels of that indulgence; whether it assume the form of hostility to a foreign and rival nation, or of inconsiderate party feeling, rising à la hauteur de la Révolution. If we look back to the past, we might ask, who foresaw five, or six, or seven years ago, the present termination ? or a termination of the like nature? Every soul, except a few on whom censure fell with unrestrained severity, expected that the Dictator, the Despot of Europe, would be the man to (what he called) give peace to Europe, having first made Europe a desert. Having subjugated the west, he meditated also the subjugation of the East: our pages contain ample evidence of his intentions; that they were not executed was not owing to want of will, but of power; not to the absence of malignant projects, but to the deficiency of opportunity to realize them. Where is the country that has not suffered by the machinations of that insatiate spirit? And what kind of parification can imagination suppose that could have been, which, by possibility, it might now be our duty to record ?Would it have been a peace? No What he formerly called a Peace, we know. But, the very cause that, as we hope, consolidates the present Peace, is the very cause that would have putrefied the core of a peace contracted with him-his all-powerful army would have interfered; for peace would have been equally contrary to its habits and its expectatious: whether confirmed by the Bourbons, or by Buonaparte. That army is now silent, and the character of the Bourbons is not that of military adventurers. The army not now calls itself the people, nor substitutes its wishes for the wishes of the people; nor assumes to place and dis- Neither do we see any immediate prospect of a successor to the crown of France, or of any near relation to that succession, arising with ambitious propensities. That France should organize her military, and so model her army as to answer all useful and honourable purposes, is nothing more than just and fair: it places in the Sovereign's hands a preponderance in this department of the State, analogous to his right in all other departments; hence it contributes to his security, and to our confidence. Whether these were part of the reasons which influenced the unanimous decision of the Cabinets of Europe, we presume not to affirm; but, we have some cause for thinking that their reasons were not dissimilar, perhaps not distant, from the basis of these observations; which are equally the result of obvious policy, and of dearly bought experience. The Sovereigns were allied to obtain peace, because Peace was absolutely necessary: it was not a trivial cause that brought them together, and occasioned their association; it was a strong conviction that uo other remedy remained for the raging and intolerable evils around them, than that which duty, equally with prudence and policy, led Nor did they trust to them to adopt. report; they witnessed events in person: nor did they refuse to meet danger or difficulty in all its variety of forms : nor did they suffer lesser interests, or petty jealousies, or unimportant animosities to mislead them away from their main object. That object was Peace; and Peace they resolved to achieve, as the Supreme purpose of their =exertions their uncommon exertions, their hopes and their wishes. + Having obtained and established Peace, will they now suffer it rashly to be interrupted? We trust they will not. So mutable are mundane interests, that honest and judicious caution strongly protests against presumption. Circumstances may arise to disappoint the most rational expectations; yet, we depend on this fact, that no evasive intention, or mental reservation, making peace with design to render it the occasion of war, has vitiated the present transaction. Much as we execrate the craft of the late despot, towhom the infernal policy of smiling before he stabbed was familiar, we should still more vehemently condemn that malignant double-dealing which could so much as excite in any mind concerned, the thought the idea of war on some future occasion, or could tolerate the mere imagination of reducing that, thought that idea, to practice. The Sovereigns have invited the King of France to add his sanction and support to the principles of their alliance: -would they have equally invited Napoleon? We answer, No! They have hinted, also, at their further agreement, in what is usually called the Christian Treaty: would they have ventured at such an allusion, had they had to deal with their quondam oppressor? Most assuredly they would not. We rejoice, therefore, that these Acts of Peace have been ratified in the spirit of peace; and that the Sovereigns have not forgot their obligations as disciples of the Supreme protector of Peace. no small reason, in confirmation of our hopes for lasting tranquillity. Whoever has perused Sully's Memoirs, knows, that it was in the contemplation of Henry IV. of France, and of Queen Elizabeth of England, to form a Union of the principal Powers of Europe, into a confederation, somewhat like the Amphyctionic Council of Greece, which assembled at stated times; and after investigating affairs generally, and taking mutual advice on what was brought before it, gave an opinion, and announced decisions, with which it behoved all to comply. That idea was entertained by both the Sovereigns we have mentioned, unknown to each other and each wished to explain to the other: to prepare for this, Sully was sent over to England, on other pretences; and the Queen did him the honour to cause him to be arrested by her special officer and command. That the imprisonment of the confidential friend and Minister of the king of France, by the Queen of England, was sufficiently gentle, will readily be believed; and on being brought into her Majesty's presence, she entrusted him with the reasons at large, which led her to suggest the scheme. The Minister knew that the same sentiments, founded, perhaps, on the same arguments, were indulged by his master, and after expressing his astonishment at the similarity of the conceptions of the two Sovereigns, he pledged France to the utmost exertions in rendering them effectual. It is probable, the affair might have been matured; but King Henry was unhappily murdered at Paris:-a loss to France and to Europe, never disThe reader will observe the declared tinctly known, because the plan was intention of these Potentates to appoint only in embrio. The reader will judge, such meetings on future occasions, as whether there is not a great resemblance circumstances may require. We are too between that plan and the present; and well acquainted with the logic and lan- according to the respect he entertains guage of statemen to take all for gospel for the memory of Queen Elizabeth, which they think proper to announce to who certainly was no feeble politicianthe public; and a declaration of inten- he will direct his opinion on what is now tion is liable to many accidents and inci- acknowledged by the Sovereigns. We dents behind which a dextrous politician confess for ourselves, that this recognized may intrench his non-compliance.-principle in a public document, does Could we rely on the exertions necessary by no means diminish our hopes that to substantiate this project, we should occasions of offence will be avoided; or certainly adduce it as one reason, and if they should arise, will be met with |