who attentively behold the Circumgyration of a Wheel or fome other Body. So the Air at Sea being much agitated, puts in Motion the Spirits which are of the fame Nature; and thefe being ftirr'd, fet the Humours on Work, which incommoding the Parts, are by them driven out by Vomits and other Ejections, according to the Temper and Propenfity of each part. For cholerick and broad-breafted, vomit more eafily and fuccefsfully than the phlegmatick and narrowbreafted, whofe Organs of Refpiration are not fufficiently tree: To which alfo the Seafon of the year contributes; for Summer provokes Vomit more than Winter, when the Humours being more heavy, rather tend downwards. But efpecially Cuftom is confiderable herein, which renders those who go frequently to Sea not obnoxious to its Inconveniencies. Some have held, That the Earth confifts of three fubftances; one Unctuous, which is the inflammable Moisture, call'd by the Chymifts Sulphur ; another Cinereous, which they call the Facas or Caput mortuum; the third humid and incombuftible, which they divide into Mercury and Salt; this latter again into Salt-nitre and Vitriol, of which the Sea being full, the fame is communicated to the first Region of the Air contiguous to the Waters; and, infinuating it felf into our Bodies by Inspiration, produces the fame Effects therein, which it doth taken in Subftance; four Grains of which is a fufficient Vomit. Whereto alfo helps the gentle Agitation of the Waves, which makes it penetrate; the Examples of o thers Vomiting, and especially the fear commonly incident to fuch as were never upon the Sea before, who are inoft obnoxious to this Trouble. For that Paffion fo conftringes the whole Body, efpecially the inward Parts, that it weakens and relaxes the Nerves, efpecially the Fibres which keep the Parts in a juft Tenor? and fo the oblique Fibres and orbicular Mufcles (which ferve to retain them) being languid, fuffer the Juices and Humours to pass out. Queft. Whether there can be Love where there is no Knowledge? Anfw. They who talk of certain Spirits iffuing out of the lov'd Perfon's Body into the Eyes of the Lover, and feizing upon the Heart, without falling under Knowledge, feem ignorant of the Nature of Love. For fhou'd fuch Spirits arrive at the Heart without being ob. ferv'd; yet they must come out thence again to be known, before they can caufe Love: As we cannot know any thing that is in the Soul, unless it come first out thence, and become fenfible; fince nothing is in the Understanding but what pafs'd through the Sense. So a Man cannot know his own Face, but by Reflection from a Looking-glafs without him. For the Soul at our Nativity is like a fmooth Table, or white Sheet of Paper; and thence its primitive Notions during this prefent State are by Phantafms fupplied to us by our Senfes. Now the effential Reason of this dependance which keeps Love fubject to Knowledge, is, that the Appetite, which is the Principle of Love, is only a Paffion or Propriety of the thing wherein it is; but the Principle of Knowledge is an effential Degree of Nature. Hence, Souls are diftinguifh'd by Cognition, not by Appetite: We call the Senfitive Soul fo, from the knowledge of Senfe, which conftitutes its effential Difference; and the Rational Soul fo, because Reason, the Principle of Knowledge, is a Degree of Nature: But Appetite is a Propriety which follows it. And there being the fame Reafon of Actions and their Principles (as the Appetite fuppofes a Principle of Knowledge, fo Love, which is the Action of the Appetite, fuppofes actual and clear Knowledge) hence there is no Love without Knowledge. For that we have more Fancy to the one of two Perfons playing than to the other, 'tis because we difcern fomething in his Face, Geftures, or Motion, that pleafes us better. Sympathy (the pretended caufe of this Love) may indeed be the Foundation of it, inafmuch as we naturally love thofe like our felves; but it can never make us love till we have found in the thing fome Je-nefeay-quoy of lovely. It cannot be the fole Cause of our Love, fince 'tis of it felt impercepti ble to our Knowledge, and confequently cannot produce Love till the Effects of fuch Sympathy, to wit, fuch an Aire, fuch a Motion, and fuch a Deportment, have pleas'd us. And whereas 'tis faid that from Eyes which behold us attentively we perceive fomething come forth that animates us? I anfwer, that oftentimes quick, fix'd and fweet Intuitions are Tokens of Love, from which 'tis no Wonder if ours take Rife and Growth, as from its proper caufe; fince Love begets Love. Queft. How does the Under standing move the Will. Anfw. There has been a Variety of Opinions on this Subject: as 1. 'Tis proper to the Understanding, not only to conjoyn things wholly different, but oftentimes to abftract and feparate fuch as are perfectly united in one and the fame Subftance, and differ only in Accidents, which it fevers from their Subjects. Hence reflecting upon it felf, it diftinguishes in its Operation two Faculties, to wit, its Cognition, and the reasonable Appetite or Will, altho' they are one and the fame Thing, not only in the Soul, whofe Effence is fimple, but also in the Intellect : Nor are their Objects different; Truth, the Object of the Underftanding, being convertible and all one with Good, the Object of the Will. Hence Civilians acknowledge no Will in thofe that want Understanding, as Ideots and Children. And as the fame Sunbeam that produces Light, caufes Heat too by the Continuation of its Action, or by its Re-union in a Burningglafs: So an Object long conider'd, or ftrongly apprehended by the Underftanding as good, immediately incites and inflames the fame to feek and defire it. So that the Cognition of a thing in the Underftanding is only Theory, which the Will, applying it felf there to by Defire, reduces into Practice. As the theorical Habit of an Art differs not from the Practical, and the Conclufion of a Syllogifm is only a Dependance upon its two Premifes. Wherefore the Will, which is the Practice of the Understanding's Speculation, and a Refult of its Ratiocination, is not diftinguifh'd from the Underftanding; and to know Good, to defire and feek Means to poffefs it, are Operations continu'd by one fole Motion. Befides, to feparate the Actions of the Soul's Faculties, and make them independent one of another, would infer a kind of Divifibility in the Soul: But the Will being only a Defire, every Defire a Species of Motion, and Motion an Accident; it is feparable from its Subject, the Understanding, whereof 'tis only an Affection and Propriety. So that the Intellect and the Will being the fame thing, when the former is carried to wards an apprehended Good, we fay it moves the Will, as it doth the other Powers which it employs in Queft of that Good, when the fame is external, and it cannot attain to it by it felf. 2. Some have argu'd, That to Know, to Will, and to be Able, tho' of the fame Extent in things purely Natural (as in æ Stone, whofe Knowledge, Defire, and Power to tend to its Centre, are the fame thing) yet are different Actions in rational Agents. For we often know without willing, and will what we cannot do; and fometimes we know not that which we would: Oftentimes we will things not only without, but even againft Reafon; witness the irregular Appetite of breeding Women and Greenfickness Maids. Whereføre thefe Actions being different, the Faculties from which they proceed, the Intellect, Will and Motive Faculty, muft be wholly diftinct; feeing their two adequate Objects, which specifie Faculties, are confider'd under divers formal Reafons, which are the fole Caufes of the Diftinction of Faculties. For Entity immaterial and fpiritual, is, as true and intelligible, the Object of the Understanding; but, as good and defirable, 'tis the Object of the Will: which are two wholly different formal Reasons. Now tho' the Intellect and the Will are two different Faculties, yet there is fuch a Dependance between them, that the one can do nothing without the other, and they communicate mutual Affiftance: The Understanding fupplies Reasons and Counfels, which the Will caules the Powers under its Dominion to execute: for 'tis a blind Queen, having no Knowledge of Her own, but only what Light She receives from from the Intellect. But how can it fee the fame, if blind, as 'tis fancied? We anfwer, that as all Things have a Bent and natural Inclination to their proper Good, tho' they know it not, as even the Intellect affents to a Truth known by Ratiocination, but knows not why it affents to a first Principle, as, that the Whole is greater than its Part, and that 2 and I make 3; these being connate Notions, fo the Will is carried to the Good propos'd to it by the Understanding, because the Goodness and Suitableness thereof engage it to Endeavours of enjoying it, wherein its fupreme Felicity lies. 3. Others fay, That fince the Will is a Defire, every Defire a Motion, and every Motion from fome other (nothing moving it felf) the Will cannot defire, unless mov'd by fome fuperior Power and Knowledge: For as there is no Defire without Knowledge, fo, that this may not be idle and unprofitable, Nature has joyn'd an Appetite to it (to wit, a fenfitive Appetite) to the Knowledge of a fenfible Good, apprehended fuch by the Imagination, which is common to Men and Brutes; and a rational Appetite (the Will) to the Knowledge of an honeft Good, apprehended fuch by the Understanding. And whereas immaterial Things cannot be known by themfelves, but by fuch as are fenfible and corporeal; we cannot better judge of the Manner whereby the Intellect moves the Will, than by that whereby the Imagina tion moves the fenfitive Appetite; which is the Sweetness of the Object, whofe Species being receiv'd by fome one of the outward Senses, and carried from the common Senfe to the Fancy, which relishes the fame to the full, is then propos'd to the fenfitive Appetite, which prefently flies to it, oftentimes fo impetuoufly, as that it hurries the Reason and the Will along with it self, and conftrains them to yield to the Violence of thofe Paffions which it excites to join with it in Pursuit of that Good, and which it redoubles on the Occurrence of any Obftacle to its Designs. In like fort the Will is carried of it felf to a vertuous Action, when the Underftanding represents the Honetty of the fame to it; provided it be not otherwife prepoffefs'd, and the faid Action be not accompanied with Difficulties and Thorns, as commonly happens: for then that fenfitive Appetite oftentimes gets the better of Reafon; the Flesh, of the Spirit. There is this Difference between the Motions of the Will and the Appetite; that the latter neceffarily follows the Duct of the Imagination, by which 'tis inclin'd, in Spight of it felf, towards a delectable Good; but the Will (common to us with Angels) is fo mov'd by the Intellect, that neverthelefs it always remains Mistress of its own Actions, and can do either Good or Evil by Virtue of its Liberty, which alone difcriminates Man from Beat, and gives him a Right of Empire and Command, (which the Ci vilians define, a Power of making use of any Thing at ones Pleasure ;) and without which not only Judgments, Virtues, Vices, Rewards and Punishments, Praises and Difpraifes, Confultations and Deliberations would be useless; but also all Laws would be to no Purpose, Man would be in worse Condition than Brutes, over whom he hath no other Advantage but that of Reafon; which would ferve for nothing if he acted Things neceffary, as other Agents do, and not freely and voluntarily. 4. But fome think it has always been accounted a vain Enquiry, how the Understanding moves the Will; and the Senfes, the fenfitive Appetite towards their Objects; because the cognofcitive Faculty, and thefe Appetites being really diftinct, and having nothing common, they cannot intervene any Commerce between them. "They are Officers that have feparate Charges, without having any Thing to fhare or difpatch together. Nevertheless it being true that we love nothing but what is first apprehended and judg'd amiable, we muft feek this Dependance fomewhat higher. Now all Actions are of the whole Compofitum ; and confequently Man, who is the whole, is he who by his Knowledge either of Senfe or of the Intellect, judges what both the one and the other Appetite ought to embrace or reject. Then after he has pafs'd his Judgment by his cognofcitive Faculty, he determines himself to follow by his Appetite what he has judg'd fit to be done; in Confequence whereof he applies his motive Faculty to the Execution of his Refolution. So that 'tis Man that moves himfelf by his Will towards Good or Evil, to pursue or avoid, after he has confider'd what he ought to will, how, and in what Sort to comport himself. By this Means we obviate a World of Difficulties arifing from this Queftion, and refolve many; as, amongst others, how the Understanding comes to illuminate corporeal Phantafms, without establishing an Intellectus Agens for that Purpofe, whofe Office is pretended to fublime thofe Phantasms by ftripping them of their Singularity and Materiality, that fo they may become actually intelligible and proportionate to the Intellect. For, befides that 'tis impoffible to conceive how any fpiritual Light can fall from the Intellect upon a corporeal Phantafm; (that which is corporeal being incapable of receiving any thing spiritual, and the Intellect of producing any thing out of it felf, fince all its Actions are immanent) we are deliver'd from all this Trouble by faying, that in the State of this prefent Life, Man by his outward and inward Senfes takes in as much Knowledge of Things as they can give him, and afterwards by his Underftanding deduceth and infers Things which the Phantafms alone could not acquaint him with. Thus when a Phantafm reprefents to him a Thing, which his Eye beholds a far off; he by his Understand ing |